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ABSTRACT 
 
My project aims to sketch out a theoretical framework to think about documentary 
films about migration and border-crossings in terms of their political potential. Thus, 
this work seeks to address the question of whether and how it is possible for these 
documentaries to give rise to political and ethical relationships that are not directly 
sanctioned by the nation-state and its sovereign power. In order to do this, I first draw 
on Jacques Derrida’s proposal of an ethics and politics of hospitality as an alternative 
conceptualization of political relations that, instead of being determined by 
membership to a nation-state and geo-political borders, are based on relations of 
responsibility and solidarity amongst individuals regardless of their citizenship status. 
Secondly, I argue that Ariella Azoulay’s triadic model of photography exemplifies 
Derrida’s notion of the ethics and politics of hospitality. For Azoulay, photography 
can give rise to political relations between the photographed, the photographer and the 
spectators. Since these relationships are not mediated by the nation-state and are 
based on partnership, solidarity and equality, I claim that they are relationships of 
hospitality that are able to disrupt the hierarchies of the social order. Thirdly, I argue 
that Azoulay’s triadic model can be transposed to the form of documentary, but that 
this transposition needs to acknowledge the fact that photography and documentary 
are two different visual media. Finally, I expand my analysis of this transposition by 
examining three contemporary documentaries about migration and drawing on the 
work of Jacques Rancière, Hito Steyerl and Trinh T. Minh-Ha. I discuss how the 
political and ethical bonds between filmmaker, filmed subject and spectators are 
shaped by the form and stylistic features of each of these documentaries. I conclude 
that documentaries are like borders, interstitial spaces, where the question of politics 
converges with questions of ethics and aesthetics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
I. The Cut and the Border 
In the cinematic lexicon a cut is that which both separates and joins two shots or 
frames. The cut is a technique by means of which the cinematic time and space is 
constituted, and hence it is what makes the film what it is both stylistically and 
narratively. In this sense, the cut determines what is seen from what is not seen on 
screen. The cut operates thus as a threshold and a boundary of sorts for it demarcates 
an inside and an outside, what is on screen and what is off screen.  
A geo-political border is, to some extent, like the cinematic cut. Borders mark 
the limits of the territory of a nation-state. Borders determine the interior and exterior 
of a nation-state; they determine the territorial extension of a state as well the space 
where the national sovereign is supposed to rule absolutely. Geo-political borders also 
define the location within which an individual who is member of a nation-state is to 
be protected by the law and entitled to certain rights and duties. Borders thus function 
as cuts or interstitial places that both separate and connect different nation-states and 
also different people by deeming them as the citizens or non-citizens of these states. 
The boundaries established by nation-states not only bind individuals within these 
geographical limits to certain obligations and entitlements, but they also govern the 
social bonds that emerge amongst these persons as well as those between the latter 
and the sovereign. In setting limits, national borders exclude that which does not 
belong within them but they also tend to invite the question of what lies beyond the 
demarcated line. One of the issues that arises in this context is what type of 
relationships can and might be formed outside of the nation-state regulation and 
mediation; what kind of bonds can individuals get involved in without the direct 
sanction of the sovereign power. In other words, is it possible to make sense of 
political relationships that fall outside the framework of the nation-state and that 
hence are not restricted by the territorial demarcation of geo-political borders? Can 
we find alternative spaces where people can bond with one another in ways that not 
only are not determined by the roles, functions and statuses of the hierarchical order 
of the nation-state, but also in ways that disrupt these very roles and functions? And 
more specifically, is it possible to think of documentary films as having the potential 
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to open up spaces for the formation of political (and ethical) relationships that are not 
directly governed by the national sovereign power?   
These are the key questions that guide this thesis. My main objective is to 
argue that there are other ways of understanding and practicing politics that do not 
need to be ultimately restricted to the manner in which we relate to and are regulated 
by the nation-state power. More particularly, my argument is that there are alternative 
forms of political relationships that can emerge through documentary films. Here I do 
not wish to deny or overlook the fact that in today’s context of a globalised market 
economy where goods, information and people move across borders with seemingly 
little restriction, political relations are increasingly determined by transnational 
companies or institutions rather than by nation-states. Indeed, global markets have 
created a transnational form of governance, which is characterised by its attempt to 
constitute a globally unified geo-political space where nation-states and their borders 
have a very restricted participation.  Nonetheless, geo-political borders still largely 
operate as institutions of control and international class differentiation that determine 
who can pass with ease and who cannot. Hence in our transnational world borders 
have a real and very concrete impact especially on the lives of those who cross them 
or attempt to cross them as undocumented migrants.  
It is in view of this context that my purpose in this work is to suggest a way to 
understand documentary films about migration and border-crossings as sites that can 
give rise to political and ethical relationships that escape the direct mediation of the 
nation-state. Documentaries -- I will argue following documentary theorists such as 
Michael Renov, Bill Nichols and Trinh T. Minh-Ha,1 are essentially an in-between 
form, between artifice and reality, partly constructed and partly factual. This 
interstitial quality of the documentary form makes it similar to the border in that it 
divides and excludes but also unites and serves as threshold. It is precisely this feature 
that gives documentaries the potentiality to serve as spaces for alternative political 
and ethical bonds beyond the framework of national borders.  
                                                
1 See Renov, ‘Toward a Poetics of Documentary,’ in Renov (ed), Theorizing Documentary (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1993), pp.12-36; Nichols, Introduction to Documentary (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2001); and Trinh, ‘The Totalizing Quest of Meaning,’ in Renov (ed), 
Theorizing Documentary, pp.90-107.  
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More particularly, I examine Jacques Derrida's2 ideas about the contradictory 
and yet inextricable relation between politics and ethics, as well as his notion of 
hospitality. Politics, for him, is the domain concerned with making decisions, 
legislating laws, which are never grounded and hence imply always a risk or a bet that 
inevitably commits violence against the other (alterity). Whereas ethics is the domain 
of the unconditional concerned with the responsibility towards the others who have 
endured the violence of politics. The notion of hospitality is one of many concepts 
that reflects the constant negotiation between ethics and politics, unconditional and 
conditional. It is through this negotiation that we can think of an alternative politics 
that is not structured around concepts like the nation-state and national borders.  I then 
link these ideas of Derrida with Ariella Azoulay's3 thesis of the political potential of 
photography in order to argue that documentaries portraying migration and border-
crossings have the potential to form political relationships that are deterritorialised for 
they do not fall under the regulation of nation-states and geo-political borders. 
Consequently, my claim is that documentaries about border-crossings can constitute 
'hospitable' practices insofar as they can actualize the politics of hospitality.  
I also argue for a connection between Derrida’s conceptualisation of politics, 
Azoulay’s conceptualisation of the political relations of photography and Jacques 
Rancière’s thesis that politics is a collective activity, ‘which turns on equality as its 
principle’4 and disrupts the existing social order, and thus leads to a re-distribution of 
the social places and functions imposed by such social order. I make the case that the 
cinematic cut (the filmmaker’s decisions about how one shot is to be linked to 
another) is akin with both Derrida’s notion of politics and the one defended by 
Rancière. The Derridian politics as ungrounded decision-making that is unable to 
forecast the effects of these decisions and that cannot but inflict violence on the other 
is like the cut in that it implies setting a limit, selecting, discriminating. The parallel 
can be drawn between the cinematic cut and Rancière’s view of politics as a process 
that interrupts the hierarchies of a current social order in that the cut is also an 
interruption, a border and a limit: it stops one shot to introduce the next one. Drawing 
                                                
2 See Derrida, Of Hospitality. Anne Dufourmantelle Invites Jacques Derrida to Respond, trans. by 
Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).  
3 See Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography, trans. by Rela Mezali and Ruvik Danieli (New 
York: Zone Books, 2008); and Azoulay, Civil Imagination. A Political Ontology of Photography, trans. 
by Louise Bethlehem (London: Verso, 2012). 
4 Rancière, Disagreement. Politics and Philosophy, trans. by Julie Rose (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999), p.ix. 
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on Azoulay’s model of the political relations created by the photograph, I claim that if 
the (documentary) filmmaker decides amongst other things on the cuts, montage, 
camera angles, and hence on the form of the film, she inaugurates thereby certain 
political relationships with the filmed subjects and the spectators. Even though the 
filmmaker can never anticipate the response the latter will have towards the film, she   
can act as a host of sorts through her decisions and leave the door open so that filmed 
subjects and spectators take active part in determining the sense of the film. The 
political relationships that could be formed in this way fall beyond the framework of 
the nation-state and its territorial borders.  
A discussion of how alternative conceptions of politics and political relations 
can take form in the context of today’s massive transnational migration is relevant 
because the struggles that undocumented immigrants, refugees and other displaced 
persons are forced to endure due to their condition of statelessness demand a 
transformation of traditional understandings of politics as a domain restricted to and 
exclusively regulated by the framework of the nation-state. Indeed, a reconsideration 
of politics as well as a reformulation of citizenship as a practice rather than as a 
category entitling individuals to a set of rights and duties within a nation-state seems 
equally necessary. Because citizenship has been territorialised and defined in terms of 
a status that the national sovereign power grants to some persons, then all those who 
have not been assigned citizenship are left abandoned without protection and hence 
vulnerable to all kinds of injustice, violence and suffering. Thus, alternative 
conceptions of political bonds and citizenship are called for that are neither 
constituted by nor circumscribed to the boundaries of the nation-state. Following 
Derrida, Azoulay and Rancière, I will argue that such notions of politics and 
citizenship entail relations based on ethical responsibility, partnership, solidarity and 
equality amongst individuals regardless of their actual citizenship status. In this thesis 
I will show that these relationships can be actualised through documentary films 
about migration and border-crossings.      
II.  The Politics of the Image 
This thesis takes an interdisciplinary approach as it is a discussion within 
documentary film theory and visual cultures but it also seeks to make an intervention 
in the areas of political philosophy and political theory. I draw on the work of Hito 
Steyerl, Trinh and Renov to support my exploration of the political aspects of 
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documentaries. 5  The core of my argument, however, is crucially informed by 
Azoulay’s theoretical approach to the practice of photography. Her model of 
photography stands against understanding the photograph as a finalised product of 
which only the photographer has full and exclusive grasp whereas the spectators can 
merely passively observe what is represented but not take part in determining the 
meaning of the image. Instead, Azoulay poses a tripartite theory where photographer, 
spectators and photographed subjects all play an active role in the event of 
photography. The relevance of Azoulay’s model to the theory of photography is that 
rather than limiting the bonds between the three parties involved to strict power 
relationships that cannot be overcome, her model offers a way to think photography 
beyond these relationships separating those with the power to represent and those who 
lack this power. Under this theoretical approach, photography becomes a practice and 
collective endeavour where the portrayed subjects suffering oppressive and violent 
living conditions are not just simply represented as passive victims, and where the 
spectators are not just observers that cannot do more than pity the photographed 
subjects. In this collective endeavour the photograph functions as a space where 
photographer, portrayed subjects and spectators are all equal partakers determining 
the meaning of the photograph. She calls this space ‘the citizenry of photography’6 
where the three parties relate to one another as equally active members committed to 
make visible the injuries and suffering of the photographed subjects. Azoulay's triadic 
model claims that the photographic event constitutes a civil contract of sorts where 
the photographer takes the picture portraying people living under very deprived and 
violent conditions or conditions of 'regime-made disaster.' 7  The photographer, 
however, has no control over the effect the image might have or how it might be 
interpreted. Spectators, in turn, exercise their civic skill of 'watching'8 photographs, 
which for Azoulay is not merely an act of passive and aesthetic contemplation of an 
event that is now in the past. In watching a photograph rather than looking at it, there 
is an activation of the spectator’s 'civil gaze and intention.'9 This involves an act of 
                                                
5 See Steyerl, 'Documentarism as Politics of Truth,' in Transversal-European Institute for Progressive 
Cultural Policies, trans. by Aileen Derieg (May, 2003), <http://eipcp.net/transversal/1003/steyerl2/en> 
[accessed 12th November 2013]; Steyerl, 'Documentary Uncertainty,' in A Prior, No. 15 (Spring, 2007) 
<http://aprior.org/issue/on_life> [accessed 12th November 2013]. 
6 Azoulay, Civil Contract, p.23. 
7 Azoulay, Civil Imagination, p.1. 
8 Azoulay, Civil Contract, p.16. 
9 Azoulay, Civil Imagination, p.121. 
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reconstruction of the photographic event in such a manner that the injuries inflicted on 
the photographed subjects are rendered inadmissible and seen as calls for the 
immediate restoration of the damages suffered by these populations. In this way, the 
photographed subjects also become active participants for they address grievances to 
both the photographer and the spectator, thus claiming the rehabilitation of their 
'impaired citizenship.'10 Hence, the three participants are bound to one another as 
equals through civil bonds and thereby they constitute a space of political relations 
beyond the boundaries of the nation-state.    
This communal space of equality has, according to Azoulay, two implications. 
One is that the meaning of a photograph is never closed or ready-determined; instead 
it remains always open for different readings with every new encounter between these 
three parties. The second is that the relationships formed within this community of 
equality are not directly governed by the nation-state for the three partakers relate as 
equals regardless of what their citizenship status is. Such relationships are hence not 
restricted by national borders and are based on partnership, solidarity and concern for 
others rather than on the duties owed to the sovereign power. According to Azoulay 
this new political space gives rise to an alternative conceptualization of citizenship. 
This is a notion of citizenship that implies an active commitment of all members of 
the citizenry of photography to restoring or rehabilitating the citizenship of those who 
have been deprived of it or who have an impaired one.  
I take Azoulay’s thesis of the political relationships of photography as an 
actualization of what Derrida calls the ethics and politics of hospitality. Derrida 
argues that the most adequate way to approach the questions that are posed today by 
the phenomena of mass migration, the displacement of people and the waning of the 
powers of nation-states due to the globalised market is by way of a consideration of 
the concept of hospitality. For him, the issues raised by undocumented migrants and 
stateless people are an instantiation of the question of hospitality because they involve 
looking at the ways in which we legislate the welcoming of others, relate to and 
receive the absolute other.  
Derrida understands hospitality as an aporetic concept, a concept that seems 
impossible because it implies two figures that are heterogeneous or contradictory and 
yet necessarily tangled together. On the one hand, unconditional or absolute 
                                                
10 Azoulay, The Civil Contract, p.15. 
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hospitality demands that we receive the foreigner without imposing any restrictions or 
conditions. On the other hand, conditional hospitality establishes certain requirements 
and limits to the welcoming of the other. Despite this apparent deadlock of 
hospitality, Derrida thinks that instead of paralysing, the aporia prompts us to think of 
the possible in a different way.11 Absolute hospitality is unrealisable, we need to set 
limits to the arrival of others and, in so doing, we discriminate and commit violence 
towards them. However, the impossibility of actualising absolute hospitality in laws 
does not lead to stagnation. Rather, this impossibility remains as a promise that leads 
us to attempt to make possible the impossible: to attempt to legislate (conditional) 
laws of hospitality that are less violent towards the other. What this means is that 
unconditional hospitality requires the conditional laws of hospitality and vice versa.  
This aporia of hospitality makes evident the inextricable link and constant 
tension existing between, the unconditional and the conditional, ethics and politics. 
Ethics demands that we remain open towards absolute alterity and take responsibility 
for the decisions and laws we make that impinge violence on the other. While politics 
requires that we set limits and take decisions that can never be based on a universal 
decision-making principle. Derrida’s main point here is these irreconcilable 
exigencies of reason are both necessary and need to work in tandem. The recognition 
of this leads to a politics that admits that every effort needs to be made so that the 
other is addressed in its singularity, and so this is a politics is on an ongoing process 
of perfectibility, looking constantly for less bad, less violent, laws. 
In view of the conditions endured by the sans-papiers or undocumented 
migrants, who lack the protection of a nation-state due to their status as non-citizens, 
Derrida proposes adopting a politics of hospitality that truly operates in coordination 
with an ethics of hospitality, a politics that aims to legislate  (conditional) laws for the 
reception of foreigners in the name of absolute hospitality, the unconditional. This 
notion of a politics of hospitality entails a politics that is not dependent on citizenship 
or on the framework established by nation-states and geo-political borders. Rather, the 
politics and ethics of hospitality involve a particular form of relationship between 
individuals without respect to what their actual citizenship status might be. Derrida's 
view of the inseparable link between the ethics and politics of hospitality entails more 
demanding ways of relating to others, for it is not exclusively the sovereign power 
                                                
11 See Derrida, ‘As If It Were Possible, “Within Such Limits,”’ in Derrida, Paper Machine, trans. by 
Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), pp.73-99 (p.91). 
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that determines how the other is to be received. The ethics and politics of hospitality 
also compel us to address the other without imposing conditions and thus to take 
ethical responsibility for the latter whatever her citizenship. In the same fashion, 
given that the ethics and politics of hospitality call for an ongoing search for less bad 
laws (even when there is no singular homogenising criteria that helps decide what less 
bad is), this is necessarily a more demanding form of political relationship. 
By using the concept of hospitality as the conceptual tool to discuss the 
question of the sans-papiers and the refugees, Derrida underscores the fact that the 
policies and laws concerning the welcoming of others entail a politics of fraternity or 
sameness that excludes and refuses to acknowledge the singularity of the radical 
other. Derrida also affirms that these laws, in setting conditions for the reception of 
the other, always fall short of doing justice. In the light of this situation, these laws 
require transformation. We require a politics that does not close off the arrival of the 
other and that addresses the latter in its alterity. This politics is not based on the 
concepts of national citizenship and nation that exclude others on the basis of race, 
class and gender. This is a politics of the friend as absolute other.12 What is more, 
Derrida’s remarks about hospitality and about the relation between ethics and politics 
also seem to suggest an alternative understanding of citizenship: a notion of 
citizenship that involves first and foremost an active commitment towards the other as 
radically other, absolutely singular.  
By drawing on this idea of hospitality as a necessary and appropriate way to 
tackle the problem of undocumented migration, I do not mean to neglect the fact that 
this is a complex issue, which therefore requires a multi-disciplinary approach. In 
particular, I am aware that an engagement with economic factors is necessary. A 
focus on the fact that the capitalist system requires cheap labour that is provided by 
irregular migrants and stateless people is called for if we are to understand the extent 
to which political relations today are dependent on and shaped by economic relations. 
However, I use Derrida’s ideas -- in tandem with the theses of Azoulay and Rancière 
around the concepts of politics and the political -- to propose a theoretical and 
philosophical consideration of the political and ethical implications of documentary 
films about border-crossings and migration. I argue that the alternative political (and 
ethical) relationships that can emerge through documentaries are not constrained by 
                                                
12 See Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, trans. by George Collins (London and New York: Verso, 
2005), pp.viii-ix. 
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the boundaries of nation-states, and hence constitute a deterritorialised form of 
politics. My approach might therefore be seen as a small contribution within a broader 
discussion, which would also include, among other things, a detailed analysis of 
economic aspects and infrastructures underpinning migration today as well as 
discussions on border control, citizenship and national and transnational sovereignty. 
I believe that Azoulay’s thesis of the space of political relationships that 
emerges through photography can be understood as an actualization of the ethics and 
politics of hospitality that Derrida poses. Her idea of the civil contract of photography 
and the concept of citizenship that she derives from it is based on relations of ethical 
responsibility, partnership and solidarity among individuals. Since such relationships 
are not directly governed by the nation-state and do not depend on the actual 
citizenship status of the parties involved, then they seem to embody the Derridian 
politics and ethics of hospitality. If this proves to be the case and if, as I intend to 
show, documentaries about migration can also give rise to political relations beyond 
the direct mediation of the national sovereign, then these will be relationships of 
hospitality. 
My analysis of the extrapolation of Azoulay’s model to documentary films is 
especially informed by the work of Rancière. I draw on his understanding of politics 
as a collective action that challenges the distribution of roles and functions, and hence 
the hierarchies imposed by the social order. In this sense, politics is not a matter of the 
judiciary, a political party or any other institution. These latter forms belong to what 
Rancière calls the order of ‘the police,’13 which not only aims to preserve and foster 
the current social arrangements, but also determines what can be experienced and 
apprehended through the senses. The order of the police establishes not just the places 
and functions of individuals within society, but it even sets the conditions of 
possibility of perception, action and thought. Thus the order of the police establishes a 
‘distribution of the sensible.’14 By contrast, politics for Rancière is a process by which 
a group of people who have been excluded or presupposed unequal by the order of the 
police act as if they were equal to all those in higher positions within the hierarchies 
of this order. Thereby, the excluded show the arbitrariness and contingency of the 
social arrangement and the conceptual and perceptual framework that underpins it. 
                                                
13 Rancière, ‘Ten Theses on Politics,’ in S. Corcoran (ed), Dissensus. On Politics and Aesthetics, 
(London and New York: Continuum, 2010), p.36.  
14 Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics. The Distribution of the Sensible, trans. with an introduction by 
Gabriel Rockhill (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), p.12. 
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Politics is thus dissensus with the police, leading to a process of reconfiguration of the 
partition or distribution of the sensible. 
I link and compare Rancière’s understanding of politics to Azoulay’s thesis of 
the space of political relations created by the photograph because I think his view of 
politics can enrich and supplement the civil contract of photography that Azoulay 
poses. Rancière’s idea of politics as a collective effort entailing a disruption of social 
hierarchies and reconfiguration of the sensible can be likened to Azoulay’s idea that 
the under the civil contract photographer, photographed subjects and spectator are 
related as equals, as active partakers in the articulation of the meaning of the 
photograph. Azoulay and Rancière thus seem to agree in that politics involves a 
collective action that implies relations based on equality and hence produces 
disruption of the social and political hierarchies. They also agree in that politics and 
aesthetics are not mutually excluding. However, Azoulay distinguishes between the 
political and the civil in order to argue that all human interactions are political, and 
that hence the encounters created through a photographic event have to be political 
too. The civil is a skill and an intention that people exercise when in those human 
interactions they choose to show concern and partnership and solidarity for others. 
Therefore, the civil contract of photography and the sphere of relationships not 
mediated by the nation-state that this contract creates can only emerge when the civil 
intention is practised. This is where Azoulay and Rancière differ. I will argue that 
Azoulay’s claim that all human encounters are political might make the notion of the 
political unclear and might leave one wondering how political change or shifts in 
social hierarchies and power relations can take place if all human interactions are 
political. Rancière’s view, by contrast, avoids this danger since for him politics 
involves a reconfiguration of the positions and roles assigned to people within the 
social order. The political should not be different from the civil or an extra dimension 
within the political as Azoulay thinks. Instead, if politics is a process of actualization 
of equality and disruption of hierarchies, then politics has to involve relationships 
based on concern, responsibility, solidarity and partnership towards others. Politics in 
this sense needs to involve the civic. 
Here we can also begin to see the point of convergence between Derrida and 
Rancière. For both Derrida and Rancière, politics pertains a sort of interruption, a 
cinematic cut of sorts. As I stated before, politics for Derrida concerns decisions that 
set limits, calculations and conditions. Politics for Rancière has to do with the 
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disruption and re-configuration of a current social order. Through Azoulay’s work of 
the political relationships of photography, I am able to make more evident this link 
between Rancière and Derrida as pertains the political bonds that can be created 
through documentary films.    
III. Transpositions 
As I mentioned, it is my purpose in this work to argue that documentary films about 
migration and border-crossings have the potential to produce political and ethical 
relationships much in the same way that Azoulay thinks photography can create 
political bonds between the photographer, the photographed subject and the viewer. 
Discussing how and to what extent Azoulay's triadic model of photography can be 
transposed to documentary film is important for two reasons. First, because this 
allows us to think about the domain of politics and political relations in a way that is 
not attached to a geographical space or territory and that is not based on the duties 
that individuals have towards a national sovereign power and vice versa. Instead, we 
can expand our conception of politics as implying relations amongst individuals that 
are based on solidarity, partnership and equality. The second reason is that we can 
understand the documentary form not just in terms of a visual art form and a 
representational medium, but also as having the potential to constitute an alternative 
space for political relationships.  
Since documentary cinema and photography are two different visual media, I 
will explore the possibility of extrapolating Azoulay's theory to documentaries taking 
these differences into consideration. I draw mainly on the work of Renov, Nichols, 
Steyerl and Trinh to explain that the documentary form is a form of the in-between: 
between fact and fiction, record of events and artistic creation. This quality of 
documentaries, I will claim, plays a role in the potential political bonds that can 
emerge between filmmaker, filmed subject and spectator. I will argue that, in playing 
with the creative expression and thus the form of a documentary, the filmmaker can 
act as a host that invites filmed subjects and spectators to play active roles in the 
determination of the film’s sense. In so doing, these three parties can constitute a 
space of political relations of hospitality, which are not directly regulated by the 
nation-state.    
The virtue of the triadic model of photography of Azoulay, which I use to 
think about documentary films, is that it presents an approach beyond the dualism of 
the power relations between the passive viewer with no representational powers and 
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the artist (the photographer or the filmmaker) bearing the power of representation. 
The moving images of documentary, nonetheless, do bring in new dimensions for the 
triadic model. In particular, the elements of temporality, movement, sound and 
subtitles, which are absent in photography, need to be taken into account in this case, 
for they necessarily produce a change in the triadic model as applied to documentary. 
The process of filming is durational, or at least it allows the chance to prolong the 
relationship between the represented subject and the filmmaker beyond the single 
snapshot occurring in the photograph. As a consequence, the process of making a 
documentary differs from the one of taking a photograph, since the durational aspect 
of film gives way to a more collaborative relationship between the subjects portrayed 
and the filmmaker. This is not to deny that the process of taking photographs can also 
be durational and thus collaborative especially when a photograph is made in a studio. 
But in general, there is more collaboration and therefore a more overt active 
participation of the filmed subjects in the making of documentaries.  
In a similar fashion, the manner and the extent to which the spectator gets 
actively involved in the determination of the meaning of the documentary is also 
necessarily shaped by the temporality and sound effects present in documentary 
images. I draw mostly on the work of Steyerl and Trinh to argue that it is more in the 
form of the documentary, in its stylistic qualities, rather than in its content, that the 
potential of the film to produce political relationships resides. Both Steyerl and Trinh 
affirm that the manner in which the documentary is organised and put together 
crucially determines the extent to which its meaning can be fixed. The editing, the 
camera angles and the way images are coupled with sounds decide how stable a 
meaning can be. When the meaning refuses to become ‘easily stabilized and when it 
does not rely on any single source of authority,’15 then the documentary can be 
political in the sense that it offers spectators the space to be actively involved in the 
articulation of its significance. In other words, if the documentary is organised in a 
way that lends itself to many readings, then it opens up the possibility of a communal 
space of equality. This is a space where the filmmaker does not appear as the 
exclusive owner of the film with privileged access to its meaning, and where the 
viewers are able to partake as equals. I will claim that this community of equality that 
can be created through the documentary is similar to the space of political relations 
                                                
15 Trinh, ‘The Totalizing Quest of Meaning,’ p.100. 
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created by the photographic event proposed by Azoulay. Through my three case 
studies, I will suggest that the spectator can engage with the film to a greater or lesser 
degree that cannot be predetermined. By the same token, I will make the point that the 
temporality and sound elements in documentary shape spectators’ involvement with 
the film’s meaning not only in terms of rational and reflexive experience, but also in 
terms of affect and embodied responses.  
Here I invoke Rancière’s work once again for my argument of the possibility 
of transposing Azoulay’s triadic model of photography to the documentary form. I use 
Rancière’s thesis of the ‘emancipated spectator’ to examine the bonds formed by the 
filmmaker (the artist) and the spectator. His idea is that an emancipatory practice of 
art is one that blurs the distinction between the roles of the artist and the spectator, the 
specialist and the amateur, and thus between doing and looking. The artist in this case 
has to start with the acknowledgement that spectators are active agents with the 
capacity to interpret and make sense of the work of art just by themselves; the artist 
needs to recognise that spectators are not passive ignorant subjects that require to be 
somehow enlightened through the work of art. Instead, when the artist offers her work 
from a position of equality, she assumes that she cannot predict or control how the 
spectator will react to it, and hence she opens up a collaborative space. Such a space 
is a sphere for the sharing of knowledges amongst equals that therefore blurs 
functions and roles assigned by the social order. I will argue that, like Steyerl and 
Trinh say, when the form of the documentary is open, then spectators can become 
active participants in determining the film’s meaning and thus the film can become a 
space for the exercise of emancipation in the way Rancière explains. In this way, this 
is a space where the hierarchies of the social order can be challenged and where 
political relations not governed by the nation-state can emerge.  
Finally, another thing I will explore is whether the transposition of the triadic 
model of photography to documentary can also be extended to different geographical 
and political contexts. While Azoulay has a particular interest in Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict, which is the context from which she draws the photographic examples to 
illustrate her thesis of the civil contract of photography, I will examine whether this 
triadic model can also be expanded to other scenes. Through my case studies, I will 
show that documentaries about migration and border-crossing experiences, regardless 
of the geographical situation of the border portrayed, have the potential to give rise to 
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political bonds, which are based on solidarity, partnership and equality, and which 
escape the direct regulation of the national sovereign.  
I undertake my consideration of the extrapolation of Azoulay’s theoretical 
approach to photography to the documentary form by means of analysing three case 
studies: Thenjiwe Nkosi’s Border Farm (2010), Sabine Lubbe Bakker and Ester 
Gould’s Shout (2010), and John Akomfrah’s The Nine Muses (2010). These are three 
recent documentaries that portray the experience of migration and border-crossing 
using diverse approaches, stylistic techniques and narratives. I have chosen these 
films because I believe their different modalities allow me to focus my discussion of 
the roles that the filmmakers, the subjects filmed and the spectators might play on 
each documentary. Thus, through these case studies I test how and to what extent 
Azoulay’s theory of photography can be transposed to the documentary form, how 
and to what extent documentary films about migration can produce political (and 
ethical) bonds beyond the framework of the nation-state. Focusing mostly on their 
stylistic features, I discuss how it is that the filmed subjects and the spectators become 
actively engaged with (and even how they affectively respond to) each of these films. 
And I argue how the filmmakers can be seen to act as hosts to both the spectators and 
filmed subjects in these three cases.   
I have limited my analysis to just three rather than a plethora of documentaries 
because this work aims to be a theoretical exploration of the potential of political 
relationships that emerge through documentaries and are not limited by geo-political 
borders. This thesis is not an exhaustive study of documentary films on migration. 
Furthermore, I do not look at how spectators, filmmakers and represented subjects 
relate to one another and engage with the film, for that would call for an analysis 
through audience and reception studies. However, I propose this in my conclusion as 
an area of further study. My purpose here is to present a theoretical discussion that 
has implications as to how we can understand and approach documentary films in 
terms of their political and ethical dimensions. 
IV. Outline of the Thesis 
This work is thus divided into six chapters. In Chapter 1, I start by looking more 
closely at what constitutes a border. I use Étienne Balibar’s analysis of this concept to 
argue that the complex ways in which the institution of the border functions allows us 
to better understand the problem of undocumented migrants and to signal ways in 
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which we can tackle this issue.16 I also draw on the work of Giorgio Agamben further 
discuss the role of geo-political borders, and to explain the necessary exclusion that 
the national sovereign power introduces. This theoretical background helps me 
introduce Derrida’s thesis that we need an alternative form of politics, a politics not 
based on resemblance or identification, but a politics that acknowledges alterity and 
that is not constructed on the basis of the concepts of nation, national borders or 
national citizenship. Through the Derridian concept of hospitality we can see how he 
concludes that ethics and politics are in a relation of contradiction where both remain 
irreducible to one another and yet indissociable. Politics as the realm of laws and 
decisions that inevitably are violent towards the absolute other, and ethics as the 
realm of the unconditional responsibility that we have towards these others who have 
suffered this violence. The relation of ethics and politics explains why the 
(conditional) laws of hospitality that govern the reception of foreigners need to be 
always open to perfectibility in order to do less violence to others, and accommodate 
the demands of the principle of absolute hospitality. This will serve me as the 
foundation for claiming, in subsequent chapters, that there can be spaces for political 
relations beyond geo-political borders, and that these spaces can be found in 
photography and documentary films. 
Chapter 2 focuses on Azoulay’s triadic model of photography as one that 
explains the political potential of photographs in terms of the active and equal 
participation of the photographer, the photographed subject and the spectator. In this 
chapter I will consider alternative conceptions of politics and citizenship that arise 
from her model, and I compare and assess these ideas with Derrida’s remarks on the 
ethics and politics of hospitality and his proposal of the need to think politics 
independently from nation-states. Here I also introduce Rancière’s ideas of the 
politics of aesthetics and the aesthetics of politics in order to show that Azoulay’s 
thesis of the political relations of photography should be understood in terms of the 
formation of a community of equality that reconfigures the distribution of the sensible 
and that hence challenges social and political hierarchies.  
In Chapter 3 I examine the different ways in which documentary films have 
been defined. I use Nichols, Renov, Steyerl and Trinh to explain that this is a complex 
film form that refuses to be explained simply as a non-fictional format and that does 
                                                
16 See Balibar, ‘What is a Border?,’ in É. Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene, trans by Christine 
Jones, James Swenson and Chris Turner (London and New York: Verso, 2002), pp.75-86. 
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not easily lend itself to a taxonomy of its different modalities. With this in mind, I 
analyse in which senses and to what extent Azoulay’s triadic model of photography 
can be extrapolated to documentaries. My argument is that despite being two different 
visual media, Azoulay’s thesis of the political bonds that can emerge through 
photography can be transposed to documentaries, and thus the latter can be 
understood as collective practices where participants relate as equals. Here Rancière’s 
notion of politics as a disruption and redistribution of the roles, functions and 
hierarchies of an existing social order can be linked to Derrida’s understanding of 
politics as ungrounded decision- and law-making through the figure of the cinematic 
cut. While the cut establishes a limit between one shot another, for Rancière politics 
entails a cut, and interruption of a social order; and for Derrida politics interrupts, cuts 
and makes violence when it makes decisions and laws that set limits and conditions.    
 The last three chapters are devoted to exploring the extrapolation of 
Azoulay’s model to the documentary form by way of an analysis of three 
documentaries. Chapter 4 looks at Border Farm by Nkosi (2010), which is a 
dramatised documentary set at the border of South Africa and Zimbabwe and that 
plays freely with elements of fictional and non-fictional films. The way in which this 
film was made allows me to focus my attention on the role that the filmed subjects 
had and the effects of their participation. My question here will be whether the filmed 
subjects can really become so active in the making of a documentary that they can be 
seen as equal participants with the filmmaker. 
In Chapter 5 I analyse Shout by Gould and Lubbe Bakker (2010). This 
documentary is set in the Golan Heights, the Syrian territory under Israeli occupation. 
I use this film’s dramatic narrative style and its stylistic techniques to consider how 
spectators can become actively involved in the determination of the meaning of the 
film. More specifically, my analysis aims to explore in which sense we can say that 
spectators might read the film in terms of claims for rights that the filmed subjects 
pose. 
Lastly, Chapter 6 discusses The Nine Muses by Akomfrah (2010), which is a 
documentary-essay film that presents a lyrical view of the history of migration to 
post-war Britain. It is composed as a collage of archive footage from newsreels and 
films with new original footage coupled with music and off-screen readings of 
classical texts, which I approach to consider the active engagement of spectators in 
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terms of affective and embodied responses, and the role that the filmmaker has in 
facilitating this form of involvement on the part of spectators. 
Through these cases I hope to show that Azoulay’s theory of photography can 
provide a good basis to think of documentaries also as political practices that can 
actualise Derrida’s hospitality. As I mentioned, the purpose of this thesis is twofold. It 
aims to lay the groundwork for further enquiry into the potential of documentary films 
for thinking about questions of undocumented migration, hospitality, citizenship and 
the border. Likewise, this dissertation also seeks to work alongside other studies 
which explore different aspects of national sovereignty, migration, citizenship, border 
control and the economic relations that determine these, as well as alongside studies 
dealing with other artistic representations and the way the latter are produced, 
circulated and consumed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Borders and Hospitality. The Relation Between Ethics and Politics 
 
I.  
The post-medieval modern political formation known as the nation-state is today’s 
dominant form of state organisation and has as its underlying constitutive principle 
that of national sovereignty, which is the ideal correspondence between territory and 
people. To put it differently, the geo-political formations that we now call ‘nation-
states’ are formed of three elements: the (national) sovereign, the territory and the 
people. A territory is required if the state is to execute its power and enforce its single 
hegemonic rule over the population within a demarcated space. Whereas a people is 
needed as one of the constitutive elements of the state and, simultaneously, as the 
object upon which the state imposes its decree. Thus, insofar as the individuals are 
members of the state, they have rights; and insofar as they are subordinates to the 
state power, they have duties. It is the sovereign power that functions here as the 
unifying element between territory and people. What the sovereign adds to the unity 
of a people and a territory is the exercise of power condensed into one single 
dominant executive authority (as opposed to power being spread and exerted amongst 
many, which was the case in the Middle Ages when the rule and domination were 
exercised by various landlords and the Church within the pre-national states), and the 
fact that this exercise is directed towards the attainment of the common good.  
Many modern political theorists, such as Carl Schmitt, have attempted to 
provide a systematic account of how the relation between territory and people can be 
shaped so as to create the spatio-temporal cohesive and coherent form that is the 
nation-state. Schmitt proposes that sovereignty is that which rationalises and 
organises the appropriation of land, and is also the power that determines when a 
‘state of exception’ (a temporary suspension of all legal restrictions to the sovereign’s 
executive powers aimed at restoring or establishing legal order) is to be installed.1 
There is another model that, instead of emphasising the role of territory, underlines 
the role of people in the determination of sovereignty. According to this approach 
sovereignty is the result of an agreement or contract between the sovereign power and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Schmitt, Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. by George 
Schwab, foreword by Tracy Strong (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); and Schmitt, The 
Concept of the Political. Expanded Edition, trans. by George Schwab, foreword by Tracy Strong and 
notes by Leo Strauss (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
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the people. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Of the Social Contract2 and Thomas Hobbes’s 
Leviathan3 provide examples of this second approach. There is, however, a common 
idea underlying the various theoretical explanations of sovereignty; and that is the 
idea that national sovereignty is an attempt to systematise the relation existing 
between people and territory. 
It is not my aim in this chapter (nor in this thesis as a whole) to offer an 
historical account of the development of the nation-state as a form of state 
organisation or to engage in a discussion about the different theoretical approaches to 
the notion of national sovereignty. Thus, I will not delve into these topics in any 
major depth. Rather, my purpose is to provide a general background to the two main 
issues I engage with in this first chapter. The first refers to the notion of ‘the border’ 
as one that needs to be analysed carefully if one is to understand at least some of the 
many ethical, political, social, economic and cultural questions that this geo-political 
institution raises. At the same time, the border as an interstitial space is akin to the 
cinematic cut, that space that both separates and links two shots within a film. The 
connection holding between the border, politics, ethics, the cut and documentary films 
will become clearer in the development of this thesis. This chapter attempts to 
introduce the political theory that will serve, later on, as foundation to the 
examination of the ethical and political relationships that can emerge through the 
documentary film form.      
How the institution of the geo-political border works and exerts its control 
today necessarily brings up the issue of how the foreigner, ‘the other,’ is received. 
This involves, as Jacques Derrida claims, the question of hospitality, which is the 
second notion I will consider in this chapter. I will explain that Derrida understands 
hospitality as a question that inexorably emerges in today’s context of mass 
migration, and I will assess his thesis of the necessary bond between the sphere of 
ethics and the sphere of politics. Thus, the argument I advance here is twofold. I claim 
that Derrida’s proposal of a politics and an ethics of hospitality offers a promising 
way to approach the questions raised by the increasing number of undocumented 
border-crossers and stateless people both circulating and detained in Europe and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Rousseau, ‘Of the Social Contract,’ in Of the Social Contract and Other Political Writings, trans. by 
Quintin Hoare, ed. by Christopher Bertram (London and New York: Penguin Classics, 2012), pp.1-
134. 
3  Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. and intro. by John Charles Addison Gaskin (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008).  
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elsewhere today. In close relation to this, I maintain that Derrida’s hospitality allows 
for an alternative formulation of politics, ethics and citizenship. The conceptualisation 
of politics that results is one that is indissociable from and yet in tension with ethics 
because it involves making decisions and setting limits which necessarily commit 
violence against ‘the other,’ whereas ethics concerns the responsibility we all bear 
towards these ‘others’ who have suffered this violence. This politics, as 
conditionality, opposes the unconditionality of ethics but it recognises the need to 
constantly make better decisions, better laws that are more attuned with ethics, and 
that get closer to the concept of justice. In the case of the notion (and practice) of 
citizenship, Derrida seems to suggest a citizenship that is neither restricted by the 
interests of the nation-state nor sanctioned exclusively by the latter. These concepts of 
hospitality and citizenship are central to this thesis because I will use them in order to 
argue for and characterise the political and ethical relationships that can emerge 
through documentaries about migration and border-crossings. Equally, Derrida’s idea 
that politics entails decisions, laws and conditions will serve me to characterize the 
filmmaker as a host of sorts who establishes limits and makes decisions by selecting 
what to film and by cutting shots, but who also invites spectators and filmed subjects 
to take active part in making sense of the film.  
In view of the mentioned purpose of this chapter, it seems necessary 
nonetheless to start with a succinct exposition of what is understood as nation-state 
and sovereignty, and how these two are related to the notion of citizenship. This will 
allow me to introduce my discussion of the border as an institution that, as Balibar 
puts it, operates beyond its mere geographical location and serves as an international 
apparatus of control and class differentiation and discrimination. In turn, the question 
of the border will act as a stepping-stone to my analysis of Derrida’s hospitality. And 
also the concepts of the border and the cinematic cut will also return later when I 
argue that documentary films can act as spaces of hospitality. The next section of this 
chapter serves to expand upon the discussion about the nation-state and sovereignty.  
II. National Sovereignty and its Link to Citizenship 
Within the political formation that is the nation-state, the state is largely instrumental 
in unifying the nation within a framework of a shared economic life, as well as 
common social and cultural values. In terms of the economy, the nation-state seeks 
unification by, for instance, eliminating certain internal tolls and taxes whilst 
imposing others externally. In terms of culture and social values, the nation-state 
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attempts to homogenise national culture by means of different state policies, such as a 
common curriculum in primary and secondary education and fostering a uniform 
language across the nation. In this sense, the nation-state constitutes a form of state 
organisation characterised by the geographical convergence of two entities. One is the 
state as a political entity that exerts its power in accordance to a set of laws that 
directly emanate from the will of the people (the nation’s common will) within the 
limits of a clearly demarcated territorial unit; and the other is the nation as a cultural 
(and/or linguistic and ethnic) entity.  
In Escape Routes. Control and Subversion in the Twenty-first Century, 4 
Papadopoulos, Stephenson and Tsianos defend the thesis that there are two 
consecutive steps that the nation-state takes in order to attain the convergence of 
territory and people. In a first step, the population is divided and categorised into 
social classes for the purposes of representation; thus a system of social strata is 
established. The second and subsequent step sees the nation-state granting rights of 
participation to each of these represented social groups. It is the balance between 
granting representation to different social groups within the national territory and 
granting rights to these groups that ensures the integration of territory and people. 
Following the work of Nikos Poulantzas,5 the authors explain this as follows: 
National sovereignty is sustained by the existence of a national social compromise -- a 
stable but changing balance of institutional power between the represented social groups, 
which is developed as a means of regulating the distribution of rights amongst these groups 
[…]. Initially, the city-state -- and later the nation state -- consisted of wealthy, property 
owners only. […] The majority of the inhabitants of the territory of the state were excluded 
[from representation and rights]. But [later] what solidifies the centrality of the state in 
modern sovereignty is a form of differential inclusion of certain social groups through 
granting rights (social, civil and political). Rights become a means of expanding the 
category of citizenship.6 
In this way, the unity created by the people and the territory under the government of 
a national sovereign necessarily entails a separation, an exclusion and a demarcation 
between those people who do not belong and those who do, those people who are 
under the rule of a certain sovereign power (and thus are entitled to certain rights and 
duties) and those who are not. Simultaneously, a geo-political division is also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Papadopoulos, Stephenson and Tsianos, Escape Routes. Control and Subversion in the Twenty-first 
Century (London and Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2008). 
5 See Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, trans. by Patrick Camiller, intro. by Stuart Hall (London: 
Verso, 2000). 
6 Papadopoulos, Stephenson and Tsianos, Escape Routes, p.5. 
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established in order to set the limits between the different national sovereignties; to 
set the territorial boundaries within which a nation-state is to exert its power and rule 
in an absolute manner, without the intervention of any other power or national 
sovereign. This is how citizenship and national borders are instituted so as to 
consolidate the sovereign nation-state.  
 The modern category of citizenship is thus, from the outset, inextricably 
linked to the nation-state insofar as it is defined in terms of an individual’s relation to 
the national sovereign. If an individual is deemed a citizen of a nation-state, then she 
is entitled to certain rights, is bound by the laws and has duties within the borders of 
such state. By contrast, an individual who is not a citizen does not belong to the 
nation-state, and hence lacks the rights and duties of the citizen. Citizenship means 
‘belonging to a nation state, where the belonging is both legitimate through law and 
codified through culture.’ 7  To the extent that citizenship distinguishes between 
citizens and noncitizens, it necessarily produces exclusions. Citizenship can never be 
all-inclusive for it would then lose its purpose as a differentiating and status-granting 
category. However, as I will argue later on following Derrida’s and Azoulay’s ideas, 
it is both necessary and possible to conceive of citizenship not merely as a 
membership entitling a person to certain rights and duties within a nation-state, but 
also as a practice of political and ethical responsibility and solidarity for others 
(citizens or noncitizens). Citizenship in this sense would mean a practice that is not 
directly regulated by the national sovereign power. My claim in this thesis will be that 
documentary films portraying migration and border-crossings can function as spaces 
that allow precisely for this conception of citizenship to be actualised, and thus for a 
way of understanding politics beyond the framework of the nation-state. 
 As mentioned above, historically the category of citizenship was expanded by 
the different nation-states to include more social groups, to grant them representation 
and rights, so as to consolidate the unity of territory and people. But because 
citizenship is always incomplete and never perfect and all-inclusive, it has been 
increasingly challenged. Since the 1960s and 1970s many excluded social groups 
started questioning the supposed inclusiveness of the traditional modes of 
representation, and demanded further rights. At the same time, the post-war era has 
been characterised by international trade and political agreements that have produced 	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supra-national blocs that challenge the nation-state’s monopoly of power and absolute 
sovereignty within its borders. The emergence of transnational corporations and non-
governmental organisations alongside the consolidation of a virtual order of global 
markets that fosters the mobility of goods, capital, labour force, people and ideas has 
gradually put pressure on national borders. Thus today there is a continuing erosion of 
the hegemonic political and economic powers of the nation-state that puts into 
question this form of state organisation and the concept of citizenship that it supports. 
This is why many theorists, amongst them Balibar and Derrida, have engaged in a 
close examination of the attrition of nation-states, the function of geo-political borders 
today, and the possibility of an alternative understanding of citizenship and a politics 
not limited exclusively to the realm of the nation-state. 
  In order to better understand why and in what sense Derrida proposes a new 
conceptualisation of politics that is not directly sanctioned by the national sovereign 
and that is founded on ethics, it is necessary to explore first what is a border and how 
it functions today. Indeed, Derrida’s proposal of an ethics and a politics of hospitality 
as the most adequate manner to approach the pressing questions that the growing 
number of undocumented migrants and displaced people pose makes sense when it is 
presented in the light of today’s role of national borders as apparatuses of control 
operating ubiquitously and well beyond their specific geographical location. Thus, in 
the following sections, I will examine Balibar’s discussion of the institution of the 
border in the current context of the crisis of the form of organisation that is the nation-
state, for this will serve me as groundwork for my analysis of Derrida’s hospitality in 
the second part of this chapter. 
III. Understanding Borders 
The notion of the ‘border’ is a complex one. As Balibar has claimed,8 it is not 
possible to provide a single and simple definition of the border that would hold valid 
for all historical, social and political contexts, for all times and places, and for all 
individuals and communities. It is precisely because there is nothing like a universal 
essence of the border, that any attempt to define the concept of the ‘border’ needs to 
acknowledge its complexity if it is to avoid producing a circular form of reasoning. 
Indeed, if the border is defined simply as that which delimits a territory and attributes 
the territory with an identity, then one is inevitably condemned to reason in circles 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See Balibar, ‘What is a Border?,’ pp.75-86. 
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because to identify or to define is exactly nothing else than demarcating a border. In 
view of today’s so-called context of globalization, which increasingly has blurred 
national borders and led to a crisis in the definition of the nation-state, a 
comprehensive understanding of the concept of the ‘border’ is called for. Thus, my 
aim in the first part of this chapter is to examine some of the characteristics that 
borders seem to share in common in order to better comprehend the complexity and 
the nuances of these apparatuses.  
Amongst some of the academics who have attempted to provide a complex 
notion of the border is Chicano and border theorist Gloria Anzaldúa.9 For her, the 
border does not simply refer to a physical boundary between two nation-states, but 
rather borders are sites where differences or identities like those of gender, race, 
ethnicity, class, nationality and religion converge or else are forced together. Two 
ideas in Anzaldúa’s work emerge as significant. First, that borders and borderlands 
are ‘in a constant state of transition.’10 Because they are sites for the encounter, 
entanglement and negotiation of different social, ethnic, religious and cultural 
identities, borders are fluid, they transform themselves. The second idea is that 
crossing a border necessarily amounts to an act of transgression against the 
constraints imposed by the dominant forces that produce and preserve some of those 
cultural and social identities. 
Anzaldúa is right to think that borders are in continuous transformation. 
Throughout history and depending on the cultural, political and economical contexts 
within which they are situated, every border has evolved and served different 
functions, thus acquiring different meanings. The fact that borders undergo constant 
modifications does not mean that borders cannot be conceptualized. Quite the 
contrary, it just means that the concept of the border does not admit reductionistic or 
monolithic definitions. However, Anzaldúa’s idea that any border-crossing experience 
is inherently and automatically a challenge to the social and political order, an act of 
transgression against the hegemonic forces, needs to be assessed because the crossing 
of a border entails different meanings depending on who the person or persons which 
cross the border are. The answers to the questions of who the border-crosser is; in 
which terms and with which purposes he or she crosses the border; and in which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza, intro. by Sonia Saldívar-Hull (San 
Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1999). 
10 Ibid, p.25. 
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historical context the border-crossing takes place, all constitute factors that determine 
how the experience of crossing the border is lived, and thus the significance that this 
experience has for the person crossing the border. This is once again a confirmation 
that borders cannot and should not be explained in simplistic terms; they require 
comprehensive analysis, from a series of perspectives, in order to be fully understood. 
In what follows, I will use Balibar’s analysis of some of the central features and 
functions of borders in order to explain why border-crossings do not necessarily result 
in an undermining of the imposed law and order of these apparatuses. 
In his article, ‘What is a Border?,’ Balibar affirms that there are three major 
qualities of borders that have manifested themselves throughout history. Namely, the 
overdetermination of borders, the polysemic character of borders, and the 
heterogeneity and ubiquity of borders. Balibar claims that examining these three 
aspects is useful for comprehending a further, and perhaps more relevant, dimension 
of borders: the ‘spiritual’ or symbolic dimension of the border. What Balibar 
understands by this symbolic dimension is the fact that national (geographical-
political-administrative) borders are not merely external realities and that, therefore, 
they do not simply involve a ‘question of external power, [a question] of relations of 
force and the distribution of populations between states.’11 For him, borders also 
become internalized12 and, hence, idealized by individuals.  
By the overdetermination of borders, Balibar refers to the fact that any geo-
political border is never purely the dividing line between two nation-states. Instead, 
borders also serve the function of organizing and configuring the structure of the 
world. In other words, while borders separate particular territories, they always at the 
same time provide the world with ‘a representable figure in the modality of the 
partition, distribution and attribution of regions of space.’13 To illustrate the extent to 
which borders have a world-configuring function and are thus sanctioned by other 
geo-political divisions, Balibar invokes the case of the two blocs that emerged after 
the end of the Second World War and lasted the entire Cold War period, until 1990. 
In 1945 the world was fractioned into two main blocs. On the one hand, the Eastern 
bloc, constituted by those countries under Socialist regimes, with the Soviet Union 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Balibar, ‘The Borders of Europe,’ in Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene, pp.87-103, (p.94).  
12 The notion of ‘interior’ or ‘inner borders’ was first coined by Fichte, and has been invoked and 
turned central in Balibar’s analysis of the notion of the border. See Fichte, Addresses to the German 
Nation, ed. with and intro. by Gregory Moore (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008).  
13 Balibar, ‘The Borders of Europe,’ p.93. 
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leading the bloc. On the other, the Western bloc, constituted by the capitalist and most 
powerful countries of Western Europe along with the United States as the main 
heading figure. According to Balibar, the consequence of this division of the world 
into blocs was twofold. First, the nation-state-form was extended world wide; and 
second, but equally significant, a hierarchy among the nation-states pertaining to each 
of the blocs was created, something that allowed these nations to enjoy more or less 
sovereignty. National borders were thus overdetermined by ulterior geo-political 
interests and allegiances, and this implied that: 
National borders of states were […], depending on the particular case, strengthened or 
weakened. It also meant that there were […], in practice, several types of aliens and 
alienness, and several different modes of border-crossing. When the border, or the sense of 
crossing a border, coincided with the super-borders of the blocs, it was generally more 
difficult to pass through, because the alien in this case was also an enemy alien, if not 
indeed a potential spy.14       
This overdetermination of borders has not been limited exclusively to the post-World 
War II period. Rather, as Balibar mentions, this is an intrinsic feature of all national 
borders, and hence it is possible to find examples of it in other historical periods and 
locations. Thus, even today, after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of 
communism as a political hegemonic regime in the Eastern bloc, national borders 
worldwide are still being overdetermined by what appears to be a North/South and 
West/East world partition along clear lines separating the ‘developed’ from the 
‘developing’ or ‘under-developed’ countries. Once again, these supra-national super-
borders determine the extent to which national borders may or may not be easily 
surmounted, and hence these super-borders decide who is considered more or less 
foreign, as well as who can cross a border more or less effortlessly. The border 
between India and Pakistan provides a good example of this current geopolitical 
‘world order.’ While Western tourists (i.e. Americans, British, German, Australian 
and other citizens from the so-called ‘First World’) as well as multinational-capital 
and goods are allowed to cross the Indo-Pak border without much trouble; Indians and 
Pakistanis, by contrast, find it very complicated to travel across the border. The latter 
are faced with multiple stringent measures that hinder their journeys, such as the need 
for visas and the fact that ‘only one crossing at the rail frontier [between these two 
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countries] is open’15 for them to use. In this example, the fact that one is or is not a 
citizen from a country belonging to the supranational bloc of the developed countries 
determines whether and in which way one is allowed to cross the Indo-Pak border. 
IV. The Multiple Meanings of Borders 
The overdetermination of borders is closely linked to the second aspect that Balibar 
enumerates in his examination of the concept of the border, namely, what he calls the 
‘polysemic nature’ of borders. Balibar affirms that borders have a polysemic character 
in the sense that they present themselves differently to different people, and therefore 
they attribute diverse meanings depending on who experiences the crossing of a 
border and how this crossing is carried out. Indeed, today’s borders increasingly 
provide individuals belonging to different social classes and holding different 
nationalities with completely different ‘experiences of the law, the civil 
administration, the police and elementary rights, such as freedom of circulation and 
freedom of enterprise.’16  
Here the case of the Indo-Pak border can help again to illustrate the extent to 
which differences in social status and nationality among individuals determine the 
meaning that a particular border has for each person. The tourists from rich countries 
who attempt to traverse the border between India and Pakistan can do so almost 
effortlessly. Whereas for both Indian and Pakistani ‘coolies’ (unskilled and underpaid 
manual labourers who carry goods from one side of the border and give their cargos 
to other manual labourers on the other side) the border appears as an insurmountable 
barrier that they must face everyday as part of their work, and hence is fundamental to 
their survival. Examples of radically divergent experiences of the same border can be 
found worldwide. Crossing the US-Mexico border is not experienced in the same 
manner by US passport holders, who cross the border rather smoothly, as it is by 
undocumented immigrants who need to pay a smuggler in order to pass through and 
reach the other side. Likewise, travelling from North African territories (like the 
Spanish-Moroccan city of Ceuta) to the European Union is an entirely different 
experience for a Western tourist who is on a holiday, than it is for a sans-papiers 
émigré risking his life on a small boat in order to cross to the other side of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Kalra and Purewal, ‘The Strut of the Peacocks. Partition, Travel and the Indo-Pak Border,’ in Kaur, 
R., and Hutnyk, J. (eds), Travel Worlds: Journeys in Contemporary Cultural Politics (London and 
New York: Zed Books, 1999), pp.54-67 (p.58). 
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Mediterranean shore. Equally, many other instances of the polysemic nature of 
borders could also be invoked here.  
Having the ‘right’ credentials (that is, the ‘right’ class status and the ‘right’ 
nationality) conditions the ways in which crossing the border is experienced. Class 
and nationality have increasingly come to signify not just exclusively a certain social 
status and a national identity (alongside the rights of citizenship that this identity 
entails), but also the possibility or impossibility to enjoy an additional set of rights -- 
more specifically, a world right to circulate without deterrents. As Balibar puts it: 
For a rich person from a rich country […] the border has become an embarkation formality, 
a point of symbolic acknowledgement of his social status […]. For a poor person from a 
poor country, however, the border tends to be something quite different: not only is it an 
obstacle which is very difficult to surmount, but it is a place he runs up against repeatedly 
[…] when he is expelled or allowed to rejoin his family, so that it becomes, in the end, a 
place where he resides.17      
It is easy to see here why Anzaldúa is correct in affirming that borders are not merely 
physical boundaries, but rather, that they are places where different social, ethnic, 
religious and cultural identities encounter one another and are negotiated. Indeed, 
borders actively function as instruments of international class differentiation and 
discrimination.  
Nonetheless, in this respect, it can also be noted why Anzaldúa is not entirely 
right when she claims that any border-crossing experience is essentially a radical act, 
an act of transgression. To the extent that the crossing of a border has different 
meanings depending on who the individual crossing is, as well as under which 
conditions and socio-historical contexts the crossing takes place, it seems that the 
latter can only be a transgression in those cases where ‘fear of death and 
prosecution’18 are involved. For those for whom travelling across the border entails no 
risk, but rather offers something more like a temporal -- and even perhaps a playful -- 
stage, crossing a border seems to be simply a transition and not a transgression. The 
‘free’ border-crossers of the developed world see their social status recognised and 
reaffirmed when they travel from one side of a border to another. And so, instead of 
being supporters of ‘a radical cultural critique, [they] are often carriers of Western 
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18 Kalra and Purewal, ‘The Strut of the Peacocks,’ p.56. 
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superiority, tourists for whom international border crossings are not acts of 
transgression but more akin to transitions.’19  
 Perhaps the reason why Anzaldúa insists on considering any border-crossing 
as a transgression could be explained as a result of her attempt to find ways in which 
the arbitrary and violent imposition of divisions that borders necessarily entail can be 
transcended and resisted. In other words, perhaps because for Anzaldúa all borders 
involve policing and violence in order to enforce and maintain the divisions that they 
impose, then any border-crossing appears, for her, as a transgression. In one of her 
poems Anzaldúa describes the violence at the US-Mexico borderline: 
1,950 mile-long open wound 
dividing a pueblo, a culture, 
running down the length of my 
body, 
staking fence rods in my flesh, 
splits me splits me 
me raja me raja 
[…] 
But the skin of the earth is seamless 
The sea cannot be fenced, 
el mar does not stop at borders.20 
But even though Anzaldúa is correct in describing the violent and arbitrary character 
of borders, her need to find ways to subvert the divisions imposed through borders 
leads her to overlook the fact that borders present themselves with different degrees of 
violence depending on the person who experiences the border-crossing and on the 
circumstances in which this crossing occurs. At this point, I would like to draw 
attention to Balibar’s remark that for those poor individuals from developing 
countries, the border appears as an obstacle but also, at the same time (through the 
constant crossing or the attempts to cross it), the border becomes their site of 
residence, almost their home. The border is here a quasi-home in the sense that, as 
Balibar points out, it becomes a site where it is only possible ‘to live a life which is a 
waiting-to-live, a non-life.’21  Certainly, given that the ease or difficulty with which 
an individual crosses a border is conditioned by the possession or lack of the right 
credentials (that is, the right citizenship or social status), then those who do not hold 	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20 Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza, pp.2-3. 
21 Balibar, ‘What is a Border?,’ p.83. 
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the credentials (the poor from poor countries) not only are deprived from the freedom 
of circulation, but they are also denied recognition as individuals.22 Therefore, those 
who lack the right credentials see their very lives reduced to what Giorgio Agamben 
has called ‘bare life.’23 That is, these individuals see their lives reduced to the mere 
biological survival, cut off from the legal and social order. In other words, the lives of 
individuals who do not have the ‘right’ social status and nationality are turned into 
lives that are infrahuman, that are non-lives.     
Agamben’s distinction between ‘bare life’ (zoē) and ‘political life’ (bios) 
between the merely biological life that has no legal or socially recognized status and 
the properly ‘human life,’ is useful to explain Balibar’s idea that the border almost 
becomes a home for the poor person from a poor country. Agamben uses the 
Aristotelian terms zoē and bios in order to address the question of the relation 
between human life and sovereign power. While zoē is simply the life of biological 
survival, which we are all born into; bios is the (good) life of political participation 
that we enter into. The transition from bare life to political life entails, for Agamben, a 
paradoxical movement, an ‘inclusive exclusion.’ To pass from mere life to political 
life implies that mere life is the necessary precondition to enter into the domain of 
politics. Conversely, and at the same time, mere life can only be acknowledged as this 
essential precondition if it is distinguished and excluded from the realm of politics. 
Consequently, bare life constitutes the threshold of human life: simultaneously 
interior and exterior; included yet only as that which has to be segregated in order for 
the ‘qualified life,’ the life that is recognized and protected by the political order, to 
be able to emerge. In Agamben’s words:  
In the ‘politicization’ of bare life […] the humanity of living man is decided […]. There is 
politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to 
his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an 
inclusive exclusion.24      
Agamben finds in the figure of the ‘homo sacer’ of the archaic Roman law a concrete 
example of the process by which biological life is included in political life by way of 
its very exclusion. The homo sacer, the ‘sacred’ man, is the juridical category that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The fact that paper can embody the force of the law and, thereby, accredit an individual as a legal 
subject, bound by duties and protected by rights, is a topic that Derrida examines and relates with the 
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23 Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), p.8. 
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designates a criminal whom the state has banned from society, deprived of all his 
rights of citizenship and deemed worthy of death. Yet the state also prohibits his 
religious sacrifice as well as his legal execution. A homo sacer, however, could be 
killed by anyone with impunity. Thus, this ‘sacred’ man is simultaneously in and out 
of the sphere of human and divine law: his ‘life is included in the juridical order 
solely in the form of its exclusion (that is, of its capacity to be killed).’25   
 According to Agamben, this process of inscription of life into politics, by 
which the sovereign power actively distinguishes those who are political beings (and 
hence have the rights of citizenship) from those who are no more than mere bodies, 
mere biological life, started in antiquity but has continued into our present times. 
Indeed, for him, the history of Western politics is the history of this distinction, the 
history of the production of ‘sacred men’ (homines sacri). The asylum-seeker or 
refugee, the death row prisoner, as well as those persecuted in the Holocaust provide 
examples of modern-day ‘sacred men.’ Their lives are liminal, at the threshold 
between life and death, between exile and belonging, between human and infra-
human. This liminal life of the homo sacer is equivalent to the life that Hannah 
Arendt described in her Origins of Totalitarianism as ‘the abstract nakedness of being 
human.’26 That is, a life of ‘a man who is nothing but a man, [a life which] has lost 
the very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a fellow-
man.’27 This life, which lacks ‘the right to have rights,’28 is clearly exemplified by the 
so-called ‘sans-papiers’ or undocumented persons, the refugees and, in general, by 
stateless people.  
Returning to Balibar, given that borders have come to be instruments for 
international class discrimination and, consequently, have come to signify different 
things for people from different countries and of different social status, then borders 
frequently appear as hard to overcome barriers. By the same token, for some people 
from underdeveloped countries, borders have become their ‘residence.’ The border is 
a ‘home’ for them in the sense that the very existence of these individuals constitutes 
a border. Their very lives are a threshold between human and less-than-human. As 
Balibar would put it: these individuals are themselves borders. The polysemic nature 
of borders is thus manifested through the various meanings that the border and the 	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26 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Cleveland and New York: Meridian, 1958), p.299. 
27 Ibid, p.300. 
28 Ibid, p.296. 
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experience of crossing it can have for different persons. For some people, a border 
means simply a transitory space or a bureaucratic step required to reach some other 
place; for some others, by contrast, it means an obstacle that has to be overcome, and 
often it even means their ‘home.’  
Geo-political borders belong to a form of politics that is structured around 
concepts such as national citizenship, nation-state and national territory. This is 
politics of exclusion and discrimination that requires to be reformulated. As we will 
see in this chapter, Derrida claims that we need an alternative politics that, instead of 
excluding, is open to absolute alterity, the absolute other. In this thesis, I draw on 
Derrida’s ideas of politics and ethics of hospitality to re-conceptualize the border and 
argue that documentaries can function as borders or interstitial spaces that can give 
rise to political bonds outside of the direct sanction of the nation-state and geo-
political borders. 
V. Heterogeneous and Ubiquitous Borders 
The idea that an individual can be a border leads to the third aspect of borders that 
Balibar discusses: the heterogeneity and ubiquity of borders. Balibar explains that in 
today’s world borders are heterogeneous and ubiquitous in the sense that the political, 
cultural and/or socioeconomic boundaries no longer seem to coincide as they more or 
less did in the past, specifically, during what Balibar calls ‘the period of the nation-
state.’29 As a consequence, borders have moved, they have been displaced and thus 
are not localizable immediately and without mistake: 
[Borders] are no longer at the border, at an institutional site [or a geographical-political-
administrative point] that can be materialized on the ground and inscribed on the map, 
where one sovereignty ends and another begins […] This institutional form of the border is 
[…] today […] irreversibly coming undone.30 
There are various reasons why borders are now no longer at the boundaries of a 
territory concentrating the functions of sovereignty, policy, administration, taxation 
and cultural control among others. For Balibar, some of these reasons are: the 
transformation that international communication has undergone with the development 
of faster modes of transport and new information technologies; the fact that the speed 
at which economic transactions (purchase and sale) take place is beyond the control of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Balibar, ‘What is a Border?,’ p.84.  
For Balibar, the nation-state period is the time in history during which nation-states existed in such a 
form that they were closest to the nation-state ideal type.  
30 Balibar, ‘The Borders of Europe,’ p.89. 
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both citizens and administrations; the fact that some natural phenomena cannot be 
entirely appropriated, contained and controlled by a single state (like the expansion of 
the so-called ‘bird-flu,’ the ‘swine-flu’ or the ‘mad-cow’ diseases; or like the 
circulation of gases produced by the explosion in Chernobyl, for instance); the fact 
that it is no longer possible to find the exercise of political power, economic decision-
making and the creation of aesthetic ideals concentrated simultaneously in a single 
location; and the fact that the phenomena of inequality, poverty and exclusion can no 
longer be dealt with exclusively within the boundaries of nation-states. 
A question arises here as to whether or not all of the above mentioned 
phenomena, which are part of the contemporary process of globalization, have 
modified the form of nation-states so radically as to be possible to say, with Balibar, 
that we have entered into a new era different from that of the nation-state. This is a 
question worth exploring thoroughly, and which merits more space than can be 
devoted to it here. However, what I can say briefly in this regard is that within the 
realms of economy, communication and culture, social relations as well as private 
practices appear to be increasingly organized and regulated at transnational levels -- 
multinational corporations and the internet provide good examples of this. It 
nonetheless also seems true that a large number of public institutions continue to be 
regulated by the nation-state. In relation to this, it is also worth noting that whereas 
the circulation of capital, goods and information around the world is virtually 
unrestricted, the movement of people who lack the economic means to circulate 
seems, by contrast, to be more and more hindered. It thus seems possible to claim that 
we are currently witnessing a period where the traditional form of the nation-state (the 
hegemonic unity constituted by population, territory and sovereignty) has been 
radically transformed. Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to declare that our present 
period is completely different from the period of the nation-state, especially if one 
considers the manner in which immigration and asylum are managed today, where 
many decisions continue to be made at a national level.    
All the phenomena associated with the process of globalization that Balibar 
mentions have, likewise, crucially transformed the institution of the border. Borders 
are indeed no longer at the boundaries between two nation-states, and their function 
no longer seems to be merely that of containing and separating one sovereign state 
from another. However, this is not to say that borders are in the process of 
disappearing. Rather, they are at once being ‘multiplied and reduced in their 
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localization and their function.’31 Borders today are heterogeneous and ubiquitous, for 
they undertake new and diverse functions and hence they are situated in places where 
they were not before. As Balibar points out: 
Borders have stopped marking the limits where politics ends because the community ends 
[…]. This in fact means that borders are no longer at the shores of the political, but have 
indeed become -- perhaps by way of the police, given that every border patrol is today an 
organ of ‘internal security’ -- objects or […] things within the space of the political itself.32  
This last idea that borders have been assumed into the space of the political, instead of 
just being situated at its periphery, can be illuminated by invoking Agamben’s work 
once more. He explains the relation between life and politics, or better put, he 
describes the politicization of life in terms of the ‘inclusive exclusion’ by means of 
which ‘mere biological’ life is both separated from and included in the ‘qualified’ or 
‘political’ life. This biopolitical division between zoē and bios, which is basically the 
mode through which Western politics has operated from the antiquity to our present 
times, places ‘bare life’ as an existence in a ‘state of exception,’ a state of matters 
where the law has been suspended (yet not eliminated). For Agamben, given that 
‘bare life’ is that life which is deprived from any legal and social status, it is thus a 
life ‘abandoned’ from the rule of law, a life with no political significance, a life in a 
state of exception. This life is clearly instantiated by the case of the sans-papiers, the 
refugees and the stateless people. 
 According to Agamben, what is crucial in modern times is the fact that the 
threshold between ‘mere biological’ life and ‘political’ life, the threshold of the ‘state 
of exception,’ seems to have moved from the periphery of the domain of the political 
to its very centre in such a way that the state of exception has increasingly become the 
rule. Indeed, today the rule of law appears to suspend itself more and more overtly 
and extensively, with the obvious result that anything becomes possible and 
legitimised. Agamben writes: 
What characterizes modern politics is not so much the inclusion of zoē in the polis -- which 
is in itself absolutely ancient […]. Instead, the decisive fact is that, together with the process 
by which the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare life -- which is 
originally situated at the margins of the political order -- gradually begins to coincide with 
the political realm, and inclusion and exclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoē, right and 
fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction.33      	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid, p.92. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p.9. 
	   41	  
It is worth noting here that for Agamben it is the law, by way of its suspension, that 
produces the exception, instead of the exception being that which subtracts itself from 
the law. In this sense, the exception is not entirely without relation to the law; the 
exception keeps a relation to the law in the form of the law’s suspension. Conversely, 
by giving rise to the exception through its suspension, and by maintaining itself in 
relation to the exception, the law constitutes itself as a law. Thus, paradoxically, the 
exception appears as the primal juridical element, as that which simultaneously 
produces and is produced by the law. In other words, the idea here is that the state of 
exception is an organizing element setting a border of sorts between what is inside 
and outside of the law. 
 Agamben argues that the state of exception that has become the rule in 
contemporary political life -- consequently leading to the suspension of the rule of law 
virtually everywhere -- is clearly exemplified by the concentration camp. Within the 
space of the concentration camp zoē and bios, exclusion and inclusion, abandonment 
and protection, law and violence, enter a zone of indistinction. For Agamben, the 
concentration camp, far from being a historical anomaly, is the undercover model 
governing in today’s political realm. Insofar as what results from the suspension of 
the law in the concentration camp is nothing but the indeterminate abstraction of ‘bare 
life,’ today’s politics is the decision concerning precisely what is excluded from 
politics, the un-political or ‘bare life.’ Agamben extends his analysis of camps as the 
form of the nomos in our current world to include and bring to the fore the 
contemporary and ‘less lethal’ (yet more familiar) version of the concentration camps. 
These are the so-called ‘centres of temporary permanence’ or ‘detention centres,’ 
which are normally located at modern airports or other points of entry in order to 
detain for a indefinite (but limited) period of time undocumented immigrants (that is, 
displaced ‘aliens’ whose legal and national status is believed to be unclear). In 
Agamben’s words: 
If the essence of the camp consists in the materialization of the state of exception and in the 
subsequent creation of a space in which bare life and the juridical rule enter into a threshold 
of indistinction, then we must admit that we find ourselves virtually in the presence of a 
camp every time such a structure is created, independent of the kinds of crime that are 
committed there […]. The stadium in Bari into which the Italian police in 1992 
provisionally herded all illegal Albanian immigrants before sending them back to their 
country, the winter cycle-racing track in which the Vichy authorities gathered the Jews 
before consigning them to the German […], or the zones d’attentes in French international 
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airports in which foreigners asking for refugee status are detained will then all equally be 
camps.34       
In the light of Agamben’s reading here, it is possible now to try to elucidate Balibar’s 
claim that borders have undertaken new diverse functions, which place them no 
longer at the margins of politics (separating one nation-state from another) but inside 
of the political realm, wherever a certain selective control is located. Balibar is correct 
because the structure of the border is increasingly found reproduced not only at any 
health or security checkpoint or at the numerous immigration detention centres, but 
also within the cities where ‘safe’ neighbourhoods are segregated from ‘dangerous’ 
neighbourhoods and/or outsiders by private hired security guards. All these are 
examples of borders, but they are also instances of what Agamben has diagnosed as 
the fact that the state of exception has become a rule in contemporary societies. 
Indeed, the proliferation of the apparatus of the border within the space of the political 
provides evidence of the degree to which, in today’s societies, the threshold between 
‘bare life’ and ‘political life’ (zoē and bios), abandonment and protection, violence 
and law, has been displaced from the periphery to the very inside of politics as much 
as it has been blurred. What this means thus is that now borders function as 
instruments for the establishment and maintenance of the state of exception. Since the 
state of exception appears to be the rule everywhere, borders have, as a consequence, 
proliferated and become a part within the space of the political. 
 In view of this situation, it has become a pressing need to think about 
alternative forms of social and political bonds, bonds that could perhaps function 
beyond the direct sanction of the national sovereign that necessarily creates the 
exclusion between the unprotected or naked lives and the protected ones. The second 
part of this chapter explores this issue. In particular, I will discuss Derrida’s proposal 
of a social and political bond based on the principle of hospitality, and his claim that 
such a bond is the best way to both understand and tackle the problem of 
undocumented people and refugees. Derrida defends a politics that is not a politics of 
fraternity, but a politics that rejects ‘the masculine authority of the brother’35 and that 
does not privilege ‘genealogy, family, birth, autochthony, and the nation.’36 As we 
will see, this entails an alternative conception of politics and a new way of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Ibid, p.174. 
35 Derrida, Rogues. Two Essays on Reason, trans by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2005), p.58. 
36 Ibid. 
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understanding citizenship as a practice that is not exclusively and directly determined 
by the nation-state. For Derrida, this politics is opposed and yet closely linked to 
ethics, and the way he explains this link is through the concept of hospitality. My 
argument in this thesis is that this alternative understanding of politics can be seen at 
work in documentary films about migration. 
VI. A Derridian Hospitality 
According to Derrida, the question of hospitality emerges whenever we are faced with 
the arrival of a newcomer, a foreigner. In other words, the question of hospitality 
essentially concerns the ways in which we respond to, receive and negotiate the 
arrival of ‘the other.’ Equally important for Derrida’s understanding of hospitality is 
the fact that he defines ethics as hospitality and hospitality as ethics. Indeed, his view 
is that hospitality is not a part or a branch of ethics, but the foundation or the principle 
upon which ethics itself is based.37 In this section, I will analyse his notion of 
hospitality as well his arguments about the relationship between ethics and politics. 
More particularly, I will consider his view of the way in which these two conflicting 
areas are nevertheless linked together, and how this bond challenges the traditional 
notion of citizenship and calls for a radical transformation of the (conditional) laws 
that govern the reception of foreigners. Derrida’s position is that, in the face of 
today’s pressing problem of undocumented people and refugees, we all have the 
moral and political duty to actively pursue the improvement of these conditional laws 
of hospitality. And this, he says, begins with our duty to translate and improve the 
languages of law, to make the laws less violent and more just. 
Arguably, the work where Derrida overtly addresses the problem of the 
political The Politics of Friendship38 in which he considers the nature of politics and 
its relationship to the unconditional (that is, to ethics) by way of an exploration of the 
figure of the friend. Through an analysis of the concept of friendship, Derrida argues 
that the experience of absolute alterity reveals that ‘what is unconditional and 
incalculable is necessarily contaminated by the calculations and negotiations [the 
decisions] we associate with politics.’39 I will explain these ideas of Derrida further 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 See Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, trans. by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p.50. 
38 Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, trans. by George Collins (London and New York: Verso, 2005). 
39 Cheah and Guerlac, ‘Introduction: Derrida and the Time of the Political,’ in Cheah and Guerlac 
(eds), Derrida and the Time of the Political (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2009), pp.1-
37 (p. 7). 
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on, but first I will present his notion of hospitality, as this will allow me to explain the 
relationship between politics and ethics, the conditional and the unconditional. 
Derrida explicitly raises the topic of hospitality in Adieu to Emmanuel 
Levinas, in Rogues, as well as in a series of different seminars that Derrida held both 
in the United States and Paris, and where he directly engaged with the issue of 
hospitality. Of Hospitality,40 Paper Machine41 and ‘Hostipitality’42 provide examples 
of this. In all these texts Derrida affirms that hospitality, just like the notions of 
forgiveness, gift, mourning and justice entails an impossibility, more precisely, an 
aporia. Derrida argues that for hospitality to be possible, there needs to be a host, 
someone who holds ownership and control of a ‘home’ (for instance, a house or 
nation), and who identifies himself as the owner. Put in other words, in order to be 
able to welcome the foreign or new arrival, it is essential to have the power to host, 
which in turn requires one to have a property, and hence also to bear control over the 
arrival and reception of the other. For, if there is no control over who is to be 
welcomed or not, guests could potentially take over the house or nation, thus 
undermining any possible hospitality. On the other hand, for hospitality to be 
possible, an absolute or unconditional welcoming of the other is also necessary. That 
is, a reception of everyone and anyone who might arrive regardless of who they are, 
where they come from, and whether they have been invited or not. Hospitality, 
therefore, simultaneously calls for the sovereign authority of the host over his house 
and for the host’s renunciation both to impose restrictions upon new	  arrivals and to 
claim any ownership. Hospitality in this sense is the ‘possibility of impossibility.’43 It 
is an aporia. In Derrida’s words: 
[Hospitality] ordains, even making it desirable, a welcome without reservations or 
calculation, an unlimited display of hospitality to the new arrival. But a cultural or linguistic 
community, a family or a nation, cannot fail at the very least to suspend if not to betray this 
principle of absolute hospitality: so as to protect a “home,” presumably, by guaranteeing 
property and “one’s own” against the unrestricted arrival of the other; but also so as to try to 
make the reception real, determined and concrete -- to put it into practice.44         
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Derrida, Of Hospitality. Anne Dufourmantelle Invites Jacques Derrida to Respond, trans. by Rachel 
Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). 
41 Derrida, Paper Machine, trans. by Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
42 Derrida, ‘Hostipitality,’ in Anidjar, G. (ed), Acts of Religion (London and New York: Routledge, 
2002), pp.358-420.  
43 Ibid, p.364. 
44 Derrida, ‘The Principle of Hospitality,’ in Paper Machine, pp.66-69 (p.66). 
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In this sense, hospitality appears as the impossible. An antinomy, an aporetic concept, 
for it entails the inexorable tension between two kinds of hospitality. On the one hand, 
there is an unlimited or absolute hospitality, governed by the ‘law of unconditional 
hospitality,’ which is an absolute ethical requirement, a categorical command that 
‘implies that you [as host] don’t ask the other, the newcomer, the guest, to give 
anything back, or even to identify himself or herself.’45 On the other hand, there is a 
conditional hospitality which, through the laws of hospitality (that is, the legal, and 
hence political, principles of hospitality), imposes some requisites and restrictions to 
the welcoming of new arrivals. It is clear then that the unconditional character of 
absolute hospitality renders hospitality impossible because a limitless reception of 
newcomers, a reception without any restrictions, implies that the host needs to be 
ready to renounce the mastery of his home and give up his control over the threshold 
or border of his space, nation or house. In other words, unconditional hospitality 
demands that the host no longer be a host, that the host receive the other infinitely, 
that the host welcome the other beyond his capacity.46 Yet, there cannot be hospitality 
without sovereignty of the host over his home nor is hospitality possible without 
limits or conditions. Absolute hospitality could never be juridically or politically 
instituted because politics, as I will further explain in the next section, pertains to 
establishing laws and hence conditions and limitations, whereas absolute hospitality is 
unconditional. Thus, Derrida concludes, hospitality is impossible. And nevertheless, 
absolute hospitality is the condition of possibility of a more restricted concept of 
hospitality such as the right to immigration, the right to asylum or the rights of 
citizenship. ‘Only an unconditional hospitality can give meaning and practical 
rationality to a concept of hospitality. Unconditional hospitality exceeds juridical, 
political or economic calculation. But no thing and no one happens or arrives without 
it.’47 Derrida also adds that because of the aporetic character of this notion, hospitality 
functions as a threshold and at a threshold. The moment the host affirms his 
ownership, declares himself ‘at home’ and sets the boundaries and the threshold of his 
property is also the exact moment when he welcomes the new arrival, and when he 
relinquishes his claim on property and allows the threshold to be crossed. This play 	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and Dooley, M. (eds), Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy (London and New 
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between the conditional and the unconditional within hospitality, the contradictory 
relationship between the two and yet their inseparability, underlines and defines the 
relationship between ethics and politics, as we will see in the next section. Cheah and 
Guerlac explain this thus: 
[The] urgent propulsion of the impossible into the realm of the possible is precisely the 
structure in which the unconditional or incalculable other demands that we as rational 
subjects respond and be responsible by calculating and inscribing the unconditional within 
present conditions even as this is a violation of the other’s alterity. It is a question precisely 
of an ‘impossible transaction between the conditional and the unconditional, the calculable 
and the incalculable.’48 
As mentioned before, Derrida links his conception of hospitality with the concepts of 
gift, mourning and forgiveness by way of the impossibility that he believes is a 
common feature of the four concepts. For instance, pure gift, like unconditional 
hospitality, can only be given without the expectation of receiving something in 
return. For if the receiver needs to reciprocate or if he contracts a debt with the donor, 
then it is not a gift. For there to be an absolute gift it is necessary that the receiver 
does not take it as a gift, because if he recognises it as a gift, then the prospect of there 
being a counter-gift, a possible reciprocation, emerges. And when the chance for 
reciprocation exists, the gift, rather than being a gift, turns itself into an exchange, a 
trade. Neither the giver nor the receiver ought to expect something in return, for this 
expectation annuls the gift. However, it seems that if a gift is not recognised as such, 
it is meaningless. Derrida thereby affirms that pure gift is impossible, an aporetic 
concept, for in order to be a gift, it would also have to not be a gift.  	   In a similar fashion, according to Derrida, mourning is impossible. When we 
mourn the death of someone we hold dear, we spend a period of time during which 
we seem to be unable to overcome such a loss; a period during which the other, who 
no longer exists, lives within us. During mourning, the ones who survive the death of 
a loved one, feel sad and guilty for having survived, and hence responsible for the 
death in question.49 If mourning is to succeed, says Derrida, the survivor who mourns 
needs to be able to overcome the loss. Nonetheless, if the survivor is able to get over 
the death of the other, mourning seems to fail in its task. A proper mourning, in this 
sense, is unattainable for if it is successful, it fails; but it has to fail if it is to succeed.    
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By the same token, forgiveness entails an impossibility; it is also an aporetic 
concept. Derrida argues that any kind of forgiveness, be it personal, political or legal 
has to forgive the unforgivable, for if ‘one had to forgive only what is forgivable, 
even excusable, venial, as one says, or insignificant, then one would not forgive.’50 A 
forgiveness which is too readily granted, is meaningless; it is not a real forgiveness. 
Furthermore, Derrida says, the forgiving subject seems to assume that he has the 
capacity to grant pardon, that he has the sovereignty needed to forgive. Nonetheless, 
pure forgiveness requires that I forgive what I am unable to forgive, that I forgive 
what is beyond my power. A forgiveness that is beyond what is mine to forgive can 
only be a forgiveness granted in the name of the other, that is, a forgiveness that 
relinquishes the self-appointed sovereignty required to grant any pardon. Absolute 
forgiveness is, like unconditional hospitality, mourning and pure gift, impossible.  
Derrida writes: 
Regarding what links the test and the ordeal [l’épreuve] of hospitality to that of forgiveness, 
one should not only say that forgiveness granted to the other is the supreme gift and 
therefore hospitality par excellence. Forgiving would be opening for and smiling to the 
other, whatever his fault or his indignity, whatever the offense or even the threat. Whoever 
asks for hospitality, asks, in a way, for forgiveness and whoever offers hospitality, grants 
forgiveness –and forgiveness must be infinite or it is nothing: it is excuse or exchange.51      
In this sense, the negotiations and transactions between the conditional and the 
unconditional, calculation and the incalculable, are not only at work in the figure of 
hospitality, but also in other figures of unconditionality like the ones above 
mentioned. Let us consider now the theoretical implications that Derrida draws from 
his approach to the concept of hospitality, and how he connects ethics and politics. 
VII. Politics of Friendship as Other, Undecidability, Responsibility and 
Ethics 
The two types of hospitality mentioned seem to amount to a distinction between two 
realms. On the one hand, the realm of ethics; and on the other, the realm of politics or 
the realm of the juridical. Indeed, for Derrida, unconditional hospitality lies outside 
right and duty; it lies beyond the juridical. Hence, absolute hospitality is not bound up 
with the state. Conditional hospitality, by contrast, to the extent that it imposes limits 
and requirements, is concerned with norms, rights, duties and obligations, and 
therefore, it is inscribed in the juridical, in the sphere of politics.  	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   It is worth stopping here to consider the conceptualisation of politics that 
Derrida defends especially in Politics of Friendship and Rogues so that it becomes 
clearer why he believes that ethics and politics are co-originary and indissociable, and 
yet also contradictory. Derrida takes issue with traditional political theory through the 
concept of the friend. He particularly criticises Schmitt’s thesis that the essence of 
politics lies on the distinction between friend and enemy, or better said, the essence of 
politics lies on the possibility of having enemies for without an enemy, war would not 
be possible and without the possibility of war the political itself could not be.52 Such a 
politics presupposes, for Derrida, an idea of the friend as identical or homogeneous to 
the self. It is a politics that grants privilege to similarity and identification, rather than 
to radical alterity and singularity. For this reason, this is a politics based on the figure 
of the brother and on the concepts of citizenship and nation, which means that it is a 
politics of exclusion of the other on the basis of gender, race, national citizenship and 
class. Derrida claims that this politics of fraternity sustains the traditional conception 
of democracy, and that we need to find another kind of politics, and hence, another 
conception of democracy, another conception of the rule of people that is disentangled 
from confraternity, brotherhood and friendship as resemblance. What Derrida 
proposes thus is a politics based on of the figure of the friend as absolute other. In this 
sense, the friend cannot be identified with ourselves or reduced to a version of 
ourselves, hence the politics that results is one of ‘heterogeneity, of the singular, of 
the non-same.’53 Because this is a politics of the encounter with the radical other, this 
encounter cannot be calculated or anticipated, it comes from an unknown future. 
Derrida calls this politics of the friend as other ‘democracy to come,’ and he says it is 
the condition of an alternative concept of the political beyond all current 
understandings of this concept. Derrida writes: 
For democracy remains to come; this is its essence in so far as it remains: not only will it 
remain indefinitely perfectible, hence always insufficient and future, but, belonging to the 
time of the promise, it will always remain, in each of its future times, to come: even when 
there is democracy, it never exists, it is never present, it remains a theme of a non-
presentable concept. Is it possible to open up to the ‘come’ of a certain democracy which is 
no longer an insult to the friendship we have striven to think beyond the homo-fraternal and 
phallogocentric schema?54 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Derrida, Politics of Friendship, p.84. 
53 Derrida, Rogues, p.38. 
54 Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, p.306. 
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For Derrida, the experience of absolute alterity is the experience of an unknown, 
incalculable and undecidable event. We cannot anticipate nor prevent this event. The 
‘to-come’ of democracy is this imminent coming of the incalculable or the 
unconditional. The ‘to-come’ (‘à-venir’), always refers to the other, the 
heteronomous, and thus implies an opening to a future, which is never a future 
present. Democracy in this sense is promise. Derrida explains: 
Future present is not democracy for tomorrow. It is within the concept of democracy that 
the promise is included. The concept of promise, that is the opening that refers to the future, 
is part of democracy. […] If one day democracy were perfectly accomplished, that is 
present, there would be no future, and there would be no promise, and without the promise 
there would be no democracy. When I say democracy is ‘to come’ first I distinguish 
between à-venir and the future present; and I insist on the coming that is the event, à-venir 
meaning the advent of an event. […] If I knew that tomorrow democracy would be present, 
that democracy was a necessity of History […], then in that case I would be a fatalist. It is 
because we know that this is not the case that we should struggle for democracy.55 
How is this politics of the friend as radical other, this democracy to-come, related to 
ethics? The experience of the undecidable implied by the ‘to-come’ of democracy 
necessarily entails a demand for responsibility. In the face of the incalculable and 
undecidable, a decision (or decisions) must be taken. ‘Responsibility for a decision 
[…] arises from the fact the decision is heterogeneous to knowledge.’56 Since there is 
no way to ground this decision on a calculation, since the decision is ungrounded and 
thus implies a risk, then responsibility must be taken for the decision. This means that 
the experience of the undecidable demands a response to the call of the other who 
requires that we inscribe and calculate the unconditional within present conditions, 
even when this amounts to doing violence to the other’s alterity. Derrida claims that 
any decision is a bet and an interruption,57 for there is no way we can anticipate its 
outcome; and yet a decision must be taken, it cannot be suspended, it is urgent. A 
‘decision is the other’s [and] responsibility is for the other, with the other. […] 
Responsibility is not my property, I cannot reappropriate it, and that is the place of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Derrida, ‘On Responsibility,’ Interview with Dronsfield, Midgley and Wilding, in Dronsfield, and 
Midgley (eds), Responsibilities of Deconstruction, PLI. Warwick Journal of Philosophy, Vol.6 
(Summer, 1997), pp.19-36 (p.30).  
56 Norval, ‘Hegemony After Deconstruction. The Consequences of Undecidability,’ in Journal of 
Political Ideologies, Vol.9, No.2 (June, 2004), pp.139-157 (p.149). 
57 In later chapters I will link the ideas of the decision as interruption, and politics as decision-making, 
to the concept of the cinematic cut as the decision taken by the filmmaker but that is always open to the 
unforeseeable and incalculable response of the spectators and the filmed subjects. 
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justice: the relation to the other.’58 Thus, the absolute other demands a negotiation 
between the unconditional and the conditional, the calculable and the incalculable, the 
impossible and the possible.   
We can now start to see the link between these contradicting realms of politics 
and ethics. As explained above, politics entails taking decisions, making laws, 
imposing conditions and thus following a calculation in the light of the experience of 
the undecidable; and this calculation is necessarily violent, for it attempts to include 
within a programme of calculation that which is unconditional and incalculable: the 
radical other. The decisions of politics are ungrounded, they necessarily imply a risk 
and hence responsibility. It is here where ethics comes into play, as ethics is the realm 
of the unconditional that demands precisely that responsibility be assumed for the 
inevitable violence impinged on the absolute other. This explains how ethics and 
politics are necessarily bound together despite being irreconcilable. These two realms 
require one another. Calculation and the incalculable are both necessary, and they 
cannot be reduced to one another nor can politics be deduced from ethics. Ethics as 
responsibility for and openness to the other implies a constant strive to make the 
decisions and laws of politics -- that inevitably violate the alterity and singularity of 
the other -- less violent. In this sense, ethics remains as a promise. As Moore explains 
it: 
[If] the deduction of politics from ethics is necessary, it is because it is impossible; because 
the condition of the possibility of deducing politics from ethics is also the condition of its 
impossibility. The deduction is not given, but promised, with the ‘very indestructibility of 
the “it is necessary [du ‘il faut’]” serving as ‘the condition of a re-politicization, perhaps of 
another concept of the political.’59  
There is thus a very particular understanding of ethics that results from Derrida’s view 
of the constant transaction between the political and the ultrapolitical, the decision 
and the undecidable. This is not a conception of ethics that constitutes a system 
stipulating what the right and wrong actions are or what our moral duties are. Ethics, 
in this sense, does not offer a standardized universal procedure or a moral code with 
which we can test and judge whether the principle or maxim under which an action is 
(or is to be) performed is a (morally) valid principle. Instead, Derrida links together 
ethics and politics through the experience of aporia. Ethical responsibility thus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Derrida, ‘On Responsibility,’ p.27. 
59 Moore, ‘Crises of Derrida: Theodicy, Sacrifice and (Post-)deconstruction,’ in Derrida Today, Vol.5, 
No.2 (2012), pp.264-282 (p.279). 
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amounts to an active exercise of observation and of maintenance of a critical stance 
over the laws, decisions, conditions and calculations made by politics. The task of 
ethics, as this constant critical awareness, is to question and interrupt decision 
procedures that attempt to reach universal consensus. ‘The ethical moment […] of 
responsibility, arises out of the restlessness of the experience of aporia, […] of 
undecidability. […] Such an experience of undecidability is at the very antipodes of 
complacency, it is the perpetual wakefulness of thinking taking place as the 
interruption of consensus.’60 
This same structure of transaction and negotiation between the unconditional 
and the conditional, incalculable and calculable, ethics and politics is also at play in 
Derrida’s account of hospitality. As I said before, the two figures of hospitality, 
conditional and unconditional contradict each other but cannot be separated. Thus 
Derrida says, the unconditional law of hospitality needs the conditional laws of 
hospitality for it to be effectively put into practice, even if those conditional laws 
‘deny […] or […] sometimes corrupt or pervert’ 61  the unconditional law of 
hospitality. Conversely, the pervertibility of the law of unconditional hospitality is a 
necessary condition for the laws of conditional hospitality to be perfectible and open 
to improvement there where they commit violence against alterity and pervert the law 
of absolute hospitality. In Derrida’s own words: 
It is the pure and hyperbolical hospitality in whose name we should always invent the best 
dispositions, the least bad conditions, the most just legislation, so as to make it as effective 
as possible. This is necessary to avoid the perverse effects of an unlimited hospitality […]. 
Calculate the risks, yes, but don’t shut the door on what cannot be calculated, meaning the 
future and the foreigner -- that’s the double law of hospitality. It defines the unstable place 
of strategy and decision. Of perfectibility and progress.62    
Derrida’s point is that the realisation that an ideal or absolute hospitality is impossible 
necessarily requires us to be constantly aware and attentive to the ways in which we 
react to and legislate the reception of newcomers. For these are always conditional 
forms of hospitality and, as such, always violent and open to improvement there 
where they impose conditions and hence fail to meet the demands of an absolute 
hospitality. Instead of leading to immobility and the self-satisfied acknowledgement 	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(eds), Responsibilities of Deconstruction, PLI. Warwick Journal of Philosophy, Vol.6 (Summer, 1997), 
pp.87-102 (p.97). 
61 Derrida, Of Hospitality, p.79. 
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of the inexorable failure to attain pure hospitality, Derrida’s assertion of the 
impossibility of unconditional hospitality opens up the possibility and the duty to 
constantly transform the conditional laws of hospitality in search for the lesser violent 
and thus less bad law. Indeed, recognising the restrictions and limits set up by 
conditional hospitality necessarily places us in a certain relation to impossibility: it 
prompts us to challenge and negotiate those limits and conditions. Thus, Derrida is 
arguing here for a politics that admits failure and that is always open to negotiation 
and improvement where it has violated alterity and failed to be just. Derrida explains: 
We have to define a policy of absolutely unconditional openness to whoever is coming and, 
because this is absolutely impossible, we have to produce laws and rules in order to select, 
in the best possible way, the ones we host, we welcome. This is an example of a situation 
where we must remain absolutely open to who is coming, but nevertheless try to adjust our 
policy as far as possible, and the conditions as far as possible, to this unconditionality. And 
this is in every singular instance a political and an ethical challenge.63  
In this way, for Derrida the two hospitalities (unconditional and conditional), like 
ethics and politics, are two opposing and incompatible spheres but ‘one calls forth, 
involves, or prescribes the other.’64 On the one hand, there’s the ‘hyperbolical’ moral 
duty to welcome the other without restrictions. On the other, there is the juridico-
political and conditional hospitality that implies an apparatus of laws, states and 
borders. What are the implications of the Derridian view about the bond between 
ethics and politics? In which way can a politics that seeks to make less violent and 
less bad laws contribute towards transforming what is going on today in our world? In 
what sense can politics as taking decisions and making laws be related to the work 
that photographers and filmmakers produce? I will explore the first two questions in 
the remaining sections of this chapter. And this will provide me the ground to discuss 
the last question in subsequent chapters, where I will argue that the documentary 
filmmaker acts as a host to spectators and filmed subjects. The filmmaker takes 
decisions and sets limits and conditions by cutting, editing and/or deciding on the 
montage of the film but also, through these decisions regarding especially the form 
(but also the content) of the film, she welcomes and leaves the door open for 
spectators and filmed subjects to take active participation in determining the meaning 
of the documentary.  	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64 Derrida, Of Hospitality, p.147. 
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 VIII. What is a Politics of Hospitality? 
The Derridian view of a politics that derives from his analysis of hospitality is a much 
more demanding politics, for it entails that we must be in constant search for the less 
bad or less violent hospitality in the light of the impossibility of an absolute or ideal 
hospitality. The acknowledgement that an ideal hospitality is impossible rather than 
leading to abasement or to the complacent recognition of inexorable failure, compels 
us to continuously improve the conditional laws of hospitality where they have 
violated alterity and perverted or failed to follow the law of unconditional hospitality. 
This is a politics of negotiation, a politics that acknowledges its flaws and never stops 
seeking the less bad laws of conditional hospitality.  	   For Derrida, the immediate consequence of such a politics is that the content 
of the laws is underdetermined, and thus, it remains always open to being determined. 
But how is the content of the laws to be determined so that these laws commit less 
violence or are less bad laws? The determination of the political or juridical content 
can never be done in advance for it is ‘beyond knowledge, beyond all presentation.’65 
Determining the juridical content cannot -- and should not -- occur through a 
machine-like, generalized process. This can only take place in the specificity of a one-
time event. In Derrida’s words: 
The political or the juridical content that is […] assigned remains underdetermined, still to 
be determined […] in a singular way, in the speech and the responsibility taken by each 
person, in each situation, and on the basis of an analysis that is each time unique -- unique 
and infinite, […] interminable in spite of the urgency of the decision.66     
It appears that for Derrida the determination of the politico-juridical content has to be 
carried out in a singular way so that the laws (the conditional laws of hospitality) 
avoid being anonymously universal and judging automatically without attending to 
the particularity of each case. The Derridian view of a politics which takes 
ungrounded decisions and is for this reason prompted to seek for less bad laws and to 
judge singularly is by far a more demanding politics. It is a politics that, by 
considering each case individually in order to decide the content of the laws, is in an 
ongoing process of perfecting these laws. When Derrida proposes a politics of 
perfectibility, a politics that contradicts ethics but that cannot be separated from it, he 
is arguing especially against the Kantian view that treats ethical questions as matters 	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that can be answered or decided by a universal law applicable to all cases under all 
circumstances.  
In Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,67 Kant defends a universal right 
to hospitality as one of three definitive articles that could ensure perpetual peace 
between states.68 Just as Kant proposes a universal law against which we can test the 
moral validity of the maxims or principles guiding our actions (the categorical 
imperative demands that we act in such a way that we can will that the maxim of our 
action be turned into a universal law),69 he also thinks that the world could reach a 
state of perpetual peace if states were to follow certain principles. In short, Kant 
believes that there is a universal procedure with which we can decide both how to act 
morally correctly and how to legislate laws that ensure peace. Reading Kant, Derrida 
argues that this cosmopolitan right to hospitality establishes restrictions and 
conditions on the reception of foreign citizens in a nation-state. This move of Kant, 
claims Derrida, renders hospitality a merely juridico-political matter, a universalized 
procedure or calculation that closes itself off from the arrival of the absolute other, 
and that consequently undermines the very principle it is supposed to defend: an 
unconditional hospitality. 
[When Kant concludes that the law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of 
universal hospitality], the universal hospitality is here only juridical and political; it grants 
only the right to temporary sojourn and not the right of residence; it concerns only the 
citizens of States; and, in spite of its institutional character, it is founded on a natural right, 
the common possession of the round and finite surface of the earth, across which humans 
cannot spread ad infinitum. The realization of this natural right, and thus of universal 
hospitality, is referred to a cosmopolitical constitution that the human species can only 
approach indefinitely.70  
Derrida qualifies Kant’s idea of a universal right of hospitality as a ‘cosmo-political’ 
hospitality. By setting conditions and turning hospitality into a matter of the State and 
laws, this allegedly universal right is entirely determined by and dependent on 	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individuals’ citizenship. There are two main things that seem to concern Derrida 
regarding the Kantian cosmopolitical right to universal hospitality. First, he believes 
that by inscribing the principle of universal hospitality in juridical discourse -- that is, 
in a (conditional) law, Kant makes any relationship with the other a public matter, a 
matter of the State. If all relationships with the other were to fall under the regulation 
of the law, then there could not be a separation between the private and the public 
spheres, for even personal relations would be governed by the law. For Derrida, a 
society where everything is public matter is a society of transparency, a society where 
everything is policed (including our most intimate relationships), and hence a society 
where responsibility for the other is fragmented. Thus, Derrida’s worry in this regard 
is that an effacement of the distinction between public and private amounts to the 
elimination of the space called home, and hence to the elimination of the very 
possibility of hospitality. Even worse, blurring the distinction between the private and 
the public can lead to the criminalisation of hospitality. As regards this latter worry, 
Derrida is particularly concerned with events that were taking place in France at the 
time when he was developing his ideas on hospitality. Specifically, he was referring 
to the offence stipulated by the French ‘Pasqua law’ of 1993 as the ‘crime of 
hospitality,’ 71  which punishes (and even imprisons) anyone hosting at home a 
foreigner in an irregular situation. This criminalisation of private hospitality clearly 
undermines our ethical responsibility towards the other by subsuming private 
hospitality into state or public hospitality. As Mireille Rosello puts it:  
The implied consequence of the state’s right to interfere in the definition of what constitutes 
an authorized guest is that the host’s house is a subset of the national territory and that 
private gestures of hospitality are always a subcategory of national hospitality.72 
The only way to avoid turning hospitality into a merely juridico-political matter, into 
a homogenizing calculation, and to avoid erasing the public and private sphere 
distinction is by adopting a politics of hospitality that recognises the impossibility of 
ideal or absolute hospitality and that, nonetheless, is constantly seeking for the less 
violent or less bad laws of hospitality, even when there is also no universal calculation 
that can allow to decide what constitutes a ‘less’ violent law.  	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 The second concern that Derrida has with regards to Kant’s idea of a right to 
universal hospitality is that, in reducing hospitality to ‘an inter-state conditionality 
that limits […] the very hospitality it guarantees,’ this cosmopolitical right turns out 
to be entirely dependent on citizenship. What is at issue for Derrida here is the fact 
that the right to give and receive hospitality is determined exclusively within the 
framework of the nation-state and the category of citizenship. Derrida is questioning 
the extent to which this framework is able to include refugees, the displaced and 
immigrants with or without citizenship. For him, today’s massive transnational 
migration phenomenon calls into question the use of national citizenship as the 
determinant condition for the right of hospitality. Indeed, the large numbers of exiled, 
displaced and stateless people evidence how the traditional concepts of citizenship 
and of nation-state are no longer pertinent. For him, ‘a change in the socio- and geo-
political space -- a juridico-political mutation […], an ethical conversion’ 73  is 
indispensable. Derrida writes: 
With regard to this right of refuge […] millions of “undocumented immigrants” [sans 
papiers], of “homeless” [sans domicile fixe], call out for another international law, another 
border politics, indeed a humanitarian commitment that effectively operates beyond the 
interests of Nation-States. 74 
It is important to underline in this respect that, although Derrida affirms that 
the question of immigration and undocumented people does ‘not strictly coincide with 
[the question] of hospitality, which [reaches] beyond the civic or political arena,’75 he 
does believe that it is not possible to discuss and make sense of the issue of the 
reception of foreigners without engaging in a discussion of the topic of hospitality. 
For him, the question of how the stateless, the refugee, the deported, the migrant and, 
in general, the other are to be welcomed is a question of responsibility. It is a question 
that calls for a responsible response to a claim made by the foreign arrival. This 
question is precisely that of hospitality.  
Here a question necessarily arises. Is a politics of hospitality that is not 
restricted to citizenship and the interests of nation-states even plausible? Can there be 
a politics of hospitality that legislates ‘in the name of the unconditional’? Derrida 
offers some clues as to how these questions could be thought of and responded. In the 
next section, I will analyse what Derrida seems to suggest as possible answers. 	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IX. A Politics Beyond the Limits of the Nation-State 
I have explained that Derrida criticises the Kantian view that the right to universal 
hospitality is to be restricted by conditions agreed between the nation-states because 
such a view proposes a system that closes off the coming of the absolute other and, 
consequently, it undermines the universal hospitality it is supposed to defend. 
Derrida, by contrast, proposes a politics of hospitality that acknowledges the 
impossibility of unconditional hospitality, and that is constantly looking for less bad 
laws. A politics that admits the limitations that the conditional laws of hospitality 
have, and that recognises the impossibility of a decision and consensual procedure to 
determine what the lesser violence is. This politics of self-critique and perfectibility 
already hints at the way in which legislating laws of (conditional) hospitality in the 
name of the unconditional and maintaining the openness to the arrival of the other but 
setting the necessary limits, could be carried out. It is the very recognition of the 
impossibility of an absolute hospitality that opens us up to the possibility of changing 
and intervening in the conditions set by these laws of hospitality. In other words, for 
Derrida, impossibility itself has a ‘poetic’ function, for the mere consideration of an 
impossible unconditional hospitality entails wondering whether the threshold of 
impossibility could ever be surpassed, hence contesting the inaccessibility of 
unconditional hospitality. 
 However, even if one accepts that the impossibility of unconditional 
hospitality already places us in the position of having the opportunity to modify the 
restrictions imposed by the laws of conditional hospitality and to try to do the less 
violence, that does not seem to ensure that such a transformation will actually take 
place. How then can we legislate in a way that better honours that which the law of 
absolute hospitality commands? Derrida hints at an answer to this question: 
 Pure hospitality consists in welcoming the new arrival before imposing conditions on them, 
before knowing and asking for anything at all, be it a name or an identity “paper.” But it 
also assumes that you address them, individually, and thus that you call them something, 
and grant them a proper name: “What are you called you?” Hospitality consists in doing 
everything possible to address the other, to grant or ask them their name, while avoiding 
this question becoming a “condition,” a police inquisition, a registration of information, or a 
straightforward frontier control. A difference both subtle and fundamental, a question that 
	   58	  
arises on the threshold of “home,” and on the threshold between two inflections. An art and 
a poetics, but an entire politics depends on it, an entire ethics is decided by it.76 
What this means is that in order to intervene effectively in the conditions of 
hospitality in a way that honours unconditional hospitality -- in order to make possible 
the impossible, it is necessary to address the other, the foreigner, first and foremost as 
a unique individual. What is crucial then is that the host addresses the guest in his 
singularity and heterogeneity, instead of addressing him through a generic calculation 
process, as a member or not of a nation-state.    
 Thus, although it is indeed not possible to completely eliminate the exclusion, 
filtering and violence involved in the exercise of the host’s sovereignty over his home 
(house or nation), Derrida’s proposal attempts to temper this inevitable violence and 
to make the asking of the guest’s name not a ‘straightforward’ border checkpoint. His 
suggestion to legislate and implement laws for the reception of foreigners -- which are 
necessarily violent for they impose conditions and limitations -- always in the name of 
unrestricted hospitality does not mean that these conditional laws aim to achieve a 
teleological horizon where unconditional hospitality is eventually realised. Rather, it 
means that it is necessary to make every effort to create laws that address the new 
arrivals, the absolute other(s), before and beyond ‘any juridical determination as 
compeer, compatriot, kin, brother, neighbour, fellow religious follower, or fellow 
citizen.’77  
This way of legislating and executing the laws of hospitality entails an overtly 
different politics and ethics: a politics and an ethics in constant negotiation between 
calculations and the incalculable; a politics and an ethics aiming to address the other 
as absolute other and ‘every time in the singular urgency of the here and now.’78 In 
other words, these would be a politics and an ethics of the friend as other.  
In the context of today’s growing numbers of displaced people and migration, 
these politics and ethics of hospitality seem very much in line with what Arendt calls 
‘the right to have rights,’79 which she affirms are rights that -- in contrast with civil 
rights and human rights that are valid only for the citizens of nation-states yet never 
for the stateless people -- belong to each and every human being independently of any 
natural or political legitimation. According to Arendt, stateless people such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Ibid, p.67. [My emphasis]. 
77 Derrida, Rogues, p.86. 
78 Derrida, Politics of Friendship, p.105. 
79 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p.296. 
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undocumented migrants, some refugees and exiled people, are neither recognised nor 
protected by the social and legal orders, hence, they are excluded from both the 
subjectivity and the domain of citizenship. Insofar as this is so, these people lack what 
she has dubbed the ‘right to have rights,’ that is, the right to belong to humanity itself. 
Arendt explains that the sans-papiers’ loss of home (their statelessness) and their loss 
of political status are identical with their being expelled from humanity all together, 
because human rights have always been (since the very appearance of the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 and 1793) identified with 
civil rights, with the rights that sovereign national governments grant to their citizens. 
Indeed, despite the fact that human rights are considered natural to and inalienable for 
all human beings (and therefore, also independent in their application and execution 
of any historical or empirical circumstances, independent of any specific people, 
nation-state or government), these rights have been and are still dependent on the 
legal sovereignty and executive powers of nation-states. This is the case because it is 
the nation-state that determines both who is or is not a citizen and what standard of 
human rights is to apply to those who are citizens within their national borders. In 
Arendt’s words: 
The full implication of this identification of the rights of man with the rights of peoples in 
the European nation-state system came to light only when a growing number of people or 
peoples suddenly appear whose elementary rights were as little safeguarded by the ordinary 
functioning of nation-states in the middle of Europe as they would have been in the heart of 
Africa. The Rights of Man, after all, had been defined as “inalienable” because they were 
supposed to be independent of all governments; but it turned out that the moment human 
beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon their minimum rights, no 
authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them.80  
In short, when lacking papers, undocumented immigrants and stateless people in 
general are not only at loss of citizenship, protection and official recognition of their 
identity, but also at loss of even their own status as unique individuals, as 
irreplaceable human beings. And this is precisely the condition that Agamben calls 
‘bare-life,’ and which I explained earlier in this chapter. 
To the extent that the politics of hospitality that Derrida endorses is a politics 
that creates laws in the name of unconditional hospitality, he could be proposing in 
the light of our current context of mass migration a politics of hospitality aimed at 
respecting and fostering the right to have rights of which Arendt speaks. Since this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Ibid, pp.291-292. 
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right to have rights is supposed to be guaranteed to every individual regardless of 
what his citizenship is and whether or not he is a citizen of any nation-state, then the 
Derridian politics of hospitality, that attempts to address the other in its singularity, 
seems to amount to a politics that legislates laws of hospitality that are not determined 
by citizenship. These are laws that are not strictly constrained by the interests of 
nation-states, and that give rise to a politics that refuses to be a system of 
universalization and calculability, a politics that eschews the tendency to eliminate 
alterity and appropriate the other, and hence a politics that remains open to the 
promise of the ‘to-come.’  
Derrida’s remarks about hospitality and about the contradictory yet necessary 
relationship between ethics and politics appear to suggest an alternative understanding 
of citizenship. He seems to be proposing a notion of citizenship that has as its core the 
duty of forming hospitable relations with other individuals regardless of their status 
within a nation-state. This is therefore a hospitable citizenship. I will further discuss 
this alternative conception of citizenship in the next chapter, where I will analyse 
Ariella Azoulay’s proposal of the citizenry of photography,81 and will claim that the 
relationships created in this citizenry exemplify Derrida’s concept of hospitality.   
One thing worth observing here is that, for Derrida, the task of legislating and 
constantly transforming the laws of conditional hospitality in order for these laws to 
commit less violence and address the other in its singularity, is in fact a duty. Indeed, 
he says, we have a (political and moral) duty to translate the languages of law because 
it is through them that the first violence is done. Since today’s migrants and refugees 
are forced to ask for hospitality in a foreign language which they do not speak (that is, 
the juridical language in which the legal conditions for the right of hospitality and the 
granting of asylum are specified), they are subjected to a violence that is necessarily 
implied by the filtering, exclusion and choosing that any exercise of the host’s 
sovereignty or of conditional hospitality presupposes. Thus Derrida says: 
It is almost impossible to suspend this violence [i.e. the violence done to foreigners through 
the juridical language of the laws of hospitality]; at any rate it is an interminable task. It is 
another reason to work urgently to transform things. A vast and formidable duty to translate 
is imposed here that is not only pedagogical, “linguistic,” domestic, and national (educating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 See Azoulay, The Civil Contract. 
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foreigners in the national language and culture -- in the tradition of state or republican law, 
for instance). That requires a transformation of law -- of the languages of law.82  
In view of the pressing question of immigration and sans-papiers, it is necessary that 
the host nations find a way to translate the language in which they formulate the laws 
that establish the conditions and limits of the duty of hospitality. It is necessary to find 
a translation that allows (or at least does its best to allow) the gap to be bridged 
between the language of the foreigner and the language of the host. It is necessary to 
make these laws more just, even when they can never be just. 
The duty to translate the languages of law in which the conditions for the 
welcoming of foreigners are stated, is not a duty aimed exclusively at ‘teaching’ 
foreigners the language and ‘instructing’ them in the culture of the host nation.	  
Rather, because this translation forms part of the endeavour of legislating the 
reception of foreigners ‘in the name of unconditional hospitality,’ 83  then this 
translation must address the other in her absolute alterity without attempting to 
appropriate or efface her singularity. Thus this translation cannot have a merely 
pedagogical purpose. The translation defended by Derrida cannot and should not only 
serve to educate the foreigner so that he is familiarized with and eventually 
assimilated into the culture and national language of the host nation, for that would 
entail an abuse of power on the part of the host over the guests and, therefore, a 
perversion of the principle of absolute hospitality. If the duty of translation is to 
remain true to the spirit of unconditional hospitality, and to contribute to the constant 
perfectibility of the political decisions and legal regulations concerning the reception 
of foreigners so as to reduce the inevitable violence involved in such reception, it 
cannot be limited to teaching and/or imposing the host’s language to the new arrivals. 
I will return to the question of the duty of translation and how it could be seen at work 
within the relationships formed by the documentary filmmaker, the filmed subject and 
the spectator in Chapter 4. 
 It is thus clear that underlying Derrida’s remarks about hospitality and the 
duty of translation there is a critique not only of the laws concerning the welcoming 
of sans-papiers, asylum seekers and immigrants in general, but also of some of 
today’s so-called politics and policies of multiculturalism in Western developed 
nations. His claims about the need for a translation of the languages of law seem to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Derrida, ‘The Principle of Hospitality,’ p.68. [My emphasis]. 
83 Ibid, p.67. 
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also directed against those policies which are supposedly aimed at integrating, 
including and giving their due space to the diverse cultures that exist within 
multicultural societies, but that are in the end restricted to instructing foreigners in the 
national language in an attempt to assimilate them into the host nation 
Derrida’s understanding of the relationship between politics and ethics and his 
notion of hospitality, that I have presented in this chapter, will serve me as the 
conceptual basis to argue that in cutting and editing and taking decisions regarding the 
form of the film the filmmaker could be said to do politics and act as a host to the 
filmed subjects and spectators. The relationships thus formed between filmmaker, 
spectators and filmed subjects, I will claim following Azoulay’s theory of 
photography, actualize Derrida’s notion of hospitality. I will also argue in Chapters 2 
and 3 that the analogy between the Derridian notion of politics as ungrounded 
decision-making and the cinematic cut can also be linked to Rancière’s understanding 
of politics as a change in the social order, or more precisely, as a challenge to and 
redistribution of the roles and positions within a social order.   
X. Final Remarks 
In this chapter I have considered two main issues. First, I have examined the functions 
that national borders have today as ubiquitous apparatuses of international class 
distinction, control and violence. I have drawn on Balibar’s work to claim that borders 
operate well beyond their mere geographical location, and that they have different 
meaning for the different people who cross them depending how the crossing is done 
and who the crosser is. These functions of the border raise questions of how 
undocumented migrants and stateless people are to be treated. At the same time, such 
functions also seem to call into question the nation-state as a feasible form of state 
organisation. My discussion of borders has provided me with a groundwork for the 
second main issue I have analysed here, which is Derrida’s conceptualization of 
hospitality. This latter concept will be crucial for my discussions later in this thesis, 
since it implies a way of thinking politics and political relations beyond the 
framework of nation-states and hence national borders. My argument in this thesis is 
that such alternative political bonds can emerge in documentaries about borders and 
migration. Thus, Derrida’s hospitality will permeate my work throughout.    
I have explained that for Derrida hospitality is essentially a question of the 
ways we respond to the arrival of the other and, hence, of the ways in which we relate 
to the absolute other. With this in mind, alongside the fact that crossing borders or 
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attempting to cross them necessarily implies an encounter between self and other, he 
concludes that today’s debates around the questions and problems raised by 
undocumented migration and other displaced stateless people should be addressed in 
terms of hospitality. I have explained Derrida’s view that ethics and politics are 
opposed but inextricably linked, and have analysed the implications that result from 
this connection. In particular, the implications it seems to have concerning the 
problem of undocumented immigrants and the ways in which politics is conceived. In 
this respect, I have sought to show, on the one hand, that these ideas of Derrida offer 
an alternative to the traditional understanding of citizenship as a status determined 
and assigned to certain people by a nation-state. On the other hand, I have maintained 
that his views also call for a drastic transformation of the laws regulating the 
reception of foreigners so that these laws are in line with the precepts of the principle 
of absolute hospitality. What results from this is a conceptualisation of politics as a 
commitment to the active and constant improvement of laws. This is also a politics 
that addresses the other in its singularity and that does not close off the arrival of the 
absolute other. Finally, this is a politics that is not exclusively regulated by the 
structure and interests of the nation-state, for it is a politics that dispenses with the 
distinction between citizens and noncitizens, and instead favours relations of 
responsibility towards others regardless of their citizenship status. 
 In Chapter 2, I will examine Azoulay’s work on photography and her view of 
the political potential of this visual medium. Azoulay maintains that photographs are 
sites for political relationships between the photographer, the photographed subject 
and the spectator. This is a space of relations based on solidarity, responsibility and 
equality functioning beyond the framework and the direct mediation of the nation-
state. I will connect and compare Azoulay’s model of photography to Derrida’s 
alternative understanding of politics and citizenship. My analysis of Azoulay will 
allow me to make the point in Chapter 3 that her theory of photography can be 
transposed to documentary films, and hence that documentaries can also function as 
spaces for political relationships that are also relationships of hospitality. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Photography as a Political Space. Politics, Aesthetics and the Notion of 
Citizenship  
 
I.  
In the last chapter I discussed Derrida’s claim that ethics and politics are two 
opposing realms that, nonetheless, supplement one another. This relationship, I have 
also said, becomes evident through the concept of hospitality. I used Derrida’s 
position in order to make the case for two ideas, which are key to my own thesis. 
First, that hospitality is the concept that best allows us to approach questions raised by 
the increasing number of people (documented and undocumented) mobilizing across 
geo-political borders today. And secondly, that we need to understand politics in a 
way that is not exhausted in all the relationships and practices mediated by the nation-
state. The issue of how we negotiate between laws that necessarily imply ungrounded 
decisions, impose limits and discriminate who we are to welcome, and the 
unconditional and unrealisable promise of the absolute reception of others can be 
better understood through the perspective of hospitality. Legislating laws in 
accordance with the unconditional law of hospitality not only allows for the 
possibility of perfecting and making less violent the conditional laws for the 
welcoming of newcomers, but it also opens up the possibility of thinking politics and 
political relationships beyond the confines of national borders and the national 
sovereign power. It is this alternative form of understanding politics that constitutes 
my main concern in this second chapter. My discussion here of how we can make 
sense of different forms of political bonds not inscribed in the framework of the 
nation-state is crucial, for it will lay the groundwork for my main argument in this 
thesis that documentary films about migration can give rise to these alternative forms 
of political relationships. 
 How can political bonds not directly sanctioned by the sovereign nation-state 
actually emerge? Is it really possible to form political spaces and relationships that are 
deterritorialised in the sense that they are not under the direct constraint of geo-
political borders? In her provocative book, The Civil Contract of Photography, 
Azoulay argues that photographic images provide a space where new forms of social 
and political relationships that are not restricted to national boundaries and the 
mediation of the nation-state are possible. She proposes that photography understood 
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as an event has the capacity to constitute a civil space of plurality (where a ‘civil 
space of plurality’ means a community in which all individuals regardless of their 
citizenship status, their social, political, cultural and or ethnic background can be 
partakers) that functions independently of the sovereign sanction. Her thesis of the 
political potential of the relationships emerging through the event of photography 
constitutes an ontologico-political understanding of photography for it offers an 
alternative approach to that presented by theories of photography focused on the 
organisation of power relations. In Azoulay’s model the social and political relations 
created through the photographic act are based on equality rather than structured 
hierarchically. 
 In this chapter I will first analyse Azoulay’s triadic model of photography and 
consider the specific conceptualizations of politics and citizenship that derive from 
this model. I will compare Azoulay’s notion of the political with Jacques Rancière’s 
ideas on politics and its connection with aesthetics.1 Both authors think that politics is 
a matter of how people relate to one another and what they do collectively, rather than 
a matter of how people relate to the institutions of government. I will argue that 
Rancière’s view of politics seems more useful since he does not think that every 
human encounter is political nor does his concept of politics require separating the 
latter from the civil. Then I will pursue the idea that there is a link between the 
political relationships resulting from the event of photography and Derrida’s 
conception of the ethics and politics of hospitality. All these discussions will allow me 
to better examine, in subsequent chapters of this thesis, the possibility of developing 
Azoulay’s understanding of photography as space of political relationships beyond the 
nation-state to incorporate the specific form of documentary cinema.   
II. An Alternative Civil Contract 
In The Civil Contract Azoulay suggests that there exists a strong link between 
photography and citizenship. More precisely, she argues that photographs play a 
crucial role in the formation of citizens. According to Azoulay, there is a ‘civil 
contract’ emerging through the practice of photography, which operates analogously 
to the social contract of which Thomas Hobbes or Jean-Jacques Rousseau spoke.2 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Rancière, Dissensus. On Politics and Aesthetics. 
2 Explaining the origin of the sovereign and its power, both Hobbes and Rousseau argue that there is a 
hypothetical agreement that individuals make so that they each transfer their power defend themselves 
into a sovereign that would then have the monopoly of violence and the power to defend the common 
good and collective interests of the community formed by the individuals. As we will see, Azoulay 
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This is a tacit hypothetical agreement through which individuals acquire a mutual 
obligation and give up their own powers to defend themselves in favour of the 
sovereign, who thereby acquires the irrevocable power to govern them and the 
obligation to protect their lives. Like the social contract, the civil contract of 
photography yields the foundation of a political community in which its members are 
mutually obliged to one another and are endowed with the power to act in connection 
with this obligation. However, unlike the social contracts theorised by Hobbes and 
Rousseau, the civil contract of photography dispenses with the sovereign as mediator 
and regulator of the relations between members. As Azoulay puts it: ‘the civil contract 
of photography organizes political relations in the form of an open and dynamic 
framework among individuals, without regulation and mediation by a sovereign.’3       
Azoulay’s proposal of a civil contract of photography that gives rise to a 
political community in which all members are bound to each other without the 
intervention of a sovereign power is underpinned by the thesis that doing without the 
sovereign entails dismantling the mechanism of exclusion that any sovereign power 
necessarily produces. In other words, she is interested in advancing a 
conceptualization of citizenship and of politics that are independent of the sovereign 
power of the nation-state because she thinks that the sovereign necessarily produces 
statelessness. Drawing on Agamben’s work Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare 
Life, she agrees that the sovereign tie upon which the state is founded does not have 
the form of a pact or a contract, but rather it has the form of an exception -- an 
‘exclusive inclusion’ -- for it produces ‘bare life’ (mere bodies) as opposed to a 
‘qualified life,’ the life of ‘political beings’ or citizens. Like Agamben, Azoulay 
believes it is possible to think a politics that dispenses with the form of the sovereign 
nation-state and that consequently prevents the emergence of excluded people. 
However, instead of renouncing the category of citizenship altogether as Agamben 
proposes, Azoulay attempts to restore this concept by promoting a political sphere 
where all individuals are equals and related to one another without the direct 
mediation of a sovereign power. For her, this political sphere is materialised in the act 
of photography. As she puts it: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
takes inspiration from the idea of this tacit agreement in order to formulate her thesis of the civil 
contract of photography.  
3 Azoulay, The Civil Contract, p.110. 
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[Photography can] edify an open political space where no one can decide on the exception, 
and a final decision cannot be made, a community in which a new beginning is a right 
preserved for each of its members and solidarity among its members precedes the 
submission and the identification with power. [This is] a politics founded on the equality of 
the governed [...].4 
In the political realm created by the photograph there is no distinction between citizen 
and non-citizen, a distinction that obscures the fact that all individuals are ‘first and 
foremost governed’5 independently of their citizenship status. For Azoulay, this 
division of all the governed between citizens and non-citizens is overcome to the 
extent that individuals in the citizenry of photography are bound by a civic duty that is 
neither imposed nor regulated by the nation-state sovereign power. In this sense, what 
she proposes is to shift the foundation of politics that Agamben has characterised as 
‘bare life’ -- which, as explained in chapter one, is the state of exception that the 
sovereign power inexorably produces -- to that of the political community created 
through the civil contract of photography. This is a political community composed of 
all those governed by this contract regardless of whether they are citizens of a 
particular nation-state or not. Since in the citizenry of photography there is no 
sovereign power, not only are its members all ‘equally not governed’6 but also their 
membership is not sanctioned by any national border. As Azoulay writes: 
Photography [...] deterritorializes citizenship, reaching beyond its conventional boundaries 
and plotting out a political space in which the plurality of speech and action is actualized 
permanently by the eventual participation of all the governed.7    
The conceptualization of citizenship that therefore surfaces is based on the relations of 
political partnership and solidarity among the participants in the photographic act, 
instead of being based on the relations that individuals have with the sovereign 
nation-state. This is a notion of citizenship indifferent to links of ethnic kinship, class 
or national belonging that are invoked by the sovereign power to connect part of the 
governed to one another and, simultaneously, to exclude others. Citizenship thus 
ceases to be a status or a private possession, and becomes a set of civil skills exercised 
by the governed in order to voice grievances and make claims whenever injuries and 
violations of rights are inflicted upon the others governed. In this sense, citizenship 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ibid, p.88. 
5 Ibid, p.17. 
6 Ibid, p.25. 
7 Ibid. 
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becomes a shield of sorts that all the governed have against the sovereign power and 
the exclusions that national borders necessarily entail. In Azoulay’s words: 
Whereas the nation-state is based on the principles of sovereignty and territorialisation, the 
citizenry of photography, of which the civil contract of photography is the constitutional 
foundation, is based on ethical duty, and on patterns of deterritorialization. […] The 
citizenry of photography is a simulation of a collective to which all citizens belong. Neither 
taking precedence over citizenship or making it conditional, the citizenry of photography is 
fundamentally and solely defined by citizenship: Membership in the citizenry means 
citizenship, and citizenship means membership in the citizenry. The citizenry of 
photography has no sovereign and therefore no apparatus of exclusion.8          
The way in which this civil contract emerges through the photographic event will 
become clearer further on. But for now it is worth noting that what is central to 
Azoulay’s notions of the civil contract of photography and the political community to 
which this contract gives shape is that they open up the possibility of new 
conceptualizations of both citizenship and the political. This alternative notion of 
citizenship is defined both by the way in which citizens relate to one another and by 
the absence of the sovereign’s mediation. Since in such a political sphere there is no 
sovereign state deciding on the exception, there are no asymmetries produced among 
the governed. Citizens here are all governed on an equal standing, which reduces their 
vulnerability to suffering outrageous forms of harm. By the same token, the principle 
that governs the relationships among the members of this citizenry is ethical 
responsibility, expressed in the form of partnership and solidarity that the citizens of 
photography practice towards each other. The kind of citizenship that surfaces here is 
thus neither a status assigned nor a good distributed. Rather, citizenship is the practice 
of effectively exercising one’s duty towards all the other members of the citizenry of 
photography: the duty to defend and to rehabilitate citizenship for all those who have 
been stripped from it. As such, citizenship as a practice is neither determined nor 
restricted by the sovereign state, which means that citizenship is deterritorialised, for 
its exercise is not confined to the geographical boundaries of the nation-state. As a 
consequence of this, the political becomes a form of relationship amongst individuals 
instead of a relationship between individuals and the nation-state.      
It is important to note at this point that Azoulay states that a politics freed from 
the sovereign power and founded on the equality of the governed, like the one she is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ibid, p.128. [My emphasis]. 
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advocating, is not a mere theoretical model. She thinks that this politics is in fact 
empirically actualised and manifested ‘in the form of nongovernmental political 
activities of many forms and agendas in […] the world today.’9 The practice of 
photography, as I will explain in the next section, is for Azoulay one of those 
empirical concretizations of a politics liberated from the conditions and the 
territorialised form of the nation-state. By making this claim, Azoulay wants to deny 
the idea that a politics freed from the nation-state is merely possible in a community 
to come. Rather, she maintains that this is a politics materialised in ‘several 
communities, both within and without the boundaries of the sovereign state, that 
already exist, communities that employ a variety of means […] to edify an open 
political space’10 which is founded on the equality of all the members, all the 
governed, regardless of what their citizenship status is. Thus Azoulay posits 
photography as one of the practices through which the communities constitute these 
open political spaces.  The collective created through photography is such that it 
allows the inclusion of a plurality of individuals who are partners sharing equal access 
within an actual concrete community with diverse interests.     
Later in this chapter I will examine the specific implications of the emergence 
of political relations not sanctioned by the nation-state that Azoulay proposes, and I 
will link this form of political relationship to Derrida’s theses of hospitality and the 
necessary though contradictory bond between ethics and politics that I presented in 
Chapter 1. Is it really possible and, furthermore, useful to conceive of citizenship as a 
form of relationship between individuals rather than in terms of a status granted by a 
nation-state? I will engage with this question later on, but for now it is necessary to 
expand my exposition of Azoulay’s thesis of the civil contract of photography in 
order to better understand what the implications of her proposal are for the concepts 
of citizenship and of politics, as well as for understanding the practice of 
photography. 
III. The Ontologico-Political Approach to Photography 
In what ways does the practice of photography actually constitute a political sphere 
where all members are made equal in standing and where the form of the sovereign 
nation-state is absent? How is the civil contract established through the photographic 
event? Azoulay articulates the relationship between photographic practices and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ibid, p.88. 
10 Ibid. 
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formation of such a political community by defining photographs as acts of 
communication between three parties: the photographer, the subject photographed and 
the spectator. A photograph, she argues, functions as a statement or énoncé11 that 
depends on the collective recognition of these three parties in order to attain meaning. 
The photograph is therefore a statement that is addressed as a civil act. This feature of 
photographs is one of the two aspects that likens citizenship to photography:  
Photographs are constructed like statements (énoncés), the photographic image gains its 
meaning through mutual (mis)recognition, and this meaning cannot be possessed by its 
addresser and/or addressee. Citizenship likewise is gained through recognition, and like 
photography is not something that can simply be possessed.12            
The other aspect that links citizenship and photography is plurality. Without plurality, 
neither citizenship nor photography is possible. While in the case of citizenship, the 
condition that guarantees plurality is an effective equality among citizens (which is 
only possible by eliminating the exclusion and asymmetries that the mediation of any 
sovereign power produces); in the case of photography, a plurality of political 
relations can be actualized by the ‘act of transforming and disseminating what is seen 
into claims that demand action.’13   
For Azoulay, both photography and citizenship rely heavily on the activity of 
recognition, which means that the two presuppose a set of relations between 
individuals, as well as between individuals and the governing authority. Photography 
and in particular those photographs portraying images of individuals who due to their 
statelessness or their ‘impaired’ citizenship have (or are susceptible to having) 
outrageous harms inflicted upon them, sets up a civil contract that binds spectators, 
photographed subjects and photographers together. The civil contract of photography 
configures a political space in which anyone (regardless of her status as citizen or as 
non-citizen) who either uses photographs as a means to address others or adopts the 
position of a photograph’s addressee becomes a member or a citizen of the citizenry 
of photography. This civil contract binds all of its contracting parts, making these 
responsible for the other members of the citizenry and for rehabilitating the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Azoulay draws here on Jean-François Lyotard’s understanding of ‘énoncés’ as statements that are 
structures resulting from the relation between an addresser, an addressee, a referent, and a meaning. An 
‘énoncé’ can only gain meaning within the context of a conversational exchange where addresser, 
addressee, and referent are all given their due recognition as constitutional elements of this statement. It 
is Lyotard’s idea of ‘making justice’ to the elements of the ‘énoncé’ that Azoulay takes cue from in 
order to articulate her thesis of photographs as statements and photography as a triadic event. See 
Azoulay, The Civil Contract, pp.29, 142-143. 
12 Ibid, p.25. 
13 Ibid, p.26. 
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citizenship of all those who have been deprived of it or who have suffered any 
damage from it. As Azoulay puts it:  
Becoming a citizen in the citizenry of photography entails seeking, by means of 
photography, to rehabilitate one’s citizenship or that of someone else who has been stripped 
of it. [The citizen of photography] is someone who sees photography and its civil contract 
as something that can protect her from anyone who would violate another citizen, which 
amounts to violating her, insofar as citizenship itself is violated.14      
The civil contract of photography is established above all by means of ‘catastrophe 
photographs.’ That is, photographs taken on the ‘verge of catastrophe’15 or ‘under 
conditions of regime-made disaster,’16 which portray populations that (due to their 
statelessness or their ‘impaired’ citizenship) experience a continuous deprivation of 
their rights and intolerable harms. For Azoulay, ‘any photographic image can in 
principle come to constitute an independent political space,’ 17  a citizenry of 
photography.18 But she also claims that photographing people living ‘on the verge of 
catastrophe’ entails a particular act of resistance, for it amounts to making visible the 
ongoing and unbearable violations these people endure on a regular basis. The civil 
contract originating from these images compels all participants in the act of 
photography to actively claim the restoration of citizenship where it has been 
impaired. Rather than simply showing empathy or pity to those who have suffered 
harm to their citizenship, the contract demands action from the spectators. In this 
sense, a photograph exceeds the status of mere testimony, document or evidence by 
calling for all the signatory parties of the contract to take action. It is the responsibility 
of all the parties involved in the contract of photography to recognize and construct 
the meaning of a photograph in terms of a statement (énoncé) that shows the injustice 
of a situation and that urges the rehabilitation of citizenship. This is the reason why 
none of the parties has unique entitlement to the ownership of the photograph nor a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ibid, p.117. 
15 Ibid, p.85. 
16 Azoulay, Civil Imagination, p.1. 
17 Ibid, p.83. [My emphasis]. 
18 As I will explain later on, Azoulay thinks that any photographic image has the potential to constitute 
a space of political relationships to the extent that these images entail an encounter between human 
beings. For her, all public human encounters are political. Azoulay unpacks this last idea in her book 
Civil Imagination but she already hints at it in The Civil Contract. My argument will be that her 
understanding of the political is problematic since she thinks each and every human encounter with 
other humans is political, thus making this latter domain seemingly too broad. I will also contrast her 
view with Rancière’s conceptualization of politics and claim that there is no need to distinguish the 
civil from the political. 
	   72	  
privileged or exclusive access to its meaning for, under this conception, the event of 
photography becomes a collective endeavour that seeks to make injustices visible. 
 Azoulay claims that to the extent that those who have been stripped of or 
denied citizenship are enabled, through the photograph and the civil contract implied 
by it, to become citizens of the citizenry of photography, then they are in the position 
to make claims and calls for the restoration of their citizenship. The photographed 
person relies on the photographer to help her make such a claim and address others 
through the photograph. It is important to note here, however, that Azoulay does not 
think photography actually terminates the photographed person’s status as a non-
citizen. Instead, she thinks that photography empowers non-citizens to make 
grievances known through the cooperation of others (photographer and spectator) that 
otherwise they would not be able to pose: 
Photography does not put an end to their position as noncitizen, but it does enable them and 
others to take part in the reconstruction of their civil grievances to exercise the legitimate 
violence of photography’s citizenry, regardless of their [actual] status as noncitizens 
deprived of rights who cannot use their citizenship to negotiate with the sovereign power.19 
For Azoulay, an important bond is created in the encounter between photographer and 
subject photographed, a bond that is inspired by a relation to an external eye which is 
not present at the moment when the photograph is taken: the eye of the spectator. 
Emphasizing the role played by the (ideal) spectator, Azoulay affirms that the latter 
acquires a very specific responsibility through the contract: to make visible the harms 
to citizenship that the photographed subjects endure. Rather than simply witnessing 
with a voyeuristic gaze the suffering portrayed in images taken on the verge of 
catastrophe, the spectator is called to actively participate in the reconstruction of the 
photographic énoncé. Her participation in this reconstruction is crucial for, without it, 
the harm inflicted upon the rights of the depicted person or persons (and hence upon 
citizenship as a whole) would not be made visible. This task of the spectator is what 
Azoulay calls the ‘ethics of the spectator,’ which is the duty of the spectator to 
‘watch’ the photograph (not just merely look at it) and care for its sense. The spectator 
must make use of her civil skill of ‘watching’ photographs; she must be able to 
recognise ‘that not only were the photographed people there, but that, in addition, they 
are still present there at the time [the spectator is] watching them.’20  Watching a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Azoulay, The Civil Contract, p.131. 
20 Ibid, p.16. 
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photograph is, in this sense, to acknowledge the temporal co-presence with a 
photographed body, and hence to acknowledge the urgency to take action against the 
dispossession and/or impairment of citizenship. To put it differently, the civic skill 
that the photographs of the verge of catastrophe demand from spectators is precisely 
that of ‘watching’ because that implies that the violations and injuries depicted are 
seen as occurring in, so to speak ‘real-time,’ right in front of the spectator’s gaze. And 
as present events, these images become binding summons to the restoration of the 
injuries portrayed. Azoulay argues that her proposal of the civil duty of spectators to 
watch photographs as if these were portraying present events offers a counterpoint to 
Roland Barthes’s approach to photography. By contrast to Azoulay who claims that 
the photographic image of catastrophe portrays what is occurring in the present, 
Barthes thinks that the photograph captures what has been; that the photograph is an 
index signaling ‘that-has-been.’21 At the same time, he says, the photographic image 
is also an indication of what will be. In this way, for Barthes, the photograph always 
shows an ‘anterior future of which death is the stake.’22 The photograph shows future 
death or loss and, for this reason, any encounter with a photograph confronts the 
viewer with the horror of seeing death. It is this difference in understanding the 
temporality of the photograph as showing the present that allows Azoulay to explain 
the binding nature of photography spectatorship.   
 The civil contract of photography that Azoulay proposes involves a 
spectatorial recognition of a ‘civic duty toward the photographed persons who haven’t 
stopped being “there,” toward dispossessed citizens who, in turn, enable the 
rethinking of the concept and practice of citizenship.’23 In a similar fashion, by 
allowing themselves to be photographed, the injured subjects demand that their 
situations be witnessed by both the spectator and the photographer. Thus, insofar as 
the meanings of photographs of people on the verge of catastrophe are collectively 
articulated as statements (énoncés) that serve as grievances demanding the 
rehabilitation of their damaged citizenships, then photographer, subjects photographed 
and viewers become equal interlocutors in the citizenry of photography. Azoulay 
thinks that if the photographer and the spectator become addressees of the claims 
made by the subjects photographed, then the three parties recognize each other as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Barthes, Camera Lucida. Reflections on Photography, trans. by Richard Howard (London: Vintage, 
2000), p.80. 
22 Ibid, p.96. 
23 Azoulay, The Civil Contract, pp.16-17. 
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equal members -- and therefore as citizens -- in the citizenry of photography. The 
three parties here share two main civic duties: first, to make visible the intolerable 
conditions of people living under the conditions of the verge of catastrophe; and 
second, to demand rehabilitation where citizenship has been harmed, denied or 
impaired. 
As mentioned before, Azoulay believes that given that the meaning of a 
photograph results from the encounter between the photographer, the photographed 
and the spectator, then none of these three parties has exclusive entitlement to 
determine the photograph’s sense nor to claim ownership over either the photograph 
or its meaning. In this sense, the civil contract of photography undermines the 
possibility of any one party becoming the only and absolute sovereign in the citizenry 
of photography. Thus constituted, the citizenry of photography is a space for equal 
and horizontal political relations -- rather than vertical ones, where both the plurality 
of positions and the equality among its members are guaranteed. Azoulay’s idea is 
that by doing away with the mediation of the sovereign power of the nation-state, the 
notion of citizenship becomes both de-nationalised and de-territorialised, thereby 
granting political agency to non-citizens and equality to all participants.   
The particular example that Azoulay employs to illustrate a situation that lends 
itself for the development of the civil contract of photography is the conflict between 
Israel and Palestine. Photographs taken by Israeli photographers of violent episodes 
occurring in the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza during the years of 
the second Palestinian intifada provide explanatory instances of her theoretical model 
of photography as a space for political relations which are not governed by the nation-
state. Her examples characterize Palestinians as bearers of impaired citizenship due to 
the retaliatory and preventive aggressions that the Israeli power continuously exerts 
upon them. The numerous checkpoints constraining movement in the Occupied 
Territories; the destruction of civilian infrastructure and homes; the targeted 
assassinations; the bombing from the sky; as well as the raids and violent arrests keep 
Palestinians’ lives on the verge of catastrophe, a condition that can (and must) be 
made visible and repaired by means of the binding commitment that the members in 
the citizenry of photography have towards one another.  
Azoulay has a particular interest in the Israel-Palestine conflict because she 
was born and raised in Israel, and has witnessed live and through photographs the 
injustices Palestinians suffer on a daily basis due to their forced statelessness under 
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the Israeli occupation. This led her to look for ways to understand citizenship beyond 
the boundaries of the nation-state. Through the civil contract of photography she 
proposes that it is the viewers’ responsibility to draw emergency claims from the 
violent images of Palestinians and to become addressees of such claims. Thereby, 
viewers exceed the understanding of these photographs as mere documentation of 
events. Thus, images of the excruciating circumstances of Palestinians have the 
potential to become political spaces for struggle and resistance against the sovereign 
power that denies and damages these people’s citizenship. The next two sections are 
devoted to exploring the notions of citizenship and of politics that derive from 
Azoulay’s view on the photographic encounter. 
IV. Politics and Ethics of Photography 
Before considering the presuppositions and the implications of Azoulay’s triadic 
model of photography and her alternative understanding of citizenship and politics,24 
it is worth summarizing three important points that her thesis of the civil contract of 
photography makes. First, she claims that because today virtually anyone (regardless 
of his actual citizenship status within a particular nation-state) can have access to the 
practices of photography either as a photographed subject, as a photographer or as a 
viewer, then anyone who takes part in one way or another in an photographic act 
immediately becomes a member in the citizenry of photography. What this means is 
that this citizenry is open, borderless and ubiquitous. Second, given that both the 
photographic act and its meaning result from the encounter between the three active 
parties and that none of them has the authority and/or exclusivity to determine the 
photograph’s sense, then there is no sovereign power regulating or mediating the 
relationships among the members of the citizenry. And third, because there is no 
sovereign power discriminating between citizens and non-citizens, then all the 
members in the citizenry of photography stand as equal. In this manner, the civil 
contract of photography establishes a citizenry that ‘functions on a horizontal plane.’25 
That is, a plane where power is not centralized, but instead it is spread equally among 
all the members.      
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Here I will be using the terms ‘politics’ and ‘the political’ interchangeably. Even though Azoulay 
prefers the latter, I use both terms because that allows me to better contrast Azoulay’s and Rancière’s 
views. Nonetheless, I follow Rancière in his distinction between ‘politics’ and ‘the order of the police,’ 
where the latter refers, as we will see, to the domain of governance, the hierarchical arrangements of 
the social order and all the institutional forms that maintain this order. 
25 Ibid, p.146. 
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Azoulay proposes a triadic model of the social relationships that converge in 
the photographic act in the hope of offering an alternative to the traditional dualistic 
model implied by most theoretical approaches in the area of image ethics. This is the 
area that studies the ethical questions that emerge in the process of making, exhibiting 
and looking at images of others, especially when these others live under conditions of 
oppression and suffering. Azoulay believes that what she calls ‘dualistic models’ of 
photography -- like those of Barthes or Susan Sontag -- focus only on the 
photographer’s and/or on the viewer’s role, and thus fail to acknowledge the agency 
of the photographed subject in the ‘social bind’ created by the photograph. 26 
Azoulay’s triadic model, by contrast, grants visibility to the portrayed subject and 
denies the supposed passivity of both the latter and the spectator within the relations 
that emerge through the photographic act. In a strong criticism of theories of 
photography which consider ‘photographs of horror’ (photographs representing 
populations in precarious conditions) from the narrow perspective of the aesthetic 
value of the images or the psychological and emotional responses that these 
photographs induce, Azoulay claims that a photographic image and its meaning are 
the result of the collective encounter between the photographer, the photographed and 
the viewer. According to Azoulay, image ethics theories -- such as that of Sontag -- 
are inherently flawed because by linking the spectator’s gaze to feelings of 
compassion, empathy and pity, they turn photographs into objects of property and 
exchange that bear a meaning that is exclusively determined by the photographer. 
Under such an understanding, photographs can only be considered in terms of their 
value as works of art; and neither spectators nor portrayed subjects play a role in the 
articulation of the photographs’ meanings.  In Azoulay’s words: 
[Sontag’s theory] turns photographs into works of art that can be judged. Her ethics of 
seeing, in effect, reifies the new visual field created with the appearance of photography, 
leaving the photograph in possession of a special ‘grammar’ that allows it to remain 
independent of its spectator.27          
Azoulay is not only arguing against traditional dualistic models of image ethics here, 
she is also posing a thesis that is at odds with what she calls the ‘paradigm or art’28 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See Barthes, Camera Lucida; and Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (London and New York: 
Penguin, 2004). 
27 Azoulay, The Civil Contract, p.130.  
28 Azoulay, Civil Imagination, p.61. 
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and/or the ‘canon [of the history] of photography.’29 If rather than considering the 
photograph as a complete and finished product created by an artist who has exclusive 
agency and access to the photograph’s meaning, the photograph is understood as 
lacking a fixed and predetermined content, then this image will be always open to the 
generation of new utterances whenever a new spectator encounters it. The photograph 
in this latter sense has a meaning that surpasses the artist’s intention; and the 
spectators and the subjects portrayed gain agency insofar as they are included as 
essential participants in the photograph’s meaning. Unlike the photographic canon, in 
Azoulay’s model the photographed subject is no longer rendered invisible; this 
subject’s gaze and her active involvement in the photographic act are acknowledged. 
In a similar fashion, the photographer has no exclusive claim over the photograph’s 
sense, while the role of the spectator is not simply reduced to the act of judging the 
aesthetic value of the image or how effectively the photographer achieved his or her 
intentions. In being directly addressed by the photographed subject’s gaze (who is 
here recognized as a member within the plurality of the photographic citizenry), the 
spectator acquires responsibility for what is seen in the photograph. In clear contrast 
with Sontag’s image ethics, it is due to the active address toward the viewer on the 
part of the photographed subject that the photograph does not fix a situation or event 
nor does it have a single, univocal, already-determined meaning. Rather, the 
photographic act opens up a space for ongoing past and present encounters between 
the photographer, the photographed and the spectator. It is therefore possible to affirm 
that the civil contract of photography entails an ethics of spectatorship, since it 
commands that the viewer abandon her role as a passive addressee of an image and 
instead adopt that of the active addresser that articulates photographs of injured 
populations in terms of emergency statements. Such statements are urgent calls for the 
immediate reparation of these injuries. As Azoulay puts it:  
The spectator is called to take part, to move from the addressee’s position to the addresser’s 
position to take responsibility for the sense of such photographs by addressing them even 
further, turning them into signals of emergency, signals of danger or warning -- 
transforming them into emergency claims.30 
In this way, Azoulay grounds photographic spectatorship on civic duty (rather than on 
pity, mercy or plain voyeurism), the civic duty towards the photographed persons. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Ibid, p.81.  
30 Azoulay, The Civil Contract, p.169. 
	   78	  
That is, the civic duty to make visible their sufferings and the intolerable violations 
these people endure, and thus to call for the urgent rehabilitation of their ‘impaired 
citizenship’31 and their damaged life conditions. This civic duty is in turn grounded on 
the assumption that the subjects portrayed in the photograph continue to be there, still 
present in the moment when the viewer encounters the photograph and makes use of 
her ‘civic skill’ to ‘watch’ this image, as opposed to merely ‘looking at’ it. Indeed, 
Azoulay’s idea is that through the cinematic watching of a still photograph, the 
spectator allows for the image to be endowed with temporality and movement. This 
consequently sets the conditions for the encounter between the photographer, the 
photographed subject and the viewer to take place in the present, thus making the 
articulation of the meaning of the photograph into an active process. In other words, 
the temporal dimension of the photographic socio-political bind is essential for the 
mutual recognition of the three parties, and hence for the plurality of the citizenry of 
photography.  
However, this civic duty is not limited to assuming the present time quality of 
the image, the spectator also needs to have the ‘civil intention’32 to circumvent the 
limits set by the photographic canon and the professional discourse of art with regards 
to photographs. This civil intention means that the spectator suspends the 
‘professional gaze’ that, in accordance with the photographic canon, attributes all 
effects produced by the photograph to the photographer’s intention. And in lieu, the 
spectator adopts a ‘civil gaze’ that allows her to transgress the boundaries of the 
visual, the limits of what is visible in the photograph. Through the civil gaze the 
spectator does not regard the photograph as a finished product where the truth is 
stored, nor does she regard it as a single source of knowledge and as an end in itself. 
But what she sees in the photograph instead is a basis for multiple utterances and 
heterogeneous knowledge beyond the visual and beyond the sanctioned parameters 
according to which the governing power represents itself. Under the civil gaze and 
civil intention that the spectator adopts, the photograph becomes the result of the 
active exchange between those who see the image and those who participated in the 
making of the image. The photograph in this sense is not a repository of truth but an 
open and plural arena where participants actively engage in the reconstruction of what 
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32 Azoulay, Civil Imagination, p.121. 
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is visible and not visible through the photographic image, an arena where participants 
are able to actively join in the ‘game of [utterance formation and] truth-claiming.’33       
This ontological-political understanding of photography that Azoulay proposes 
also aims to constitute an alternative theoretical approach to the one offered by the 
social power model of photography. While the latter model reduces the photographic 
act ultimately to the outcome of the relations of power that emerge between the 
photographer and the photographed subject, Azoulay’s triadic model is an attempt to 
overcome the restrictive scope of this notion of power relations. With her model, 
Azoulay eschews the power relations discourse that qualifies the photographic act as 
inexorably repressive in nature, for there is always one party holding representational 
authority (the photographer) over the other party, which is the subject of 
representation (the photographed subject). Instead, her triadic model underscores the 
complexity as much as the conflict and the negotiation involved in the photographic 
encounter. Azoulay does not deny that photography, as a practice of representation, 
implies construction and prejudice and that it is very often used by governmental and 
institutional power hierarchies for the control of populations and preservation of the 
social order. However, her thesis of the civil contract of photography opens up the 
possibility for the photographic encounter to contest precisely those power relations, 
and thus for photography to play an emancipatory role.  
Azoulay provides many examples both in The Civil Contract and in Civil 
Imagination to illustrate and support her arguments. One of the photographs she refers 
to is by Israeli photographer Micha Kirshner, who uses studio photography to realize 
his portrayals of Palestinians under the Israeli Occupation. Kirshner sets his 
photographs on improvised studios on site and employs studio lighting, staging and 
other studio aesthetic techniques to represent the conditions of ‘regime-made’ 
disaster, which Palestinians endure on a daily basis. Azoulay refers to Kirshner’s 1988 
photograph of Aisha al-Kurd and her young son Yassir, who was born in prison when 
his mother was serving a jail sentence for resisting the Occupation. Seated on the 
floor and wearing a black dress, Aisha al-Kurd is presented with her child peacefully 
sleeping on her lap while she caresses his head having her eyes almost closed, in a 
gesture that is reminiscent of Michelangelo’s famous sculpture La Pietà.  
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According to Azoulay, a reading of this photograph following the traditional 
paradigm or the canon of art would exclusively focus on the aesthetic traits of it, 
namely on the composition, the lightning, the positioning of Aisha al-Kurd and her 
child, among others. This approach to the photograph would amount to employing 
only the ‘professional gaze’ to read this image, and so it would reconstruct the 
photograph in terms of a complete finished product owned by the artist and in which 
the spectator has no role except for that of passively confronting the photographed 
figure. With this professional gaze the spectator would be restricted to assess the 
photograph according to the judgment of taste as an aestheticized image of the 
suffering of Palestinians, and thus as not political enough. However, if the spectator 
was also to adopt a ‘civil gaze’ and ‘watch’ the photograph instead of just looking at 
it, she would have to acknowledge that inscribed in the image there is the presence of 
all the people involved in the making of it. The spectator would then recognize the 
photograph as a collective and unfinished product. The spectator would then see the 
fact that Aisha al-Kurd actively gave her consent to being photographed by an Israeli, 
that she cooperated with him receiving his directions through an interpreter, and that 
she actively wanted to have her life and conditions made visible. With this realization, 
says Azoulay, the spectator becomes an active participant in the event of photography, 
going well beyond what is visible in the frame and seeing though the personal story of 
Aisha al-Kurd the effects of an unjust and intolerable regime affecting many people. It 
is through this civil intention of the spectator that the civil contract of photography 
emerges. In Azoulay’s words: 
Alongside her professional skills in analyzing the photograph, the trained spectator is 
required to activate her civil intention to assist her in deciphering the defective conditions in 
which [Aisha al-Kurd] finds herself. The civil contract (of photography), between the 
spectator and the woman photographed, protects her – even if only partially against the 
takeover of the civil malfunction that structures the regime that she inhabits and that 
threatens to impair her ability to determine that what is depicted in the photograph is 
unbearable.34  
A question emerges here as to whether it is possible for the spectator to always go 
beyond the frame and have access to the circumstances of production of the 
photograph. Does the isolated photograph without any knowledge about the subject 
portrayed and the context in which the image was made compel the spectator to find 
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out more? Could the photograph without a backstory still have a useful function and 
how? Azoulay seems to believe that a photograph can oblige spectators to find out 
more as a result of what it does not show or tell as much as the story that appears to be 
contained within its frame. To some extent, this is a useful approach since it seems to 
demand a responsible or conscious form of ‘consumption’ (of images), which could 
be compared to how we ‘consume’ other products often without being aware of the 
supply chain and conditions in which things are produced and distributed. On the 
other hand, however, it is not clear to what extent it is possible to indeed have access 
to the context of production. Can all spectators have the resources and capacity to 
undertake the kind of background research that Azoulay seems to assume? What is 
problematic here is that Azoulay’s proposal seems to presuppose a certain type of 
‘academic’ viewer, one that is both compelled and able to pursue the backstory and go 
beyond what is visible in the frame. If this were so, Azoulay’s model would depend 
on existing hierarchies rather than contest them.  
Moving on from this discussion of the kind of spectator that Azoulay’s thesis 
appears to assume, there is a particular conceptualization of the political results from 
Azoulay’s approach to photography that is worth analyzing. What she deems as 
political is the encounter between people and the special forms of relationships that 
they create in such an encounter. In this sense, the political exists independently of the 
sanction of a sovereign power and it entails a collective practice, where all 
participants act as equals. This idea that the political is essentially a form of being-
together or being-with-others and that this relationship is characterised by the 
plurality and equality of the people involved is similar to what Rancière defines as the 
domain of politics. I will use Rancière’s ideas of politics here to better analyze and 
assess Azoulay’s view of the political, and this will also help me later on to establish a 
connection between Derrida’s view of politics as ungrounded decision-making, the 
cinematic cut, hospitality, and Rancière’s and Azoulay’s notions of politics.  
V. Politics and Aesthetics of Photography 
For Rancière, politics emerges in opposition to the order of the police (or, simply, the 
police), which is the system that distributes and legitimizes the social positions and 
roles that are assigned to individuals by the ruling power. The order of the police is a 
form of governance that follows the ‘logic of saturation’ in the sense that it counts and 
accounts for each and every part of the community and attributes them with a precise 
place and function. This means that insofar as the order of the police is a process that 
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decides how and which parts are acknowledged and visible as parts, and also whether 
the voice or speech of these parts would be heard as intelligible or not within a 
specific society, it is a process that determines what is perceptible. The police thus 
sets the boundaries of the field of possible experience, the field of our own sensibility. 
The police is ‘a distribution of the sensible (partage du sensible).’35 Politics, for 
Rancière, emerges in opposition to the order of the police, to this partition of the 
sensible. Politics, however, is not a matter of the institutional creation of just social 
arrangements. Instead, politics is a matter of what people do and how they relate to 
one another, and in particular what they do collectively that contests the hierarchical 
order of the police. Rancière believes that to challenge and disrupt such a social order 
and its distribution of social parts and places is to act under the presupposition of 
one's own equality.  
Here we can start to see a connection between Derrida’s idea of politics as 
making ungrounded decisions and taking risks, and Rancière’s thesis that politics 
entails a disruption of the social order. These connections will become more evident 
in subsequent chapters, but it is worth noting that the common ground for these two 
philosophers is that politics involves in one way or another an interruption.     
Like Azoulay’s understanding of the political that stems from her idea of the 
civil contract of photography, Rancière argues that politics is a process that involves 
action on the part of a group, rather than on an individual level. Through this process, 
those who have been made and/or presupposed unequal by a particular social order 
(as well as those in solidarity with them) act under the presupposition of equality; they 
enact their equality, and thereby disrupt the hierarchical order itself. In addition to 
this, both Azoulay and Rancière also agree that the political is not an attribute of the 
work of art (the photograph, in the specific case of Azoulay), but rather the political is 
the result of a particular form of social relations that are often enabled and originated 
by means of the work of art. However, Azoulay and Rancière are not in complete 
agreement as to what constitutes politics or the political as well as what the 
relationship between politics and the work of art and/or aesthetics consists of. 
Because Azoulay is trying to argue that the photographic event is a space of political 
relations not mediated by the nation-state and that the photographer does not have 
exclusive ownership over the photograph, she maintains that neither the aesthetic nor 	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the political are properties of photographs. Her view is that all images (including 
photographs) are necessarily aesthetic insofar as the manner in which they are 
experienced is always by way of the senses. In this way, a photographic image 
belongs to the domain of the aesthetic not because the author of it so intended or 
because a critic has judged the photograph as such. Similarly, one photograph cannot 
be more aesthetic than another nor can it be considered as not aesthetic enough.  
Underlying this view is Azoulay’s rejection of the use of what she calls the 
‘third judgment of taste,’ by which she means the most prevalent form of the 
judgment of taste within today’s paradigm of art.36 The third judgment of taste 
considers works of art such as photographs as either being political (and hence not 
aesthetic) or as being not political (and hence aesthetic). This judgment implies that 
the categories of the political and the aesthetic are seen as incompatible qualities of 
the work of art that can be absent or present in the work, and that it is the sole 
decision of the artist to make stylistic choices that result in her work becoming either 
aesthetic or political. Rejecting the use of the third judgment of taste and the 
dichotomy it entails allows Azoulay to maintain that all photographs -- insofar as they 
are objects of the senses -- belong to the aesthetic domain, and also that the political is 
not a trait that photographs have but a ‘space of human relations exposed to each 
other in public.’37 Here Azoulay draws on Arendt’s view of what the political is. 
Arendt revisited the classical distinction between vita activa and vita contemplativa.38 
For her, the political is part of our vita activa, involving action; as opposed to our vita 
contemplativa, which is that part of our lives we devote to contemplation, speculation 
and theorizing. The political for Arendt ‘exists only insofar as people exist together in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Azoulay takes her idea of the judgment of taste from Kant. For him, aesthetic judgments that decide 
whether a work of art is beautiful or not are judgments of taste. Kant develops his theory of the 
judgment of taste in The Critique of Judgment, where he explains that the two fundamental conditions 
of the judgment ‘this is beautiful’ is that it is subjective and universal at the same time. Azoulay 
explains that the Kantian judgment of taste is the first form of this judgment and that the other two 
forms emerged during the twentieth century with the different developments in art practice, history and 
criticism. The second judgment of taste shifted from the question of beauty to the question of art. Thus 
this second judgment evaluates whether some work is or not art. Finally, Azoulay explains that the 
third judgment of taste emerged during the inter-war period and that it decides whether a work of art is 
aesthetic or political. See Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. by Paul Guyer and trans. by P. 
Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and 
Azoulay, Civil Imagination, pp.35-38. 
37 Azoulay, ‘Getting Rid of the Distinction Between the Aesthetic and the Political,’ in Theory, Culture 
& Society, Vol. 27, No. 7-8 (2010), pp.239-262 (p.251).  
38 See Arendt, The Human Condition, intro. by Margaret Canovan (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1999). 
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public, and it ceases to exist when they part ways.’39 Adopting this notion of the 
political and denying that the photographer is the unique exclusive author of the 
photograph, serve as premises for the argument that Azoulay is trying to advance. Her 
claim is that, since the photograph also involves the subjects photographed and the 
spectator as active participants and not just the photographer’s intervention, then the 
photograph creates a plural space of human relations. Therefore, the photograph 
configures a political space. The idea that wherever there is human encounter there is 
a political space is central because it is on the basis of this that Azoulay can claim that 
there are some collective practices that create relationships that are not directly 
mediated by the nation-state, and that photography is one of those practices. 
It is precisely here where Azoulay’s and Rancière’s understandings of politics 
or the political differ. While for Azoulay every human encounter is political, for 
Rancière only those collective actions that suppose equality amongst the participants 
and that hence imply dissent and subversion of social hierarchies and the distribution 
of the sensible can be deemed as politics. Against this, Azoulay wishes to deny the 
idea that politics is an infrequent and unique event and that it does not necessarily 
imply rupture, resistance or contestation with the ruling order. She believes that by 
making all human interactions expressions of the political, the dichotomy introduced 
by the third judgment of taste between the aesthetic (the non-political) and the 
political (the non-aesthetic) will simply not arise; and hence practices like 
photography can be seen as essentially collective rather than as a product made by an 
individual (the artist, the photographer). For Azoulay, if all human exchanges are 
political, and if all photographic images involve interactions amongst humans and are 
necessarily aesthetic (because they are experienced through the senses), then all 
photographic images are political and aesthetic at the same time. Here aesthetics and 
politics are not mutually excluding domains. This last idea is something that Rancière 
also endorses, albeit for completely different reasons.  
Rancière argues that aesthetics and politics are not opposing concepts but that 
rather they bear an important relationship to one another (while remaining two 
different domains). This is because he thinks that politics is a process of emancipation 
whereby a collective of people refuses to identify with the positions and functions that 
have been assigned to them within the order of the police; and instead this collective 	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assumes their equality with other groups positioned higher in this order. It is a process 
of challenging the distribution of the sensible and producing alternative ways of what 
can be seen, thought, experienced and said. In other words, politics involves a 
dissensus that not only calls into question the power arrangements and the supposed 
justice of a social order, but it also unveils the arbitrariness and contingency of the 
conceptual, epistemological and perceptual axioms that underpin such an order; the 
arbitrariness of the partition or distribution of the sensible. This is precisely where the 
aesthetic aspect of politics can be seen, for politics is the disruption of that partition 
that determines the limits of the sensible, the limits of all experience.  
Inversely, aesthetics also has a political aspect for Rancière. Like politics, art 
can also be a dissensual activity; an activity that subverts forms of domination for it 
can also lead to a process of enactment of equality or of verification of equality. It is 
important to note that he distinguishes three different regimes of art or of the artistic 
practice, only referring to the third of these as aesthetics; the only regime associated 
with dissensual and subversive activity. The first regime of art is the ethical regime, in 
which a work of art is judged by its truth and by the (ethical) effects upon individuals, 
their behavior, and upon the community at large. The second is the representative or 
the mimetic regime in which works of art are destined to imitation. These are works of 
art that show an adequacy between expression and subject matter and most 
importantly between the way the artwork is created, its form and texture (poiesis), and 
the way it is perceived, enjoyed and understood (aisthesis). Finally, the aesthetic 
regime is that where the work of art breaks up the correspondence between poiesis 
and aisthesis, ‘between the texture of the work and its efficacy.’40  This rupture is the 
aesthetic break that disrupts the cause-effect link that the representative regime 
establishes between artistic creation and aesthetic pleasure. According to Rancière, 
while in the representative regime the adequacy between poiesis and aisthesis could 
only be appreciated by a select few with a refined sensibility and never by the 
unsophisticated masses, the aesthetic regime liberates the work of art from its 
supposed exclusive circle of addressees. In this regime art is open (in principle) to the 
gaze of everyone and anyone by way of the gap created between the particular 
creative artistic practice and the affects that this practice may produce. As Rancière 
argues, in the aesthetic regime the rules of mimesis are dismissed and the domain of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, trans. by Gregory Elliot (London and New York: Verso, 
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affect and/or experience is cut from its conventional reference points. Thus art is freed 
from strict structures, and ‘what is offered to the free play of art is free appearance.’41 
Corcoran offers a clarifying explanation of Rancière’s view as follows: 
Since no pre-ordered, pre-given structures are available anymore that would define what 
can be said, in what form, in which language, using which images, and to whom, art in the 
‘aesthetic regime’ consists of always limited attempts or propositions for a local 
restructuring of the field of experience.42  
This free play of aestheticization unveils the arbitrariness of a particular distribution 
of the sensible by constructing alternative distributions that are not grounded upon the 
hierarchies implied in the ethical and the representational regimes of art. Indeed, the 
primacy of mimesis is replaced with that of expressiveness in the aesthetic regime, 
which means that instead of employing images and language of the world for merely 
representational and mimetic purposes, these images and language become ends in 
themselves, valuable for their own poetic potential. The aesthetic regime thus 
articulates a new partition of the sensible that rejects the hierarchy of the existing 
order and rather is founded on certain ‘equalities.’ For example, in this regime there is 
no particular subject to be represented, nor is there a fixed way of representing a 
subject. To illustrate this, Rancière recalls Gustave Flaubert who made it clear 
through his writing that style should not be determined by the represented subject, and 
that it is form and style that take primacy over mimetic representations and subject 
matters. Flaubert’s Madame Bovary shows this insofar as it meticulously describes the 
life of a bourgeois woman who commits adultery; her affairs are taken here as 
aesthetically valuable as the life and adventures of any conventional heroic character.  
In this manner, art in the aesthetic regime implies a dissensus. Just as politics, 
so aesthetics contests a particular distribution of the sensible. Nevertheless, the form 
of dissensus of politics and that of aesthetics differ from one another. The dissensual 
activity in politics produces a collective subject, a ‘we’ that disrupts the social order -- 
the distribution of the sensible -- by way of its emergence. This is what Rancière calls 
the ‘aesthetics of politics.’43 On the other hand, the form of dissensual activity of 
aesthetics does not create, as politics does, a new form of subjectivation or a 
collective voice for those who have been excluded from the social order. Rather, it 
articulates an alternative shared world of experience, and thereby it produces new 	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43 Rancière, ‘The Paradoxes of Political Art,’ in Dissensus, pp.134-151 (p.141). 
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forms of individuality as well as new ways in which these forms relate to one another, 
and also new modes of perception. This is the ‘politics of aesthetics,’44 which 
Rancière describes as follows:  
The ‘politics of aesthetics’ […] does not give a collective voice to the anonymous [those 
who have no part]. Instead, it re-frames the world of common experience as the world of 
shared impersonal experience. In this way it aids to help create the fabric of a common 
experience in which new modes of constructing common objects and new possibilities of 
subjective enunciation may be developed that are characteristic of the ‘aesthetics of 
politics.’45 
An important thing to underline here is that any effects that are produced by the 
politics of aesthetics are conducted ‘on the basis of an original effect that implies the 
suspension of any direct cause-effect relationship.’46 What this means is that art in the 
aesthetic regime cannot foresee nor know what will result from the encounter between 
the work of art (and the artist’s intention) and the spectator’s reception and response 
to this. In other words, aestheticized art is unable to predict the outcome that its 
disruption of the ruling distribution of the sensible and its suspension of the 
hierarchical order will generate upon the forms of political subjectivation. And it is 
this unpredictability that makes art in the aesthetic regime an instantiation of politics. 
‘Aesthetic experience has a political effect to the extent that the loss of destination it 
presupposes disrupts the way in which bodies fit their functions and destinations.’47  
This last idea of Rancière that it is not possible to anticipate the meaning of the 
artwork or the effects that this work has is shared by Azoulay too. Her triadic model 
sustains the claim that the photograph is never a complete, fixed and finished product 
for its significance cannot be restricted to the intentions of the photographer. The 
photograph as such is only one utterance of the many possible utterances produced 
through the encounter of photographer, subjects photographed and spectators. The 
three parties play an active role in the constitution of the photograph as a political 
space, but none of them can act as the final arbitrator of the image. This idea of 
Azoulay of photography as an always-evolving practice and a continuously open 
space for dialogue is valuable, and I will explore in the next chapters how it can be 
transposed to documentaries. Likewise, Derrida’s understanding of politics as the 
domain of laws and decisions that cannot be grounded, that are always a bet in the 	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sense that it is impossible to anticipate the outcome of such decisions, could be seen 
to mirror both Rancière’s claim that the effect of an artwork cannot be forecast, and 
also Azoulay’s idea that the artwork is always open to myriad readings and meanings. 
I will also return to this later on.     
Despite the convergence between Azoulay’s and Rancière’s views with 
regards to politics and aesthetics, Azoulay also assumes a critical distance from 
Rancière. She affirms that the processes of subversion and emancipation that Rancière 
calls ‘politics’ do occur within the domain she considers as ‘the political’ but only 
when certain civil skills are put into action. Azoulay maintains that when the skills of 
the civil intention and the civil gaze are exercised, then political relations can truly 
contest a social order and its hierarchies. In the case of the event of photography, it is 
when the spectator employs her civil gaze to ‘watch’ the images and go beyond what 
the photograph frames, that the spectator shows interest, responsibility and 
partnership with the subjects portrayed and their situations. And it is only then that the 
social relationships emerging through the photograph can pose a challenge for the 
ruling social order. 
A question surfaces here as to whether Azoulay’s notion of the political is 
more adequate than that presented by Rancière; and if it really helps to understand the 
realms of the political, the aesthetic and the civil in a more useful way. I believe that 
Azoulay insists that all human interactions are political because she thinks there is no 
other way to avoid three theses she believes are mistaken. First, the thesis of the third 
judgment of taste that distinguishes the aesthetic and the political as mutually 
excluding attributes of the work of art. Second, the paradigm of art approach that 
denies all agency to spectators and the subjects photographed, and sees the 
photograph as a finished product owned by the artist in whose hands resides 
exclusively any possible political rupture with the hierarchies of the social order. And 
third, the idea that Azoulay attributes to critical theorists and that affirms that the 
political is a practice ‘reserved for a select few’48 who are outside politics and who 
relate to the regime in certain way.  
For Rancière, unlike for Azoulay, not every human encounter is political. He 
claims that the ‘essence of politics consists in disturbing the [social] arrangement by 
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supplementing it with a part of those without part.’49 Politics in this sense is a process 
and not an attribute or quality of a person, a work of art or an event. While Rancière’s 
notion of politics does imply a unique event, he does not need to make use of the third 
judgment of taste and distinguish aesthetics and politics as conflicting domains. 
Contrary to what Azoulay thinks, when Rancière distinguishes politics from its other 
(the non-politics), he does not mention aesthetics. What opposes politics is the order 
of the police. Politics takes place when those who are denied a share in the communal 
distribution of the sensible and who are hence unaccounted for within the order of the 
police actively verify their equality to those who are above them in the social order. 
This does not mean that politics is an exclusive process accessible only to certain 
people (the unaccounted or excluded). On the contrary, for Rancière politics is 
precisely that collective process that affirms the equality of all individuals and that 
shows the arbitrariness and contingency of the social hierarchies and the partition of 
the sensible. In this way, Rancière’s views allow for a politics that not only does not 
oppose aesthetics, but that is also based on the principle of universal equality without 
having to endorse Azoulay’s idea that every human interaction is political.  
In trying to avoid making the political an infrequent event, Azoulay proposes 
that the political is the everyday action of human beings. She is thereby led to affirm 
that an extra element is needed within all the political interactions for the latter to be 
able to raise a challenge to the social order and its hierarchies. This extra element or 
extra dimension of the political is what she calls the ‘civil intention,’ which is the civil 
skill that enables individuals to form relationships with others based on partnership, 
responsibility and solidarity; relationships that are neither sanctioned nor restricted by 
national borders, social class or professional roles. In the case of the event of 
photography, the civil skill or intention that spectators put into action is that of 
‘watching’ the photograph and seeing the event portrayed as occurring in the present. 
Only in this way can the photographic encounter create a space of political 
relationships that challenge the hierarchies of the social order. 
Does Azoulay’s claim that only when the civil gaze and civil intention are 
involved it is possible to bring up a challenge to the social order provide a more useful 
or a clearer understanding of the political than that of Rancière? It is my view that 
Azoulay thesis of the political is manifested in every human interaction ends up 	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making this domain too broad. In her attempt to include photography as a space where 
political relationships emerge and where (against what the canon of art claims) 
spectators and subjects represented play an active role, she extends the political to 
such an extent that she needs to add the dimension of the civil so as to explain the 
possibility of political relationships that disrupt the hierarchies of the ruling social 
regime. Even though she emphasizes that the civil skills always co-exist with the 
other two dimensions of the political life or the ‘life of action’ (namely, the dimension 
of survival, orientation and experience of the world; and the dimension of 
professional expertise), she needs to underline the civil skills as unique and necessary 
to ensure forms of human interaction that are subversive of the ruling order. I believe 
that Azoulay is correct in pointing out the relevance of the civil skills and intention, 
understood in terms of the dimension through which individuals show concern, 
responsibility and partnership for one another and for the world they share. But her 
position seems to imply that the civil is not always guaranteed. This is evidenced 
when she says that it is the photograph that allows the spectator to realize the civil 
potential and activate the civil gaze, which refuses to consider the photograph as the 
finished product of the photographer, and thus ‘resists the attempts of others to erase 
this space of plurality’50 created through the event of photography. If the civil 
intention and gaze are a potential, then the possibility of relationships that challenge 
the ruling order becomes exceptional in the exact same way that (according to 
Azoulay) Rancière’s notion of politics is infrequent and unique. In this way, despite 
what she claims, Azoulay’s understanding of the political does not appear to be 
radically different from that of Rancière. In fact, his view might be clearer than that of 
Azoulay for he does not need to single out the civil dimension within politics (for 
him, these two are completely merged). Furthermore, as I will explain in Chapter 3, 
he is able to offer an explanation of the active role of spectators and the (political) 
subversiveness of the work of art without having to extend the political to all type of 
human exchanges. 
I will return to contrast Azoulay’s and Rancière’s views further on in this 
thesis. In particular, I will draw on Rancière’s ideas of the relationship between 
spectators and artist in order to argue that Azoulay’s model of photography can be 
transposed to documentary films about migration. But for now, I will examine the 	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concept of citizenship that is implied by Azoulay’s thesis of the civil contract of 
photography. This analysis will allow me to bridge Azoulay’s ideas of politics and 
citizenship with Derrida’s conception of hospitality. 
VI. Rehabilitating Citizenship?  
According to Azoulay, what follows from her triadic model of photography is that 
whenever citizenship has been in one way or another violated or injured, there is the 
possibility of rectifying such injustices through photography.  Photography offers an 
arena for political (and civil) action, and hence for a new understanding of the concept 
of citizenship in terms of a practice of solidarity and duty towards others, rather than 
in terms of a status, a membership or a possession that individuals are endowed with 
in a certain nation-state. She states that: 
The civil contract of photography assumes that, at least in principle, the users of 
photography possess a certain power to suspend the gesture of the sovereign power which 
seeks to totally dominate the relations between them as governed -- governed into citizens 
and noncitizens, thus making disappear the violation of citizenship. This is an attempt to 
rethink the political space of governed populations and to reformulate the boundaries of 
citizenship as distinct from the nation and the market whose dual rationale constantly 
threatens to subjugate it.51    
The conceptualization of citizenship that therefore emerges from the thesis of the civil 
contract of photography is one that entails the exercise of certain civil skills that serve 
to negotiate with the sovereign power. At the same time, the civil contract of 
photography implies that the citizen has the political obligation to give expression to 
grievances on behalf of those whose rights have been violated and those whose living 
conditions are on the verge of catastrophe. Here, citizenship means adopting an active 
political stance to defend the governed (that is, both the citizens and non-citizens of a 
nation-state) against the power of the sovereign state. The domain of the political is, 
in this sense, understood in terms of the relationships between the governed, ‘whose 
political duty is first and foremost or at least also toward one another, rather than 
toward the ruling power.’52  
Can a conceptualization of citizenship such as the one Azoulay defends really 
make sense outside of the boundaries of the nation-state? As she explains, from its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Azoulay, ‘Ariella Azoulay on her book The Civil Contract of Photography,’ in Rorotoko (January 
22nd, 2009), 
<http://rorotoko.com/interview/20090123_azoulay_ariella_book_civil_contract_photography/?page=4
> [accessed February 10th 2012]. 
52 Ibid. 
	   92	  
very inception the modern notion of citizenship was inextricably linked to the nation-
state insofar as it was defined in terms of the ways in which individuals are related to 
the sovereign power. Thus understood, citizenship necessarily produces exclusions for 
it implies a distinction between citizens and non-citizens. Dimitris Papadopoulos has 
put this idea very clearly by way of a thought experiment. 53 He proposes to imagine a 
nation-state that grants citizenship to everybody without restrictions or conditions. 
The result is that in such a state citizenship becomes, useless since it no longer 
distinguishes individuals who belong to the nation as citizens from those who are not. 
Papadopoulos’s point is that citizenship inevitably implies the production of exclusion 
-- and hence of irregularities; and that the more inclusive citizenship is, the less useful 
as a distinguishing tool it gets. This means that if citizenship is conceived as 
legitimately belonging to a nation-state, then from the outset it can never be all-
inclusive. 
Concerned with the everyday and normalised -- and therefore often invisible -- 
violence to which Palestinians are subjected, and in the hope of offering an alternative 
conceptualization of citizenship that does not exclude anyone, Azoulay argues for a 
notion of citizenship that is not sanctioned by the nation-state but that functions as a 
tool that citizens employ to negotiate with the sovereign power. Her proposal thus 
needs to be understood as a de-nationalised and de-territorialised notion of citizenship 
that is, for this reason, able to include everyone as active members in a political 
community. Indeed, she asserts that for the conceptualization of citizenship to be 
restored today it is a necessary condition that it be based on the ‘principle that 
everyone everywhere is entitled to citizenship in the state in which he or she lives.’54 
To the extent that Azoulay’s notion of citizenship is not dependent on the way in 
which individuals relate to a nation-state but rather on the way they relate to one 
another, then citizenship sheds its appearance as a fixed status bestowed by the state 
and instead becomes a set of civil duties towards others and civil skills that everyone 
can exercise. Citizenship thus establishes a plane of horizontal political (and ethical) 
relations among equals.     
One might still object here that by detaching citizenship from the nation-state, 
Azoulay is presenting a perspective on certain political relations that emerge through 	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different practices today, such as photography, but that these are not equivalent to 
citizenship. The criticism would be that Azoulay is not really providing a notion of 
citizenship but something altogether different. A possible response to this would be to 
emphasize that precisely because she is seeking to find an alternative notion of 
citizenship that does not distinguish between citizens and non-citizens, and that grants 
political agency to those who are either stateless or with an impaired citizenship, she 
needs to articulate the notion of citizenship outside of the framework of the nation-
state. Her proposal does entail a different way of thinking both about politics and 
citizenship. The virtue of this proposal is twofold for, firstly, it constitutes an 
inclusive notion of citizenship; and secondly, it allows rethinking politics as a sphere 
of relations among individuals, rather than between individuals and the sovereign 
power. 
 Nonetheless, a further objection would be that Azoulay’s idea to make 
citizenship independent of the nation-state and politics a domain of relations among 
equals is a romanticised conceptualization of citizenship and politics, a utopian 
proposal that fails to have any possible application. The response here would be that 
Azoulay tries to avoid speaking about an ideal political community, a political 
community to come, by invoking actual practices that allow for the materialization of 
political relationships -- and hence political communities -- both inside and outside 
national borders. For her, photography is one of those practices. Equally, her view 
that any human interaction is political allows her to eschew a distinction between the 
political and the non-political, and therefore avoiding the distinction between an ideal 
political community and one that is not ideal. 
However, the critic might still insist that insofar as those political relations 
remain beyond the regulation of the sovereign power, then they can have no bearing 
on the actual world. If as Azoulay admits, through the civil contract of photography a 
stateless person or one with an impaired citizenship will not in fact be able to modify 
his or her conditions, then a citizenship beyond the framework of the nation-state 
seems to be an abstract and unrealizable ideal. In the hope of addressing this last 
objection, Azoulay asserts that her proposal does empower non-citizens and people 
with a damaged citizenship to direct claims to both spectator and photographer, and 
thereby eventually also to the sovereign power. It is by way of the collective 
articulation of civil grievances of non-citizens and/or impaired ones, that the latter are 
actually able to negotiate with the sovereign. Yet, one thing that seems 
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counterintuitive in Azoulay’s conceptualization of citizenship is the fact that she 
presents it as a notion that is not regulated by the sovereign nation-state, and 
nonetheless as a notion that simultaneously operates as a protective shield and tool to 
negotiate with the sovereign power. One thus wonders, why does Azoulay insist on 
getting rid entirely of the sovereign power (within the citizenry of photography) and 
yet she still wants to maintain the capacity to negotiate with it? 	  
Another point that is questionable in Azoulay’s account of the citizenship of 
photography is the idea that anyone who comes into contact with the practice of 
photography is a citizen in the citizenry of photography. Her claim that photography 
is, in principle, ‘accessible to all, [and that therefore it] bestows universal citizenship 
on a new citizenry whose citizens produce, distribute and look at images’55 is also 
problematic because it is not clear that everyone anywhere can enjoy access to 
photography; which means that becoming a citizen of photography is not really open 
to everybody. The question of how images are distributed, exhibited, accessed and 
appropriated today is something that Azoulay does not seem to consider at length. 
Even though the Internet has opened up the possibility for the immediate worldwide 
circulation of images and hence for the wide appropriation of them, this does not 
mean that everyone has equal access to these images. Taking issue with the question 
of access is something that Azoulay would need to do. For if she wants to establish a 
borderless citizenry, one that is truly de-territorialised, then the possibility of 
becoming a citizen of photography would have to really be open to everyone and not 
restricted only to those who can come into contact with photography.56 
In view of the mentioned problems, in the following paragraphs I will argue 
that Azoulay’s proposal needs to be refined and supplemented by drawing on 
Derrida’s discussion of hospitality and the relation between this latter concept and the 
domains of ethics and politics, which I have already presented in Chapter 1. I will 
claim that Azoulay’s understanding of the concept of citizenship -- as defined in terms 
of a practice of partnership and solidarity among individuals -- is in line with 
Derrida’s idea that ethics and politics are two opposing spheres that are inextricably 
linked. At the same time however, if Azoulay’s notion of citizenship as both a set of 
skills to negotiate with the sovereign and as a practice based on civil responsibility is 	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to be meaningful and effective, it should not do away with the national sovereign 
altogether. Instead, her notion of citizenship can only be possible if it is based on an 
idea of politics that is guided by the principle of hospitality.  
To recapitulate what I mentioned in the previous chapter, Derrida defines 
hospitality as an aporetic concept, for it involves an insoluble tension between two 
opposing yet inseparable and coexistent figures that this concept takes. Absolute or 
unconditional hospitality demands that we receive the foreigner without imposing any 
restrictions and conditions. Conditional hospitality, on the other hand, establishes 
certain requirements and limitations to the welcoming of the other. According to 
Derrida, absolute hospitality is impossible because it is a formal ‘promise’ that lacks 
content, and hence it can never be actualized in laws. Thus, the conditional laws of 
hospitality are called forth in the light of the impossibility of this promise. Because 
these conditional laws necessarily commit violence by selecting and discriminating 
who is to be welcome, these laws are in constant need of improvement where they 
have failed to meet the demands of absolute hospitality. 
These two figures of hospitality express the relation existing between ethics 
and politics, which in turn parallels the relation between justice and law (droit). While 
the law is associated with legitimacy or legality, that which is always ‘calculable, a 
system of regulated and coded prescriptions; [justice, by contrast is] infinite, 
incalculable, rebellious to rule and foreign to symmetry.’ 57 Justice exceeds the law; 
and the law is ‘haunted’ by the prospect of a justice that it will never entirely 
accomplish. Yet the impossibility of justice, as much as that of unconditional 
hospitality, ‘far from paralyzing, sets in motion a new thinking of the possible.’58 The 
impossibility of pure unconditional hospitality and of pure justice does not provoke 
the idealization of the unachievable; rather, it prompts us to attempt to make possible 
the impossible, and so opens up possibilities of transformation. What this means is 
that, for Derrida, unconditional and conditional, ethics and politics are in a constant 
and inevitable play of negotiation. In the absence of ideal hospitality, politics needs to 
constantly look for less bad laws, laws that commit less violence against the absolute 
other.  
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Derrida proposes adopting a politics that aims to legislate (conditional laws of 
hospitality) in the name of the unconditional, a politics that inevitably imposes 
conditions but that admits these conditions can always be perfected. This implies a 
notion of politics that strives to remain open to the arrival of the other and that is critic 
of the laws of hospitality that depend on citizenship or on agreements between nation-
states. Derrida’s views about hospitality and the relationship between ethics and 
politics seem also to suggest an alternative approach to citizenship. As he says, today 
we need to re-think ‘what is “political” in citizenship, […] what it means to belong to 
a nation or a state.’59 The form of citizenship that Derrida appears to propose 
involves, above all, relationships that, instead of being determined solely by the 
sovereign power, are based on political and ethical responsibility among individuals. 
In other words, Derrida seems to argue for a notion of citizenship that has as its core 
the duty of forming ‘hospitable’ relations with other individuals regardless of their 
status within a nation-state. This could be called, therefore, a hospitable citizenship. 
And the concrete application of this hospitable citizenship is our moral and civic duty 
to struggle to transform the conditional laws of hospitality so that they are less violent 
and avoid closing off the arrival of the absolute other.  
Returning now to Azoulay’s conceptualization of citizenship derived from her 
triadic model of photography, we can see that the ‘hospitable’ citizenship that appears 
to follow from Derrida’s remarks about hospitality is similar to the one that she 
defends. Like Azoulay, Derrida seems to maintain a notion of citizenship that entails 
the formation of (hospitable) relationships not directly sanctioned by the nation-state 
for he proposes a form of political and ethical commitment towards other individuals 
independently of what their actual citizenship status is within certain nation-state. 
Also like Azoulay, Derrida affirms that a conceptualization of citizenship that is 
adequate to today’s most pressing matters (for instance, the large number of people 
suffering inequality, repression and rights deprivation) should necessarily involve an 
active struggle, an active demand from the state to find ‘the best “legislative” 
transaction, the best “juridical” conditions,’60 as well as a demand for the actual 
implementation of such improved laws. All in all, Derrida and Azoulay seem to 
coincide in their views pertaining to how the task and the domain of politics should be 
understood today. They both consider that political relationships can be created 	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without the mediation of the state through, for instance, nongovernmental 
organisations and other practices like that of photography. Crucially, they agree that 
the sign of today’s political relations is (or should be) that of solidarity across national 
borders and the struggle for equality. This is not a solidarity out of pity, mercy or 
empathy, but one out of a genuine ethical and political commitment towards others 
irrespective of their citizenship status. As Azoulay explains, what motivates these 
ethico-political relations is the double realization of the fact that the violations 
inflicted on others mean that not all the people governed (citizens and non-citizens) 
are equally governed, and of the fact that so long as citizens are governed alongside 
others who are not governed as equals, then citizens themselves can never be 
governed equally. Striving for the improvement of laws as the way to counter the 
violence endured by stateless persons and those with a flawed citizenship stems from 
the conviction that, insofar as nothing is done towards modifying the unequal 
treatment and government of all individuals, then citizens can never be really equal.  
Unlike Azoulay, however, Derrida does not propose a citizenship that entirely 
dispenses with the sovereign state. Nor does his notion of citizenship imply that 
everyone can become a citizen, thereby flattening and overlooking power relations 
that nevertheless still inevitably exist. There is a horizontal non-hierarchical way of 
relating to others in Derrida’s account of hospitality and in the notion of citizenship 
that stems from this account to the extent that we all have an ethico-political duty 
towards the other, and especially towards those who are under the constant threat of 
suffering inequalities and unjust treatment. According to him, the world as it is now 
does require that we re-think politics outside of the restrictive framework of national 
borders, and that we strive for the creation of laws of conditional hospitality that best 
respect the principle of absolute hospitality. Yet, Derrida does not think that with this 
ethico-political duty we can do away entirely with the sovereign power and become 
equal members of a citizenry beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. In fact, he 
warns us of the danger of a complete effacement of the state or a too straightforward 
hostility towards sovereignty: 
I think on the one hand you have to be active against what you call ‘the passing away of the 
state’ (the state can still, sometimes, set limits to private forces of appropriation, 
concentrations of economic powers, and it can restrain a violent depoliticization occurring 
in the name of the ‘market’). But also, on the other hand, you have to resist the state where 
it is too often soldered to the nationalism of the nation-state or the representation of socio-
economic hegemonies. Every time you must analyse, and invent a new rule: in one case you 
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should challenge the state, in another consolidate it. Politics is not coextensive with states 
[…]. The necessary repoliticization must not be in the service of a new cult of the state. We 
have to bring about new dissociations and accept complex and differentiated practices.61     
Thus it appears that where Azoulay’s view of political relations differs from that of 
Derrida is in her notion that through the photographic act everyone can become a 
‘citizen’ in the citizenry of photography, and that the ‘injured citizenship’ of those 
who suffer the deprivation or the violation of their rights can be ‘restored’ by way of 
the civil contract of photography. These ideas are problematic because they entail the 
creation of an abstract, apparently utopian, sphere of political relations that operates 
independently of the actual sovereign state yet pretends to negotiate with it and 
produce changes in the political sphere governed by the state. If the political relations 
emanating from the civil contract of photography are to effectively empower the 
stateless, the noncitizens and/or those with a ‘damaged’ citizenship, then Azoulay 
needs to acknowledge that those relationships cannot entirely disregard the sovereign 
nation-state. Furthermore, if her argument is that the two spheres of political relations 
-- the one governed by the sovereign state and the one independent of it -- can coexist, 
then her model would imply that there are two types of citizenship: the one granted by 
the nation-state, and the one not sanctioned by it and hence accessible to everyone. 
Yet again, claiming that there are two sorts of citizenship seems at least awkward, if 
not flawed.  
Additionally, Azoulay’s triadic model also appears to assume that just by the 
act of coming into contact with a photograph of horror, the viewer immediately takes 
up her civic duty to ‘watch’ a photograph and to reconstitute it in terms of grievances 
for those injured. But there is no guarantee that this is the case; nothing ensures that 
spectators will indeed assume responsibility for the meaning of the photograph and 
what it depicts. Again, here the problem with Azoulay is that she holds a utopian view 
of both the citizenry of photography and the spectators. For her, the spectator who 
‘watches’ photographs of the verge of catastrophe and hence takes a responsible 
stance towards those images and what they portray is an ideal, a universal spectator. 
That is, the viewer is a ‘moral addressee’ that is able to overcome ‘the narrow 
considerations of time and place or local interests. [And in this sense her existence] is 
a necessary logical postulate, […] a limit concept embodying the ethics of the 
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spectator.’62 Without this concept of an ideal ‘true’ spectator, the consent given by the 
citizenry of photography cannot be explained.  
Ultimately, I believe, it is the terminology she employs that makes her 
proposal appear difficult to grasp and self-defeating. For instance, using the terms 
‘impaired’ or ‘damaged’ citizenship suggests there is one form of citizenship that is 
pure or complete or undamaged. But it is problematic to affirm that there is a ‘perfect’ 
citizenship for, what could that be? If the whole, perfect, citizen is the one who has 
always all his rights respected and one who can always voice grievances when either 
himself or others have suffered unacceptable injuries, then it would seem that such a 
citizen is also an ideal construction. This terminology equally suggests that citizenship 
can be somehow fully repaired. What would it mean to have a ‘repaired’ citizenship? 
Would a repaired citizenship amount to a whole, untainted or pure citizenship? Do we 
all not, in one way or another, have a failed or an impaired citizenship? Furthermore, 
such terminology seems misleading, for it implies a distinction between those with 
complete or undamaged status and those with an impaired one. This distinction is self-
defeating for -- or at least contradictory to -- Azoulay’s argument as she is thereby 
reinforcing a distinction that she had rejected from the traditional understanding of 
citizenship. The contradiction seems to stem again from the fact that she wishes to 
dispense with the sovereign power, yet her model entails addressing claims towards 
and negotiating with the nation-state. 
In order to maintain and refine what is valuable in Azoulay’s insight about 
citizenship as a set of civic skills and duties towards other individuals, and her idea 
that political relationships can emerge beyond the framework of the nation-state, it is 
necessary to turn to Derrida’s thesis about hospitality and the inextricable link 
between ethics and politics. If the political relationships not mediated by the state, 
which Azoulay thinks are created through the photographic event, are understood as 
hospitable relations -- that is, ethico-political relations based on partnership and 
responsibility -- between individuals rather than between citizens of some idealized 
state-independent citizenry, then her thesis of the practice of photography as an 
alternative space for politics becomes more plausible. As Derrida affirms, politics is 
neither identical with nor restricted to the framework of the state, but there is no need 
to postulate platonic citizenries. Instead, here and now the concept and practice of 	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citizenship needs to be broadened, to encompass more than a membership or a status 
granting rights and duties within a nation-state. Citizenship has to involve a constant 
exercise of hospitality towards others, and particularly towards the stateless and those 
with an impaired citizenship. Indeed, the experience of refugees, undocumented 
persons, deportees, and so on calls today for ‘another kind or practical response,’63 
and thus for wider notions of politics and citizenship. The essential trait of citizenship 
now has to consist of striving ‘to get the laws of hospitality written into actual law.’64 
Since the principle of absolute hospitality can never be captured entirely by the laws 
of conditional hospitality, then the trait of citizenship needs to be that of doing the 
impossible: struggling to ‘enjoin a negotiation with the non-negotiable so as to find 
the “better” or the least bad [laws].’65   
 An understanding of citizenship as an exercise in hospitality allows for the 
actualization of a ‘shared’ sovereignty understood as the active participation of 
citizens who put the state under strict scrutiny in order to ensure that better laws are 
continuously being legislated and enforced. As Derrida says, there is no hospitality if 
there is not a sovereign or host of a household; and there cannot be a host if there is 
no guest. So it is through the guest, the other, the foreigner, that the host can really 
become a host. In a similar fashion, citizens can only exercise their citizenship 
completely by fulfilling their duty of hospitality, by demanding better laws for the 
reception of foreigners and the way these laws are implemented. Only then can 
citizenship as an exercise of hospitality give rise to a shared sovereignty.  
 If Azoulay’s conceptualization of citizenship is understood in terms of 
Derrida’s remarks on ethics and politics of hospitality, then her identification of the 
photographic act as an alternative space for political relations becomes clearer and 
plausible since there is no need to get rid of the sovereign altogether. In this way, a 
shared sovereignty and a hospitable citizenship in the event of photography mean that 
spectators activate their civil intention and skills, and become active participants in 
the political space created through the photograph. Spectators thus become 
responsible for articulating and reconstructing the meaning of images of people 
deprived of rights in terms of demands for better laws. This active participation of 
spectators ensures the ethico-political relationships emerging between the 	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64 Ibid. 
65 Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, p.112. 
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photographer, the spectators and the photographed persons are not only relationships 
based on equality, partnership and solidarity but also relationships that can therefore 
‘suspend disciplinary, sectarian or sovereign interests and […] oppose the authority of 
anyone seeking to impose them.’66 These ethico-political relationships that emerge 
through the photographic event are thus deterritorialised, they are not directly 
regulated by the nation-state and have a subversive character.    
VII. Final Remarks 
I have dedicated this chapter to examining Azoulay’s model of photography, which 
proposes understanding the latter as a practice that involves the relationship between 
three parties: photographer, photographed persons and (actual and/or potential) 
spectators. Through the event of photography these three parties can form political 
relationships that are not mediated by the nation-state and are independent of the 
citizenship status of the participants. Instead, these relationships are based on 
solidarity and partnership, and they exist beyond the territorial demarcations of geo-
political borders. Thus these political relationships question and resist the sovereign 
powers that oppose them and often threaten to erode them.  
 As I argued -- following Derrida -- in Chapter 1, today there is a need to 
understand politics and the political in ways that do not reduce this domain to the 
nation-state. The large number of displaced and stateless people, as well as those who 
endure a constant deprivation of their rights attest to the urgency of thinking forms of 
political relationships that are neither dependent on having a citizenship status nor 
restricted to the regulations imposed by national borders. Azoulay presents a view of 
photography that does precisely this. Her triadic model is an alternative theory of 
photography to the long established models that see photography only in terms of 
power relations between the represented subjects and those with the power to 
represent or in terms that restrict the role of spectators to mere passive voyeurism. But 
perhaps most importantly, Azoulay’s theory of photography makes a contribution to 
the area of political philosophy by articulating politics as human encounters and 
relations, and by making the photographic event as a space that gives rise to such 
interactions without the complete subordination to the sovereign sanction. In other 
words, Azoulay’s approach to photography is useful because it allows thinking this 
visual medium beyond the perspective of its aesthetic value, and instead it allows 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Azoulay, Civil Imagination, p.106. 
	   102	  
considering this medium in connection to wider questions, such as what politics is, 
how political relations can be created and what constitutes (or should constitute) the 
practice of citizenship today. I believe that Azoulay’s model can be transposed to 
other visual media and, in particular, to documentary films about migration and 
border-crossings. In the next chapter, I will examine the possibility of this 
transposition.  
I have considered Azoulay’s proposal of the civil contract of photography and 
have assessed the understanding of politics and of citizenship that derive from this 
contract. I have compared her conceptualization of the political to that of Rancière, 
and I have concluded that they both see politics as a subversive practice realized only 
in collectivity, and they also think that aesthetics and politics are not two mutually 
excluding domains. However, my belief is that Rancière’s notion of politics as a 
collective process of dissent and emancipation that presupposes the equality of all 
people and therefore challenges the social order (the distribution of the sensible) is 
clearer than that of Azoulay’s. I will return to compare Rancière’s and Azoulay’s 
views on politics in the next chapter, and I will draw on his notion of the relation 
between spectator and artist in my consideration of the transposition of Azoulay’s 
model of photography to documentaries. The consideration of the characteristics of 
documentary form in the next chapter, and specifically the notion of cinematic cut, 
will also allow me to establish a link between Rancière’s understanding of politics as 
disruption and redistribution of the places and roles within the social order, and 
Derrida’s view of politics as ungrounded decision-making.  
I have claimed that the political relationships that give rise to what Azoulay 
calls the citizenry of photography should be understood as relationships of hospitality 
as defined by Derrida. Azoulay thinks that citizenship, rather than a membership or a 
status granted by the nation-state, is a practice whereby people relate to others in 
terms of partnership and solidarity regardless of what their actual citizenship status is. 
This notion of citizenship coincides with Derrida’s proposal of a politics (and an 
ethics) of hospitality, a politics that seeks to legislate less bad laws for the reception of 
foreigners, each time striving to follow the principle of absolute hospitality, receiving 
others unconditionally despite their citizenship. That is a politics that fosters forms of 
political relationships based on responsibility, solidarity and equality beyond the 
perimeters of geo-political borders.  
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The next chapter will deal with the consideration of extending Azoulay’s 
triadic model of photography to documentary films as well as to situations different to 
her specific focus on the Israeli occupation of Palestine, which frames and defines her 
thesis of citizenship. I will suggest that documentary films have the potential to 
constitute spaces for ethico-political relationships (relationships of hospitality), and 
that therefore the form of documentary can be politically subversive and call into 
question cultural, social and political hierarchies.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The Art(ifice) of Documentary as a Hospitable Space  
 
I.  
In the last chapter I introduced and analysed Azoulay’s triadic model of photography. 
Her thesis of the political relationships that emerge through the photographic event 
provides a valuable contribution to both the theory of photography and political 
philosophy. Her theoretical model grants an active role to the spectator as well as to 
the photographed person. Thus, this model implies that the photograph is not a 
finished product realised by the photographer, but the product of a collective and 
upon which no one can claim exclusive ownership. By this, Azoulay means that the 
photograph never has a fixed meaning; its meaning is open since it is articulated 
differently each time with each photographic encounter between spectator, 
photographed subject and photographer. Photography is here understood as a set of 
practices, always evolving, always changing, and always generating new encounters 
and meanings. 
In this way, the triadic model of photography offers a counter theory to that of 
the social power relationships model by challenging the supposed sole agency, the 
hierarchy and the exclusive representational and creative powers of the photographer. 
At the same time, this model also offers an approach to photography that goes beyond 
the question of representation. Azoulay’s theory of photography yields an alternative 
understanding of politics and of the practice of citizenship. Here the photographic 
event gives rise to political relationships between the three parties -- the photographer, 
the portrayed subject and the spectator -- that are not directly sanctioned by the 
sovereign power. These political relationships beyond the framework of the nation-
state are hence deterritorialised, that is, they are not confined to, nor are they 
determined by geo-political borders. The concept of citizenship that Azoulay wishes 
to defend with her thesis of the political space of photography (the civil contract of 
photography) is that of a practice -- instead of a membership granting rights and 
duties within a nation-state -- based on solidarity and partnership towards other 
persons regardless of what their official citizenship status is. I maintained that these 
political relationships created through photography should be understood as 
relationships of hospitality, as Derrida conceived of this term. Insofar as these 
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relationships are based on the principle that we ought to receive and be ethically and 
politically responsible for others irrespective of what their citizenship might be, these 
are ethico-political relationships or relationships of hospitality.  
In this chapter, I will ask whether it is possible to extrapolate Azoulay’s model 
of photography to documentary cinema. My aim here will be to demonstrate how, 
once her triadic theory of the event of photography has been appropriately reworked, 
it might then be transposed to the documentary form. Equally, Azoulay’s model has to 
be adjusted for it to be extrapolated both to documentary films and to historical 
contexts beyond that of Palestine. This is precisely one of the main points of this 
chapter. I will argue that this double extrapolation is possible provided that there is an 
acknowledgement that photography and film are two different forms of visual media. 
Cinema, and in particular documentary film, can also constitute a space of ethico-
political relationships that are not entirely mediated by the nation-state and that are 
based on responsibility, solidarity and partnership towards others. Nevertheless, the 
fact that cinema is composed of moving images -- and hence constitutes a temporal 
visual medium -- and that these images are coupled with sound, necessarily affects the 
form in which political relationships can emerge through film and how they function. 
In order to consider how particular features of documentary films determine 
the ethical and political relationships that could potentially arise through this medium 
-- as opposed to those created through photography, I will give an overview of how 
scholars writing about the documentary form tend to describe this visual medium. 
Drawing on the work of Trinh, Renov and Steyerl I will argue that the dichotomy 
between fact-based objectivity and fictive interpretation, between naturalness and 
artifice, between truth and pleasure (which has been frequently employed to explain 
the distinction between non-fictional and fictional cinema) is a false dichotomy. The 
idea that capturing raw facts and ensuring pure objectivity are ever achievable 
through a representational practice such as filmmaking and/or photography is 
misguided. The products of these two practices are always constructions and, as such, 
they cannot ever offer raw facts. What is more, the idea of the possibility of capturing 
raw facts is also a very limited way of understanding representation that fails to see 
the ethical and political value of ‘constructed’ scenes and narratives.  
I present and contrast two taxonomies of the documentary form -- one 
proposed by Nichols, the other by Renov -- because I consider them to be 
heuristically valuable in understanding why any strict typology of this film form is 
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deemed to fail; and also in showing the multiple modalities that documentaries can 
adopt according to the context of their creation and the desire/incentive driving the 
documentarist. Finally, comparing these two categorisations will allow me to make 
the point further on in this chapter that photography and documentary show 
similarities and differences, and that the latter determine the manner in which each of 
these two visual media can function as spaces for political relationships not mediated 
by the nation-state.  
Another aim of this chapter is to argue that it is by means of the form and the 
stylistic techniques of the documentary film (that is, the manner in which its content is 
organised) rather than its discursive and ideological content that spectators are invited 
to become engaged with the documentary and eventually to read it as a claim for 
rights for the represented subjects. I side with Steyerl and Trinh to put forward the 
thesis that it is through the montage alongside the sound effects (the form of the film), 
that the documentary allows the spectator to actively partake in the articulation of the 
meaning of the film. And therefore documentary can be considered a medium with 
the potential to create political relations. As Rancière would say, it is when the 
hierarchical distinction between spectator and filmmaker is blurred; when they both 
actively create a ‘new fiction’ in conjunction with images of the filmed subjects, that 
there is a challenge to the current social order or ‘partition of the sensible.’ Their roles 
as (passive) spectator and (active) filmmaker are thus eroded, and an alternative 
distribution of the places and roles within the social order surfaces. 
Lastly, I will argue that since movement, and hence time, along with the sound 
effects are the core elements distinguishing cinematic images from photographic ones, 
then the potential political (and ethical) relationships emerging from documentary 
films ought to differ from the political relationships that can be formed through 
photography. Documentary, like photography, can be a space for relationships of 
hospitality even while these two spaces have their own specific features that need to 
be acknowledged.         
II. The Documentary. An Impossible Definition? 
From its very inception the word ‘documentary,’ when employed to refer to a certain 
kind of films, has always evoked divergent understandings and, very often, 
contradictory definitions. Indeed several scholars, among them Bill Nichols and 
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David Saunders,1 have attempted to find a single all-encompassing characterization 
for documentary films only to find that it is a form of filmmaking that refuses to be 
given any clear-cut definition.  
Documentary film production has been ‘haunted’ by its etymological shadow. 
To document is to record or gather evidence or proof; and it comes from the Latin 
words ‘documentum’ and ‘docere,’ which mean ‘lesson’ and ‘to teach’ respectively. 
There is thus a tension at the core of documentary practice. On the one hand, there is 
an attempt to capture the real, to serve as a register of facts as they occur, without 
mediation. On the other hand, there is the intention of producing more than a mere 
mimetic reproduction of an event or situation, the intention of providing an approach 
to, an angle or a comment on the facts recorded. It is this conflict between authenticity 
and artifice, fact and fictional construct, that defines the documentary form. As 
Olivier Lugon claims, the documentary project is ‘beyond art, yet very much a part of 
it.’2  
This inexorable paradox cannot be reconciled, and yet it is the determining 
feature of documentary, and it is what has allowed the continuous development and 
reinvention of this form of filmmaking. In trying to present things as they are in the 
actual world and yet claiming a bearing on this creative representation of actuality,3 
documentarists have been involved in a constant exploration of new techniques and 
codes. Throughout the development of the documentary form, filmmakers have opted 
to test out different forms of expression by including techniques and stylistic devices 
from other visual practices such as visual anthropology, newsreels, but also fictional 
cinema genres like the avant-garde as well as ‘fictive’ strategies including dramatized 
narration, character construction, manipulation and exaggeration of camera angles and 
distance, and musical scores. Thus, for instance, films produced by artists of the so-
called ‘direct cinema’ movement (which rose in America in the 1960s) sought to 
efface mediation and achieve transparency as much as possible by minimizing the 
interference of the filmmaker and the camera with the subject filmed. Unobtrusive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Nichols, Introduction to Documentary; Saunders, Documentary (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2010); Lind and Steyerl (eds), The Greenroom: Reconsidering the Documentary and 
Contemporary Art #1 (Berlin and Annandale-on-Hudson: Sternberg Press and Center for Curatorial 
Studies, Bard College, 2008); and Renov (ed), Theorizing Documentary. 
2 Lugon, ‘”Documentary”: Authority and Ambiguities,’ in Lind and Steyerl (eds), The Greenroom, 
pp.28-37 (p.35). 
3 John Grierson, British theoretician and founder of the ‘Documentary Film Movement,’ first coined 
the term ‘documentary’ and described it as ‘the creative treatment of actuality.’ See Renov, ‘Toward a 
Poetics,’ p.33. 
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camera work -- the so-called ‘fly-on-the-wall’ technique, synchronized sound, and a 
minimal use of narration and explanatory titling are some of the distinctive techniques 
employed by direct cinema. In opposition to the purely observational mode of direct 
cinema, the French school known as cinéma vérité, attempted to overtly acknowledge 
the effect that the camera and the filmmaker have upon the situation and subjects 
filmed by rendering visible and audible their presence in the ‘pro-filmic’ space. In this 
way, not only etymologically but also historically, the tension between capturing the 
real and affirming authorship has pervaded and still pervades documentary practice. 
In view of this apparently paradoxical nature and the resulting ever-evolving 
documentary methods, it would seem that only a negative and very broad definition of 
this form could be possible. Documentary, it is generally agreed,4 is a non-fictional 
form of filmmaking. In contrast to fictional cinema, documentaries do not re-present a 
world entirely imagined by the filmmaker; documentary films do not re-present 
imaginary places, events or beings. Instead, this form of filmmaking provides 
representations of certain aspects of the actual world in which we live. Beyond this 
basic description in terms of what documentaries are not, a myriad of viewpoints have 
emerged as to how actuality is to be re-presented, how the material is to be collected, 
assembled and employed, and which facts are worth recording.  
If documentary is never entirely subdued to ‘naked’ actuality, if it is never a 
mere accumulation of ‘raw’ facts but a particular construction or treatment of the real, 
then it is a form of filmmaking that not only aims to serve recording and preserving 
purposes, but also strives to provide some sort of persuasive, didactic or pedagogical, 
and propagandistic effects, and even to produce aesthetic pleasure. In this sense, the 
documentary is closely linked to the literary essay, insofar as it is a form of cinema 
that seeks to argue for a view or to make a point, and not merely serve as a descriptive 
record of facts. And this structuring of the argument, this making-a-point, has 
necessarily an expressive or creative dimension because it entails a rhetorical, and 
hence an aesthetic function. As Renov has put it: 
Under scrutiny, the Griersonian definition of documentary -- the creative treatment of 
actuality -- appears to be a kind of oxymoron, the site of an irreconcilable union between 
invention on the one hand and mechanical reproduction on the other. And, as with the 
figure of the oxymoron in its literary context, this collision can be the occasion of an 
explosive, often poetic effect. […] As a study of [the work of] accomplished documentary 	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artists reveals, there need not be exclusionary relations between documentation and 
artfulness.5    
In an attempt to put forward a ‘poetics’ of the documentary form (that is, a systematic 
investigation and account of the documentary as an aesthetic form), Renov has 
explained that the supposed tension between record and truth versus beauty and 
pleasure at the core of documentary stems less from a limitation of this film form as 
such than from the long assumed schism between science and art. The clear-cut 
distinction of science and art, assumes that science is a completely objective 
description of the world, while art is taken to be a creative expression and hence a 
product of interpretation and subjectivity that has no relation to facts as they ‘truly 
are.’ A poetics of documentary that is able to provide an adequate explanation of this 
form needs, according to Renov, to reject the idea that science and art, truth and 
pleasure are mutually excluding. Instead, a poetics of the documentary form requires 
to start from the idea that there is no such thing as an all-encompassing, all-
explanatory, totalitarian theory ‘which would filter, hierarchize and order [all local, 
partial and discontinued knowledges] in the name of some true knowledge and some 
arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects.’6 For only in this way, the 
character of documentary as simultaneously a record and a creative or expressive 
form can be defended without a sense of contradiction. In other words, a poetics of 
documentary for Renov has to embody the spirit of Foucault’s genealogies and thus 
question at every step the presuppositions, categories of discourse and values that 
underlie this systematic research of the form of documentary. This poetics will 
therefore question the possibility of a stark distinction between fact based objectivity 
and fictive expression; it will accept that all theoretical explanations are partial; and it 
will take both political and historical contingencies into account in any explanation of 
the documentary and its development. 
Other scholars of documentary theory have shared Renov’s view. For instance, 
Trinh has denied that there is a difference between naturalness and artifice. It is a 
false dichotomy, she says, one which sets a clear-cut distinction between nonfictional 
representation, the documentary sign, and fictional representation. Both fictional and 
nonfictional representations are creations, fabrications for the screen, and thus equally 
‘artificial’ or synthetic. Since both imply a process of producing meaning and images, 	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6 Ibid, p.17. 
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their ‘nature’ is that of creativity. In other words, the ‘naturalness’ of these two forms 
of representation lies precisely in their creativity. In Trinh’s words: 
From its descriptions to its arrangements and rearrangements, reality on the move may be 
heightened or impoverished but it is never neutral (that is, objectivist). “Documentary at its 
purest and most poetic is a form in which the elements that you use are the actual 
elements.” Why, for example, use the qualifying term “artificial’ at all? In the process of 
producing a “document,” is there such a thing as an artificial aspect that can be securely 
separated from the true aspect (except for analytical purpose – that is, for another artifice of 
language)? In other words, is a closer framing of reality more artificial than a wider one?7  
In this sense, both Renov and Trinh coincide in that a definition of documentary, if 
one is at all possible, needs to deny the supposed boundary between science and art, 
truth and pleasure, objectivity and subjectivity. Trinh goes as far as to argue that there 
is no such thing as documentary, if this term is understood either as ‘a category of 
material, a genre, an approach, or a set of techniques.’8 What she means by this is that 
it is not possible to have a term or label that completely encompasses and 
homogenises all the practices that have been and could be considered as documentary. 
In particular, Trinh thinks, those narratives that claim to give a single unified account 
of the evolution of the documentary form as if there was a continuous historical 
unfolding of the latter are misled. For her, no periodization of the documentary 
practice is possible as it is ever-developing and refuses to be fitted into narrow 
historical explanations. This is why she rejects the label ‘documentary’ all together.  
Even when Renov does not discard this term, he agrees with Trinh: ‘it is 
unwise to generalize any uniform laws of construction for nonfiction film and video.’9 
His view is that both subjectivity and expressivity (that is, interpretive creativity) play 
a major role in the practice and production of documentary films. Thus, here Renov is 
opposing Nichols’s characterisation of documentaries as an instance of the 
‘discourses of sobriety.’ These discourses include, for Nichols, the domains of 
economics, politics, science, education, foreign policy, religion and welfare and they 
all claim a ‘direct’ relation to the real. Without denying the link that documentaries 
have to the actual world, Renov wishes to acknowledge their undeniable expressive 
and subjective dimensions. It is with this in view, that he calls for a poetics of the 
documentary form, a systematised approach to this film form that denies science and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Trinh, ‘The Totalizing Quest of Meaning,’ p.100.    
8 Ibid, p.90. 
9 Renov, ‘Introduction: The Truth About Non-Fiction,’ in Renov (ed), Theorizing Documentary, pp.1-
11 (p.6). 
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art are mutually exclusive, and that avoids the pretence of achieving a universal and 
unified theory of documentary practices and instead admits that all knowledge is 
provisional and partial. Such an approach also acknowledges that fictional and 
nonfictional film forms are intertwined. Finally, this poetics takes into account -- 
alongside the rhetorical and formal strategies of documentaries -- the local, political, 
ideological and historical contexts that determine both documentary production and 
scholarly discourse on this film form. Indeed, this is a poetics that is self-aware and 
critical of its own presuppositions and theoretical axioms.    
I take my cue from Renov and Trinh throughout this thesis and affirm that it is 
indeed not possible to defend a universal homogenising definition of the documentary 
form, and that this form is -- without contradiction -- simultaneously an informative 
record of facts or events in the world and an artistic creation. As it will become clear 
in subsequent chapters, my three case studies aim to reflect the broad diversity of this 
film form, and also seek to reflect the extent to which actuality and creative 
expression intermingle and how much the boundary between fictional and 
nonfictional cinema is blurred. My view, like that of Trinh and Renov, is that 
documentary is a film form of the interstice, of the in-betweenness, of the borderline, 
and that is why it refuses to be perfectly defined and to be constrained by clear-cut 
parameters. As I will argue further on in this chapter and later through my case 
studies, it is precisely this interstitial quality of documentaries that makes them fertile 
spaces for the emergence of political relationships (as Azoulay understands them), 
and hence relationships exemplifying Derridian hospitality.  
III. The (Non-Rigid) Modalities of Documentary 
Once established that the documentary form by nature eludes any definitive well-
delimited definition as well as any taxonomy and strict rules of classification, it is 
worth looking at the diverse modalities or functions that this film form might take, so 
that we can have a better understanding of the wide range that documentaries 
encompass and also of how much these modalities have been and are combined and 
emphasized to produce different effects. Discussing these rhetorical and/or aesthetic 
functions also serves two additional purposes. First, these modalities will provide me 
with the analytic tools necessary to argue that it is more within the form, rather than 
the content, that the political (and ethical) potential of documentaries is located. This 
in turn will allow me to both extrapolate Azoulay’s model of photography to 
documentary film and elaborate on her model as applied to this specific cinematic 
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form. And second, I will refer back to these modalities to enrich my own analysis of 
the case studies I present in the following chapters.  
Here I draw on Renov’s proposal of four discursive or aesthetic functions that 
he claims have been apparent to a greater or lesser extent since the beginning of 
documentary film practice, which can be traced back to the Lumière brothers. Indeed, 
the Lumières’s ground-breaking work at the end of the nineteenth century attempted 
to offer a window onto the actual world and the quotidian life of their time through a 
creative portrayal of the latter. Now, Renov describes these four rhetorical functions 
as ‘modalities of desire,’ 10  that is, as incentives that govern and shape the 
documentary discourse. As he explains, these four modalities are neither strictly 
delimited nor a-historical. Rather, they tend to mix, supplement each other and are 
subject to historical contingencies. In Renov’s words: 
These categories are not intended to be exclusive or airtight; the friction, overlaps – even 
mutual determination – discernible among them testify to the richness and historical 
variability of nonfiction forms in the visual arts. At some moments and in the work of 
certain practitioners, one or another of these [functions] has frequently been over- or under-
favored.11  
Before looking at the four discursive functions of documentary film identified by 
Renov, it is important to note that, even though there is no unified agreement amongst 
film scholars as regards the different types of documentaries, there have been some 
efforts to offer typologies of this film form. For example, David Bordwell and Kristin 
Thompson and also, famously, Nichols have advanced taxonomies to distinguish 
modes, categories or sub-genres within documentary cinema.12 I consider it useful to 
look briefly at Nichols’s typology, for it provides insight into the many stylistic 
techniques and devices that documentarists might choose in creating their films.  
Simultaneously, his model is also helpful precisely in understanding why it is that 
taxonomies of the documentary form can only have explanatory and heuristic use, but 
can never be ontologically rigid or precise. Nichols identifies six types or modes of 
representations in documentary cinema, which he believes to have emerged 
progressively throughout the development of this form. These six modes are: the 
poetic, expository, observational, participatory, reflexive and performative.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Renov, ‘Toward a Poetics,’ p.22. 
11 Ibid, p.21. 
12 See Bordwell and Thompson, Film Art. An Introduction, 8th Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
2007), pp.342-350. 
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The poetic mode of representation is characterised by the prominence of 
‘visual associations, tonal or rhythmic qualities, descriptive passages, and formal 
organization.’13 Documentaries in the poetic mode move away from the aims of 
conveying straightforward objective information about a situation or an aspect of the 
world and of advancing an argument in order to stress mood and affect. For this 
reason, in the poetic mode the rhetorical element of a documentary is, for Nichols, 
underdeveloped and the traditional narrative content is forsaken. This mode has 
frequently been likened to the avant-garde film school. 
The expository mode, in contrast to the poetic mode, stresses the rhetorical or 
argumentative dimension of documentary by employing verbal commentary and by 
addressing the viewer directly. Documentaries in the expository mode endeavour to 
gather footage and arrange it so as to strengthen the spoken narrative and the 
argumentative flow. The use of voice-over commentary, known as ‘voice of God,’ is 
the main feature of this mode. 
The observational mode attempts to present footage that gives the impression 
that the filmmaker is merely an observer and is not intruding on the behaviour of the 
subjects filmed. Documentaries in the observational mode emphasize ‘a direct 
engagement with the everyday life of subjects as observed by an unobtrusive 
camera.’14 The withdrawal of the documentarist to the position of a passive and 
neutral observer is achieved through a technique known as ‘fly on the wall,’ which 
supposedly allows the filming of events just as they would occur in the absence of 
both the camera and the filmmaker. According to Nichols, the rhetorical practice of 
moving and convincing viewers is here kept to a minimum and avoided as much as 
possible. As a result of this, observational documentaries do not make use of voice-
over commentary, additional sound effects or music; nor do they resort to historical 
re-enactments.  
It is important to note that Nichols seems to think that persuading viewers 
cannot be done with purely observational techniques, and that the overt intervention 
of the filmmaker and obvious explanations are required for the documentary to 
convince of or promote a view. The way Nichols describes the observational mode 
appears to imply that he does not think observational documentary can in itself be 
persuasive. This view, I believe, is mistaken. As it will become clear later on, Renov’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Nichols, Introduction to Documentary, p.33. 
14 Ibid, p.34. 
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proposal of four functions implies that the capturing and observing of facts does not 
conflict with the promotion of a view. In fact, it emerges from Renov’s argumentation 
that there is no such thing as ‘pure’ observation since all records, all images, are 
always mediated. Therefore, the visual record or document, even if attempting to 
‘merely’ observe, is inexorably promoting a view. The more or less overt role of 
promotion of the film is determined by its stylistic features. Indeed, contrary to what 
Nichols seems to claim, the rhetorical function of a documentary in the observational 
mode lies precisely in its supposed ‘plain’ and non-interventionist observation.  
The participatory mode, unlike the observational mode, encourages the 
interaction between documentary filmmaker and filmed subjects. Here the 
documentarist becomes part of the events recorded and hence appears as one of the 
subjects in her own work. This mode is often identified with the so-called ‘cinéma 
vérité’ because what is made visible is the ‘truth of an encounter [between 
documentarist and subject] rather than the absolute or untampered truth.’15 Interviews 
are one of the most common forms employed to convey this encounter between 
subject and filmmaker. 
In the reflexive mode crucially there is an open acknowledgement of the 
constructed nature of documentary cinema because the use of artifice in this cinematic 
genre is evidenced to the audience, and thereby documentary is de-mystified and its 
implications are reflected on. The reflexive mode thus entails a shift from the focus on 
what or who gets represented to a focus on how it is represented. This means that 
reflexive documentaries pose a challenge to the supposed realism or truthfulness of 
documentary representations. 
Finally, the performative mode of documentary representation is based on the 
conviction that our knowledge and understanding of the world are never abstract and 
disembodied but are, rather, concrete and embodied. A documentary in the 
performative mode stresses the ‘subjective or expressive aspect of the filmmaker’s 
own engagement with the subject and an audience’s responsiveness to this 
engagement.’16 Instead of addressing viewers via a logic of argumentative persuasion 
and rhetorical imperatives, performative documentaries engage viewers emotionally 
and expressively by confronting them with the filmmaker’s own vivid responsiveness 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid, p.118. 
16 Ibid, p.34. 
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in the hope of moving the audience to sympathize subjectively with her emotional and 
affective perspective. 
Here I prefer to focus on and to adopt the four aesthetic or rhetorical functions 
that Renov poses, rather than Nichols’s six modes, not so much because the latter 
presents these six modalities in a way that often suggests them to be pure or mutually 
exclusive genres (in fact, Nichols does recognise that the six are increasingly being 
mixed today by documentary filmmakers), but mainly because Nichols based his 
categorisation of documentaries almost completely on the historical evolution of 
American independent cinema and thus his proposal fails to be applicable to 
documentaries made elsewhere, in other social and cultural conditions and markets. 
Nichols does not seem to be aware of this shortfall in his typology. He does not 
appear to acknowledge the fact that such categories are political, social, economical, 
cultural and historically contingent, hence his taxonomy -- even if useful for studying 
the documentary form -- seems dated and too strict at times. Since Renov’s four 
aesthetic functions are posed in terms of modes of desire, that is, as impulses driving 
the filmmaker, then his model explains more clearly why and how these modalities 
may combine, overlap, enhance one another, and be highlighted to a greater or lesser 
extent within a documentary film according to its discursive and aesthetic purposes. 
Similarly, because Renov conceives of these modalities of desire as ideologically and 
historically determined, his proposal is able to explain the different tendencies that 
have driven and still drive documentarists’ works made within different social, 
political and historical contexts. In other words, as opposed to Nichols’s taxonomy, 
Renov’s model not only focuses on the formal and rhetorical strategies of each 
modality of the documentary form but also is crucially aware that such strategies are 
ideologically and historically inflected. As Renov puts it: 
There are, to be sure, historical contingencies which temper any claims for “modalities of 
desire” as eternal or innate. The documentative drive may be transhistorical, but it is far 
from being untouched by history […] Four decades [after World War II] – in the wake of 
countless TV ads which trade on their documentary “look” (shaky camera, grainy black-
and-white) – the technically flawed depiction of a purported reality no longer suffices as 
visual guarantee of authenticity. […] [W]hile the instinct for cultural self preservation 
remains constant, the markers of documentary authenticity are historically variable.17       
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Renov, ‘Toward a Poetics,’ p.23. [My emphasis]. 
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Renov’s proposal of the four functions of documentary film thus seems to provide a 
more adequate explanation of the different tendencies that this film form may adopt 
according to the socio-historical circumstances and purpose of the filmmaker. These 
four fundamental modalities of desire guiding documentaries are: to record, reveal or 
preserve; to persuade or promote; to analyse or interrogate; and to express. And the 
most important thing to bear in mind is that, despite being presented as separate and 
distinct modalities for the sake of clarity, simplicity and explanatory potential, these 
four functions are never found as pure types; the four tend to be always present to a 
greater or lesser degree within all documentaries.   
The first of these four tendencies -- that of serving as a record that reveals and 
preserves -- is the most basic function present in all documentary films. Much in the 
same way as photography, this function of documentary attempts to reproduce the 
historical real and, thereby, ‘to cheat death, stop time, restore loss.’18 Through this 
desire of safeguarding the trace of the event, the camera is here mainly used as a 
machine with revelatory, indexical and preservation powers. Nonetheless, as 
mentioned before, Renov is emphatic that even when the motivation here is that of 
recording and serving as evidence, documentary images are always the result of a 
selection process (the camera angle, the take, the editing) and hence they are always 
inexorably mediated images. Invoking the work of art historian John Tagg, Renov 
affirms that the indexicality and evidential power of documentary representation is 
just the outcome of particular historical conditions and institutional practices. There is 
thus nothing ontologically essential that makes the documentary image guaranteed 
evidence, an infallible record. 
To persuade or promote constitutes the second rhetorical function of the 
documentary, and this modality is intrinsic to this film form and therefore operates in 
tandem with the other three modalities. The persuasive drive of documentary can be 
more or less obvious and the manner in which it is presented varies greatly according 
to the way in which this function intermingles with the other modalities. To be sure, a 
core parameter for a documentary’s persuasive power is its indexical quality, which is 
one essential element of the record and preserve modality of this film form. Equally, 
persuasion in documentary cannot be considered in isolation from the ways in which 
sound and images are coupled to support the argument promoted, and therefore 	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persuasion and the expressive function need to be looked at together. The persuasion 
or promotional function first emerged as a result of a particular historical context. 
Crucially, it has been mainly due to governmental urgency to mobilize popular 
support for different policies that the documentary’s persuasive powers were 
acknowledged and began to be exploited. Grierson’s work is emblematic in this 
respect. He led the film unit of Britain’s Empire Marketing Board during the thirties 
producing documentaries aimed at promoting the consumption and trade of British 
Empire products. Today this promotional modality is used widely not just for 
governmental purposes, but also by other groups and/or cultural and commercial 
institutions -- such as NGOs and charities as well as cultural associations and even 
businesses -- seeking to advocate certain causes, foster subcultural identities and/or 
sell products or values. For instance, to promote their work and raise funding, the 
charity Macmillan Cancer Support uses short videos showing personal testimonies of 
people who have been diagnosed with cancer and have been helped by Macmillan 
throughout their medical treatments.19 
A third modality of documentaries is to analyse or interrogate. This function is 
concerned with reflecting on and questioning the record, reveal and preserve modality 
of the documentary. The film here turns to look toward itself critically and 
interrogates its own presuppositions and production processes. Crucially, 
documentaries in the analytical mode draw attention to the fact that they themselves 
are works claiming a direct and essential bind to the real. And thus these films 
acknowledge that they are mediated works, that the relation between what is seen on 
screen and the event or thing that existed in the world -- between the documentary 
sign and its referent -- is the outcome of myriad interventions and choices. This 
analytical and interrogative function aims to motivate an active response on the part 
of spectators. Films in this modality seek to ‘encourage inquiry, offer space for 
judgment and provide the tools for evaluation and further action’20 for viewers. Thus, 
the ‘analytical impulse is not so much enacted by the filmmakers as encouraged for 
the viewer.’21 Among the techniques most commonly used to foster analysis and 
interrogation are breaching the synchronicity between images and audio, repeating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See Macmillan Cancer Support, <http://www.macmillan.org.uk/Aboutus/AboutUsHome.aspx> 
[accessed 4th December 2013]. 
20 Renov, ‘Toward a Poetics,’ p.31. 
21 Ibid. 
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certain images and sounds, and introducing unrelated, anachronistic or banal 
sequences into the train of narrative.     
The last of the four rhetorical modalities proposed by Renov is to express. 
According to Renov, this function of the documentary form has often been repressed 
and neglected within the history and development of this film format. Despite existing 
since the early days of documentary as embodied by the poetic work of Robert 
Flaherty (Nanook of the North, 1922)22 or Dziga Vertov (Man with a Movie Camera, 
1929)23 in the 1920s, expressivity has been belittled in the documentary tradition due 
to the widely spread and institutionalised dichotomy between art and science, 
subjective expression and factual objectivity. But, as mentioned earlier, this is a false 
dichotomy; artfulness and documentation need not be mutually exclusive. There is no 
ontological necessity preventing a documentary with poetic/aesthetic qualities from 
effectively representing the historical real. As Renov explains well, the expressive 
character of a documentary is a matter of degree, and some filmmakers choose to 
underscore this quality to a greater or lesser extent. 
[The] realm of filmic nonfiction is a continuum along which can be ranged work of great 
expressive variability – from that which attends little to the vehicle of expression (the no-
so-distant apotheosis of cinema verité [sic] – surveillance technology might serve as the 
limit case) to that which emphasizes the filtering of the represented object through the eye 
and mind of the artist.24   
If we consider, with Renov, that these four functions of the documentary are impulses 
guiding the film, rather than rigid categorizations that mutually exclude one another, 
then it is possible to use them for their explanatory and heuristic value towards better 
understanding the documentary’s multiple modalities. As impulses, these functions of 
the documentary help in explaining why this is a film form of the in-betweenness and 
the extent to which documentary films are shaped and determined by the historical 
and social context of production as much as by the documentarist’s motivations. With 
this in mind, in subsequent chapters I will invoke Renov’s taxonomy of 
documentaries and also the one proposed by Nichols for the purposes of the analysis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Flaherty, Nanook of the North (USA and France: Les Frères Revillon and Pathé Exchange, 1922). 
23 Dziga Vertov (born Denis Abramovich Kaufman) was a Soviet experimental filmmaker and cinema 
theorist. Considered a pioneer documentarist with strong political views, both his film style and 
theoretical work on the moving image medium has been of great influence to many filmmakers to 
follow. His most widely known film is Man with a Movie Camera (Soviet Union: VUFKU, 1929). 
24 Renov, ‘Toward a Poetics,’ pp.34-35. 
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of my case studies. It will then become clearer that a strict classification of 
documentaries is not possible.  
In the next section I will argue that it is in the form and/or style of the 
documentary -- the manner in which its content is organised, rather than exclusively 
in its discursive and ideological content, that the potential for the creation of political 
and ethical relationships that are not directly governed by the nation-state rests. I will 
draw on Hito Steyerl’s and Joanne Richardson’s views about what makes a film 
politically subversive or have emancipatory potential. According to these theorists, a 
film made politically has a self-reflexive form, meaning that its arrangement of 
sounds and images is such that it calls for spectators to question the film’s modes of 
production, its mediating nature, its ways of constructing meaning, as well as the 
hierarchical relations that govern how the film is owned and distributed. It is the 
possibility of the active involvement of the spectator that gives the film its political 
potential. Steyerl’s and Richardson’s insight will allow me to discuss, later on in this 
chapter, whether and how it is possible to extrapolate Azoulay’s triadic model of 
photography to documentary films.  
IV. Making Films Politically vs. Making Political Films 
In the course of its historical development, the documentary form and its theory have 
appeared to be more or less concerned with its constructed nature and its potential for 
indoctrination. As Richardson remarks: 
[Historically], the logic of the documentary-form has been partly obscured in the American 
landscape, where the pretext to truth and immediacy has been foregrounded, and where the 
reality effects have been more tenaciously defended. The propagandistic effects of the 
documentary form have been more evident in Eastern European productions, from Soviet 
agit-prop of the 1930s to the recent pre-89 past.25 
The very close link between documentary and (political) propaganda, between 
documentary and politics, has been an issue that theorists of non-fictional cinema 
have increasingly discussed. Especially after the emergence of Foucault’s model of a 
politics of truth,26 scholars and filmmakers alike have been careful to signal the 
instrumental value of the documentary form for the affirmation and maintenance of 
social power relations. At the same time, however, the documentary’s ability to serve 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Richardson, ‘Est-ethics of Counter Documentary,’ ARTMargins Online (16 June 2000), 
<http://www.artmargins.com/index.php/archive/421-est-ethics-of-counter-documentary> [accessed 
12th October 2011]. 
26 See Foucault, ‘Truth and Power’, in Gordon (ed). Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings By Michel Foucault 1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), pp.109-133. 
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militant or activist causes that challenge precisely those power relations has also been 
considered. For instance, as I said in the previous section, Renov explains how the 
promotional function of documentary has been employed to advance governmental 
policies or state’s interests, as well as to sell certain products. At the same time, 
Renov argues that documentaries that emphasize the subjective and creative 
expression (in particular those films that tend toward the essay form and/or the 
autobiography, like the so-called film-diaries) bear a personal imprint or a signature 
of sorts (the trace, the self-imprint of the filmmaker) that gives the film critical and 
provocative agency against the supposedly objective truths. According to Renov, the 
personal or subjective elements of the expressive function of documentary paired with 
its analytical function have the power to interrupt and even subvert institutionalised 
‘truths’ and state official narratives that sustain and reinforce power relations and 
socio-political and cultural hierarchies. In his words:  
During the direct cinema period, self-reference was shunned. But far from a sign of self-
effacement, this was the symptomatic silence of the empowered, who sought no forum for 
self-justification or display. […] Not so the current generation of performative 
documentarists. In more ways than one, their self-enactments are transgressive. Through 
their explorations of the (social) self, they are speaking the lives and desires of the many 
who have lived outside “the boundaries of cultural knowledge.”27  
In this way, documentaries show, once more, an ambivalent quality: they can be 
instruments of power and surveillance, as much as a means to undermine the very 
structures they serve to sustain. Furthermore, these two opposing uses of documentary 
presuppose that the audience is a political field of sorts; a mobile body that can in one 
way or another interact with and respond to the constructs created by documentarists. 
Either the viewer is taken as a subject susceptible to governmental subjectivation, 
manipulation and unconscious indoctrination through the truths created by 
documentary (and by other media products and apparatuses that assume the 
governmental role of truth production), or she is regarded as a subject that is able to 
engage actively in the articulation of the meaning of documentary representations. 
Steyerl -- like Trinh and Renov, among others -- has also taken issue with the 
question of the political quality of the documentary form. She has noted that in order 
for this form to effectively deconstruct or challenge power structures, it first needs to 
be acknowledged that documents themselves are inextricably linked to authority, to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Renov, The Subject of Documentary, Visible Evidence, Vol. 16 (Minneapolis and London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2004), p.181. 
	   121	  
procedures of certification, and thus to hierarchical structures of power. According to 
Steyerl, if one is to undermine power structures, it is not enough to simply denounce 
them by providing documentary proof or evidence of their existence. For this 
evidence is thereby erected as truth, as an authoritative power itself, which is what the 
documentary was supposed to be criticising in the first place. In her own words: 
Superficially or on the content level, many documentary articulations seemed to erode or 
even attack unfair power structures. But on the level of form, by relying on authoritative 
procedures, conventional documentaries have intensified the aura of the court room, the 
penitentiary or the laboratory […] Documentary production has taken on forensic duties for 
a long time, and has functioned in the service of a large-scale epistemological enterprise 
that is closely linked to the project of Western colonialism. Reporting the so-called truth 
about remote people and locations has been closely linked to their domination. 28 
Thus, concludes Steyerl, it cannot be at the level of the information or content where 
the political strength of the documentary form lies, but in the way this content is put 
together, articulated and presented. In other words, how a documentary organizes its 
subject matter determines whether it operates as an instrument at the service of 
domination and power structures or as a means of subversion against those very 
structures.  
Steyerl’s point seems to be confirmed by French filmmaker Jean-Luc Godard, 
who (although he was speaking about cinema in general, and not just about 
documentaries) has proposed the distinction between making film politically and 
making political films.  Godard first introduced this contrast during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, when he was making films as part of the experimental collective Dziga 
Vertov Group -- which took its name from the Soviet filmmaker. Curiously enough, 
as Richardson reminds us,29 Godard went on later to regard the methods, films and 
manifesto of this collective as ‘Marxist-Leninist’ rubbish. His criticism being that the 
Dziga Vertov Group had made mere ‘political propaganda,’ but never engaged in a 
conscious self-examination of their own production procedures, their presuppositions 
or the ways in which their films could articulate political meaning. For him, what was 
important was not so much the content of a film but its mode of production and 
reception. Thus, a film engaging in an exercise of self-reflection about its constructed 
nature and the way it organizes and conveys information is not a political film, but 	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29 Richardson, ‘What Does it Mean to Make Film Politically?,’ in Subsol, 
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rather a film made politically. According to Godard then, making films politically 
meant working beyond the level of content and concentrating instead on the level of 
form, the level of the articulation of content, expression and the creation of 
significance.  
The work that Godard produced after this collective was dissolved, 
particularly those films he made in collaboration with Anne-Marie Miéville, mirror 
this concern of his and, thus, are works that utterly avoid militancy or endorsing any 
particular cause. In this sense, these films can be regarded as Godard’s best examples 
of cinema made politically. Ici et Ailleurs (1976), for instance, has often been invoked 
by scholars30 as a film made politically because in it Godard and Miéville employ 
footage from a previous film by the Dziga Vertov Group, the pro-Palestinian film 
Jusqu’à la victoire (1970), not only to reflect about the 1970s French solidarity 
movement with Palestine, but also to draw attention to and criticize the extent to 
which any political protest stages, organises and expresses its demands.   
The relevance of Godard’s distinction between making films politically and 
making political films, as both Steyerl and Richardson affirm, is that it allows us to 
move beyond the focus on the ideological content, and instead think about how this 
content is gathered, produced, structured, presented, and provided with meaning. This 
shift of focus brings to the fore the extent to which the medium of film (either 
fictional or non-fictional) is determined by the intertwined and complex relation 
between its modes of production, its ways of articulating information, and its methods 
of constructing meaning, as much as by the cultural and other hierarchical structures 
under which films are made, owned and distributed. As Richardson says, Godard’s 
insight underlines the fact that any radical militant message presented through cinema 
fails to have any political effect if it is not accompanied by a questioning on ‘who 
speaks for whom, how images and sounds are coded, and what type of social 
relationships they make possible or deny.’31    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 See Steyerl, ‘The Articulation of Protest,’ in Transversal (Webjournal of the European Institute for 
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Taking cue from Godard, Richardson further expands on the idea of making 
films politically, and in doing so she proposes five concepts, each corresponding to 
one of the various relations that make up the intricate medium of film -- the relation 
between ‘the image and its referent, between different subjects, between form and 
content, between the work and its audience, and between its production and 
distribution.’32 These five concepts or trajectories signal the aspects that are to be 
considered and put into question by any film that intends to go beyond the level of 
content, that is self-aware of its constructed nature, and that offers a critical view of 
this medium as a cultural product. The five trajectories are: mimesis, intersubjectivity, 
form, reception and ownership.  
According to Richardson, films made politically have a self-reflexive quality, 
which involves putting into question the transparency and mimesis that the cinematic 
image supposedly achieves. For her, however, foregrounding the impossibility of non-
mediated (direct) representations of the real in no way amounts to condemning all 
images for their inadequacy to capture reality. Making film politically thus amounts to 
‘thinking critically about our relation to images and admitting the subjectivity of 
perspective [by] asking how our own ideologies and inherited prejudices influence the 
general frame that creates meaning.’33      
A film made politically also involves self-interrogating its mode and means of 
organization. By questioning its hierarchies of knowledge, its division of labour and 
the relation between the filmmaker and the subjects represented, films made 
politically transform the process of production into a collaborative, intersubjective, 
one for they open up a dialogue with other subjects, rather than merely speaking for 
them. A clear example of this intersubjective dialogue is found in Trinh’s work. Her 
first film, Reassemblage. From the Firelight to the Screen (1982) was shot in Senegal, 
and it constitutes a critique of the methods and presuppositions of traditional visual 
anthropology and ethnographic documentary filmmaking. Reassemblage presents 
images of Senegalese in their daily activities and errands without following any clear 
narrative line. It also has some voice-over commentary by Trinh interwoven with long 
silences and/or asynchronous sounds and music, but none of this is meant to assign a 
fixed meaning to what is seen on screen. The film is thus open for spectators to find 
the meaning of the images themselves, as there is no attempt or intention to explain 	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the culture and way of living of the Senegalese. As Trinh mentions in the opening 
sequence of the film: ‘I do not intend to speak about, just speak nearby.’34 I will 
return to discuss the intersubjective, inter-dialogic, character of documentary films, 
when I consider the potential political and ethical relationships formed between 
filmmaker, filmed subjects and spectators through these films -- the potential for these 
films to act as spaces of hospitality.  
Continuing with Richardson, she explains that the form in a film -- that is, the 
manner in which images and sounds are put together and presented -- crucially 
determines the sense of totality that the film conveys. When the images and sounds 
are intermingled seamlessly and cohesively, the film appears as a homogeneous 
totality thus prompting the viewer to immerse themselves in the narrative and identify 
with it. By contrast, when ‘montage is disjunctive, made up of elements that do not 
seem to fit, the message becomes ambiguous or even contradictory, requiring the 
audience to take an active part in constructing the meaning.’35 Films made politically, 
for Richardson, employ disjunctive montage. A disjunctive montage in a film disrupts 
its sense of totality and, consequently, invites a viewer that reflects, doubts, asks 
questions, and that refuses to merely receive the content of the film in a passive 
fashion. In other words, a film that employs estrangement devices (such as 
asynchronous sound, distorted images or discontinuous and interrupted flow of 
natural time sequences) and thereby makes the spectator wonder about its meaning, 
thus inducing her ‘to step back and reflect, is more genuinely activist than a work of 
agit-prop that plays on the emotions of the audience and gets it to agree and act in 
accordance with its message.’36 
Finally, Richardson claims that filmmakers who attempt to make films 
politically must take issue with the question of the ownership of their work and how 
and by whom it is distributed, for only thus can these films present a real challenge to 
the existing cultural hierarchies. In Richardson’s words:  
As long as a film is copyrighted and cannot be disseminated or used freely, as long as it 
circulates primarily through dominant cultural institutions and is accessible only to an elite 
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35 Richardson, ‘What Does it Mean?’ 
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type of audience, it is doomed to remain trapped in a system that constrains it and renders 
its critique ineffective.37 
How films are ‘framed’ by film festivals, art-house and/or independent cinemas, 
galleries, TV programming schedules and other distribution and exhibition channels 
crucially determine the spatial, temporal and socio-economic conditions under which 
films are consumed. These factors need to be taken into account if a film is to disrupt 
social and cultural hierarchies.   
As I will argue later following Steyerl and Richardson, it is indeed more in the 
form rather than (exclusively) in the content that the possibility for political and 
ethical relationships emerging between the spectators, the documentary filmmaker 
and the portrayed subjects resides. These relationships, I will maintain mirroring 
Azoulay’s theory of photography, are not directly mediated by the nation-state and 
they can transgress the hierarchical power relations imposed by the social order. An 
open-ended form and a disjunctive montage of a film do invite and allow for the 
viewer to become an active participant in determining the film’s meaning, thereby 
contesting the stark binary active-filmmaker and passive-viewer.  
Before considering the link between the form of a film and its capacity to give 
rise to political and ethical bonds, there is one very important thing to mention in 
regard to Richardson’s view that overtly militant and propagandistic films cannot be 
as critical and politically subversive as those films that employ a disjunctive montage 
and disorienting techniques. Here, Richardson seems to overlook the fact that 
throughout history there have been activist films that have significantly contributed to 
liberation processes, struggles and movements, especially those that took place in the 
late twentieth century.  Significantly, what is known as the Latin American ‘militant 
cinema’ played an important role in resisting and criticising military dictatorship 
regimes that emerged in this area. The work by Argentinian filmmakers Fernando 
Solanas and Octavio Getino is a good example of this. Most famously, Solanas and 
Getino made La Hora de los Hornos (The Hour of the Furnaces, 1968), which is a 
four-and-a-half-hour long documentary that was filmed clandestinely. The film not 
only overtly attacks the military dictatorship but it also critically exposes First World 
nations that supported and benefited from the dictatorial regime. Screenings of La 
Hora de los Hornos were also surreptitiously organised, and attending them was 
considered an act of treason. At the screenings the filmmakers would frequently pause 	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the projection in order to open the floor for discussions and questions as well as to 
directly ‘provoke’ the viewers into action. In this manner, the radical quality of this 
film does not reside so much in its documentation of both ‘the “quotidian violence” of 
social injustice and the repressive violence that enforces it, [but rather it lies more] in 
its move beyond documentation into the sphere of militant agitation, the challenge it 
issues to the passive spectator through its conception of the “cine-acto.”’38  What is 
more, Solanas and Getino wrote a manifesto, entitled ‘Towards a Third Cinema. 
Notes and Experiences for the Development of a Cinema of Liberation in the Third 
World,’39 that was to guide their militant documentary work as well as that of other 
filmmakers adhered to the Grupo Cine Liberación. This overtly militant cinema 
greatly influenced film directors throughout Latin America and the world as a model 
of politically activist filmmaking to counter official discourses and the hierarchies of 
the social order.  
Thus, there are examples of films like the ones made following the Third 
Cinema manifesto that present their ideological content very openly in order to 
promote political causes and move viewers into action. 40 And this evident activism 
does not necessarily mean that these films are mere political propaganda that cannot 
pose a serious challenge to the political, economical, social and cultural stratified 
organization imposed by the social order. What I consider valuable from the insight of 
Godard, Richardson and Steyerl is, as I have said, that they emphasize the need for a 
film to be self-aware and self-critical of its own artifice, values and presuppositions if 
it is to really incite (but never impose) viewers into active spectatorship. In inviting 
the viewer to take part actively by reflecting on, questioning and trying to make sense 
of the images presented, the film does show a potential to subvert the social order. I 
agree with the above mentioned three authors in that the key element that gives a film 
its political subversive potential is its form and not so much (or at least not 
exclusively) its ideological content, although the latter can also play a role, as was the 
case with Latin American militant cinema. Drawing on Rancière’s thesis of the 	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emancipated spectator, in the next section I will explain how the self-reflexive form 
of the documentary film invites spectators to become active participants without 
assuming that the latter need to be enlightened or emancipated, for that would only 
reinforce rather than challenge the hierarchical status of the filmmaker over 
spectators. Likewise, I will consider why the active participation of the spectator can 
bring about a new (non-hierarchical) relationship between the latter and the 
filmmaker, and hence even give rise to an alternative social order or distribution of 
places and functions within society. This in turn will allow me to conclude that 
documentary films can engender political (and ethical) relationships that are not 
directly sanctioned by the nation-state. Consequently, I will argue that Azoulay’s 
model of the political relationships created by photography can be transposed to the 
documentary form --with some modifications due to the different qualities of the 
moving image of film as opposed the still image of photography.  
V. Self-reflexivity as Politics. The (Blurred) Relation Between Spectator and 
Filmmaker   
As a specific film form, the documentary has the potential to challenge power 
structures insofar as it can invite and involve a self-exploratory and self-critical 
reflection on the epistemological, cultural, economical and political hierarchies, and 
also on the ideologies that necessarily underlie and determine how sounds and images 
are arranged in order to create meaning. This is largely owing to the documentary’s 
in-between nature -- in-between fact and fiction, plain record of events and artifice, 
which creatively plays with the style and montage to document facts and present a 
certain viewpoint. 
Steyerl argues, in agreement with Richardson, that it is only by means of a 
‘radical montage,’ by means of editing and stylistic techniques that disrupt the 
traditionally homogeneous entwinement of sounds and images, that a documentary 
can offer a critical stance capable of undermining the status quo. According to 
Steyerl, every political protest is the result of an articulation -- much in the way of a 
film montage -- of various elements including its programme, its demands, the actions 
proposed for the attainment of such demands, but also the allegiances and feuds, 
alliances and differences with other protest movements and interest groups. Thus 
understood, a protest is articulated at two levels. One is the level of the ‘organization 
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of its expression,’41 that is, the language, signs and symbols used to manifest and 
voice their demands. The other level of articulation is the ‘expression of its 
organization,’42 which refers to the structural or internal arrangement of the protest 
itself, the rules under which the protest is organized. Steyerl extends the analogy 
between film editing or montage and the articulation of a political protest, and she 
claims that a documentary film can constitute a successful oppositional movement 
when it makes transparent its own form of organization. By making evident the 
principles guiding its particular concatenation of images and sounds, a film invites the 
viewer to reflect about the way in which this concatenation is made. This self-
reflexive form of organization is what Steyerl calls a political or ‘radical montage’: 
Which movement of political montage then results in an oppositional articulation – instead 
of a mere addition of elements for the sake of reproducing the status quo? Or to phrase the 
question differently: Which montage between two images/elements could be imagined, that 
could result in something different between and outside these two, which would not 
represent a compromise, but would instead belong to a different order – roughly the way 
someone might tenaciously pound two dull stones together to create a spark in the 
darkness? Whether this spark, which one could also call the spark of the political, can be 
created at all is a question of this articulation.43 
Radical montage thus entails a particular organization of content, one that draws 
attention to its own presuppositions guiding the juxtaposition of images. The more 
self-reflexive a documentary is; the more visible a documentary renders its mediating 
activity and its constructed nature, then the more critical it seems to be of itself. And 
this critical stance necessarily calls for the spectator to be active; it calls for her to 
reflect on the articulation of the film and thus to take part in the construction of its 
meaning. If rather than being offered a supposedly mimetic depiction of an event or 
situation -- an already digested and non-negotiable re-presentation of the real through 
juxtaposed images, the viewer is instead given the chance to reach her own 
conclusions by being confronted with the artifice of documentary representation, then 
a political critique can be articulated. In other words, if instead of assuming the 
spectator is merely passively receiving information, she is encouraged to ask 
questions and become part of the cinematic artifice in the creation of meaning, then a 
documentary can offer a strong critique that can undermine the social order that 
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imposes who has and who does not have representational powers. That is, a critique 
that can undermine the hierarchical structures and values sustained by this order. 
This view of Steyerl is also shared by Trinh, who affirms that self-reflexivity 
is significant and transgressive only if it is employed to avoid the closure and 
absolutizing of the meaning of a documentary film. Whenever reflexivity is reduced 
to a mere stylistic technique or method -- as commonly occurred with visual 
anthropology which uses self-reflexivity as a default style to guarantee its scientific 
status, this only reinforces scientific and cultural hierarchies. For self-reflexivity to be 
subversive and constitute a political cause in itself, it has to crucially preclude a single 
and totalizing meaning. This means that a documentary that is self-aware of its own 
constructed nature and does not attempt to hide its artifice, is one that lets fact and 
fiction, realism and artificiality, freely move without having to solve contradictions or 
commit to a sole and definitive meaning. In Trinh’s words: 
To compose is not always synonymous with ordering-so-as-to-persuade, and to give the 
filmed document another sense, another meaning, is not necessarily to distort it. […] 
Therefore, meaning can be political only when it does not let itself be easily stabilized and 
when it does not rely on any single source of authority, but, rather, empties it, or 
decentralizes it. Thus, even when this source is referred to, it stands as one among many 
others, at once plural and utterly singular. In its demand to mean at any rate, the 
“documentary” often forgets how it comes about and how aesthetics and politics remain 
inseparable in its constitution; for, when not equated with mere techniques of beautifying, 
aesthetics allows one to experience life differently.44 
I agree with Steyerl and Trinh that it is this particular feature of the documentary 
form, the manner in which it can lend itself to multiple readings, to be attributed 
myriad senses (some of them contradictory, others not) by making evident and 
questioning its very own artifice, that gives this film form its potential for calling into 
question the power structures and hierarchies imposed by the social order, and for 
suggesting that there might be alternative orders.  
Now, how exactly is it that the self-awareness of a documentary and its refusal 
to have one single meaning and a single authority determining this meaning can 
configure a strong political criticism? Both Steyerl and Trinh point to an answer. 
When, through an open-ended and self-reflexive form, the spectator is invited to take 
active part in the articulation of the meaning of the film, then the schism between a 
passive spectator and an active filmmaker is challenged. What is relevant here is the 	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implication that the viewer plays a role not only in configuring the sense of the 
images and sounds with which she is presented, but also in articulating the critical 
stance that the documentary aims to put forward. The viewer is here not passively 
subjected to a pedagogic lecture, and instead her active involvement entails that the 
power relations establishing the distinction between someone with representational 
powers (the documentarist) and someone who lacks them (the spectator and the film 
subject) is merely contingent. Thus a political relationship between the filmmaker and 
the spectator is created, a relationship of equality that subverts the hierarchies of the 
social order. This idea will become clearer if we turn, once more, to Rancière’s ideas 
on the relation between aesthetics and politics. 
As explained in Chapter 2 of this thesis, Rancière believes that aesthetics and 
politics are not two mutually exclusive domains, but that rather the two are closely 
intertwined. He explains this by arguing that the social order or order of the police 
assigns shares, functions and places to all members of society but it also sets up the 
conditions of possibility of (or the a priori laws that determine) what can be thought, 
seen, heard, said, made, done, and everything that can be apprehended through the 
senses. Rancière calls these epistemological and perceptual underpinnings of the order 
of the police, the ‘distribution of the sensible.’45 This means that the sensible is 
partitioned in such a way that it demarcates the forms of inclusion and exclusion 
within a community. It is the role of the order of the police to maintain a particular 
distribution of the sensible and thus a hierarchy of places and roles. Rancière’s 
understanding of politics bears a close link to the notion of the partition of the 
sensible. For him, politics is the process of the collective enactment of equality. 
Politics is ‘a set of practices guided by the supposition that everyone is equal and by 
the attempt to verify this supposition.’46 Those who are involved in the verification of 
the axiom of equality are those who are unaccounted for within the social 
arrangement. By acting under the presupposition of equality, these people disrupt the 
hierarchies of the order of the police. In this sense, politics is a process that aims to 
reconfigure the distribution of the sensible, and thus it is a process of emancipation 
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and a form of dissensus with the current social order. This, Rancière says, is the 
‘aesthetics of politics.’47  
Aesthetics is, as I also explained in Chapter 2, a form of dissensus, a challenge 
to a certain partition of the sensible. Thus, both aesthetics and politics involve a 
process of rupture with a hierarchical order and its re-organization. Similarly, both 
aesthetics and politics are based upon the principle of equality. The difference here 
lies in that the re-configuration of the partition of the sensible performed by politics is 
the result of forms of subjectivation, that is, the result of the constitution of ‘a subject 
of collective demonstration [of those who have no part; the anonymous] whose 
emergence is the element that disrupts the distribution of social parts.’48 The re-
distribution of the sensible effected by aesthetics, by contrast, does not frame a 
collective ‘we’ for the unaccounted and anonymous. Rather, the rupture of aesthetics 
‘re-frames the world of common experience as the world of a shared impersonal 
experience.’49 This rupture reconfigures the ‘forms of visibility and intelligibility of 
artistic practice and reception’50 in such a way that the parameters of aesthetic 
worthiness are revealed as contingent. Rancière calls this the ‘politics of aesthetics.’51  
It is important to recall that for Rancière aesthetics is not a term that refers to 
art in general, but rather this term names a particular regime of artistic practice. For 
him, there are three regimes of art, the ethical, the representative and the aesthetic 
regimes. But only the last one is to be identified with the rupture just mentioned. The 
aesthetic regime emerges against the representative regime that establishes a 
hierarchy of artistic disciplines and stipulates that every artwork needs to have a 
narrative with a moral, social and political significance. By contrast, the aesthetic 
regime of art affirms the singularity of art and liberates it from the structures that 
determine what can be said and the language and form that are to be used. The 
aesthetic regime disrupts the hierarchy of disciplines, subject matter and genres of the 
representative regime. Instead of giving primacy to the mimetic function, in the 
aesthetic regime language and images of the world are employed as expressive 
powers and ends in themselves. Most importantly, the aesthetic regime induces a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Rancière, ‘The Paradoxes,’ p.140.   
48 Ibid, pp.141-142. 
49 Ibid, p.142. 
50 Rancière, ‘The Aesthetic Dimension: Aesthetics, Politics, Knowledge,’ in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 36, 
No. 1 (Autumn, 2009), pp.1-19 (p.5), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/606120> [accessed 7th 
March 2013]. 
51 Rancière, ‘The Paradoxes,’ p.142. 
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break between the intention of the artist and the effect it may have upon the 
spectator’s behaviour; a break between a way of doing (poiesis) and a way of being 
affected by it (aisthesis), between cause and effect.52   
The key idea that Rancière is defending here is that art cannot anticipate the 
outcome that its subversive strategies might or might not have upon the forms of 
political subjectivation. Rancière is arguing here against the widely held 
presupposition in critical thought and political art that there is a straightforward causal 
relationship between artistic means and political aims or ends, as well as a straight 
line from raising political awareness of an apparently passive spectator to her political 
mobilisation. As Rancière says: 
The images of art do not supply weapons for battles. They help sketch new configurations 
of what can be seen, what can be said and what can be thought and, consequently, a new 
landscape of the possible. But they do so on condition that their meaning or effect is not 
anticipated.53  
Rancière is critical of an art that aspires to emancipate the spectator that is passive and 
ignorant. He is sceptical of the art that seeks to reveal market relations, commodity 
consumerism and to make the viewer understand the nature of exploitation, inequality 
and class domination. Nothing guarantees the political efficacy of an artwork for there 
is no easy and direct transit between certain modalities and strategies of artistic 
production and the subjective determination to mobilise politically. Since there is no 
way to forecast the effects and affects that art may produce, the work of art that can 
challenge the distribution of the sensible and give rise to alternative forms of 
subjective enunciation does not assume that the artist has a superior knowledge and 
that the spectator needs to be enlightened. Under this understanding, the spectator is 
creative and has the capacity to interpret and translate what she is presented with. The 
role of the artist is not to teach spectators what she knows, but rather to encourage 
them to make new associations and dissociations from the images and representations 
they see. In this way, instead of serving as a vehicle for the transmission of 
knowledge, the work of art emerges as an unknown entity that the artist and the 
spectator are to verify together. This is what Rancière calls an ‘emancipatory practice’ 
of art. This is a practice that blurs the roles of specialist and amateur, active artist and 
passive spectator; the boundaries between looking and doing, viewing and knowing. 	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53Ibid, p.103. 
	   133	  
Artist and spectator thus emerge as equals. Equally active and equal participants in 
reshaping and creating new possibilities of what can be thought, seen, experienced 
and said. As Rancière explains, the point of the emancipatory practice of art is not to 
confront reality with mimetic representations of it and/or to reveal the reality of 
inequality and domination behind these images. The point is to produce works of 
‘fiction,’ to create ‘different realities, different forms of common sense -- that is to 
say, different spatiotemporal systems, different communities of words and things, 
forms and meanings.’54 In other words, these works of fiction allow for the emergence 
of new partitions of the sensible insofar as it is not possible to anticipate the effects on 
the spectator, hence the latter and the artist no longer fit the functions and destinations 
assigned to them in the social order. 
What is valuable in Rancière’s theses about the relations between politics and 
aesthetics is the idea that the political entails a collective and plural practice, which is 
also -- as I will explain further on -- the view that Azoulay maintains with her model 
of photography. Politics is a matter of what people do collectively that calls into 
question and disrupts the hierarchical order of a social arrangement. And the political 
dimension of a work of art lies in its potential to involve the spectator as an active 
participant alongside the artist; a spectator who questions what is visible and not 
visible in the images and who invents new links between things and meanings. 
Rancière’s views coincide with and help clarify the ideas of Trinh and Steyerl that the 
spectator’s active partaking in the articulation of a documentary’s meaning precludes 
the existence of a single authority determining its meaning, and therefore subverts the 
hierarchies of the social order and configures a political critique. When filmmaker and 
spectator relate as equal participants in creating alternative meanings and novel 
‘fictions’ they make evident the arbitrariness of the social arrangement and open the 
door for new possibilities of what can be experienced, thought and said. The 
connection with Derrida’s idea that politics pertains decisions and setting limits and 
conditions can be seen here more clearly. The filmmaker selects and makes choices as 
to how to present a story and join one shot to the next one, but she cannot foresee or 
control the spectator’s response, for her decisions are always ungrounded and imply 
risks. The filmmaker thus can only act as a host allowing spectators to create their 
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own fictions. Leaving the door open for the arrival of the other (the spectator in this 
case), opens up multiple avenues that the meaning of the film can take. 
The fact that the filmmaker cannot foresee and does not have control over 
what the viewer would see, experience or think of the documentary does not mean 
that the documentarist withdraws himself completely from the film. This cannot be 
done as the film always bears the presence of the filmmaker; the film always bears her 
voice. But the documentary that has the possibility to transgress the cultural, social 
and political hierarchies of the social arrangement has to allow spectator and artist to 
work collectively in determining the meaning of the images. As Trinh puts it:  
A film is like a page of paper that I [the filmmaker] offer the viewer. I am responsible for 
what is within the boundary of the paper, but I do not control and do not wish to control its 
folding. The viewer can fold it horizontally, obliquely, vertically. They can weave the 
elements to their liking and background.55 
The degree to which the spectator becomes involved is decided by her alone. But 
there is a special bond created between the filmmaker and the spectator, a political 
relationship to the extent that its emergence questions the distribution of functions and 
places of the social arrangement, and blurs the hierarchical distinction of filmmaker 
and viewer. This is also a relationship of hospitality in a Derridian sense, since the 
filmmaker offers his film for the spectator to freely engage with, without imposing a 
meaning onto the images that the viewer must admit. In this way, and as it will 
become clearer through my case studies, the filmmaker can be said to act as a ‘host’ 
to both the filmed subject and (especially) the spectator. 
This is how I believe political relationships can be created through 
documentary films. By means of its form, the documentary brings filmmaker and 
spectator together as equal collaborators in the articulation of the film’s sense. This 
community of equality between documentarist and spectators already suggests the 
possibility of extrapolating Azoulay’s model of political relations of photography to 
the form of documentary. In the following section I will consider this extrapolation. 
VI. A Triadic Model of Documentary Film? 
In the previous chapter I introduced Azoulay’s theoretical approach to photography. 
Her model puts forth an understanding of photography in terms of an aggregate of 
social practices; a set of socio-political relationships created through the interplay 	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between three parties: the photographer, the photographed subject and the spectator. 
Azoulay argues that photographs of ‘the verge of catastrophe’ -- which portray 
populations whose lives are deprived of resources and subjected to such a constant 
violation of their rights that their living conditions are ‘normalised’ despite being 
utterly unacceptable -- can engender political relationships between the three parties 
involved in the photographic act.  
Azoulay’s triadic model offers an alternative to traditional dualistic 
approaches that focus only on the photographer’s role and/or on the viewer’s 
experience, and that thus fail to acknowledge the agency of the photographed subject 
(or subjects) within the ‘social bind’ created by the photograph. Instead, her model 
grants visibility to the portrayed subject and denies the passivity of both the latter and 
the spectator in the relationships that surface through the event of photography. 
Azoulay aims to open up new theoretical perspectives about photography (and 
especially about photographs representing populations in precarious conditions) that 
go beyond the narrow view that considers photographs only in terms of their aesthetic 
value or the psychological and emotional impact that these images might induce. She 
proposes that a photograph and its meaning are the result of a social encounter 
between the photographed, the photographer and the viewer, and that none of these 
parties has exclusive claim over the ownership of the photograph, nor do they have it 
over its significance. Because there are many participants in the making of a 
photographic event, the meaning and intention of a photograph are always beyond the 
control of the photographer and exceed her purpose. This idea of Azoulay mirrors to a 
certain extent that of Rancière in that the artist has no way to forecast the effect that 
her artwork might have over the spectator, and in that this uncertainty is what 
prevents the photograph from having one single and fixed meaning. Consequently, 
because the photograph’s meaning is open, the spectator is free to participate in the 
determination of the artwork’s sense. The photographic act, for Azoulay, opens up a 
space for ongoing past and present encounters between the three parties. 
In Azoulay’s model of photography, the photographed person is never 
rendered invisible; her gaze and her active involvement in the photographic act are 
affirmed as crucial elements in the constitution of the social and plural space created 
by the photograph. This is so because both the photographer and the spectator become 
addressees of the claims made by the portrayed subject, and they also acquire thereby 
(civic) responsibility for what is seen in the photograph. In this manner, a sphere of 
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political relationships is created among the photographer, the photographed subject 
and the viewer bound together by their mutual recognition and the civic duty to make 
visible the intolerable violations that people living on the ‘verge of catastrophe’ 
endure on a regular basis. Azoulay calls this socio-political bind the ‘civil contract of 
photography,’ and she claims that this ‘might be actualized by the act of watching, 
transforming, and disseminating what is seen [in the images of violence and suffering] 
into claims that demand action [and reparation].’56   
There are some points implied by Azoulay’s model that are worth considering 
when thinking about its applicability to documentary film. The civil contract of 
photography entails an ‘ethics of spectatorship,’ since it commands that the viewer 
abandon its role as a passive addressee of an image and instead adopt that of the 
active addresser that articulates photographs of injured populations in terms of 
emergency statements.	   In this way, Azoulay grounds photographic spectatorship on 
civic duty, the civic duty towards the photographed persons. That is, the civic duty to 
make visible their sufferings and the intolerable deprivations these people undergo, 
and thus to call for the urgent rehabilitation of their ‘injured citizenship’ and their 
damaged life conditions. According to Azoulay, what follows from her model is that 
whenever citizenship has been in one way or another violated or injured, there is the 
possibility of rectifying such injustices through photography. Photography for her 
offers an arena for political relationships that are not directly sanctioned by the 
nation-state. Her proposal also implies a new understanding of the concept of 
citizenship in terms of a practice of solidarity and duty towards others, rather than in 
terms of a status that individuals are endowed with in a certain nation-state. This 
citizenship of photography entails the exercise of a particular set of civil skills that are 
employed to negotiate with the sovereign power and demand reparation for those 
whose rights have been violated.   
As explained in Chapter 2, Azoulay ontologico-political model of photography 
works as an alternative to social power approaches that define the photographic act as 
inexorably repressive in character, for there is one party holding representational 
authority and power (the photographer) over the other party, which is subject of this 
representation (the photographed subject). While Azoulay does not deny that 
photography implies social hierarchies, her thesis of the civil contract of photography 	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allows for the photographic encounter to (potentially) challenge those very power 
relations to the extent that every such encounter exceeds the photographer’s intention 
and opens up the possibility of myriad readings of what the photograph might mean. 
Since there is not a single authority to determine the meaning of the image, then the 
hierarchies of representation are eroded, and thus photography can be a space for 
politics and an emancipatory practice.  
Returning to the discussion of documentary cinema, it is possible to draw 
some parallels between Azoulay’s thesis of the political relationships engendered 
through the practice of photography; Derrida’s hospitality; Rancière’s views on 
politics and aesthetics; and Trinh’s and Steyerl’s ideas about documentary 
filmmaking and its potential to question and disrupt social, cultural and political 
hierarchies. I am interested in these parallels because I believe that documentary films 
can (also) provide a space for political (and ethical) relationships that escape the 
traditional conception that locates politics exclusively within the boundaries of the 
nation-state. And I think Azoulay’s understanding of photography can be used as a 
groundwork to develop an approach to documentary that explains the political 
potential of this film form in these terms.  
Both Steyerl and Trinh affirm that for a documentary to have the capacity to 
subvert the hierarchies of the social order, the film needs to question its own 
construction and presuppositions so as to destabilise its meaning and leave open the 
possibility of many interpretations. This opening invites (but does not force) the 
spectator to become an active observer of the moving images presented to her and so 
to question and contribute to the articulation of the sense of the images. It is mainly 
through the stylistic features of the film, its modes of organization, that this open 
space becomes possible. When the documentary refuses to allow a single authority to 
specify its meaning, then the spectator can, alongside the filmmaker, partake in the 
construction of the film’s sense. Thus, in the same way Azoulay considers 
photographs, Steyerl and Trinh think that there is nothing like a fixed, ready-
determined, meaning of (cinematic) documentary images. The meaning of these 
images is the result of the joint participation of those involved (one way or another) in 
the making and the watching of them. If a documentary film produces a dialogue of 
sorts between the filmmaker, the filmed subjects and the viewer; if it seeks to ‘speak 
nearby’ rather than to speak about the represented subjects; and if instead of 
attempting to lecture passive viewers incites them to examine the message conveyed 
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through the purposely concatenated images and sounds, then the documentary’s 
meaning can be political. 
The sense of collective creation of meaning, the sense of shared 
responsibilities and consequent blurring of roles and functions that Rancière explains 
with his understanding of the aesthetics of politics is implied in Azoulay’s 
understanding of photography, and it is also present in Steyerl’s and Trinh’s views 
about what it is that makes documentary cinema into an art form with the capacity to 
have political effects. Indeed, the importance here lies in the idea that for a 
documentary to function as a politically emancipatory practice, it needs to eschew the 
pretension that the images it presents have a definitive, stable meaning, and the 
pretension that this meaning is not contingent. For only in this way can a documentary 
undermine hierarchies of knowledge and of the production of representation. As 
Guerra has put it, the documentary practice that aims to have a (collective) pedagogic 
role but that avoids imposing any teachings, is that which implies ‘a social 
reorganization of labour [in the creation of documentary] representations, [and thus] 
the redistribution of responsibilities, often segmented between the authors, those 
represented in the work, the critics and the public.’57 
This parallel between Azoulay’s ideas on the political relationships of 
photography and those of Rancière, Steyerl and Trinh suggests how and to what 
extent the triadic model of photography can be extrapolated to explain documentary 
film and its potential to form political relationships that are not directly sanctioned by 
the nation-state. Even though Azoulay does not distinguish made politically from 
political photographs -- because for her all human interactions are political and hence 
all photographs are political, the distinction that Steyerl and Trinh make does help to 
elucidate the way in which spectators can become active participants in the 
documentary made politically and hence create a relationship with the filmmaker that 
is based on equality and that challenges hierarchies -- as Rancière explains. However, 
one point that is central to Azoulay’s theory that is not fully developed by these other 
three authors is the thesis that the portrayed subject has agency within the sphere of 
socio-political relationships originated through the photograph. The represented 
subject is recognised as an active (and equal) participant in the photographic event, 
and so her grievances are heard. This is how Azoulay explains the moral and civic 	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duty that both the photographer and the viewer have towards the photographed 
subject who is addressing them. Photographer and viewers must make visible and 
demand restoration for the violations suffered by the portrayed subjects.    
This three-party model of photographic relations can still be reconciled with 
Steyerl’s and Trinh’s ideas on documentary. Since these two scholars propose that the 
articulation of the meaning of documentaries be done collectively, with the active 
participation of the spectator, this means that the latter is confronted with facts that 
are always negotiable. At the same time, the spectator’s involvement in the 
determination of the sense of the film necessarily implies an opening towards the 
other. This other is here embodied by the filmmaker but also, very especially, by the 
represented subject. The presence of the latter prompts the viewer to consider who 
this filmed subject is and why she might be represented in this way. There is thus a 
negotiation between self and other, which means that not only is the bond created 
between filmmaker, filmed subject and viewer political but also ethical. The bond is 
political insofar as the hierarchical status of the documentarist -- who has the power 
and ownership of the means of representation -- is challenged by the fact that the 
meaning of the documentary cannot be anticipated and can only be articulated 
collectively, and thus there is a re-distribution of roles and responsibilities within the 
hierarchies of representation. The bond is ethical to the extent that there is an overt 
recognition of the other as an indispensable partaker in the process of negotiating 
facts and determining the sense of the film. Since the relationships thus created 
through the film are simultaneously ethical and political in character, then these are 
relationships of hospitality in the sense that Derrida understands this concept -- and 
which I discussed at length in chapter one.    
 In this way, Azoulay’s triadic model of photography and the idea that 
photography can be a space for political relationships not directly mediated by the 
nation-state can be transposed to the field of documentary film. This is important 
because an approach to the documentary form following the guidelines of Azoulay’s 
theory of photography opens up the possibility of understanding documentary in 
terms of its potential to originate political and ethical relationships, and thus to think 
of this film form beyond its representational qualities, and instead consider 
documentary in terms of its capacity to question and undermine cultural, social and 
political hierarchies. Similarly, understanding documentary film on the basis of a 
triadic model like the one Azoulay proposes allows considering the domain of politics 
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or the political outside of the framework of the nation-state and geo-political borders; 
a deterritorialised form of politics. Finally, as I argued in Chapter 2, the political 
bonds formed through the photographic event are relationships of hospitality, 
relationships based on the ethical and political responsibility we have towards other 
people regardless of their actual citizenship status. And if the documentary film can 
create, like photography, a field of political bonds not sanctioned by the nation-state, 
then documentaries can operate as vessels of hospitality.         
Can this transposition be done seamlessly given that there are significant 
differences between the medium of photography and the medium of film that would 
arguably challenge a straightforward extrapolation of Azoulay’s model to the 
documentary form? I will take issue with this question in the next section by looking 
at the differences and similarities of these two visual media. This discussion will 
continue in subsequent chapters where I will explore in greater depth the possibility 
and the extent of this transposition through my case studies. 
VII. An Expanded Transposition. Movement, Time and Sound 
Because movement is one of the most obvious differences between photography and 
cinema, a first thing to consider when trying to extrapolate Azoulay’s triadic model of 
photography to documentary film is whether a theory conceived to apply to still 
images could be transposed to a medium of moving images (and hence a temporal 
medium) coupled with sounds. I will argue that these factors absent from the medium 
of photography bear an impact on the ways the filmmaker, filmed subjects and 
(especially) the spectator engage with the film and with one another. In particular, I 
will argue that temporality and sound produce reflexive as much as affective 
responses from the spectator.  
Movement necessarily implies change; and change in turn implies temporality. 
This means that movement, change and time are key elements distinguishing 
photography from film. While both photography and film are representational 
practices, photographic images capture and freeze a single moment in time (they 
embalm a moment in the past) but cinematic images, by contrast, capture equally 
consecutive and non-consecutive moments that are juxtaposed creating a sense of 
continuity. This means that the moving images are experienced by the viewer as if 
they were unfolding in the present even when they portray an event in the past. As 
Malin Wahlberg explains: 
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The analogy between photography and film has been justified either by the photographic 
base of filmic representation or by the experiential difference between the moving image 
and the photograph. The latter claim refers to the cinematic experience of continuous 
change, denoting the present tense of involvement and identification. The difference 
between a single still image and the filmic flow of sound-images in constant change has 
motivated the present tense of film.58     
The fact that moving images are usually identified with the temporality of the present 
does not prevent them from also offering traces of the past -- just like the 
photographic image does. To be sure, cinematic images (fictional and non-fictional 
alike) constitute cultural representations marked by the date on which they were 
recorded, and therefore, they are also imprints of the past. This foremost trait of 
cinema as an imprint of past events provides the documentary form in particular with 
a close and inextricable relationship to the passing of time, the development of 
history, and consequently to the past, present and even the future. Documentary films 
in this sense belong to what Gilles Deleuze has characterised as ‘time-images’59 since 
they render visible the actual movement of time. For this reason, documentary images 
contain, display, intertwine and imply simultaneously several layers of time. The time 
of filming; the time being represented and/or referred to (often through the use of 
personal testimonies, interviews or found footage); the time of viewing (which can be 
discontinuous and dislocated since today’s home film-watching allows spectators to 
stop the film and resume their viewing when they want); and finally the time that is 
evoked in the spectator’s mind through her viewing. Thus film, and therefore 
documentary, is a time-based medium whose images are able to ‘perform 
simultaneously as [images] of the present and [as traces] of the past [that is, as 
mementos of events occurred in the past].’60 This temporal quality, as I will explain 
further on, necessarily shapes the experience and response that viewers might have 
when seeing a film. 	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Returning to Azoulay’s model of photography, she proposes that spectators 
exercise their civic duty of ‘watching’ photographs of horror so as to adopt the 
perspective of actual witness of the unacceptable living conditions of populations on 
the verge of catastrophe. In watching photographs, instead of merely looking at them, 
viewers act as if the event or situation portrayed was happening in the present, in front 
of them. This presupposition is not necessary in the case of documentaries for, given 
that film is by nature a time-based medium, spectators watch the images and are 
thereby necessarily immersed in the flow of time presented through the documentary. 
The sense of duration and simultaneity of the present moment (obtained by way of the 
flux of images in a continuous sequence) and the trace of the past embedded in 
documentaries, directly provide the spectator with a sense of being present, of 
witnessing. This suggests that the spectator becomes involved in and with the 
documentary in a way that is different from the responses she would have towards a 
photograph. 
Indeed, the way in which the spectator is affected by and engages with the 
documentary differs significantly from her encounter with photographs. This 
difference can be better understood if we draw on Wahlberg’s conception of the trace 
in documentary film. Following André Bazin and Paul Ricoeur, Wahlberg defines the 
trace or image-memory in documentary filmmaking as that which ‘“signifies without 
making anything appear,” and yet [as that which] bears witness to something that 
happened and even to the passing of time itself.’61  Thus defined, the trace is 
characterized by its contingency and deferral. That is, the trace functions less as an 
imprint of an event that took place in the past, and more as a constituent sign within 
the narrative that seeks to re-construct a historical event. In this way, the viewer 
engages with the film not exclusively in terms of a mnemonic activity, but most 
importantly in terms of both an affective and reflexive process that consists in the 
organizing and combining of the (documentary) images so that they acquire sense. 
Wahlberg further claims that what prompts viewers to get involved in such 
articulation of the meaning of a documentary is precisely the dimension of duration 
and the temporal quality of this film form. For her, temporality and duration produce 
in the spectator the experience of a ‘frame-breaking’ event. This means that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Ibid, p.41. 
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viewer has an aesthetic experience through which she ‘becomes disturbingly aware’62 
of the socially and culturally constructed preconceptions that frame and determine 
both her understanding and her affective responses to a given situation. Here 
‘affective’ refers to the quality that produces ‘affects’ as Deleuze understands the 
term, that is, as experiences with no concrete form in themselves but with certain 
intensity, experiences that are non-conscious or pre-conscious but that are neither 
feelings nor emotions.63 The frame-breaking event that according to Wahlberg is 
produced by a documentary creates an affective response in the viewer. This affective 
quality of frame-breaking is ‘propelled by a combination of manipulated space-time 
(duration, tempo, rhythm and repetition) and the enactment of the sound-image record 
as a trace of a historical and social realm.’64 At the same time, this frame-breaking 
also entails a reflexive and critical response in the viewer insofar as it draws attention 
to and hence calls into question her own cultural and social preconceptions when she 
actively engages in making sense of the documentary. In this sense, this affective 
frame-breaking also has the potential to disrupt cultural, social and political 
hierarchies. Wahlberg’s theses on temporality and trace in the documentary form 
coincides with and confirms what Steyerl and Trinh say about how the form and 
stylistic features of documentaries determine the involvement of the viewers with the 
film, and hence also the political potential of the latter. At the same time, Wahlberg’s 
ideas make evident how these features of documentary make the viewer’s experience 
differ from the one she would have with a photograph. Hence, a transposition of 
Azoulay’s model of photography to documentary would have to take into account 
such differences. 
Another temporal aspect that differentiates photography from documentary 
films lies in the process of making the film itself. As Kate Nash has explained, 
documentaries, particularly those that aim to be purely observational, imply ‘a long-
term and intimate relationship between the participant [the filmed subject] and the 
filmmaker.’ 65  Such a relationship is possible precisely because filming a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Ibid, p.50. 
63 I will return to the question of affects and affection later on in Chapter 6 of this thesis. But it is worth 
recalling Deleuze’s own words on affect and affection in his book Cinema 1: ‘[affect] is not a 
sensation, a feeling, an idea, but the quality of a possible sensation feeling or idea.’ This means that 
affects precede feelings and emotions. See Deleuze, Cinema 1. The Movement-Image, p.100. 
64 Wahlberg, Documentary Time, p.53. 
65 Nash, ‘Documentary-for-the-Other: Relationships, Ethics and (Observational) Documentary,’ in 
Journal of Mass Media Ethics: Exploring Questions of Media Morality, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2011), pp.224-
239 (p.225), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08900523.2011.581971> [accessed 13th November 2012].  
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documentary, as opposed to taking a photograph, is a durational practice, it requires 
time and thus it provides the opportunity for the emergence of a different bond 
between the person having the means and power of representation and the represented 
subject. Nash argues that documentaries in the observational mode often do raise 
ethical questions related to the way in which the filmmaker might be invading the 
filmed subject’s privacy or whether the former needs some sort of informed consent 
from the subject in order to avoid merely exploiting her image. However, precisely 
due to the fact that observational documentary requires the filmmaker to spend long 
periods of time with the subjects, this documentary mode ‘also admits a degree of 
collaboration, thereby preserving the alterity of the other.’66 The potential for a 
collaborative relationship between filmmaker and filmed subject is thus determined 
and enhanced by the temporality of the medium of film that is absent in photography. 
This collaboration would imply that filmmaker and portrayed subject can relate more 
as equals and not so much in hierarchical terms. I will explore this collaborative bond 
in more detail through my case studies, and particularly in chapter four.  
Movement and temporality are not the only aspects that differentiate film and 
photography. Sound and the way it is married with the moving images add another 
dimension that also complicates a straightforward transposition of the triadic model of 
photography and the documentary film. Sound effects and music definitively play a 
significant role in the affective response that spectators have towards a film. 
Likewise, as Trinh has remarked,67 asynchronicity between documentary images and 
sound openly signals the constructive nature of the film and destabilizes meaning, and 
this prompts spectators to actively engage with it, ask questions, and take part in the 
articulation of the sense of the film. Since sound is absent in photography, the 
spectator’s affective and reflexive response to a photograph is again (just as it occurs 
with the temporal dimension of film) necessarily different from her response to a 
(documentary) film. This means that any attempt to transpose Azoulay’s theoretical 
approach to photography to the form of documentary will require modification and 
expansion so as to accommodate the fact that these two media differ from each other 
and hence engage viewers in different ways. 
As I have said, through my case studies I will explore more thoroughly the 
question of the forms of engagement that spectators can have with documentaries and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Ibid. 
67 See Trinh, ‘Why a Fish Pond?,’ pp.168-169. 
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also test and explore the extent to which Azoulay’s theory of photography can be 
extrapolated to the domain of documentary. I will pay particular attention to the 
possible response that viewers might have to sound effects in chapter six of this 
thesis. My main argument will be that Azoulay’s model can be transposed to 
documentary and that her views provide a way to approach this film form beyond 
representation and, instead, in terms of its potential to produce political and ethical 
relationships that escape the direct sanction of the nation-state. But this transposition, 
I will claim, cannot be seamless; it would also need to acknowledge the differences 
between the medium of photography and that of film.  
Alongside movement, temporality and sound as key elements preventing a 
straightforward transposition of Azoulay’s model of photography into documentary 
film, there is the question of whether her model, which aims to offer a new 
understanding of the political and civic life having the specific context of the 
Palestinian population, can indeed be extrapolated to other socio-political and 
geographical contexts. Azoulay has a particular interest in finding a theoretical 
approach that serves to subvert or counter the condition of ‘regime-made disaster’ 
under which Palestinians are forced to live by the Israeli government. This is why she 
proposes photography as a deterritorialised space of political relations that are not 
entirely subordinated to the rule of the nation-state. Her proposal of a citizenry of 
photography seeks to open up a space that restores citizenship and the possibility of 
civic and political action for those populations who suffer constant violation of their 
rights and denial of citizenship status. Hence she defends an idea of citizenship that, 
rather than being a status granting rights and duties to a person within a certain 
nation-state, is a practice of forming relationships of partnership and solidarity 
towards others who have been unjustly injured, regardless of what their actual 
citizenship status is.  
It is worth noting here that Azoulay also focuses on photographs of women in 
The Civil Contract because she believes that women, like Palestinians, have an 
‘impaired’ citizenship and are thus susceptible to a very specific type of harm and 
disaster -- namely, rape -- that is never examined in terms of their civic status. This 
suggests that she thinks that her model can apply to other populations and not just the 
Palestinians. It is my aim in this thesis to argue that her triadic model can be 
extrapolated not only to documentary films as yet another space for political relations 
beyond the exclusive mediation of the power of the nation-state, but also that the 
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extrapolation can be done to encompass other geographical and political contexts (not 
just Palestine) where populations have their rights systematically violated due to their 
citizenship status (or their lack of it). In particular, I want to argue that Azoulay’s 
theory can be transposed to include those populations that have to migrate or cross 
borders irregularly or without documents because they then become stateless and are 
thus susceptible to excruciating rights violations, living under unacceptable 
conditions. What I propose therefore is a double transposition of her triadic model of 
photography: first, a transposition to the field of documentary, and second, a 
transposition to other contexts beyond Palestine where individuals find themselves 
without the protection of any nation-state. This double transposition (from 
photography to documentary cinema and from the specific case of the Palestinian 
population to people who experience border-crossings) will allow me to show not 
only that documentaries can be alternative spaces for political relationships that are 
not under the direct meditation of the nation-state power but also, consequently, that 
the documentary about border-crossings as an interstitial film form between fiction 
and fact, reality and artifice, has the potential to function as a site hospitality 
relationships, a vessel for hospitality encounters in a Derridian sense. This is what I 
aim to do in the next chapters by taking particular documentaries as my case studies 
and analysing them in terms of their stylistic traits, their modalities and the way they 
were produced in order to test the possibility of this double transposition. 
VIII. Final Remarks 
My aim in this chapter has been to argue that Azoulay’s theses that photography is a 
practice that gives rise to political relations that are not directly sanctioned by the 
nation-state and that these relationships constitute a novel form of understanding 
citizenship can be extrapolated to the field of documentary cinema. I have claimed 
that documentaries, like photography, can also produce relationships of ethical and 
political responsibility and solidarity between documentarist, spectator and filmed 
subjects. I am interested in Azoulay’s approach because I think it serves as a 
groundwork to explain alternative forms of politics not constrained by territorial 
boundaries. However, I have explained that the way in which these relationships that 
escape the direct sanction of the state emerge through documentary films necessarily 
differs from the way photography produces this type of bond, for cinema and 
photography are two distinct visual media that hence produce different responses in 
the viewer. 
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I have linked Rancière’s ideas on aesthetics and politics with Steyerl’s and 
Trinh’s views that documentaries can be politically critical when their form is self-
reflexive and open to different readings and meanings. Through this link I have 
explained how the spectator can become actively engaged with the film and thereby 
form ethico-political relationships with the filmmaker and the filmed subjects in a 
way that resembles the political relationships of the civil contract of photography 
proposed by Azoulay. These relationships of documentary, just like the ones Azoulay 
says are formed through the photographic event, also escape the direct regulation of 
the nation-state and are based on equality rather on a duty imposed by the sovereign 
state. Similarly, like Derrida’s view of politics as decisions that cannot calculate the 
arrival of the other, filmmakers make choices as regards the form, style and content of 
the film but they cannot anticipate the spectators’ response. The filmmaker’s 
decisions thus remain open to the spectator’s arrival that will necessarily challenge 
and transform such decisions.  
I have proposed that because movement adds a temporality dimension to film 
that is absent in the still image of photography, then the involvement that the 
filmmaker, filmed subjects and (very particularly) the spectator might have with the 
film and with one another has to be different from the way they might engage with 
and through a photograph. I drew on Wahlberg’s work to explain that through 
documentary there is an experience of a sense of duration or of an ongoing real-time 
experience of the present moment, but also of a sense of a trace of an actual past 
event. This dual experience results in affective and reflexive responses on the part of 
the spectator who is thereby prompted to adopt an active part in the determination of 
the meaning of the documentary and to question her own social and cultural 
predispositions, and hence to disrupt the hierarchies imposed by the social 
arrangement. Wahlberg’s ideas on the temporality of documentaries show how 
Azoulay’s model can be transposed to the documentary while acknowledging the 
temporal quality of this form. Through my case studies, I will further explore this 
transposition and question how sound effects and music (and silence) produce a 
similar affective and reflexive response in the viewer to that produced by time.    
This transposition that I am proposing is double. I want to argue for the 
possibility of extending Azoulay’s view of the political relationships of photography 
not just to the field of documentary but also to other contexts beyond Palestine and 
the conditions under which Palestinians live. In particular, I will claim that just like 
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there might be political relations created through the photographic event that are not 
sanctioned by the nation-state and can make visible and protest against the injustices 
suffered by populations without a citizenship status (like the Palestinians), 
documentaries that portray border-crossings and migration also have the potential to 
form such political relationships.  
Thus the purpose of the following chapters is to examine the feasibility of this 
double transposition by means of three case studies. These cases are documentaries 
that take issue with border-crossings and migration occurring in different 
geographical and political contexts, and they approach the topic by employing 
different stylistic and narrative strategies and thus adopting one or more of the 
modalities of documentary that Renov proposes (and that I introduced in this chapter). 
Each of these cases is aimed at exploring the role of one of the three parties (the 
filmed subject, the spectator and the filmmaker) in the hope to shed light on how and 
to what extent the triadic model of photography can be extrapolated to documentary 
films about border-crossings.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Crossing Borders and Re-enacting Stories. The Case of Border Farm 
 
 
I.  
In the previous three chapters I have argued for the need for alternative ways to 
understand politics and the political beyond the confines marked by geo-political 
borders and beyond the direct sanction of the nation-state. The phenomenon of 
undocumented migration and displaced populations that are vulnerable to all sorts of 
exploitation and violations due to their lack of citizenship status call for other forms 
of political relationships and for changes in the conceptualization and practice of 
citizenship. Following Derrida, 1 I explained that a politics and an ethics of hospitality 
open up the door to ways of relating to others that are not reduced to the framework of 
the nation-state, ways of relating that are based on our (ethical and political) 
responsibility towards others without regard of where they come from and what their 
actual citizenship might be. I then presented Azoulay’s theory of photography and 
conceptualization of citizenship that derives from it.2  This is a concept of citizenship 
that, rather than determining a status or a membership of an individual in a nation-
state that entitles her to certain rights and duties, is defined in terms of relationships of 
partnership and solidarity amongst individuals. My claim was that Azoulay’s proposal 
of photography as a practice that gives rise to a space of political bonds between 
photographer, portrayed subjects and spectators actualizes the practice of hospitality 
as understood by Derrida.  The final point that I have made is that Azoulay’s triadic 
model of photography can be transposed to the domain of documentary cinema. The 
documentary form -- and in particular documentaries about border-crossings and the 
experience of migration -- can also operate as spatio-temporal sites for the emergence 
of relationships based on solidarity, responsibility and partnership not regulated 
directly by the nation-state, and hence as relationships that actualize the ethics and 
politics of hospitality.  
The transposition I am proposing cannot be done simply and straightforwardly 
for it has to accommodate the fact that documentary cinema and photography are two 
different visual media. It has to accommodate the fact that the moving images of 
                                                
1 See Derrida, Of Hospitality. 
2 See Azoulay, The Civil Contract. 
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documentary add the temporal dimension of duration as well as the element of sound 
effects, which are both absent from photography. Similarly, I also intend to 
extrapolate Azoulay’s thesis to other populations and other geographical contexts. As 
I explained in Chapters 2 and 3, Azoulay is concerned with finding ways to 
‘rehabilitate’ populations who live under conditions of ‘disaster’ and are therefore 
vulnerable to constant violations. She is especially concerned with the case of the 
Palestinian population in the occupied territories, and she thus proposes an alternative 
conception of citizenship that can be applied to this deprived population and 
rehabilitate it. The extrapolation that I argue for seeks to extend to other populations 
that, similar to the Palestinians, are stateless and/or suffer the lack of protection that 
the nation-state is supposed to guarantee. This is why I propose to transpose 
Azoulay’s model to documentaries that are about border-crossings and the experience 
of migration. For as I maintained in chapter one, geo-political borders install a regime 
of exclusion, and populations that are displaced and forced to cross borders irregularly 
are exposed to intolerable sufferings and exploitation precisely because they are 
excluded from and/or abandoned by the protection of the nation-state. In this way, the 
transposition that I here pose has a double character. It aims to take Azoulay’s 
theoretical approach to photography as a place for political relations to the field of 
documentary film and to extend it to the context of borders and migration.   
It is my aim in this chapter and the following two to test out this transposition 
and further discuss documentaries and their potential to provide alternative 
understandings of politics that are deterritorialised and unhinged from the direct 
sanction of the nation-state. Following the scheme of Azoulay’s triadic model, each of 
my case studies will be mainly focused on the role of one of the three parties involved 
in the political and ethical relationships emerging through documentary, either the 
filmed subjects, the filmmaker or the spectators. Thus, in this specific chapter I will 
consider the way and extent to which the represented subjects actively participate 
within the documentary and thus in their own representation, and how this 
participation shapes the (political and ethical) relationships established between the 
filmmaker and the spectator. Azoulay believes that the way in which the portrayed 
subjects living in conditions of disaster take active part in the photographic event and 
thus enter into a relationship with the photographer and the viewers is by addressing 
the latter, by demanding that their injuries and deprived lives be made visible and 
repaired. How can this idea of the active participation of the represented subjects be 
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transposed to documentaries about border-crossings and migration? How can the 
filmed subjects form bonds with the filmmaker and the viewers so that they become 
equally active in the articulation of the meaning of the documentary? To what extent 
can these bonds call into question the hierarchies of the social order and hence be 
considered politically subversive? These are the main questions that I seek to address 
in this chapter by using as my case study the documentary Border Farm by Thenjiwe 
Nkosi (2010), a dramatised documentary about Zimbabwean border-crossers who 
work in a farm in the northern part of South Africa. I will engage in a textual and 
stylistic analysis of this film, but will also discuss the way it was produced by 
drawing on interviews and email exchanges with the filmmaker. This analysis will 
help me consider the above mentioned questions as they arise for this specific 
documentary, and ultimately examine whether documentary films can function as 
spaces for the emergence of relations of ethical and political responsibility amongst 
individuals without the direct mediation of the nation-state.  
II. A Dramatised Documentary 
Nkosi’s work has been strongly influenced by her own migration background. Her 
father was a member of the Pan Africanist Congress in South Africa that during the 
late 1950s and early 1960s actively opposed the apartheid regime. Due to her father’s 
political views, Nkosi’s family spent over 31 years in exile in the United States. In 
addition, Nkosi’s maternal grandparents were Greek refugees from Turkey in the 
1920s. This family background and the consequent experiences derived from her own 
immigration from and to South Africa have determined the interests and work of 
Nkosi. For this reason she has produced various artworks where she explores the 
ideas of migration and the sense of belonging to a community and/or to a country. In 
her documentary Elephant King (2008),3 for instance, she interviews members of her 
family and of the South African community in order to discover the origins of her 
family’s surname and thus to reflect on her own identity. Darfurian Voices (2008) 
was a human rights advocacy project commissioned to Nkosi by the not-for-profit 
organisation 24 Hours for Darfur. 4 The aim of this organisation is to document and 
broadcast what Darfurian refugees think about the issues of peace, justice and 
reconciliation by conducting public opinion research and recording video testimonies. 
                                                
3 See Anon, ‘Thenjiwe Nkosi,’ in Bag Factory Art Studios Website, 
<http://www.bagfactoryart.org.za/?p=50> [accessed 6 January 2011]. 
4 See Darfurian Voices Website, <http://www.darfurianvoices.org/index-new.php> [accessed January 
20th 2011]. 
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In this film Nkosi presents, through a series of interviews, the testimonials and 
viewpoints of several displaced Darfurians in the refugee camps of eastern Chad. The 
commission for this film, she explains in an interview, came to her while she was 
shooting and working on her own art project in those very refugee camps. The aim of 
her video project was to create a critical artwork about the ‘Disney Land-like’5 
infrastructure created by the non-governmental organizations working in these camps.  
The dramatised documentary Border Farm is one of the products that emerged 
from a larger art project conceived and led by Nkosi and, at the same time, it also 
constitutes the documentation of the developing process of this art project. The 
motivation behind Border Farm was Nkosi’s interest in the fact that immigrant 
workers in fruit farms of the Limpopo province, in northern South Africa, largely lack 
collective forms of organisation and are not able to unionize due to the exploitative 
conditions under which they work. Nkosi has said that even though there are some 
churches and football teams in this area of South Africa in which these migrant 
workers are able to participate, they are unable to organise collectively and thus to 
have a greater sense of community because most of their time has to be spent in the 
fields picking fruits and they have very few opportunities to share non-work related 
activities with other migrants. As Azoulay might say, the life conditions of these 
migrant farm workers are conditions of disaster since they are easily exploited by the 
farm owners and suffer countless injuries and injustice at the hand of either the 
smugglers that transport them into South Africa or other people that take advantage of 
their vulnerable conditions. 
With this in mind, and after visiting several of these farms in the border area 
between South Africa and Zimbabwe, Nkosi started an art project on one of the farms 
in the city of Musina, South Africa. This project consisted in creating a drama group 
in which the voluntary members could take part and collaborate in different art 
workshops and thereby build a sense of community among the participants. Nkosi’s 
idea was to provide the group with a space where they could speak out about common 
experiences as immigrants and farm workers, as well as to document and explore 
these life experiences using drama, photography, video and creative writing. The art 
workshops functioned both as skills-transfer programmes and as a way to create art 
works about an experience. Nkosi ran these workshops in cooperation mainly with 
                                                
5 Nkosi, Interview via email exchange by Pantoja-Peschard, unpublished manuscript (12th August, 
2011), Windows Word file, p.1. 
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South African photographer, Raymond Marlowe, and the Zimbabwean drama 
workshop facilitator, Tapiwa Marovatsanga. But there were also four other South 
African facilitators involved in the project and the different workshops.  
In a telephone interview with Polly Savage on January 23 2011,6 Nkosi 
explains that the collective was formed by approximately 25 people (which later took 
the name of the Dulibadzimu Theatre Group), most of them from Zimbabwe and all 
of whom had crossed the border into South Africa as undocumented immigrants. A 
Zimbabwean man, Meza, had already started writing a drama script, and it was 
through him that the rest of the members of the group were recruited. Meza’s script 
was enriched and modified by the group of migrant farm workers and this became the 
core around which the art workshops were planned.  
The photographs, the written texts and the video recorded dramatizations that 
resulted from the different workshops with the group of migrants were exhibited. The 
exhibition was called ‘Border Farm,’ and it allowed the Zimbabwean immigrants to 
tell their stories while, at the same time, providing a platform for displaying these 
real-life narratives in South Africa, the country to where they had migrated. ‘Border 
Farm’ was exhibited both at the Bag Factory7 and in the Musina Municipal Buildings 
in 2010. The defining theme, around which the exhibition was organised, as Nkosi 
puts it, was ‘life in-between.’ The idea was to show ‘the pressures, challenges, 
absurdities and opportunities’8 which migrant farm workers experience by living in 
liminal zones, neither here nor there, and by having precarious lives. The Limpopo 
river -- separating Zimbabwe and South Africa -- alongside the video footage and 
photographic images portraying the migrant’s lives around its waters functioned as a 
symbol of this condition of ‘in-betweenness.’ Similarly, crossing the river became a 
powerful ‘metaphor of passage and catharsis’9 for the group members. Thus, as 
curator of the exhibition, Nkosi decided that the river would be the core concept 
around which the show was to be organised. And as will become clear further on in 
this chapter, the qualities of liminality and in-betweenness are also defining aspects of 
                                                
6 Nkosi, Telephonic interview by Savage (23rd January, 2011), Windows Media Audio file. 
7 The Bag Factory, officially named the Fordsburg Artists’ Studios, is a collective art studio space in 
Johannesburg, South Africa, which also offers a residency programme for artists from the African 
continent and the world. Thenjiwe Nkosi is currently one of the studio artists at the Bag Factory. See, 
Bag Factory Artists Studios Website, <http://www.bagfactoryart.org.za/?cat=3> [accessed 17th January 
2011]. 
8 Nkosi, ‘Sheet B: Project Description and Motivation,’ unpublished manuscript (12th February, 2010), 
Microsoft Word file. 
9 Ibid. 
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the documentary Border Farm insofar as it combines fictionalized scenes with 
documenting footage and blurs the lines between filmmaker (and also artists and 
workshop facilitators) and subjects filmed.  
The dramatised documentary also entitled Border Farm was, along with the 
exhibition, another one of the outcomes of the workshops with the group of farm 
workers. The film makes use of conventional documentary aesthetics and methods. 
For instance, it employs extreme close-up shots to present the interviews and personal 
testimonies of some of the group members who speak about their experience of 
crossing the border. It also adopts the so-called ‘voice of God’10 commentary in order 
to explain the process of the workshops and of the filmmaking itself. The off-screen 
voice used here and throughout the film belongs to one of the group’s members, 
Norman Masawi. While the ‘talking heads’ of the migrants function as record of their 
experiences, the explanatory ‘voice of God’ adds to the persuasive or promotional 
modality of this documentary, which, as I said in chapter three following Renov, is 
the intrinsic function of all documentaries.11 Thus, Border Farm provides viewers 
with a sense of evidence of the real conditions of these migrants. But it also guides 
spectators through the sequence of images and suggests what these mean with the 
specific purpose of stressing the collaborative nature of the project, and the active 
involvement of the farmers.  
However, at the same time, the film draws on techniques and narrative styles 
that have usually been attributed to fictional cinema. For example, there are several 
scenes where the migrants re-enact crossing the river and the border fence 
clandestinely, mimicking the way in which they had in fact crossed. There are also 
various scripted sequences that recreate and show the abuses to which border crossers 
are subjected by smugglers and the precarious work conditions they need to endure. 
These fictionalized scenes help construct the dramatic narrative of Border Farm and 
therefore they also constitute the expressive modality of this documentary or, to use 
Renov’s terms,12 these fictional and dramatic elements are part of the creative and 
subjective aspects of the film. 
                                                
10 As I discussed in Chapter 3, the ‘voice of God’ commentary is that where the speaker is heard but 
not seen, it has been usually employed in documentaries that aim to be more openly rhetorical or 
argumentative. See Nichols, Introduction to Documentary, pp.105-109.   
11 See Renov, ‘Toward a Poetics of Documentary.’ 
12 Ibid. 
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The way in which Border Farm intertwines elements of non-fiction 
filmmaking with those more typical of fictional cinema gives the film a rich texture 
and many layers that can lend themselves to myriad readings, depending on which 
elements and/or functions one chooses to focus on. To what extent can we read 
Border Farm as a space where certain political and ethical relationships between 
individuals are formed independently of the mediation of national-state? To what 
extent is it possible to claim that the subjects filmed in this documentary actively take 
part in these political and ethical relations? The rest of this chapter will explore these 
questions by looking at how Azoulay’s triadic model of photography can be 
extrapolated to documentary film, and in particular to Border Farm. Equally, this 
chapter will discuss in which sense and to what degree the political and ethical 
relationships that can emerge through this documentary have the potential to subvert 
social, cultural and political hierarchies. Finally, the chapter will also think through 
how these relationships can be said to be relationships of hospitality in a Derridian 
sense as well as how they allow for the emergence of an alternative conceptualization 
of citizenship, a notion of citizenship that is not a status a person has but a practice 
through which individuals relate such that their political duty is toward one another 
instead of toward the governing power. 
III. The Triadic Model in Border Farm: The Relationship Between The 
Filmmaker and the Filmed Subjects 
In the last chapter I argued that Azoulay’s triadic model of photography can be 
extrapolated to documentary provided some adjustments are made to this theoretical 
approach so that the differences between the medium of photography and that of 
cinema are taken into account in the explanation of the potential relationships 
emerging between filmmaker, filmed subjects and viewers. In this section I will 
explore how this three-party relationship emerges in the particular case of the 
documentary Border Farm. 
Azoulay proposes that photographs of people who either have suffered the 
violation of their rights or who have been deprived of their rights altogether create a 
space of political relations between the photographer, the photographed subjects and 
the viewer. These relationships are not directly governed by the nation-state, and so 
the political space they constitute is deterritorialised for it functions beyond the 
framework of geo-political borders. Azoulay’s argument is that photographs depicting 
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populations on the ‘verge of catastrophe’13 have the potential to make claims on 
viewers so that the situation of the photographed subjects becomes visible, and 
thereby gets considered intolerable and in urgent need of reparation. According to her, 
it is through their gaze that spectators of photographs of populations on the verge of 
catastrophe become addressees of the claims made by the photographed subjects, and 
hence acquire a duty both to resist injury inflicted on others (i.e. the photographed 
subjects) and to demand the restoration of the latter’s impaired citizenship. In this 
sense, photography for Azoulay has the potential to restore citizenship where it has 
been damaged. What is more, the photograph in this way stops being regarded as a 
product owned by the photographer, who has exclusive access to its meaning.  
Instead, the sense of the photograph is always open and it is collectively constructed 
with each and every different encounter between the photographer, the portrayed 
subjects and the spectators. Photography for Azoulay is therefore a social practice 
always evolving and remaining open-ended.  
According to Azoulay, the way in which the photographed subjects become 
equal partakers within the citizenry of photography is, first, through letting 
themselves be seen by the photographer and the (potential or actual) spectator, and 
second, by directing emergency claims to the latter. These portrayed subjects are 
active citizens just as much as the photographer and the viewers are, and it is the civil 
contract that binds all three parties to one another in the rehabilitation of citizenship. 
The partnership and solidarity these parties have to each other is not motivated by 
compassion, empathy, shame or pity, but by the contract. In Azoulay’s words: 
I employ the term “contract” in order to shed terms such as “empathy,” “shame,” “pity,” or 
“compassion” as organizers of the spectator’s gaze in photographs. Within this political 
space, the point of departure for the mutual relations between the various “users” of 
photography cannot be empathy or mercy. It must be a covenant for the rehabilitation of 
their citizenship in the political sphere within which we, spectators and photographed 
persons, are all ruled. When the photographed persons address the spectator, claiming their 
citizenship in […] the “citizenry of photography,” they cease to appear as stateless or as 
enemies – they cease to appear how the sovereign regime strives to construct them.14 
How is it then that these political relationships of photographs can be mirrored in 
documentary films about border-crossings and migration? More specifically, how can 
these political and ethical relationships not sanctioned by the nation-state emerge in 
                                                
13 Azoulay, The Civil Contract, p.291. 
14 Azoulay, “Ariella Azoulay on her Book The Civil Contract of Photography,” p.2.  
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Border Farm? In which sense is Nkosi, as the filmmaker, not the owner of the 
documentary and who has exclusive access to the meaning of the film? To what 
extent are the migrant farmers active partakers in Border Farm?  
The first, and perhaps most striking, set of relations to be noted in Border 
Farm is that between Nkosi and the members of the Dulibadzimu Theatre Group. The 
very purpose of the South African filmmaker’s art project establishes, from the outset, 
both an ethical and political commitment of the filmmaker to each of the members of 
the drama group. The fact that Nkosi set herself to organize art workshops through 
which migrant farm workers could learn some skills that would allow them to express 
their experiences as border crossers and thereby also gain a certain sense of 
community, means that the filmmaker adopts certain (political and ethical) 
commitment to the farm workers. This already raises the issue of what kind of 
intervention Nkosi produced with her project. It also raises the question of whether 
the relationships that were created with Nkosi’s project are not straightforwardly 
hierarchical insofar as it was ultimately the filmmaker who determined that a 
particular group of people needed to document their experiences and acquire some 
skills. Equally, the idea that these farm workers were lacking a sense of community 
suggests that it was Nkosi’s own understanding of ‘community’ that was being 
promoted with her project. However, could it have been otherwise? Would these 
migrant workers have had the chance to film their testimonies, learn how to use video 
and photo cameras and get to know better other farm workers without the intervention 
of Nkosi and the other facilitators? I will delve into these questions later on, but I will 
first consider the manner in which Border Farm was made and also the footage and 
dialogues, as well as the montage and its stylistic features. For it is through its formal 
qualities that this documentary makes evident the relations created between Nkosi, the 
migrants of the drama group, and also the potential or actual spectators. 
Like any documentary in its most basic modality -- that of being a record,15 
Border Farm documents, preserves and reveals real events. Thus the film includes 
interviews and personal testimony footage throughout in order for the filmed subjects 
(the members of the drama group) to give accounts of their own experiences as 
border-crossers and low-wage farm workers in the Limpopo province. The film opens 
with a hand-held camera shot of hand-written sheets of paper and zooms in to a pair 
                                                
15 See Renov, ‘Toward a Poetics,’ pp.25-28. 
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of hands moving these sheets. Simultaneously, a diegetic yet off-screen voice explains 
that these papers contain the script the Dulibadzimu group wrote collectively for the 
film. A cut is then followed by an extreme close-up shot of a Zimbabwean farm 
worker explaining that he migrated to South Africa in the hope of finding a job and 
improving his living conditions. He continues, adding that it had not been his purpose 
to cross the border and live away from his family, but that the economic situation in 
Zimbabwe had forced him to risk crossing the Limpopo River as an undocumented 
migrant.  Similar testimonies of the farm workers telling their own migration stories 
are skilfully interwoven with hand-held camera footage shot both during a working 
day at the crop fields, and also during the course of the art workshops as well as the 
rehearsals of the scripted scenes in the compound and the river bank. Thus we see 
alternating images of the migrants selecting fruits, of them singing and clapping at 
one of the workshop sessions, and of them re-enacting how they crossed the border. 
In this sense, Border Farm not only documents the migrants’ experiences and 
everyday lives in the fruit farm, but it also offers a record of the process of the art 
project itself.  Thus, for instance, immediately after a shot in which a woman explains 
that she decided to join the drama group and the workshops in order to learn more 
about her life and other people’s lives, a shot frames the members of the group when 
they are giving instructions to one another about how they are supposed to act in front 
of the camera when they re-enact crossing the border fence. Throughout the film, 
almost all the sequences that present the rehearsals and the workshops are 
accompanied by voice-over commentaries of one of the participants that serve to 
explain to viewers how the project -- and the film -- evolved and the motivations that 
guided the group during the process. Thus, for instance, we hear: ‘we wanted to 
capture our stories on film; we wanted to go back to the places we crossed and show 
the world what we did.’ 16  It is important to note here that this voice-of-God 
commentary was always made by the participants in the group, and never by Nkosi or 
another one of the workshop facilitators. The voice-of-God is usually thought of as 
the embedded yet strong presence of either the filmmaker or the enunciator, which as 
Laura Rascaroli explains, does not always coincide with the subjective expression of 
the filmmaker and instead it ‘often represents a broad, institutional authority.’17 
                                                
16 Nkosi, Border Farm (South Africa: Thenjiwe Nkosi with the Dulibadzimu Theatre Group, 2010). 
17 Rascaroli, The Personal Camera. Subjective Cinema and the Essay Film (London and New York: 
Wallflower Press, 2009), p.13. 
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Nonetheless, the fact that it is the migrants’ voice that is used seems to suggest that 
Nkosi is at least willing to share her representational powers and hierarchy as 
filmmaker. I will discuss this in more detail below.  
Border Farm can be deemed a dramatized documentary -- and in fact this is 
how Nkosi herself describes it -- because it mixes techniques from non-fictional 
filmmaking with scripted scenes and re-enactments. As mentioned before, it is this 
collage of techniques that gives the film its particular expressive modality and thus 
adds to its other functions as a record and a promotional or persuasive documentary. 
There is a sequence, for example, in which the drama group re-enacts a scene where 
they cross the Limpopo River led by a smuggler who, once they reach the other side, 
asks the migrants for more money and deprives them of the very last few possessions 
they have. Later on in the film, we see yet another participant -- a Zimbabwean 
widow -- who narrates on screen how hard it had been for her to find a job once she 
crossed the border, and also the blackmail from potential employers she had to 
endure. This testimony is then illustrated by a sequence where a young participant 
impersonates a migrant in a scene where she goes around the compound asking for a 
job and the only offer she gets is as an underpaid childminder.  
In addition to these staged scenes, Border Farm also includes extra-diegetic 
music, a feature supposedly more commonly used in fictional cinema than in 
traditional documentaries, especially those following a ‘purely’ observational form 
like the documentaries of the direct cinema movement.18 This off-screen and non-
diegetic instrumental music accompanies some of the scenes shot while the members 
of the group were in fact working in the fields picking fruit or preparing it for its 
transportation. This is yet another element that enriches the narrative and adds to the 
expressive function of the film. And hence -- as Renov would say -- this shows the 
subjective and/or creative contribution of Nkosi as filmmaker. By contrast, there are 
other scenes that have diegetic music. The farm workers chose a traditional 
Zimbabwean song about migration that they performed live with some clapping and 
drumming during the workshops. Nkosi explains that the group were all happy to sing 
and experiment with it, and that the lyrics of this song say: ‘Those hills, those far off 
hills, they make me think of Zimbabwe.’19 As I explained in Chapter 3, music and 
sound effects are one of the elements that crucially distinguish the medium of film 
                                                
18 See Nichols, Introduction to Documentary. 
19 Nkosi, Interview via email by Pantoja-Peschard, p.1. 
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from that of photography. For this reason, an attempt to extrapolate Azoulay’s triadic 
model of photography to the documentary has to include a consideration as to how 
sound might bear consequences on the political relationships that could potentially 
emerge through this film form. In the case of Border Farm, the choice of the 
traditional song and its performance on screen is arguably a sign of the active 
participation of the migrants in the film, and hence of the way in which they related to 
the filmmaker as collaborators, but also to the potential viewers insofar as the group 
wanted to be filmed performing a song that is presumably significant for them. In 
chapter six, by means of another case study, I will further examine the potential 
effects that sound can have on spectators in terms of affect and in terms of the way 
they engage with documentaries.    
The fact that the film is narrated entirely by one of the participants (and never 
by the filmmaker) and that the scripted scenes were all written collectively by the 
drama group seems to confirm a sort of political and ethical commitment from Nkosi 
to the group members. At the same time, this fact also gives evidence of the reciprocal 
relationship that the farm workers have with Nkosi. Border Farm in this sense could 
constitute a space for horizontal and non-hierarchical ethical and political 
relationships between the filmed subjects (i.e. the participants) and the filmmaker. 
Indeed, the film allows for the emergence of a type of mutual hospitality. While the 
group members welcome the filmmaker into their lives by letting her film their 
everyday errands on the farm and their personal migration experiences; the 
filmmaker, in turn, welcomes them into her art project and the film, and thereby 
acquires a commitment to disseminate the voice and claims of these migrant farm 
workers. The collective quality that this documentary has suggests at least certain 
willingness of the filmmaker to let go her position of power or, as Rancière would 
say, a willingness to ‘dis-identify’ with her role as artist and person with 
representational powers. Equally, since the migrants partake in the production of their 
own representation, they seem to counter their role as the passive represented 
subjects. This blurring of roles seems to suggest the possibility of a new ‘distribution 
of the sensible,’20 a re-ordering of the functions and positions established by the social 
arrangement.    
                                                
20 Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics. The Distribution of the Sensible, p.12 
 161 
It nonetheless could be argued here that because the editing and hence the final 
cut of the film was done entirely by Nkosi (with the help of a film editor), then 
Border Farm is not a truly collective product between her and the farm workers. And 
in this sense, what could seem like the formation of a space for horizontal ethical and 
political relations among equals beyond the framework of the nation-state is simply 
another vertical power relation of filmmaker and filmed subjects. The argument 
would be that if Nkosi is the one who ultimately decided how the shots would be 
linked to one another and what the film would look like in the end, then the filmmaker 
is in a position of superiority over the drama group members since she still has control 
over the representational powers that the migrants do not have. 
Trinh has been particularly critical of projects and documentaries that like 
Border Farm seek to either ‘give voice’ to those who have no chance to express 
themselves or to ‘make visible’ their deprived living conditions. Trinh claims that 
these aims are problematic because the mere idea of ‘giving voice’ to someone or that 
of ‘making visible’ what is not visible, already entail a distinction between those who 
can give voice to others and those who do not have a voice and need to be given one. 
‘Giving voice’ and ‘making visible’ in this sense necessarily involve power relations. 
What is more, the filmmaker is always implicated in the film, and therefore her voice 
can never be erased. As Trinh puts it: 
The notion of giving voice is so charged because you have to be in such a position that you 
can “give voice” to other people. And also the illusion that you “give voice,” whereas the 
film is very much the voice of the filmmaker -- the term “voice” meaning here the place 
from which meaning is produced, through both coherence and discontinuity. No matter how 
plural and diverse the voices featured, one always has to point back to the apparatus and the 
site from which these voices are brought out and constructed, and so the notion of giving 
voice remains extremely paternalistic.21    
According to Trinh those documentaries that attempt to ‘give a voice’ to certain 
people or ‘make visible’ their suffering not only implicate power relations, but also by 
having these aims they are films that are unaware of their own ideological 
presuppositions and the hierarchical powers that shape and support them. If a 
documentary is to remain open to multiple meanings, to avoid having a single source 
of authority and hence to be critical of political and social hierarchies, then it must be 
able to self-direct questions about its own form of representation and the ideology 
underpinning it.     
                                                
21 Trinh, ‘“Why a Fish Pond?” Fiction at the Heart of Documentation,’ p.169. 
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There is undoubtedly a relationship of power between Nkosi and the 
participants in the Border Farm project, and this needs to be acknowledged if we are 
to understand to what extent there is also a bind between filmmaker and filmed 
subjects that could erode or at least interrupt their initial unequal relationship. Here 
some things could be said in response to the objection that Border Farm maintains 
rather than disrupts the power relations between the documentarist and the portrayed 
migrants. First, while it is true that Nkosi is better off than any of the group members 
and that she had the technical skills and knowledge to make a film and the economic 
resources to run the workshops, it needs to be acknowledged that she would not have 
been able to make Border Farm or even implement the workshops without the active 
participation and collaboration of the drama group. Indeed, all the members agreed to 
take part in the workshops and, more importantly, they gave their consent to be filmed 
while they were working in the fields, rehearsing a scene or telling their personal 
stories. As one of the farm workers puts it on screen: ‘I am telling this story, so that 
people know that we are suffering in this world.’22 Could the hierarchical relation 
between Nkosi and the migrants have been otherwise? Could the group members ever 
find a way to represent themselves and have their artwork exhibited without any 
external help? Are not the multiple hierarchical relations here at work precisely what 
authenticate the project as a collective production?  It is my belief that despite the fact 
that Nkosi’s voice is ever present and her representational power could not be eroded, 
this power need not be entirely negative. Insofar as the hierarchical differences are 
acknowledged openly, the role of Nkosi can be likened to that of an enabler of sorts 
that facilitates the filmed subjects with a way of representing themselves, rather than 
simply use or exploit the migrants for the purposes of her art project. The important 
thing here is that Nkosi recognises her own status as filmmaker, and that she made 
every effort to make the aim and process of her project overt both to the migrants and 
within the film. This acknowledgment indicates that she was aware of the questions 
that a project like Border Farm could bring up.  In Nkosi’s words:  
Every documentary is skewed to some extent by the perspectives of its makers. But what 
makes Border Farm interesting to me is that the ‘making’ and ‘perspective’ of the film was 
owned jointly by me (the ‘filmmaker’/editor) and the group (who were the ‘writers’). It was 
                                                
22 Nkosi, Border Farm.  
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important to me that I was implicated in the film, and that the process that we went through 
in making the film was portrayed/made ‘transparent.’23 
A second thing to note in this respect, is that the filmmaker also appears in the film in 
the course of the workshops and at the end of the film in the credits sequence when 
each of the participants and the facilitators introduce themselves and say where they 
come from. The closing credits sequence crucially allows for everyone in the film to 
be accredited as equal partakers both in the film and in the art project as a whole. 
Here Nkosi allowed the camera to be directly pointed at her up-close, thus she appears 
as yet another talking head on the film. Without a doubt there are many examples of 
documentarists that openly make their presence on screen. For instance, filmmaker 
Michael Moore in Bowling for Columbine (2002)24 is followed by the camera while 
he travels in the United States interviewing several people with the aim of 
determining the reasons why the massacre at the Columbine High School might have 
happened. British filmmaker Nick Broomfield has used a very similar strategy, 
appearing on screen in many of his documentaries and trying to make transparent the 
process of making these films, most recently in Sarah Palin: You Betcha! (2011).25 
However, Nkosi’s appearance (and that of the other workshop facilitators) in Border 
Farm as another participant, and not as a filmmaker, attests to the way in which she 
really tried to give due credit to the migrants and to present the project as a 
collaboration rather than as a product of her exclusive ownership.  
Thirdly, as the narrator of the film asserts, all decisions concerning the 
workshops, the script and the film were taken collectively, so that the roles that each 
of the participants and the facilitators took were elected and agreed on in advance. 
The name of the drama group, Dulibadzimu -- which means sacred place or place of 
the ancestors in Shona language -- was equally proposed and chosen by the group 
members. There were also frequent discussions about how each of the members felt in 
relation to the project and what their expectations were. Nkosi explains that it was 
very important for her to make sure everyone was aware of the project’s purposes 
from the beginning and that no one held unrealistic prospects about it, so that all the 
decisions taken by the group were well informed. In this sense, Border Farm is more 
                                                
23 Nkosi, Interview via email by Pantoja-Peschard, p.1.  
24 Moore, Bowling for Columbine (USA, Canada and Germany: Iconolatry Productions Inc., Alliance 
Atlantis Communications, Dog Eat Dog Films, and Vif Babelsberger Filmproduktion GmbH & Co. 
Zweite KG, 2002). 
25 Broomfield, Sarah Palin: You Betcha! (USA: Gravity Films and Lafayette Films, 2011). 
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the product of a communal effort than something for which a single individual can 
take exclusive credit. Thus, in an interview, the filmmaker recalls that when Meza 
(the main scriptwriter) first introduced the project to the farm workers he said that it 
would be ‘our’ project, by which he meant the project of the people in the farm, and 
that Nkosi would only be the facilitator. But then, she continues, ‘I think “our” 
became “all of our” as well. Ray [the photography facilitator] and I definitely became 
part of the group and the other facilitators too.’26 This sense of community and 
cooperation that allegedly the participants, the workshop leaders and the filmmaker 
were able to build suggests that the film disrupts notions of authorship as it prevents 
the filmmaker from being the single authority and stable source of meaning. In other 
words, the collective character of Border Farm does seem to reverse hierarchies and 
create a space of equal and horizontal relations between the migrants, the facilitators 
and Nkosi. 
Lastly, Nkosi has acknowledged the fact that she made an intervention, that 
her presence in the farm and the project had an impact, at least, in the lives of the 
migrant farm workers who were involved in it. She believes that this impact has been 
positive and that she managed to build a trusting strong relationship with the group. 
She aimed to be careful at every step of the project by being honest and realistic about 
the purposes of the project as a whole, and also by ensuring that privacy of the 
participants was respected so that only those personal testimonies that they were 
willing to share were documented. What is more, Nkosi and the other workshop 
facilitators planned and implemented an ‘exit’ strategy with the purpose of 
encouraging and ensuring that the theatre group continued working together self-
directed after the Border Farm project was finished. In a last exchange with Nkosi in 
late August 2011, she said that the Dulibadzimu group had remained active albeit 
with a significantly reduced number of committed members (only five out of the 
original twenty-three participants). The group had been working with local non-
governmental organisations and with Médecins sans frontièrs, ‘creating short drama 
pieces for HIV/AIDS peer education and awareness purposes.’27 They also had been 
writing new material and had made contact with the Made in Musina Arts Network, 
which is a networking project aiming to link the arts community in this town. 
                                                
26 Nkosi, Telephonic interview by Savage. 
27 Nkosi, Interview via email by Pantoja-Peschard, p.2. 
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Thus, Border Farm shows that the filmmaker and the facilitators adopted a 
relationship of partnership and solidarity towards the filmed subjects. In spite of their 
obvious position of power, Nkosi and her team were able to constitute a space of 
political and ethical bonds with the members of the drama group beyond the direct 
sanction of the nation-state. The documentarist and the facilitators seem committed to 
fostering the filmed subjects to become their own storytellers, and as Azoulay would 
say, to address claims to potential and actual spectators. Correspondingly, by agreeing 
to take part in the project, to be storytellers, to act and to be filmed, the portrayed 
subjects adopt an active role and are thereby able to disrupt the power relations and 
the distribution of roles and functions imposed by the social order. In other words, the 
migrant farm workers share a space and an experience with Nkosi, the facilitators and 
eventually with spectators in such a way that they can take part where they have no 
part. The migrants’ partaking thus makes possible a ‘re-configuration of the 
sensible.’28 And the space that these three partakers constitute can, therefore, be 
considered as a space of hospitality in the Derridian sense. 
A thing worth noticing at this point is that in extrapolating Azoulay’s triadic 
model of photography to the form of documentary film not only are movement, time 
and sound to be taken into account as central elements distinguishing the still image 
of photography from the moving image of cinema, but there is also the fact that film 
tends to involve many more parties than the three proposed in Azoulay’s theory. And 
even though Azoulay gives examples of how a civil contract of photography emerges 
where the photographer had assistance with the lighting and staging in the creation of 
the photograph, the three-party model focuses on the bonds created between the 
photographer, the photograph subjects and the spectators. A transposition of 
Azoulay’s model to documentary thus need to acknowledge that the medium of film 
almost always involves more than three parties since directors more often than not 
draw on the support of a film crew in the process of making a film. Border Farm 
offers a good example of this since Nkosi worked with the workshop facilitators, a 
sound designer, a director of photography, and two editors in order to put the film 
together into its final cut. 
Once the differences between the medium of photography and the medium of 
cinema have been considered, then -- as will become clearer through the next two 
                                                
28 Rancière, ‘The Paradoxes,’ p.141.  
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case studies -- it is possible to use Azoulay’s insight on the political relationships of 
photography and transpose it to the medium of documentary film. My argument will 
be that documentaries about migration and border-crossing experiences have the 
potential to create political and ethical bonds that are not under the direct regulation 
of the nation-state, and therefore these films can constitute spaces or vessels of 
hospitality. I have analysed thus far the bonds made between the filmmaker and the 
filmed subjects by using Border Farm. However, if we are going to explain how 
spectators take active part in the space of political and ethical relationships of 
documentary films, then we need to examine how spectators relate to filmmakers, 
how they become engaged with a film, and how they are addressed by the filmed 
subjects. The next part of this chapter will explore these questions.  
IV. The Triadic Model in Border Farm: The Relationship Between The 
Filmmaker and the Spectators 
One of the defining features of Border Farm is that it has a form that crucially 
challenges the long assumed opposition between documentary and fictional cinemas, 
between reality and artifice. Nkosi’s film shows that these are false dichotomies, and 
that the documentary and the fictional forms can enhance rather than simply exclude 
each other. Thus, attending to the form and the stylistic qualities of documentary 
opens up the door to discuss this film format beyond the questions of whether and to 
what extent documentary representations are accurate, whether they correspond to 
reality or not.  So far, I have been trying to make the point that Azoulay’s theory of 
photography can be transposed to the field of documentary cinema precisely as a way 
to think documentary beyond the question of representation, and instead to shift the 
focus to the political and ethical relationships that can arise through this form of 
cinema without the direct sanction of the nation-state. In transposing Azoulay’s 
insight to the domain of the documentary, I have drawn in previous chapters on the 
work of both Steyerl and Trinh to explain how viewers get actively engaged in the 
determination of the documentary’s meaning, and thereby form political and ethical 
relationships with the filmmaker and the subjects filmed. Here I will return to 
Steyerl’s and Trinh’s work to examine the bond that can emerge between the 
documentarist and the spectators. 
In Chapters 2 and 3 I explained that the theoretical approach to photography 
that Azoulay poses constitutes an alternative to the canonical views that either focus 
on the aesthetic value of a photograph and see the latter as a completed product 
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created by an artist, or on the role of spectators as merely passive subjects satisfying 
voyeuristic desires when presented with photographs of horror. Azoulay proposes 
understanding photography from the perspective of the ‘paradigm of visual culture’ 
rather than the ‘paradigm of art,’29 which means seeing photographs not exclusively 
in terms of what is represented by the image and the intentions of the photographer. 
The visual culture paradigm approach relinquishes the scholarly gaze that sees the 
photographic image as having a fixed content that is the only source of utterance. 
Instead, the visual culture paradigm that Azoulay defends adopts a ‘practical gaze’ 
that approaches the photograph considering all the information regarding the 
circumstances (the historical and political conditions) under which the image was 
produced as well as the subjects portrayed in it. As opposed to a theory of 
photography like that of Roland Barthes, who thinks the photographic image is an 
index signalling ‘that-has-been’30 and hence restricted to that which it represents, 
Azoulay’s thesis of the practical gaze eschews seeing the photographic image as a 
finished work of art for which there is a single and final arbitrator. Rather this 
practical gaze sees the image as continuously open and constantly generating new 
utterances and new meanings with every new encounter between photographer, 
photographed subjects and spectators. This approach allows Azoulay to present a 
theory of photography that grants an active role to both the portrayed subjects and the 
viewers, and hence a theory of the potential social and political relationships of 
photography. While Barthes speaks about the photograph as portraying future death 
as certainty, Azoulay’s approach also opens up through the possibility of the multiple 
utterances of photographs the potential of the latter to prevent and repair catastrophes. 
How does the space of political relationships arise in the particular case of Nkosi’s 
Border Farm? How can potential and actual spectators become active participants in 
articulating the sense of the film?      
Here it is worth recalling some of the ideas of Steyerl pertaining to the need to 
examine documentaries from a perspective beyond that of representation, for this 
perspective tends to restrict its analysis of representational media like film to a 
discussion of the power relations between those who represent and those represented. 
An exclusive focus on representation thus reduces its account of documentary film as 
a practice of artifice and construction of truths made and regulated by the governing 
                                                
29 Azoulay, Civil Imagination, p.55. 
30 Barthes, Camera Lucida, p.96. 
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power, which seeks to manage populations by imposing such constructed truths.  
Steyerl further explains that representation limits the scope of documentary theory 
because it does not allow space to think about documentary practices in terms of what 
it is that these practices express in relation to the process of film production, the social 
relations implied by it and the institutional powers underlying such production. 
Considering documentary films not merely as mimetic representations of events or 
situations in the actual world but also as expressions of social reality, that is, as 
expressions of their entire mode of organization (including their conditions of 
production, of representation, their funding and modes of distribution), opens up the 
possibility of discussing other (non-representational) aspects of this form of 
filmmaking. Thus, as shown in last section of this chapter, by attending to the process 
of production of Border Farm and the bonds that seem to be created between the 
filmmaker and the migrants (rather than to whether this film accurately represents the 
latter or not), it becomes possible to consider questions concerning the emancipatory 
and political potential of documentary. This is what Steyerl means by an approach to 
documentary from the perspective of expression as opposed to an approach in terms 
of representation.31  
I believe it is possible to trace a parallel between, on the one hand, Azoulay’s 
idea of adopting the visual culture paradigm to examine photography and the social 
bonds the latter can produce, and on the other hand, Steyerl’s views on expression as 
a manner to approach documentary film outside the boundary of representation. Both 
Steyerl and Azoulay propose to move beyond the limiting question of whether a 
documentary or a photograph represent accurately what they portray, or whether such 
representations are mere constructions at the service of the structures maintaining the 
social order. But without denying the mediating gaze, artifice and/or the prejudice 
necessarily involved in documentary and photography representations, Steyerl’s and 
Azoulay’s proposals open up the scope of perspectives and issues that can be raised 
through the two visual media. They both suggest attending to the circumstances of 
production of the documentary or the photograph, and to the people who are 
portrayed (filmed or photographed) in these. Most importantly, Steyerl and Azoulay 
coincide in that the artist (filmmaker or photographer) does not have exclusive access 
to the meaning of the work of art, but rather this meaning is articulated collectively 
                                                
31 Steyerl, ‘Making Films Politically: Interview with Hito Steyerl.’ Interview by Zanny Begg, in Zanny 
Begg Website, <http://www.zannybegg.com/hito.htm> [accessed 2nd March 2012]. 
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through the encounter of the represented subjects, the spectators and the filmmaker or 
photographer. In this way, Azoulay and Steyerl offer a way to think of photography 
and documentary as social practices, practices that give rise to social and political 
relationships not mediated by the nation-state. 
Following Steyerl and Trinh, I explained in Chapter 3 that the way in which 
the spectators become actively engaged in the construction of the meaning of the film 
is mainly through the form and stylistic strategies rather than exclusively through its 
content. Indeed, the documentarist motivates viewers to think about what the moving 
images might mean by playing with montage, sound effects, camera angles and other 
techniques, and also by using self-reflexivity to make evident and call into question 
the constructed quality of the documentary. The documentarist employs the form and 
style of the film to destabilize the meaning of the latter and hence preclude the 
existence of a single and final arbitrator of the film. In this sense, the filmmaker acts 
as a host of sorts, for she incites and invites (without imposing on) spectators to 
actively partake in determining the sense of the moving images even when she cannot 
anticipate nor control the spectators’ engagement. A space of hospitality is thus 
created, where spectators are given the choice to engage with the film in such a way 
that they can be collaborators with the filmmaker, equal partners in the articulation of 
the meaning of the documentary. Through this partnership, the social and political 
roles distinguishing spectators from the filmmaker are blurred, and the hierarchies of 
the social arrangement are thereby disrupted. As Rancière might put it, the possibility 
of eroding the socially assigned roles allows for the emergence of new alternatives to 
what can be experienced, seen and said; and hence a new distribution of the sensible. 
Without a doubt, the open form and self-reflexive style of a documentary does not 
guarantee the active engagement of the spectators. However, the potentiality for this 
engagement is established. The next two chapters will examine in greater detail the 
degree and forms of involvement of the spectator. My claim will be that spectators 
can become active partakers in the determination of the film’s meaning to different 
extents and not only in an intellectual and reflexive manner but also affectively, at the 
sensorial level.    
Returning to Nkosi’s Border Farm, the way in which the spectator becomes 
actively engaged, participating as an equal with the filmmaker is by means of the 
editing and other stylistic features of the film. The manner in which the documentary 
presents the migrant farm workers’ personal testimonies interwoven with the re-
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enacted scenes and the footage of the workshops, creates a rich and multi-layered 
narrative that flows between fiction and non-fiction. By having the farm workers 
speak about their border-crossings experiences directly to the camera; by using the 
migrants’ own voices to narrate the process of the workshops and of the documentary-
making itself; and finally by getting them to write and perform a script about their 
experiences as migrants and farm workers, Nkosi draws attention to the fictional and 
constructed quality of non-fictional narratives. In other words, the documentarist 
presents the staged and the real intermingled not in an attempt to erode the line 
between fact and fiction so that the artifice of re-enactments cannot be seen, but in a 
bid to invite a contemplation on the fictions caught in what we call the real. In 
addition to this, the close collaboration of the farm workers and Nkosi brings out the 
question of what the role of a documentary filmmaker really is. Is it ever possible for 
a documentarist to withdraw entirely from her position of the person with 
representational powers? Is Nkosi really willing to share her role as storyteller with 
the filmed subjects when a sub-title granting her credit as director is first to appear in 
the opening sequence? Furthermore, am I not reiterating Nkosi’s position of power by 
drawing on interviews with her to analyse Border Farm? Is not the fact that I was able 
to track Nkosi down to discuss Border Farm a confirmation that her authority extends 
beyond the project, whereas the authority of those in the film only lasts during the 
film itself (whether considered in terms of the making or the viewing of it)?  
These questions are suggested to the spectator through the form and the way in 
which the film was produced. And this opens up a critically creative space in which 
the viewers can participate to consider these questions and to give meaning to the 
images, sounds and the way these are put together. Border Farm offers in this way a 
hospitable space where filmmaker and spectators can relate as equal and active 
partners. The exercise of hospitality that Nkosi carries out through this documentary 
necessarily inaugurates a relationship between the spectators and the filmed subjects 
since the film draws attention to its own internal organisation and therefore 
problematizes the representational privilege of the filmmaker supposedly has over the 
farm workers. At the same time, since Border Farm seems to refuse having a fixed 
and ready-determined meaning, since it switches back and forth from fiction to non-
fiction, then the articulation of its meaning calls for a collective collaboration between 
filmmaker, viewers and filmed subjects. This means that viewers acquire certain 
responsibility for what is seen in the documentary images and hence they form a 
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political bond with the represented subjects. In the next section I will discuss this 
relationship of viewers and portrayed subjects. 
V. The Triadic Model in Border Farm: The Relationship Between Spectators and 
Filmed Subjects 
I have shown that in Border Farm there is a potential political bond emerging 
between the filmed subjects and the documentarist and between the latter and the 
viewers. The sort of community that is constituted through this bond is one based on 
relationships of partnership, solidarity and equality. Thus this community can unsettle 
hierarchical structures imposed by the social order and it also escapes the direct 
sanction of the nation-state. In this section I will argue that when the viewers of 
Border Farm engage in the articulation of meaning of the film they also exercise what 
Derrida called the ‘duty of translation,’ which -- as I explained in chapter one -- is the 
duty that we have to translate the languages of law by looking constantly to legislate 
better laws for the reception of foreigners, trying to counter the violence that the latter 
suffer whenever they cross a border and arrive into a host country. 
In The Civil Contract Azoulay argues that photographs of subjects living on 
the ‘verge of catastrophe’ can only make the photographed subjects’ struggles 
evident, and thus become emergency claims to restore the impaired citizenship of 
these subjects, when the photographer ceases to be considered the owner of the 
photographs’ meanings. Instead, continues Azoulay, when those meanings are 
collectively constructed through the relationship that emerges between the 
photographer, the photographed subjects and the spectator; then photographs become 
effective claims to the urgency of repairing the injury, the damaged citizenship. For 
Azoulay, the spectator in particular has the duty to ‘watch’ photographs of subjects on 
the verge of catastrophe, rather than merely passively looking at them. In watching 
photographs, the spectator is actively involved in reconstructing the act of 
photography as if it was taking place in the present; that is, in reconstructing it as a 
visible phenomenon that the spectator is witnessing and that has a particular meaning. 
Watching photographs also implies a ‘watching out for,’ that is paying attention to the 
‘catastrophe’ that is about to happen. It is only when photographs are watched that 
they can become claims that demand action to repair injuries impinged on individuals 
with impaired citizenships. As Azoulay writes: 
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The duty to watch as spectators is at the same time the duty to resist injury to others who 
are governed and the duty to restore the civilian skill of spectatorship: to be an addressee of 
this injury, to produce its meaning as injury, and to continue to address it.32 
In a similar fashion, using Border Farm I will contend that documentaries about 
borders and border-crossings that depict the suffering and deprivation that migrants, 
refugees or stateless people face can only emerge and operate as emergency calls for 
the reparation of the injuries impinged on the filmed subjects when the viewers 
become actively involved in determining the meaning of the film and also in 
‘translating’ the images into claims that the film subjects address to both the 
photographer and the spectators.    
As I explained in Chapter 1, Derrida argues that the controversial problem of 
the undocumented persons and refugees constitutes an instantiation of the question of 
hospitality because it is a problem that crucially involves the forms in which we relate 
with the other, and that in this respect it is a problem that concerns the realm of ethics 
as much as that of politics. Derrida’s understanding of hospitality as an aporetic 
concept, allows him to affirm that there is a necessary and urgent bond of the sphere 
of politics and the sphere of ethics (the unconditional). For him, politics and ethics 
oppose one another but cannot be disentangled from each other in the sense that 
politics is unable to achieve absolute justice through laws and unable to avoid doing 
violence, since any legislation is always imperfect and falls short of justice, but it 
needs to try to commit less violence towards the other and be more just. This is a 
politics that recognizes its limitations and, Derrida would say, a politics that is 
constantly seeking the least bad laws. 
In discussing the concept of hospitality, Derrida also affirms that the first 
violence which foreigners must endure is that they have to ask to be hosted and assert 
their rights in a language that is not their own. This violence, he believes, cannot be 
avoided for any politics of hospitality and hence any (conditional) laws for the 
reception of foreigners exercise an action of filtering, selecting and discriminating, 
which is by nature violent. Nonetheless, precisely because it is impossible to suspend 
such violence, we must engage in a constant task of translation and transformation of 
the languages of international law. We have thus ‘a vast and formidable duty to 
translate’33 the laws that govern the welcoming of others.   
                                                
32 Azoulay, The Civil Contract, p.343. 
33 Derrida, ‘The Principle of Hospitality,’ p.68. 
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In which sense does the spectator of documentaries about border-crossings and 
migration exercise this Derridian duty of translation? I have argued that viewers are 
incited (without imposition) to become active partakers in articulating the meaning of 
the documentary when its form is open and its stylistic strategies preclude it from 
having a single and fixed sense. But when the viewer is presented with images that 
portray people that have crossed borders and that -- due to their statelessness and 
displacement -- are exposed to excruciating suffering and precarious living 
conditions, she is called to ‘translate’ the moving images and sounds in such a way 
that they acquire meaning as injuries that need to be repaired. Only then does the 
spectator actively take the role of an addressee of the claim. This is the responsibility 
that the viewer is invited (but never pressed) to take for the filmed subject: a 
commitment to acknowledge the hardships and injustices faced by undocumented and 
stateless migrants and to strive against the situation of the latter. Consequently, the 
spectator is thus committed to improving the (always conditional and hence always 
failing to be just) laws for the reception of foreigners. In this way, the viewer’s gaze 
cannot be considered here as a passive, merely voyeuristic, gaze ‘enjoying’ a 
‘spectacle of suffering.’ If the relationships that are created between the documentary 
filmmaker, the filmed subject and the viewer are understood in terms of a 
reciprocated political and ethical responsibility that compels these three parties to 
acknowledge the injuries impinged on the filmed subjects and to struggle for the 
restoration of such injuries, then the claim that the spectator’s gaze is a passive, 
desensitized gaze that disavows the images of suffering does not stand. Indeed, 
spectatorship in this sense entails an ethics, insofar as the viewer is involved in the 
process of negotiating, constructing and hence translating the meaning of the 
documentary images in terms of demands that call for resisting against and rectifying 
the injustices that the filmed subjects endure. 
Without a doubt, the question surfaces here regarding the sort of spectator that 
is being interpellated. Is it possible to make the assumption that the spectator will 
actually engage in this way with the documentary, adopt the civil gaze and form a 
relationship of responsibility and partnership towards the filmed subjects and the 
filmmaker? As I said before, the spectator is given the opportunity to become 
involved in making sense of the film, and it is her choice to do so or not, as well as to 
which degree she gets engaged. Indeed, I agree with Rancière that the spectator does 
not need to be enlightened or emancipated through the film for she already is. All she 
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needs is to be offered the space where she can decide whether and how she becomes 
involved with the images and the people portrayed through them. However, I believe 
that there is implicitly a particular kind of spectator that a documentary like Border 
Farm addresses. It is possible to assume that this is a spectator that arguably is 
already actively engaged and concerned with the world she shares with others and 
makes manifest her concern. Presumably, this the sort of spectator that has a 
particular interest either in the type of collaborative-community art project that 
Border Farm is or in the topic of migration or in documentary filmmaking in general. 
And if the spectator is invested in this way, then she is likely to become involved also 
in the articulation of the film’s meaning and in actively struggling against injustices 
that the filmed subjects endure. The assumption is possible given the circuit within 
which Nkosi’s film has been distributed and exhibited. The documentary was first 
screened in its final cut at the South London Gallery in January 2011, and Nkosi was 
at the time looking to have it exhibited through ‘community TV channels, 
universities, organisations for migration and other educational outlets.’34 This means 
that the viewers of Border Farm are prone to be students, academics, people who 
attend art galleries and/or those who work for other non-profit organisations. 
Someone might object at this point that if only certain educated or privileged 
individuals can become active spectators in the sense explained, then a triadic model 
of the political and ethical relationships of documentary films is elitist and only 
reinforces the social and cultural hierarchical disparities already existing in society. 
Nonetheless, as Trinh has very well argued with respect to her films, the idea that a 
film can be directed to the ‘general public’ is misleading and even irresponsible, 
because mainstream directors openly direct their films to particular audiences and 
target their marketing strategies to them. Therefore, it is not possible to assume that a 
film is directed to any spectator in the abstract. In Trinh’s words: 
I think it is very important to have my films circulate in educational networks, because the 
classroom is a workplace. And if it is a privileged workplace, it’s because changes in the 
production of knowledge can be effected, where film consumption can be challenged, and 
where different sensitivities and new forms of subjectivities and resistance are possible.35 
Thus, even though the spectators that are likely to become involved in making sense 
of the film are privileged to some extent, it is again a matter of their own choice rather 
                                                
34 Nkosi, Telephonic interview by Savage. 
35 Trinh, ‘Why a Fish Pond?,’ p.75. 
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than an imposition whether they actually enter in a relationship of responsibility and 
solidarity towards the filmed subjects. The filmed subjects, in turn, address claims to 
both the documentarist and the viewers when they actively allow themselves to be 
portrayed. Their ability to make claims on the filmmaker and spectators enables them 
to show their suffering and make clear that ‘they have not the rights that they have 
and have the rights that they have not.’36 Indeed, if through the collective construction 
of the documentary’s meaning, those excluded from the political order or included in 
it in a subordinate way (the filmed subjects) are able to some extent to speak for 
themselves, then -- as Rancière has argued -- their claims can become political 
criticisms, insofar as they manage to question the hierarchies of the socio-political 
order and thus have the potential to bring about a change in the distribution of the 
social arrangement.   
Thus understood, documentaries portraying the border-crossing experiences of 
migrants, refugees and stateless people can articulate political spaces beyond the 
boundaries of the nation-state. Border Farm provides a good example of this not only 
because the migrant farm workers speak directly to the camera (and hence to the 
viewers, potential or actual) about their struggles, but also because they worked 
closely with the filmmaker in the creative process of the documentary. By writing the 
film script, by helping out in the filming process, by re-enacting their border-crossing 
experiences and by narrating the scenes, the migrant farmers they are able to take a 
position of power in relation to the filmmaker as much as she is to them as the person 
holding the means and power of representation. These multiple hierarchies at work in 
this documentary cannot disappear altogether, but they seem to give authenticity and 
authority to the collective project insofar as they allow the creation of a community 
where everyone participates and the social order can be put into question (if not 
entirely eroded). It remains our responsibility as spectators of this film to not remain 
passive and to engage with the documentary in such a way that we construct its 
meaning as a claim the filmed subjects make both on us and the filmmaker. Border 
Farm can articulate a political space where all the parties involved are responsible for 
one another without the mediation of the national sovereign power. Accordingly, the 
scene where the main scriptwriter, Meza Weza, addresses the camera to explain that 
he wrote the script in the hope that his story would help others wishing to migrate 
                                                
36 Rancière, ‘Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man,’ The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 103, No. 2/3 
(Spring/Summer, 2004), pp.297-310 (p.302).  
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shows the extent to which he is calling for the spectators’ attention and claiming the 
rights he has been deprived of. Meza says: ‘[Border Farm] is the story of a million 
people; it is my story and it is your story.’37   
VI. Final Remarks 
Using Border Farm as a case study, in this chapter I have explored extrapolating 
Azoulay’s triadic model of photography to the form of documentary film. My 
argument is that documentaries concerning borders and border-crossing experiences 
of migrants, refugees and stateless people have the potential to articulate political 
relations beyond the framework of the nation-state. The relationship of reciprocal 
political and ethical responsibility between documentarist, filmed subjects and 
spectators that can emerge through such documentary films suggests an alternative 
way of exercising politics based on hospitality. This is a form of political obligation 
towards other individuals instead of towards a sovereign power, and it is a form of 
political obligation that is not constrained by geo-political borders. Within this 
political space that documentaries can constitute, all the parties involved can hold 
equal shares for they are all simultaneously guests and hosts. Thereby, they allow the 
possibility of an unconditional hospitality. It is in this sense that documentaries can 
become hospitable spaces or vessels of hospitality. The next chapters are devoted to 
further exploring the transposition of Azoulay’s theses on photography to 
documentaries about border-crossings and migration. In particular, I will discuss in 
more detail, by looking at other case studies, the roles of the spectators and the 
filmmaker within the triadic scheme.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Moments of Truth and the Engaged Spectator in Shout 
 
I. 
In the last chapter I used Nkosi’s film Border Farm to explore the possibility of extending 
Azoulay’s theory of photography to documentary films about migration and border-crossings. 
I also considered the possibility for the emergence of ethical and political relationships 
through these films, and the role that the filmed subjects play within those relationships. The 
aim of the present chapter is twofold. First, by using the documentary Shout (Lubbe Bakker 
and Gould, 2010) as a case study, I will argue that documentaries have the potential to be 
more than representations of reality and mere ‘constructions of truth’ at the service of power, 
surveillance and domination of people in a society. To this end, I will employ Steyerl’s thesis 
that documentaries can actually articulate ‘moments of truth’ that offer critical perspectives 
that call into question and destabilize the hierarchical structures that create and maintain the 
dominant forms of truth.1 Drawing on Steyerl’s and Azoulay’s ideas, I will claim that these 
films can not only disrupt the hierarchies of the social order, but also even constitute claims 
for rights that have been violated. In parallel to this purpose I will continue to discuss the 
question of whether documentary films about migration and border-crossing experiences can 
give rise to ethical and political relationships of equality and solidarity between the 
filmmaker, the spectator and the filmed subjects. In this respect, I will pay particular attention 
to the issue of how and to what extent spectators can become engaged with a documentary 
film by invoking Rancière’s work. 
It is worth noting, however, that I will not approach this last question as an empirical 
enquiry. Even though such an approach is possible and in fact often relevant for some 
discussions within certain areas of film studies (the areas of reception and/or audience 
studies), my interest in the topic of the involvement of the spectator is more philosophical or 
theoretical, rather than empirical. One can indeed ask how it is in fact that spectators become 
involved or engaged with a film, and the answer would very likely require questioning a 
significant number of viewers. However, this is not the approach I would like to pursue in 
                                                
1 Steyerl is inspired by Foucault’s idea that image production and representational practices are part of what the 
latter calls ‘governmentality,’ which is the exercise of political power through the collective operation of 
institutions (such as hospitals, schools, universities and psychiatric institutions) practices and agents that 
produce certain truths in order to manage populations and goods. See Foucault, ‘Governmentality,’ in Burchell, 
Gordon, and Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect. Studies in Governmentality. With Two Lectures by and an 
Interview with Michel Foucault (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp.87-104. 
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this chapter (or in this thesis at large). I am not concerned here with the question of the actual 
engagement of the spectator with the documentary film, for I believe this involvement of the 
viewer takes place in a variety of manners depending on the type of audience, what their 
cultural background, gender, age, nationality are, as well as what the time and circumstances 
of the screening and the watching of the film are. Hence, a discussion of all these aspects 
requires a specific focus on reception. By contrast, I am interested in the political, ethical and 
aesthetic implications of the role of the spectator of documentaries about borders; and it is 
through this philosophical-theoretical perspective that I will take issue with these questions. 
In order to do this, I will draw again on Rancière’s ideas about the relation between aesthetics 
and politics, and what he calls the ‘emancipated spectator.’2 
II. Historical and Political Background of Shout 
The documentary Shout was filmed in the Syrian territories known as the Golan Heights, 
which have been under Israeli occupation since 1967. In order to better analyse this 
documentary, it is necessary to provide some historical and political background relating to 
the place where it was made. This historical detour will allow me to discuss how exactly 
Shout can offer a critical stance against some forms of truth construction, as well as how this 
film can articulate claims for the rights of which the Golani population has been deprived 
during the 46 years of Israeli occupation. 
The territory of the Golan Heights sits in the southwestern corner of Syria, and it has 
borders with Lebanon to the north, Israel to the west and Jordan to the south. This territory 
has always been a matter of contest between Israel and Syria mainly due to its water 
resources. In 1967, after the Six-Day War, the Golan was occupied by Israeli military forces 
and remained under their administrative control until December 1981, when the Israeli 
Knesset approved the Golan Heights Law,3 a legislation that made effective the annexation of 
the territory to Israel.4 This unilateral action by the Israeli government was not recognised by 
the international community and this remains the case today. Furthermore, both the United 
States and the United Nations Security Council have condemned the action, with the latter 
issuing the Resolution 242 against the annexation.5      
                                                
2 Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator. 
3 The Knesset is the unicameral parliament of Israel. 
4 This legislation was passed by a majority of 63 votes against 21. See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Golan 
Heights Law. December 14, 1981,’ in Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Golan+Heights+Law.htm> 
[accessed 29th April 2011]. 
5 The UN Security Council Resolution 242 was issued in November 1967 after the Six-Day War. See UNSC, 
‘Resolution 242,’ in United Nations Security Council Resolutions-1967, 
<http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1967/scres67.htm> [accessed 29th April 2011]. 
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In an effort to make the annexation appear legitimate, the Israeli army attempted to 
distribute blue Israeli identity cards among the (Syrian) Golani population in 1981. But the 
soldiers were received with contempt and the Syrian residents utterly refused to accept and 
carry the ID cards since that would also mean accepting that they and their territory belonged 
to Israel. As a result, Israelis gave up their effort to make the occupied Golan and the people 
inhabiting there an official part of Israel. Thus, the Syrians ‘were somewhat victorious: while 
the Israeli attempt to impose citizenship failed and [Syrian] residents were classified as 
permanent residents, their land remains occupied.’6 After the annexation, the border with 
Syria was closed while the Israeli side of the border was opened up, again in an effort to 
make Golanis feel part of Israel. This meant that many of the households and families were 
split in two not only because of the imposition of a border that did not exist before, but also 
because many Golanis in resistance were taken away by Israel as political prisoners and later 
returned to Syria (in exchange for Israeli soldiers captured by Syrian forces). By the time 
these prisoners were returned, they found it impossible to go back to their homes in the 
Golan.    
The village of Majdal Shams -- where a large part of Shout was filmed -- is 
considered the most important and most populated Druze village in the occupied Golan.7 
Majdal Shams is only about an hour’s drive from Syria’s capital city, Damascus. The village 
is separated from Syria by a narrow strip of no-man’s land that marks the cease-fire line, 
which since 1967 has been under control and surveillance by UN peacekeeping forces. 
Arbitrarily torn from their relatives and placed under imposed movement restrictions, people 
in Majdal Shams first started communicating with family and friends on the Syrian side by 
shouting to each other from a nearby hill, since all other forms of contact and communication 
were forbidden. The so-called ‘Shouting Hill’ thus became a meeting point for many of the 
Druze on both sides of the line. To this day, it remains a tradition for families to ‘meet’ and 
‘talk’ at the Shouting Hill using loudspeakers, especially on Mother’s day. However, younger 
generations of Druze now prefer using mobile phones and the internet to communicate with 
                                                
6 Guarnieri, ‘Golan Residents Recall Their Tahrir,’ in Al Jazeera in English (25th February, 2011), 
<http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/02/201122093915567148.html> [accessed 18th December 
2013]. 
7 Druze is the religion most widely practiced by the population in the occupied Golan Heights. Political activists 
and Golanis who actively resist and criticize the 46-year-old Israeli occupation emphatically express the fact that 
Druze is a religion, and that practising it does not make them any less Arab. This is a crucial point they are eager 
to make in opposition to Israel’s attempts to convince the younger generations of Golanis that they are different 
from Syrian Arabs. See Ibid.  
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their relatives. Therefore, meeting and shouting at this hill has become a symbolic ritual of 
sorts rather than a practical way of communication.    
 Since the occupation, the only people allowed to cross the cease-fire line are the UN 
peacekeepers, some members of the clergy and, once per year, a very small, carefully 
selected group of students aged between 18 and 20 years. Under this agreement, Syria and 
Israel grant some students entrance into Syrian territory, but they are not allowed to return 
back into the occupied Golan until the summer holidays. Shot between the village of Majdal 
Shams in the Israeli-occupied territories of the Golan Heights, and Damascus, Shout follows 
the lives of two young Golani Druze, Ezat and Bayan, during the year they spend studying in 
the capital of Syria. The two main figures of the documentary are among the few Druze 
residents in the Golan that have had the chance to go to Syria. Shout offers a view of the 
experience of these young men in Damascus and a reflection about how being away from 
their close relatives and friends in Majdal Shams affects their lives in different ways. The two 
Dutch film directors, Lubbe Bakker and Gould, decided to call their documentary ‘Shout’ 
mainly in reference to the Shouting Hill, which symbolizes the families torn apart by the 
imposed border. But this title was also chosen because, while the filmmakers were 
conducting research in the Golan and Damascus previous to filming, they met Golani 
students eager to tell their stories. The documentary thus attempts to gather some of the 
voices of this younger generation of Golanis, who are undoubtedly still affected by the 
occupation, but who also have a different take on the conflict since they were born into an 
already occupied Golan. 
Keeping this historical framework in mind, in the next sections I will engage in a 
textual and stylistic analysis of this documentary. That is, I will analyse Shout’s narrative 
content but also the specific techniques employed in the construction and presentation of such 
narrative -- that is, the specific form of the film. I will do so with the aim of making the case 
for three interrelated theses. First, I will argue that the construction of truths that 
documentaries realise -- like those of any other representational practice -- can be more than 
just instruments at the service of the hegemonic power regulating populations, since they can 
also articulate a critical stance against the hierarchies of the social order, and can even 
function as claims for certain rights. In particular, I will contend that Shout presents a critique 
of the regime of national borders and of the Israeli occupation in the Golan, and also that this 
critique demands the viewer engage in the construction of the meaning of the images -- 
instead of just passively gazing at the latter, and that she engage in a way that these images 
can become claims for the restoration of those subjects whose rights have been violated. As I 
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did in the previous chapter devoted to discussing Border Farm, I will extrapolate Azoulay’s 
work on the political potential of photography to documentaries portraying migration and 
border-crossings in order to make the point that these films have the ability to invite 
spectators to actively take part in the articulation of their meaning, and that these 
documentaries can be constituted as urgent calls for the restoration of rights that have been 
disrespected or violated. 
Secondly, I will draw again on Azoulay’s triadic model of photography as well as on 
Rancière’s conceptualization of ‘politics’ and his idea of the ‘emancipated spectator’ in order 
to maintain that documentaries about borders have the capacity to give rise to relationships of 
ethical and political responsibility and solidarity between the filmed subjects, the filmmaker 
and the spectator. These relationships emerge beyond the direct mediation or sanction of the 
national sovereign, and the individuals involved thereby adopt a position of equality instead 
of preserving and reinforcing the place and function that they have been assigned in the social 
order. Therefore, I will conclude, such relationships have the potential to question and thus 
subvert political, social and cultural hierarchies.  
Thirdly, I will make the point that the viewer of these documentaries can be incited 
and invited to actively engage with the film in such a way that she becomes an active 
spectator that stands on a par with the filmmaker in the determination of the meaning of the 
documentary. In other words, the viewer of these films can be said to embody or exemplify 
the figure of the ‘emancipated spectator’ of which Rancière speaks.     
III. A Documentary Between Fact and Fiction 
Shout is a coming-of-age documentary that shows how two teenagers, Ezat and Bayan, 
prepare for their departure, bid farewell to their families and friends in Majdal Shams, cross 
the border into Syrian territory and experience life in Damascus without the chance to go 
back to their homes in the Golan Heights until their school year is over. From a very early 
age, the two best friends have dreamt of visiting what they and their families consider to be 
their homeland. Alongside a reduced number of Golani students aged 18 years old, Ezat and 
Bayan are granted the once-in-a-life-time chance to go to Damascus to pursue an 
undergraduate degree. 
Shout opens with a panoramic birds-eye-view shot of a village surrounded by 
mountains. Then a cut frames two young men sitting on the top of a water tank overlooking 
this landscape. The two are smoking whilst they admire the view. The frame shows their 
backs but not their faces. One of them shouts out loud and his voice resonates with an echo. 
The village, we will later on be informed, is Majdal Shams. This opening sequence 
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constitutes both a motif in the documentary and a metaphor. It is a motif since in this scene 
with the two young men looking down over a landscape is repeated also towards the end of 
the film, except that the shot is set in a different location: a hill overlooking the Syrian 
capital, Damascus. The mentioned sequence, but especially the scene where one of the youths 
shouts out loud with his voice is echoing throughout the landscape, also functions as a double 
metaphor. On the one hand, his shout is a metaphor for the arbitrariness implied by the forced 
separation that all geopolitical borders inflict equally on landscapes and on people’s lives. 
Simultaneously, this is also a metaphor for the specific urgency to voice the grievances of the 
people in the occupied Golan.  
Immediately after the young man’s shout, the title of the film appears on screen. A cut 
returns to frame the landscape view accompanied by an off-screen diegetic dialogue of two 
people greeting each other. The next sequence shows that this dialogue is held between two 
old men who are separated by a strip of land (of approximately one kilometre wide) and thus 
have to use megaphones to talk. Then a new sequence shows a barbwire fence under military 
observation, an army vehicle patrolling the fence, and a checkpoint surveillance tower. These 
last shots are accompanied by a sequence of titles explaining the Israeli occupation in the 
Golan Heights and the consequences this has had for the residents in this area. Thus this is the 
first time that the film overtly positions itself as a non-fictional film. As one of the directors, 
Gould, mentions in an interview, ‘the kind of film we wanted to make [was] not an 
informational film, but one with a dramatic narrative.’8 Indeed, Shout is a documentary that 
constructs a dramatic narrative by employing both ‘conventional’ documentary techniques, 
such as interviews conducted with close-up shots and factual information titles. But the film 
also uses other technical features that are more traditionally identified with fictional cinema’s 
stylistic characteristics, such as the use of non-diegetic and asynchronous sound effects and 
music, continuity principles of montage, and titling.  
Reflecting on the combination that Shout produces with these once supposedly 
opposing techniques, Gould and Lubbe Bakker agree on the idea that distinguishing fictional 
and non-fictional forms of filmmaking is not really relevant. Rather, the directors believe that 
both forms inform and learn from one another, and that this mixture is the most effective and 
enriching way ‘to show realities, tell stories, and also bring across ideas or thoughts.’9 Gould 
is eager to emphasise that she and Lubbe Bakker organised and decided in advance which 
                                                
8 Gould, Interview via email exchange by Pantoja-Peschard (21st December, 2010). Unpublished transcript. 
9 Lubbe Bakker, Interview via email exchange by Pantoja-Peschard (28th November, 2010). Unpublished 
transcript. 
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scenes they wanted to film always based on reality, on how events took place, as much as on 
what the people being filmed told them. But, she adds, ‘the fact that [one] selects and to some 
extent directs the scenes, does not mean that the reality of what [one is] filming disappears.’10 
Lubbe Bakker further expands on this idea when she claims that documentary is ‘directing in 
an indirect way’ insofar as one can give certain guidelines to the filmed subjects and 
‘prepare’ some of the scenes to be shot, but never more than that. In her own words:  
Reality does not always work the way you [as a documentary filmmaker] want at the time you need 
it. For example, the army jeep in the beginning of the film drives on the border. According to most 
people, it passes every hour. We needed this jeep to show this road is a border and under 
surveillance. But when we were standing there to film the patrolling jeep we waited and waited [for 
several hours]. Then we decided to throw rocks at the electrical fence. This sets off an alarm at the 
basecamp and five minutes later the jeep arrives. And so we got our shot.11 
It seems thus that Shout, like any other documentary, finds its inspiration in reality; but it also 
constructs and shapes a narrative thread by means of the variety of techniques and stylistic 
resources that it draws on: sound effects, camera work and montage, among others. Thus, 
Shout provides a good example of how documentaries mix the four functions or tendencies 
that Renov12 has attributed to these films. This documentary is a record of one year in the 
lives of the two young Golanis studying in Damascus, but it also seeks to make the point or to 
persuade the viewer of the hardships that the Golani population has had to endure due to the 
Israeli occupation. Similarly, the way in which Shout presents the story and builds the 
characters of Ezat and Bayan in a melodramatic tone (aiming to appeal to the spectator’s 
emotions) constitutes the expressive dimension of this film. 
In this sense, the remarks of the Dutch directors concerning documentary filmmaking 
in general and the particular way in which they made Shout coincide with what I have said in 
chapter three about the documentary as a film form of the interstice, a form in-between fact 
and fiction. But these remarks also concur with what Steyerl has said about documentaries as 
a practice of truth construction. Steyerl invokes Foucault’s notion of a ‘politics of truth,’ 
according to which the production of knowledge and hence the distinction between true and 
false is a necessary practice for the government and ordering of both individuals and 
populations as a whole. Truth, in this sense, necessarily implies power to the extent that it 
establishes and maintains the social, political, economic and cultural forms of hegemony 
within societies. A politics of truth is thus determined, standardised and regulated by political 
                                                
10 Gould, Interview. 
11 Lubbe Bakker, Interview. 
12 See Renov, ‘Toward a Poetics.’ 
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hierarchies or, in other words, by social power relations. Specifically, Foucault defines a 
politics of truth as follows:  
Truth […] is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects 
of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth -- that is the types of 
discourse it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances that enable one to 
distinguish true and false statements; the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and 
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying 
what counts as true.13 
Steyerl pursues Foucault’s line of thought and argues that documentary practices constitute 
examples of truth-producing procedures that are politically regulated. To the extent that 
documentaries construct truths that generate, maintain, but sometimes also challenge social 
relations of domination, they are a form of government since ‘governmentality’ is, for 
Foucault, a way of exerting power and regulating the conduct of populations through the 
production of truths. Steyerl calls this feature of documentary practices ‘documentality.’14 As 
she explains: 
I call this interface between governmentality and documentary truth production ‘documentality.’ 
Documentality describes the permeation of a specific documentary politics of truth with 
superordinated political, social and epistemological formations. Documentality is the pivotal point 
where forms of documentary truth production turn into government – or vice versa. It describes the 
complicity with dominant forms of a politics of truth, just as it can describe a critical stance with 
regard to these forms.15   
The key point in Steyerl’s account of documentality is the fact that documentary forms -- 
which include documentary filmmaking as well as other documenting and recording practices 
such as journalistic photography and/or video -- not only serve as instruments for the 
execution of administrative, governmental and regulating functions of power, but that they 
can also articulate critical perspectives that attempt to question and thwart dominant forms of 
truth production as well as forms of government. However, if all truths are the product of a 
construction within a particular system of truth production or ‘regime of truth,’ and if all 
documentary forms are subdued and shaped by hierarchical social power relations, how 
exactly can a documentary like Shout actually challenge and undermine those very power 
                                                
13 Foucault, ‘Truth and Power,’ p.131.  
14 Other documentary theorists, like Renov, have made similar arguments to the one Steyerl poses about 
documentaries as constituting forms of truth production that serve political aims. As I explained in chapter three, 
Renov describes the persuasive and promotional function of documentaries as that which aims to convince 
viewers about certain viewpoint, which very often concerns a policy or a reform that a government seeks to 
foster. However Steyerl might be more specific in making the connection between governmentality and 
documentality. See Renov, ‘Toward a Poetics.’ 
15 Steyerl, ‘Documentarism as Politics of Truth.’ [My emphasis]. 
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relations? Steyerl has written about this at length, and she has advanced an answer to this 
question. In the next section, I will unpack Steyerl’s proposal about the possibility of 
resistance and subversion that documentaries can have by way of analysing Shout. This will 
allow me to argue that this particular documentary can articulate ‘moments of truth’ that have 
the potential to disrupt -- even if just subtly -- certain power relations and social hierarchies. 
IV. Moments of Truth in Shout 
Steyerl notes that Foucault’s concepts of ‘governmentality’ and the ‘politics of truth’ seem to 
suggest that all documentary forms, insofar as they are truth-producing practices within a 
regime of truth, first ‘create’ the reality that they claim to be recording. In this sense, truth is 
created from politics and not the other way around, which would mean that all systems of 
truth and falsity are contingent and relative to the social power framework in which they have 
been forged. However, Steyerl claims that even if the articulation, production and reception 
of a document is shaped and constricted by social power relations, what gives the document 
its legitimacy and authority lies in the fact that the document ‘is also intended to be able to 
prove what is unpredictable within these power relations -- it should be able to express what 
is unimaginable, unspoken, unknown, redeeming or even monstrous -- and thus create a 
possibility for change.’16  
In order to argue for the idea that all truths are constructed and contingent but some of 
them can become points of resistance that expose and disrupt power relations, Steyerl recalls 
Walter Benjamin’s concept of the ‘dialectical image.’17 Benjamin’s notion of the dialectical 
image is based on a materialist understanding of truth, which permeates all representations 
and hence explains their constructed nature. And at the same time, this concept of the 
dialectical image affirms the ‘impossibility of relativizing truth that continues to persist 
despite’18 the constructedness of representations. Following Benjamin, Steyerl claims that all 
documentary forms (including documentary films) are like the dialectical image in that they 
re-present a specific historical moment under specific materialist and historical conditions, 
but the truth of this representation is not entirely contingent. Documents, for Steyerl, have the 
ability to articulate ‘moments of truth’ even if they can never capture the ‘whole’ truth. In her 
own words: 
The ‘urgency’ of the documentary is grounded in the ethical dilemma of having to give testimony to 
an event that cannot be conveyed as such, but instead contains necessary elements of truth [that is, 
                                                
16 Ibid.  
17 Benjamin, The Arcades Project, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann, trans. by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
18 Steyerl, ‘Documentarism as Politics of Truth.’ 
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moments of truth] as well as of ‘darkness.’ […] We must insist in reading and rescuing ‘the moments 
of truth’ preserved in [documentaries], otherwise it no longer makes sense to speak of truth at all.19 
Steyerl observes two things in relation to these ‘moments of truth.’ One is that it is necessary 
that there be truths whose power and effectiveness as truths can be separated from the 
economic, political, social and cultural forms of hegemony within which these truths have 
been produced and operate. In other words, it is necessary that there be at least certain 
moments of truth that are captured in documents and that can resist being put at the service of 
the evilest ends -- such as, for instance, when the Nazis denied the truth of the photographic 
evidence of their crimes. The second remark that Steyerl makes is that those moments of truth 
should not be invoked to support a ‘humanitarian’ or ‘charitable’ politics of truth that 
employs documents in purely voyeuristic and victimising terms in order to justify military 
and economic invasions. Avoiding the use of narratives and images of suffering and human 
rights violations as mere performances of victimhood and/or spectacles of traumatic 
situations is essential to ensure that the moments of truth captured through these narratives 
and images are not perverted and turned into means at the service of political, economical and 
cultural interventionism. This is crucial, for all (potential) moments of truth recorded or 
documented run the risk of becoming instruments at the service of domination and power 
disguised as a humanitarian cause; and hence they run the risk of not functioning as moments 
of truth at all. Indeed, the notion of charity often reaffirms (rather than questions) social 
hierarchies, which is why it is necessary to attend to the ways in which a documentary has 
been funded and how it is circulated and exhibited in order to know if and how it is used for 
purposes beyond its supposedly charitable aim.  
Thus, for Steyerl, documentary forms always confront us with a challenge: becoming 
aware of the social power relations that determine the production, use and reception of these 
forms. Such awareness opens up the possibility of circumventing and questioning the very 
power relations at play in documentary forms. As Steyerl puts it: 
There is hardly a visibility that is not steeped in power relations -- so that we can almost say that 
what we see has always been provided by power relations. On the other hand, the doubt in these 
visibilities insists with a vehemence that is capable of constituting its own form of power.20 
As a documentary, Shout offers an alternative representation of the conflict in the Middle 
East, and thereby calls into question the ways in which this conflict is usually presented in the 
media. Lubbe Bakker and Gould affirm in an interview that it was their intention to ‘tell a 
different story about the Middle East conflict [since] most people only think about 
                                                
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid.  
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Palestine,’21 so it was important for them to draw attention to another aspect of the problem. 
The directors do recognise that Palestinians are much worse off than Golanis, because the 
latter do not have to endure the constant raids, bombings, roadblocks and overall violence 
that Palestinians suffer under the Israeli occupation. However, they are convinced that 
precisely because of this fact, the Palestine-Israel problem has received widespread coverage 
whereas the situation in the occupied Golan Heights has very often been overlooked and 
forsaken.22 Indeed, as Azoulay has explained, representations and narratives of conflict (in 
particular for Azoulay, the conflict between Palestine and Israel) often flatten, homogenise 
and even trivialise violent events or situations of injustice and suffering to the point that these 
catastrophic events appear as ‘normal,’ as if they were everyday life events rather than as 
exceptional and intolerable circumstances. It is by way of the constant circulation of such 
images and narratives of suffering in the media, that these representations become 
‘naturalised’ and the injustices and struggles that they are supposed to make visible remain 
invisible.     
Without claiming to present a full account or the ‘whole’ truth about the Israeli 
occupation in the Golan, Shout focuses on exploring how the situation and the imposition of a 
border with Syria has affected and still affects the younger generations of Golanis, and in 
particular the impact that it has had on the lives of Ezat and Bayan. Thus, rather than giving a 
grandiose all-encompassing depiction of the Syria-Israel problem or offering an overtly 
militant narrative against the occupation, the film constructs an emotive narrative to tell the 
story about two best friends and what their experience of crossing the border to study in 
Damascus means for each of them.  
There are various scenes in the film that foreground the effects that the arbitrarily 
imposed border has had on the lives of Golanis and on those of the two friends. For instance, 
in the sequence where Ezat and his family are interviewed by director Lubbe Bakker days 
                                                
21 Al-Makhadhi, ‘Shouting for Freedom,’ in Al Jazeera in English (11th March, 2011), 
<http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/03/20113871812819484.html> [accessed 10th April 2011]. 
22 Recently, this situation appears to be changing due to the ongoing civil conflict that has sprung in Syria in 
March 2011. The uprising against the regime of president Bashar al-Assad started in the city of Derra, in the 
south of the country, but it quickly expanded towards other areas of the country. Today, almost two years since 
the conflict between the forces loyal to al-Assad’s government and the rebels who seek to overthrow his 
oppressive regime started, there is no apparent sign of the fighting coming to an end as neither party seems to be 
willing to negotiate. This has taken a large toll on the civilian population; the UN estimates that more than 
60,000 people have died and that more than half a million Syrians have fled to neighbouring countries. The 
Druze population in the occupied Golan Heights have always identified themselves as Syrians, even after over 
forty years of Israeli occupation. For this reason, the Druze have continuously supported the Syrian government 
over the years. However, today’s civil war in Syria has meant that divisions are emerging amongst them. See, 
Anon, ‘Golan’s Druze Divided over Syrian Unrest,’ in Al Jazeera in English (28th September, 2012),	  
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/09/20129287535962927.html> [accessed 18th February 
2013]. 
 
 
188 
prior to Ezat’s departure to Damascus, he explains how the Golanis’ rejection of Israeli 
citizenship has entailed that they have an ‘undefined’ status within the Israeli state (signalled 
by the asterisks printed in Ezat’s official identity card). Such undefined status signifies that 
Golanis are deterred from travelling to Syria to meet their relatives. Going to Damascus to 
study, Ezat says directly addressing the camera, means that he will finally meet his 
grandfather and his homeland but also that he will not be able to return to his home in the 
Golan for an entire year. In another scene, Ezat is shown packing his suitcases in his room. 
He explains to the director -- who remains off-screen throughout the duration of the film -- 
that he needs to make sure everything that he takes with him does not have any labels in 
Hebrew, because Syrian authorities do not allow Israeli products into their territory, even if 
those products come from the visiting students from the Golan.23 On the day of their 
departure, Bayan, Ezat and the rest of the students who have been granted the opportunity to 
study in the Syrian capital are carefully scrutinized by the UN forces and under the strict 
vigilance of the Israeli army at the border. The UN forces need to ensure that everything in 
the students’ luggage is safe and approved by the Syrian government before the youngsters 
are allowed to board the bus that will take them to Damascus. This last scene underscores 
how Syrian Golanis have an ‘undefined’ status, since Israel treats them as non-Israeli citizens 
in accordance with international law, and thus restricts their mobility across borders. At the 
same time, the scene also shows how this forces Golanis to be a captive market for Israeli 
products. On the other hand, in Syria Golanis are referred to as ‘brothers sharing the same 
blood,’24 as a man selling coffee in Damascus tells Bayan and Ezat. Yet the Syrian 
government imposes strict controls as to who is allowed to study in Damascus and what they 
can bring with them.  
One of the crucial moments in Shout is the scene where Ezat and Bayan go to the 
Shouting Hill on the Syrian side to greet their families and friends on Mother’s Day. Here 
once more the documentary makes visible how a narrow territorial demarcation can unjustly 
keep families apart, and how this situation can prove emotionally excruciating for some. 
While Ezat seems happy and having fun with his Syrian girlfriend on the Shouting Hill, a 
close-up shows Bayan in tears as he hears his mother’s voice on the loudspeakers. Film 
director Gould describes this scene as follows: 
                                                
23 Due to the occupation, Syrian residents in the Golan are forced to consume Israeli products because only these 
are available in the area. Likewise, since the beginning of the occupation, Golanis have seen their lands 
confiscated and instead used for Israeli settlements and industries. Consequently, produce that Golanis used to 
grow or make has now to be bought from Israeli producers.     
24 Lubbe Bakker and Gould, Shout (Netherlands: Pieter Van Huystee Film/IKON, 2010), DVD. 
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This scene [on the shouting hill] is very moving but also very surreal […]. When you are standing 
there, you do not see all the landmines scattered near the fence and you do not even really see the 
border. From a distance it looks like just a modest fence with a dirt road alongside it, and you really 
feel like walking up to it and getting close to the people on the other side. But of course it is 
impossible to do this. It is also surreal because this hill has already become something Syrian 
propaganda is using in a systematic and persistent way. On Mother’s Day, for example, there are 
always reporters there from Syrian television and they always film the tears of the mothers and 
students, and use this to show what the Zionists are doing to their people. It is a situation planned in 
advance, but also authentic in a certain sense. For most of the students, like Ezat, it was not very 
emotional but for others, like Bayan, it is really heartbreaking.25 
Thus, Shout avoids adopting an overtly militant or activist discourse, and instead it centres its 
narrative on the particular experiences of Bayan and Ezat as Golanis visiting Damascus for 
the first time. In this sense, the film appears closer to a drama than to an advocacy 
documentary or to a ‘purely’ observational one. The interviewer never figures on screen, and 
a significant number of sequences are coupled with Ezat’s and Bayan’s asynchronous off-
screen voices, which suggest their internal dialogues. Such stylistic features provide this 
documentary with a dramatic twist. As I mentioned before, this film deploys to varying 
degrees the functions that Renov attributes to documentaries. It functions as a record of the 
lives of two young Golanis, but it also aims to persuade the viewer of the unjust conditions 
that the Golanis live under the occupation. The expressive function of this documentary 
resides in the fact that it constructs the narrative by drawing on some stylistic features of 
melodrama. Thus this film is a good example of the extent to which documentaries are a form 
of the in-betweenness. Further on in this chapter, I will discuss how these features and 
functions in Shout might invite the spectator to engage with the documentary.    
Even if subtly, Shout does articulate critical commentary on two issues. One is how 
the border politics imposed by Israel within the occupied Golan Heights forces Golanis 
studying in Damascus to make a very difficult choice at the end of their courses. If they 
decide to stay in Damascus, then the Israelis will never let them return to their families and 
friends in the Golan; but if they decide to go back to their homes in the occupied territories, 
then ‘the border will be shut behind them forever and their new lives, loves and homeland 
will remain out of reach.’26 As their first year of their courses draws to a close, Bayan and 
Ezat are already torn apart by the prospect of this choice after graduation. This is made 
explicit in the scene where the two young Golanis are sitting together once again overlooking 
                                                
25 Anderman, ‘A Different Occupation,’ in Haaretz Daily Newspaper (28th September, 2010), 
<http://www.haaretz.com/culture/arts-leisure/a-different-occupation-1.316061> [accessed 20th March 2011]. 
26Al-Makhadhi, ‘Shouting for Freedom.’ 
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a panoramic view (but this time it is the view of the urbanised Syrian capital). Ezat says to 
Bayan: ‘It has only been a short while, but I got attached to it [Damascus]. I want to be here, 
not there [Majdal Shams].’27 To which Bayan replies: ‘Of course we have changed. You liked 
it here; but I am sure you will like our hometown again.’28 Thus the border seems to have 
grown between these two friends. As the closing titles explain, after the summer break, 
Bayan decided to stay in Majdal Shams whereas Ezat went back to Damascus to continue his 
studies in Dramatic Art. 
 The second critical point that Shout makes is that the way in which the younger 
generation of Golanis and the older ones understand and approach the conflict between Syria 
and Israel is increasingly different. Young Golanis, born after the occupation, do not seem to 
feel connected to the struggle against Israel in the same manner as their parents and 
grandparents do; and also they are in general less politicized. This is not to say that the Syrian 
youths in the Golan Heights consider themselves Israeli. On the contrary, they see Israel as 
the occupier and the Golan as Syrian territory. But they are also significantly less invested in 
the old resistance discourse against the ‘Zionist enemy.’29 The most revealing sequence that 
manifests this is when Ezat, visiting his family in Damascus for the first time in his life, is 
asked to show to the interviewer (and to the camera) a book about his grandfather’s 
achievements as a ‘freedom fighter.’ When the grandfather (in a close-up shot) is questioned 
what he would like for his grandson’s future, he replies: ‘I want the Israelis out of this 
country; then the enemy out of Iraq; and I salute the Palestinians in solidarity with their 
cause.’30 Ezat, in despair after hearing these words, repeats the question. And thus the 
grandfather finally replies: ‘I would like to see Ezat succeed in his studies. With education, 
he can fight better the occupation in the Golan.’31 As years go by, the generational gap, just 
like the border, grows deeper between old and young Golanis. The younger generations are 
becoming more and more sceptic of the possibility of ever defeating and expelling the Israeli 
settlers and army. They do not seem to believe active resistance actually stands a chance of 
                                                
27 Lubbe Bakker and Gould, Shout. 
28 Ibid. 
29 It is likely that this situation of the young Golanis as being less overtly politicized has changed over the last 
two years in the light of the current civil conflict in Syria between supporters of Bashar al-Assad’s oppressive 
regime and the rebels fighting against the later. As mentioned in a previous footnote, the Syrian civil war has 
started to create divisions within the Golani population who are torn between endorsing al-Assad (who has 
always been critical of the Israeli occupation of the Golan, and has allowed the Golan’s produce to be exported 
and sold in Syria) and backing the rebels in the opposition. Since both the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ and the 
Syrian rebel movement have been characterised by the active participation of younger sections of the 
population, then it is possible that the youth in the Golan are being influenced and inspired to get active and 
more politically involved. See, Anon, ‘Golan’s Druze Divided over Syrian Unrest.’  
30 Lubbe Bakker and Gould, Shout. 
31 Ibid. 
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changing their situation. As Ezat puts it in a tracking shot that follows him walking along the 
streets of Damascus: ‘I hope I can do something for the Golan. All Golanis share the same 
goal. But in the end the question remains: what can we do?’32  
Needless to say, the fact that younger Golanis are gradually becoming distanced from 
the old rhetoric of resistance that their parents and grandparents endorsed only favours the 
Israeli aspiration that one day Syrian Golanis will ‘forget’ the occupation altogether and fully 
embrace Israeli citizenship. Furthermore, Israel’s strategy of imposing so many restrictions 
on Syrian Golanis wishing to travel to Damascus while encouraging them to study in Haifa 
and other Israeli cities only helps to deepen the generational gap. This is a danger that the 
film seems to be pointing at.   
Thus far I have argued that Shout presents an alternative perspective of the Middle 
East conflict, and that in this sense it simultaneously calls into question the common 
representations of this conflict and makes visible the consequences that the Israeli occupation 
has over the Syrian inhabitants in the Golan Heights. Indeed, Shout eschews a polarized 
political discourse that is frequently employed in advocacy documentaries that tend to exploit 
images of suffering and pain in order to make a point by way of producing a sense of guilt in 
the viewers. By contrast, Shout constructs a dramatic narrative to tell the story of two best 
friends who have completely different experiences of life in Damascus; a life on the other 
side of the border and away from their homes in the Golan. Paradoxical as it may sound, it is 
precisely due to the mixture of dramatic and non-fictional techniques that this documentary is 
effective at articulating the ‘moments of truth’ that Steyerl speaks about. And thereby the 
film problematizes the representations of this conflict that pervade the dominant media. In 
Gould’s words: 
In the Middle East, people are used to the fact that everything is political and polarized […] I was 
touched by the fact that an Israeli army officer came up to us after the screening, and wanted a copy 
to show to his whole unit […] Another film with Arabs speaking harsh words about Israel would not 
touch them (they have heard that story so often and immediately defend themselves, this defensive 
discourse is like second nature to Israelis). But Shout is a soft film without militant words or actions. 
And I really believe that can touch a lot of Israelis […] I think that the softness of the film can work 
to give [Golanis] a voice [without falling in] the same old political rhetoric [used by the Syrian 
state], but [offering] instead a small, human, story.33   
It could be argued that this strategy of trying to portray a ‘small, human, story’ can lead to a 
depoliticising effect. For this tendency if often used in TV documentaries to focus on 
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personal human stories that avoid addressing the political conditions and structures that 
provoked these very stories. Nonetheless, this is not the case of Shout. In this film, the fact 
that the two students actually have opportunities (even if these are restricted) and the 
possibility of making decisions, refuses a narrative of victimhood. And this seems to enable 
viewers to identify more strongly with the story than if the two Golanis were portrayed 
simply as oppressed, suffering victims. Thus, the alternative depiction of the Middle East 
conflict alongside the absence of an overtly activist view on the topic can open up the 
possibility of new approaches through an engaged viewing on the part of the spectator. 
Indeed, new perspectives and angles can be suggested by documentary forms. However, for 
this to happen, an active spectator is necessary if the dominant representations are really to be 
challenged and if moments of resistance that avoid ‘humanitarian’ discourses based on mercy 
or pity are to emerge.  
 In the next section, I will once more contrast Azoulay’s understanding of the role of 
spectators in the civil contract of photography with Rancière’s conceptualization of the 
emancipated spectator. I will do this with the aim of arguing that spectators can become 
engaged with the documentary in a way that blurs the hierarchical distinction between the 
filmmaker with the power and means of representation, and the supposedly passive spectator 
that lacks this power. Contrasting Azoulay’s and Rancière’s views will also allow me to 
explain how documentaries about migration and border-crossings -- like Shout -- have the 
potential to invite an active spectator, and thus to articulate a critical stance against dominant 
forms of truth production and hierarchical power relations.   
V. The Engaged Spectator 
In Chapters 2 and 3 I explained that Azoulay believes that the viewer, rather than passively 
being presented with representations at the service of social power relations, is called to 
actively participate in the construction of the meaning of these representations. It is the civil 
duty of the spectator to respond to the represented subject’s counter-gaze by articulating the 
meaning of these representations in terms of claims for rights of those represented. It is worth 
noting here, however, that the notion of spectator proposed by Azoulay is an ideal concept, 
insofar as it not only implies the active participation of the viewer in articulating the meaning 
of the photograph, but it also requires that her involvement constitute claims for the 
restoration of rights. This seems to be slightly over-demanding on the viewer, since it is one 
thing to say that she is moved by the photo, engaged and invited to reflect on its meaning (as 
opposed to simply being provided a close-ended story of the photo), and another to affirm 
that the involvement of the viewer with an image portraying subjects enduring ‘regime-made 
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disasters’34 is such that she articulates a ‘statement of emergency,’ a call for the restitution of 
rights.  
Azoulay has acknowledged that her triadic model of photography does presuppose an 
ideal spectator; one that subscribes to the civil contract of photography and acts as a citizen in 
the citizenry created through the photograph. It is possible, she believes, that a photograph 
portraying ‘disaster’ fails to motivate the form of political relationships that she claims 
photography is able to produce. It is possible that the photograph is unsuccessful in calling 
the spectator to adopt a civil gaze and commit to making emergency claims when the rights 
of others have been violated. Is there a way in which Azoulay’s insight could be preserved 
without the over-idealization of the role played by the spectator of both photographs and 
films? I believe that an understanding of the engagement of the spectator that eschews an 
overly utopian view of the potential that visual representations have to form political and 
ethical relationships that can subvert hierarchical relations of power is possible if we turn 
again to Rancière’s thesis of the emancipated spectator, and to his ideas about the necessary 
bond between aesthetics and politics. It is my view that a notion of the engaged spectator can 
be defended without invoking a romanticised idea of citizenship in the way that Azoulay’s 
model of photography does. It is possible to speak of a spectator who is motivated to take 
active part in the articulation of the meaning of a film and to become involved in 
relationships of ethical responsibility and political solidarity with the filmmaker and 
(especially) with the represented subjects through the form of the film, and through its 
aesthetic elements. I will argue that a documentary film can have the potential to invite 
spectators not as citizens in a utopian citizenry of documentary film (as in Azoulay’s thesis of 
the citizenry of photography), but as active viewers able to partake in the ethical and political 
relationships that the film can produce mainly through its form and stylistic aspects.  
In The Emancipated Spectator, Rancière critically argues against the view that 
assumes that what the spectator understands, or how she feels when presented with a work of 
art, is exactly what the artist intended. According to him, there is no such thing as a straight, 
uniform and smooth transmission occurring between the artist’s mind and that of the 
spectator. Through her viewing of a work of art, a spectator necessarily interprets and 
transforms what she experiences. In other words, whatever the spectator feels, sees and 
comprehends from her encounter with a work of art does not necessarily correspond to what 
the artist planned to convey. For Rancière, the spectator is first and foremost creative; she is 
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not an inactive or passive viewer that needs to be enlightened or instructed by the artist. For 
this reason, if art is to be a truly ‘emancipatory practice,’ then the artist needs to eschew 
adopting the position of the specialist transferring his wealth of expertise. Instead, the artist -- 
just like the figure of the ‘ignorant schoolmaster’35 -- needs to foster the spectator’s capacity 
to interpret and translate a work of art. Without imposing or assuming any superiority, what 
the artist needs to do is to encourage the spectator to make new associations and 
disassociations from the artwork. It follows that, for Rancière, emancipation (of the spectator 
and of all other individuals in subordinate positions within the hegemonic power relations) 
entails the eradication of clear-cut boundaries between the amateur and the expert, the pupil 
and the teacher; between (passively) looking and doing. In this sense, the emancipated 
spectator becomes her own storyteller, for there is no longer a dominant authoritative figure 
that determines the story or has some sort of privileged access to it. Rancière describes the 
role of the emancipated spectator as follows: 
Like researchers, artists construct the stages where the manifestation and effect of their skills are 
exhibited, rendered uncertain in the terms of the new idiom that conveys a new intellectual 
adventure. The effect of the idiom cannot be anticipated. It requires [emancipated] spectators who 
play the role of active interpreters, who develop their own translation [of the work of art they are 
presented with] in order to appropriate the ‘story’ and make it their own story.36 
Thus, rather than adopting a paternalistic and/or elitist approach by assuming the passivity of 
the spectator, the role of the artist is that of creating, through the work of art, the conditions 
that allow the spectator to ‘dis-identify’ herself from the functions and roles that have been 
prescribed to her through the socio-political relations of production, and thus from the power 
relations within which she is immersed. It is only in this way that the distinction between an 
ignorant and passive spectator, and the knowledgeable, expert, artist is dissolved, thus 
allowing for the true emancipation of the spectator. Rancière believes in the creative and 
transformative potentiality of spectatorship. He affirms that looking is as active as doing, and 
that hence there is no gap between artist and spectator. In Rancière’s own words: 
These oppositions -- viewing/knowing, appearance/reality, activity/passivity -- are quite different 
from logical oppositions between clearly defined terms. They specifically define a distribution of the 
sensible, an a priori distribution of the positions and capacities and incapacities attached to these 
positions. They are embodied allegories of inequality. […] Emancipation [by contrast] starts from 
the opposite principle, the principle of equality. It begins when we challenge the opposition between 
viewing and acting; when we understand that the self-evident facts that structure the relations 
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between saying, seeing and doing themselves belong to the structure of domination and subjection. It 
begins when we understand that viewing is also an action that confirms or transforms this 
distribution of positions, and that “interpreting the world” is already a means of transforming it, of 
reconfiguring it.37 
In this sense, Rancière’s understanding of emancipation entails a radical shift in the 
distribution of the sensible, rather than a mere redisposition of places and capacities. 
Emancipation entails a change of meaning, a blurring of oppositions, rather than simply a 
shift in perspective or vantage-point that fails to dissolve inequalities. It is not enough to 
simply produce a work of art aimed at instructing and enlightening the supposedly ignorant or 
dormant spectator, for this only amounts to maintaining the unequal social relations derived 
from the dominant distribution of places and functions within society. The process of 
emancipation disrupts the symbolic order that distributes and assigns the names and positions 
that attach people to their work and roles within the social order. Emancipation for Rancière 
is the verification or demonstration of equality, which is attained through the enactment of 
equality.38 This enactment is always done in the name of those identities, those categories that 
have been denied equality in some way. But precisely because it is the enactment of equality, 
it cannot be identified with the self of the community that has been somehow injured. The 
enactment of equality cannot be identified with a particular group or population. For the 
enactment to effectively prove equality, it has to be beyond any social identification. In other 
words, Rancière maintains that the construction of a demonstration of equality is neither the 
affirmation of an identity nor the demonstration of the values of a specific group. The process 
of emancipation or of the enactment of equality is a process of subjectivization, that is, a 
process of the constitution of (political) subjectivity.  
Rancière avoids aligning political subjectivization with identification because, for 
him, identification belongs to the order of the police, which is the process distribution of 
names or identities that attach people to their work, function and place within society. Insofar 
as the order of the police is first and foremost that which regulates what parts of the society or 
the community are visible and identifiable as parts, then the police is the delimitation of the 
field of all possible experience, the partition of the perceptible or, in Rancière’s words, the 
‘distribution of the sensible.’  
Rancière emphasises that the order of the police is never a complete, all-
encompassing, unchangeable process. The supposition that the distribution of roles and 
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functions to all parts of the society are underpinned by a strong ontological reality of sorts is 
misleading. Put differently, there is no ‘objective’ order of reasons upon which the social 
order of domination is supported. The distribution done by the order of the police is 
contingent, and as such it can be subverted and contested. This is what emancipation, as a 
process of enactment of equality, consists in. Emancipation or politics produces a ‘break with 
the sensory “natural” order that destines specific groups and individuals to rule, to public or 
private life, […] by pinning bodies down to a certain time and space.’39 Politics introduces a 
dissensus into the social order of the police. Thus, politics is a process of dis-identification, a 
dissociation of parts of the society from the names and positions they occupy in the social 
order. In this sense, politics has egalitarian effects, for it undermines the idea that those who 
rule are entitled to do so; and it functions as a demonstration that those either excluded from 
the social order or included in it but in a subordinate manner can also partake in this order. 
The capacity for politics is never exclusive to anyone; it belongs to everyone but, at the same 
time, to no one in particular. The equality enacted by politics therefore brings about a 
different distribution of the sensible, a change in the system that assigns and ties individuals 
to their functions in society. Like the cinematic cut, marking simultaneously the end of one 
shot and the beginning of the other, politics for Rancière interrupts an existing social order 
and inaugurates a new partition of the sensible.  
Rancière considers that what is central to aesthetics is that it bears a strong correlation 
to politics. For him, aesthetics is not a set of artistic practices, nor is it the general theory that 
attempts to explain such practices or a theory concerned with sense experience at large. 
Instead, he argues that what is at stake in aesthetics is exactly what is at stake in politics too, 
namely, the partition or distribution of the sensible. Aesthetics is constituted by various 
structural systems that, on the one hand, determine the shared world of our everyday 
experiences; and on the other, divide, distribute and delimit the positions and roles that a 
person occupies within this world. While politics is not to be identified with or reduced to 
this partitioning of the sensible conditioned by the aesthetic systems, politics is however 
determined by these aesthetics. As Rancière puts it: 
[Aesthetics] can be understood […] as the system of a priori forms determining what presents itself 
to sense experience. It is a delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible and the invisible, of speech 
and noise, that simultaneously determines the place and the stakes of politics as a form of 
                                                
39 Corcoran, ‘Editor’s Introduction,’ p.7.  
 
 
197 
experience. Politics revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the 
ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of times.40  
In this sense, aesthetics entails a mode of appearance that does not restrict itself to a purely 
artistic practice, but it also constitutes the force of the political inside art itself, which can 
suggest an alternative politics to the institutionalised and ruling structures of power relations 
from outside those very structures. If politics implies a break, a dis-identification with the 
dominant symbolic order, then aesthetics is political to the extent that it allows persons to 
disentangle themselves from the roles that have been prescribed to them within the social 
order. This dis-identification entails a challenge to -- and hence a change in -- the distribution 
of the sensible. This change is precisely what Rancière calls emancipation, a process of the 
enactment of equality. And this dis-identification is precisely the process that undergoes the 
emancipated spectator. 
I argued in Chapter 3 that Rancière and Azoulay coincide in the view that aesthetic 
experiences (photography in the specific case of Azoulay) have the potential to be politically 
subversive. The two theorists also share the idea that the viewer or spectator can play a role 
as an active participant, rather than merely as a passive observer. Azoulay proposes that there 
is no real opposition between the aesthetic and the political, for neither the former nor the 
latter are attributes of works of art. Insofar as a work of art is an object given to the senses, 
experienced by the senses, then it cannot exist outside the aesthetic plane. Photographic 
images are thus aesthetic in this sense. The political, according to Azoulay, is not a trait, ‘but 
a space of human relations exposed to each other in public, and […] photography is one of 
the realizations of this space.’41 The space of the political is thus realized whenever people 
assemble together and, as a collective, have the capacity to actualize (at any given moment) 
their civil duties towards one another and their inner potential for equal participation. 
Rancière, in turn, proposes that there is a crucial aesthetic dimension of politics, as much as a 
political dimension of aesthetics. For him, the aesthetics of politics means the split of the 
social order from itself; that is, the disruption of the existing distribution of social functions 
and places as much as the rearrangement of the sensible world upon which such a distribution 
rests.   
Despite the similarities between their views about the relationship between aesthetics 
and politics, the role of the spectator, and the political potential of art, Rancière’s 
understanding of the emancipated spectator avoids the romanticised and utopian idea of 
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citizenship that Azoulay’s triadic model of photography seems to imply. As Rancière claims, 
it is possible to conceive of a spectator who can become an active participant in the 
articulation of the meaning of a work of art such as a documentary film. This spectator is 
hence involved in certain types of relationships with the filmmaker and especially with the 
represented subjects simply through the form of the film, through its aesthetic and stylistic 
elements. There is no need to evoke citizenship or a civil duty (like Azoulay does with her 
ideal citizenship of photography) in order to explain the possibility of the spectator’s active 
engagement with the documentary film and the potential it offers for political emancipation. 
The moving images of a documentary and the manner in which they are put together have the 
capacity to invite the viewer to become responsible for and to act in both political and ethical 
solidarity towards the other, the filmed subject. And thus these films have the capacity to 
form a space of relationships that are not directly mediated by the nation-state. 
As I have argued in Chapter 3 and will further claim in Chapter 6, it is the open form 
of a documentary film that allows for the active involvement of the spectator. For an open 
form prevents the film from having a fixed meaning and single source of authority, therefore 
the spectator is invited to take part in determining the documentary’s meaning. Here, the 
spectator is not considered to be an ignorant passive viewer that needs to be somehow 
relieved from her ignorance. Instead, the open form of a documentary blurs the hierarchical 
distinction that exists between the filmmaker as the one with the representational power, and 
the portrayed subjects and the viewer as the ones lacking such power. The hierarchical 
distinction is disrupted to the extent that the stylistic aspects and the form of the film are 
‘loose’ or ‘open’ in a way that calls for the spectator to act as a translator of sorts; an 
interpreter of the images that she is presented with, and of the manner in which they are 
linked together. The spectator thus appropriates the narrative and emerges as an active and 
equal partaker in the articulation of the meaning of these moving images. Because the 
spectator has the choice to engage or not, then spectatorship can never be fully determined or 
fixed. As a result, instead of acting merely as a vehicle for the transmission of knowledge (as 
a ‘pedagogical tool’ that reinforces the distinction between a knowledgeable filmmaker and 
an ignorant spectator), the documentary film has the capacity to function as a product that the 
filmmaker, the represented subject and the spectator can collectively verify and provide with 
meaning, without any of them having any ownership and/or privileged claim over the 
significance of the documentary. And it is in this sense that the documentary can pose a 
challenge to the ruling forms of truth production and governmentality, subvert social and 
political hierarchies, and hence assume an emancipatory function. In other words, the 
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documentary can function, in Rancière’s terms, as an enactment of equality by reorganising 
the dominant distribution of the sensible.   
In this section I have discussed how the spectator of documentaries can become 
actively engaged in the articulation of the meaning of the film without having to invoke 
utopian citizenries in the way that Azoulay does. Following Rancière, I explained that the 
spectator is free to decide her involvement with the documentary. In the next section, I will 
make the point that spectators not only have the capacity and choice to be active partakers 
determining the sense of the film, but they also can decide the degree to which they become 
involved. And I will examine how this could happen in the particular case of Shout.  
VI. The Spectator’s Degree of Engagement 
Even though spectators are always free to find their own narrative and interpretation of any 
documentary, there are some documentaries that allow the relationships between filmmaker, 
filmed subject and spectator to become an encounter based on the equality of intelligences. 
Indeed, some documentaries have a form (and a content) that does not invite too much 
interpretation on the part of the viewer. These films seem to refuse to let go of their intention 
to teach and make a point, and they also seem to prevent their meaning from being 
completely open to the spectator’s interpretation. In other words, these documentaries seem 
to ‘spoon-feed’ the information that they attempt to convey to spectators, and so their images 
and narratives are presented using a sort of strategy that does not give space for the spectator 
to be in conversation with the film’s meaning. For example, Michael Moore’s documentaries 
-- such as Bowling for Columbine (2002) -- tend to employ this overtly persuasive strategy. 
Other documentary films, however, are multi-layered (and often ambiguous) in the way they 
employ images and intertwine them in order to promote a view. These documentaries use an 
aesthetic style that prompts the spectator to actively interpret and to partake in the articulation 
of its meaning, and hence to appropriate the latter. At the same time, a spectator might be 
more or less motivated to become engaged with the documentary, to participate in 
articulating the significance of it, and to enter into ethical and political relationships with the 
filmed subjects. It is the spectator’s choice to be a more or less active partaker in the social 
bonds that can be created between filmmaker, filmed subjects and viewers through the film. 
The degree to which the spectator is responsible for the other, the portrayed subject, is her 
own decision, as is the degree to which she reads the images as binding urgent claims for the 
restoration of rights.  
Thus, for example, the series of four short films directed by Marc Silver and Gael 
García Bernal in co-production with Amnesty International entitled Los Invisibles (The 
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Invisibles, 2010) depicts the difficult and dangerous journeys that thousands of migrants from 
Central America take when they travel between Mexico’s southern border with Guatemala 
and the northern Mexico-United States border. All four films show interviews with migrants, 
volunteers and activists, where García Bernal, a world-known Mexican actor, often appears 
in frame. These interviews are coupled (often off-screen and asynchronously) with images 
that directly present migrants travelling on top of freight trains, staying in shelters, and 
suffering serious injuries caused by falling from the trains or by being abused, raped and/or 
robbed during their journeys. As a large number of activist films do, the four-part series Los 
Invisibles seeks to draw the attention of the viewer by employing an aesthetic style where 
images and narrative leave little space for interpretation on the part of the spectator.  
Many activist documentaries about migration overtly endorse a cause by exploiting 
images of suffering and adopting a victimising narrative style with the aim of making a deep 
impression on the viewer so that she too subscribes to the cause. Los Invisibles uses this 
narrative strategy and style throughout. For instance, in the fourth part entitled ‘Goal’ a shot 
depicts in close-up a deeply open wound that a migrant child has on the back of his leg. The 
boy is shown lying on his stomach in a bed provided by a shelter for passing migrants, and he 
is having his wound cleaned by one of the volunteers working at the shelter. In a similar 
fashion, the second part called ‘Six out of Ten’ shows García Bernal speaking to three 
migrant women from Honduras about why they left their country and families in order to 
reach the US and find work to support their children and other relatives back home. In this 
section, images alternate between the conversation with the three women seated on the rail 
line track, still close ups of other migrants’ faces and shots of the landscape that migrants 
have to travel through in southern Mexico. Meanwhile, in voice-over to these images, García 
Bernal explains the struggles and sufferings of these people: ‘according to estimates, six out 
of ten women are sexually abused on their journey to the United States.’42 These overtly 
shocking images alongside the interviews and narration by García Bernal can indeed produce 
reactions in viewers -- in fact, Amnesty International has affirmed that ‘The Invisibles [was 
made] to shine a light on the abuses migrants suffer in Mexico’43 -- but they do not seem to 
leave spectators free to decide their own interpretation of the film. Rather, the meaning of 
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these images seems closed and predetermined, and aimed directly at fostering a cause and 
getting viewers to support it. That this is the case is confirmed by García Bernal’s off-screen 
closing statement at the end of the fourth part. He says:  
The Mexican authorities must protect migrants in our country. The law must protect us all whether 
nationals or foreigners. It is essential Mexico sets a good example in the way it treats migrants in 
order to be consistent with the valid demands we make for the fair treatment of migrants in the 
United States. We cannot continue to be invisible.44 
By contrast with Los Invisibles, the video installation The Mapping Journey Project (2008-
2011) by Moroccan artist Bouchra Khalili presents,45 through eight screens, different 
documentations of migrants’ journeys from Northern Africa and Afghanistan into Europe. 
Each of the eight screens frames an identical shot of a coloured atlas made of paper and 
showing the Mediterranean Sea and southern and central Europe. On each map a hand draws 
with a marker the route that the voice-over of the migrant describing his or her journey into 
Europe. Each hand thus follows a different itinerary drawn over an identical background 
map. Khalili has described her video as an attempt to distort normative and official 
cartographies and geographies by way of mapping clandestine journeys.46 The lines traced 
over the maps not only indicate the illegal trajectories, but they also subvert the geopolitical 
borders as the latter are crossed, drawn over, and broken with the marker. At the same time, 
the off-screen voices of each migrant explaining the specific itinerary they decided to follow 
serve as documentations of minor histories that otherwise would not be recorded. Similarly, 
another way in which this video artwork is subversive is through the strongly accented 
languages and dialects of the migrants describing their journeys. As Khalili has explained,47 
the dialects used in combination with French, Arabic and Spanish make for an eclectic mix 
that make evident the colonial history and the postcolonial situation of the migrants and their 
countries of origin. Thus, these documentations stress the inherent forms of inequality 
existing in our current societies and contest dominant histories and accounts of 
undocumented migration.  
Khalili’s video installation presents a much more open form than that of Los 
Invisibles. Instead of pursuing the conversion of viewers into a cause, her video encourages 
the latter to actively reflect on the meaning of the images and audio. Indeed, the eight-screen 
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video installation invites a discussion about the arbitrariness of geopolitical borders and the 
extent to which official cartographies are constantly challenged through the journeys that 
undocumented immigrants undertake. Spectators in this case are presumably considered to be 
active individuals with the capacity to interpret the moving images and sounds with which 
they are presented. Rather than assuming that spectators are passive and/or ignorant subjects 
that need somehow to be informed about a certain actual event or situation, the video-art 
work ‘opens the door’ for them to decide the degree to which they want to become engaged 
with the film. Spectators in this way are provided with a sense of freedom to interpret and 
translate the moving images and sounds. In this way, the overt attempt to ‘educate’ the 
viewer that a documentary like Los Invisibles realises is actively avoided in The Mapping 
Journey Project.       
What these examples show is that all documentary films depicting migration and 
border-crossing experiences – such as Shout, Los Invisibles or The Mapping Journey Project 
-- have the potential to be more or less politically subversive, more or less challenging 
towards social and political hierarchies. By the same token, to the extent that spectators are 
offered a more or less conclusive film, they are more or less free to create their own ‘fictions’ 
and draw their own interpretations. Thus, spectators have the capacity to adopt a more or less 
active role in the articulation of the meaning of the documentary. They have the capacity and 
opportunity to become equal with the filmmaker. 
Returning now to the particular case of Shout, it seems that the approach to the Israeli 
occupation of the Golan Heights from the point of view of two young Syrian Golanis invites 
the viewer to question not only dominant media depictions of this particular conflict (and of 
the Middle-East conflict as a whole), but also the Israeli border regime imposed on the Syrian 
Golani people. And this is indeed the hope that Lubbe Bakker and Gould had when they 
made this documentary:  
When we made [Shout], the goal was to get into the minds of people, to make them wonder and think 
about certain regions and the people in there with another perspective. This eventually might lead to 
changing political ways of thinking or even laws.48     
It is precisely through engaging with these questions that the spectator of Shout opens up the 
possibility of forming relationships of solidarity and responsibility with the filmed subjects 
(with Ezat and Bayan, but also with the Syrian Golanis in general). These relationships are 
not mediated by the nation-state. And since they are based on an active concern for the other 
                                                
48 Lubbe Bakker, Interview. 
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regardless of her actual citizenship status, they are ethical and political relationships guided 
by the principle of unconditional hospitality.   
Throughout Shout there is an emotional use of camera angles -- such as close-ups, and 
the filmed subjects openly acknowledge the camera. As I mentioned before, this documentary 
constructs the film characters as if they were dramatic characters -- as opposed to subjects of 
‘pure’ observation. In this sense, the documentary refuses offering mimetic representations 
and thus allows viewers to become interpreters. It is precisely the melodramatic narrative that 
provides spectators the space to engage with the film by identifying and sympathising with 
the two main figures, but also by making visible the effects that the Israeli occupation and the 
border have upon the lives of the two friends and their families. At the same time, a moment 
of truth is present in this documentary since it shows an alternative angle on the broad 
conflict in the Middle East. The way the film does this is by avoiding a straightforward 
narrative of victimhood. For, even though the film underscores the restrictions imposed on 
Golanis, it also shows the opportunities that the two students have: the possibility of deciding 
between family obligations and the desire to define their own identity. This new perspective 
allows the spectator to reflect upon the dominant approaches to this conflict, and thus to 
freely consider the suggested new perspective. The spectator is here free to understand this 
film as a demand for the restoration of the rights of Golanis. In this way, the spectator 
actively appropriates the narrative and partakes in the meaning of the film. Conversely, the 
filmmakers make decisions on the form and content of the film, but they cannot calculate the 
responses of spectators. Hence, filmmakers act as hosts leaving open the possibility for 
spectators to take active part and thus give rise to a new distribution of the sensible. And in 
consequence, the hierarchical distinction between filmmaker and viewer is thereby blurred.  
VII. Final Remarks 
In this chapter I have continued exploring the possibility of transposing Azoulay’s triadic 
model of photography to documentary films about migration and border-crossing 
experiences. I have used here the case of Shout as an example of a documentary that 
constructs a dramatic narrative in order to convey the difficulties that the Golani population 
suffers under the Israeli occupation. While in the last chapter I centred my analysis on the 
role of the filmed subjects within a documentary, my focus in this chapter has been on 
discussing the role that spectators might adopt towards Shout, and the way in which they 
might become actively involved with it. I claimed that spectators can engage with 
documentaries as much or as little as they decide, and that the filmmaker need not attempt to 
enlighten viewers but only to invite them to question the images they see by offering 
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representations that avoid mimesis and instead encourage interpretation from the viewer. In 
the case of Shout it is the melodramatic style that opens up the space for spectators to become 
actively engaged in determining the meaning of the film, and to relate to the filmed subjects 
in terms of solidarity and partnership. In this sense, it is the form and style of the film and not 
so much its content that determines the degree of involvement of the spectator. In the next 
chapter I will further argue for this point, and will conclude that it is more in the form than in 
the documentary’s content that the political potential of the film resides. Finally, I have also 
argued here that despite its constructed nature Shout creates moments of truth that can 
challenge the hierarchies of the social order.  
In the next chapter, I will continue my exploration of the transposition of Azoulay’s 
model to documentaries by examining Akomfrah’s The Nine Muses (2010). My focus will be 
mainly on the role of the filmmaker. However, I will also claim that spectators cannot only 
engage with the film to different degrees and at a rational level, but that they can also become 
involved in a sensorial and embodied way, at the level of affect. Indeed spectators can be 
engaged cognitively as much as affectively with the film.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Traces of Memory and Time. Affect and Politics in The Nine Muses 
 
 
I. 
By transposing Azoulay’s triadic model of photography to documentaries, and by drawing on 
Derrida’s notion of hospitality and his claim of the necessary link between ethics and politics, 
I have argued that documentary films which focus on migration and the experience of 
crossing the border can give rise to ethical and political relationships between the filmmaker, 
the viewers and the filmed subjects. These relationships are relationships based on 
responsibility and solidarity, and hence they are relationships of hospitality with the potential 
to subvert cultural, political, and social hierarchies. Documentaries that explore the issue of 
migration can articulate a space (and a time) where those represented, those with the power to 
represent and those who are viewers no longer relate exclusively in terms of vertical or 
hierarchical power relations operating unilaterally. Rather, the way these three subjects relate 
becomes more horizontal, and thus a more equal way of relating. The reason for this is that 
these documentaries allow for spectators to become involved in the articulation of the 
meaning of the film, and for the filmed subjects to make visible their grievances. In this 
manner, filmmaker, spectators and represented subjects all play an active role within the 
social relationships that emerge through the film. 
But, how exactly is this achieved? What features does a documentary film about 
migration need to have for it to enable the formation of such ethical and political 
relationships and thus to pose a challenge to established social hierarchies? What is it that 
gives a documentary film its political potential? In this chapter, I would like to consider these 
questions. I will take my cue once more from Rancière’s ideas around the political potential 
of the work of art in order to discuss what it means for a documentary film to have political 
potentiality. Drawing also on the ideas of Hito Steyerl, Trinh T. Minh-Ha and Laura U. 
Marks, I will claim that it is more through affect rather than through the ideological content 
of a documentary that spectators become active participants in the determination of the 
meaning of the film. I will particularly deal with the question of how the elements of time 
and sound in documentaries might affect and thereby invite spectators to actively engage with 
the film, and I will use John Akomfrah’s documentary essay The Nine Muses (2010)1 as my 
                                                
1 Akomfrah, The Nine Muses (UK: Smoking Dogs Films, 2010). 
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case study. Finally, I will also consider what the role of the filmmaker needs to be in order 
for spectators to become such active participants. 
II. Affect and the Expressive Dimension of Documentaries 
In discussing documentary filmmaking and its potential for articulating political criticism, 
Steyerl has argued that documentaries should neither be regarded as mimetic reproductions of 
reality (and hence as representations that are able to capture the essence of facts, and convey 
true reality), nor should these films be understood as mere constructions of a reality that does 
not exist as such. In her own words: 
Both positions are problematic. While realists believe in an objectivity that, more often than not, 
turns out to be extremely subjective and which has nonchalantly passed off hideous propaganda as 
truth, constructivists end up not being able to distinguish the difference between facts and blatant 
misinformation or [...] between truth and plain lies. While the position of realists could be called 
naīve, the position of constructivists runs the danger of sliding into opportunistic and cynical 
relativism.2   
Other documentary theorists, such as Trinh and Renov, have maintained similar views to that 
of Steyerl. Trinh has argued that there is no real opposition between the natural and the 
synthetic or the artificial in (documentary) films. According to her, because cinematic images 
are representations, because they mediate or frame reality, they necessarily involve staging 
and artifice. And since this is the very nature of film, then a film that ‘call[s] attention to the 
subjectivity at work and [that] show[s] the activity of production in the production [is a film 
that functions] in its most natural, realistic and truthful [way].’3 What is seen as the natural 
and the staged are not separated for Trinh; they are part of the same process, of the same 
whole production. In chapter three I said that Renov has characterised this opposition as 
being based upon the mistaken dichotomy between science and art, between objectivity and 
subjectivity.4 This dichotomy has led to the belief that if documentaries are to represent 
reality ‘objectively,’ then they cannot be artistic expressions, and vice versa.  In view of this, 
Steyerl has explained that the opposition between realist and constructivist approaches has 
led to an impasse of sorts within documentary theory, and that a good way to overcome this 
stalemate is to understand the documentary form also in terms of expression rather than 
exclusively in terms of representation. This, she says, in no way means denying that 
documentaries are representational practices. Instead, documentaries are representations that 
necessarily bear an expressive dimension. 
                                                
2 Steyerl, ‘Documentary Uncertainty.’ 
3 Trinh, ‘When the Eye Frames Red,’ interview by Akira Mizuta Lippit, in Trinh T. Minh-ha Website, 
<http://www.trinhminh-ha.com/> [accessed 12th May 2012]. 
4 Renov, ‘Toward a Poetics.’   
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If we here turn briefly to Stefan Nowotny’s discussion of what ‘expression’ means, it 
will be easier to grasp what this expressive aspect of documentary is. Concerned with the 
question of the possibility of cultural translation, Nowotny argues that it is necessary to 
understand the way in which ‘the reference to any extra-linguistic social reality [such as 
culture] is manifest [or expressed] within linguistic enunciations.’5 Following the linguist 
Emile Benveniste, Nowotny explains that any expression bears a relationship to the world in 
the sense that whatever is expressed by means of a linguistic enunciation is not itself the 
world (or more precisely, a thing in the world), but a relation that holds between the world 
and language. Now, this relation constitutes the reference of the linguistic utterance, and what 
determines such relation is what Benveniste deems a ‘centre of expression’ or ‘centre of 
reference.’ The centre of expression of an enunciation is the presence that the speaker has 
upon her utterance. This presence leaves a trace that operates as an inherent reference that is 
non-linguistic and that binds the enunciation to a specific point in time and space. In other 
words, at the core of all enunciations there is a relation between ‘the linguistic given’ and that 
aspect which cannot be reduced to the linguistic given but still expresses itself through the 
utterance. This non-linguistic centre of reference of the enunciation is thus ‘dialogical and 
situated in a world,’6 an expression which is embodied and temporalised. 
Let us return now to documentaries and Steyerl’s claim that what these films express 
through their form constitutes their potential for political criticism, subversion and 
emancipation. This means that the political critique that documentaries may articulate does 
not reside so much in what they represent through their ideological content, but rather this 
potential lies more in the expressive aspect of the film that is necessarily included within its 
form. The form of a documentary constitutes an expression of social reality, that is, an 
expression of ‘the conditions of production and representation [as much as] the material and 
aesthetic choices.’7 All of these social relations determine the manner in which the film is put 
together. And so these relations are expressed through the documentary, but they are not 
necessarily represented within the film’s content and narrative. In this way, by attending to a 
documentary’s form and not restricting oneself exclusively to its content, it is possible to find 
out whether it has potential for articulating a political criticism, and also the manner in which 
it articulates such critique.     
                                                
5 Nowotny, ‘The Stakes of Translation,’ in Transversal Webjournal, trans. by Gerrit Jackson (June, 2006), 
<http://eipcp.net/transversal/0606/nowotny/en> [accessed 21st May 2012]. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Steyerl, ‘Making Films Politically: Interview with Hito Steyerl.’ 
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As I explained in Chapter 3, Trinh and Steyerl have made the point that the 
documentaries that are able to articulate a political criticism that calls into question social, 
economical, political and/or cultural hierarchies have as one of their core traits that of being 
self-reflexive. By self-reflexivity, they mean the recognition within the film that the images 
produced are made from a certain perspective, always through a certain lens. However, it is 
important to note here that a documentary that turns to reflect on itself, on its own 
production, is not to be equated simply with a film that adopts a certain method or technique. 
Indeed, as Trinh emphasises, self-reflexivity should not be reduced to a mere aesthetics, to a 
purely formalistic and ‘beautifying’ device. In particular, Trinh claims that the broadly 
extended tendency in the area of Visual Anthropology to ‘self-expose’ the methodology 
adopted and the conditions of production of the filmed ethnographic material supposedly in 
order to guarantee the scientific rigour of the film has undermined and trivialised the 
importance of self-reflexivity. A self-reflexive documentary -- despite being determined by 
and imbued with the social, political and cultural conditions under which it is produced -- has 
an open-ended form, a form that challenges its own closure and thus suggests other possible 
closures, inviting other possible meanings. And it is here where the value of self-reflexivity 
lies. In Trinh’s words: 
[Self-reflexivity aims] to prevent meaning from ending with what is said and what is shown and -- 
through enquiries into production relation -- thereby to challenge representation itself even while 
emphasizing the reality of the experience of film as well as the important role that reality plays in the 
lives of the spectators.8 
The aperture to other possible meanings is, according to both Steyerl and Trinh, what makes 
a documentary film truly critical. That is, a documentary that challenges rooted ideologies 
and destabilizes the status-quo is that which puts under scrutiny the representational and 
referential function of cinematic images and sounds, and thus not only questions the authority 
of documentary representations as depictions of reality, but also refuses to have a single and 
fixed meaning. This is the sense in which the meaning of a documentary can be said to be 
politically critical, ‘when it does not let itself be easily stabilized, and when it does not rely 
on any single source of authority but, rather, empties or decentralizes it.’9 Even though every 
film is in itself whole or complete in that it has its particular order and closure, when the film 
calls into question its own wholeness, it opens a door of possibilities onto other closures and 
significations. It is by defying the single and totalizing subject of meaning and of knowledge 
                                                
8 Trinh, ‘Documentary Is/Not a Name,’ in October, Vol. 52 (Spring, 1990), pp.76-98 (pp.94-95), 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/778886> [accessed 15th May 2012]. 
9 Ibid, p.89. 
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(that is, a subject that assumes herself as the only and ultimate reserve of reference) that the 
power relations that this subject fosters and helps to maintain are undermined. Steyerl argues 
that it is by means of its self-reflexive form that a documentary can prompt the viewer to 
become aware of the mediating nature of the cinematic representations she is being presented 
with. In other words, it is by means of what the images in tandem with sounds express -- 
rather than what they represent, that documentaries can affect viewers and even invite and 
mobilise them to critically question the hierarchies of the social order.  
More specifically, Steyerl draws on Brian Massumi’s10 work on fear to argue that 
documentary practices mobilise spectators by way of affect much in the same manner that 
power today ‘addresses us [by triggering and] modulating the intensity of collective feelings 
[and emotional responses].’11 To be sure, fear is and has always been a political tool 
employed by governments to justify the incrementation and expansion of the police state and 
wars elsewhere. Thus, for example, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by a coalition of troops from 
the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Spain and Poland was justified on the dubious 
claim that the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein had refused to disarm and eliminate the 
nuclear and biological weapons programmes in his country, and that his government had ties 
with terrorist group al-Qaeda. There was never actually sufficient evidence for this rationale 
to support the war against Iraq, and that was one of the reasons why many countries -- 
including France, China and Russia -- would not support the invasion. However, by invoking 
weapons of mass destruction and by making the military intervention in Iraq an essential part 
of the so-called ‘war on terror,’ the governments of the invading countries, especially the US, 
resorted to instilling fear of a potential threat to the world’s security in order to justify the 
attack on Iraq.  
Massumi further explains that the images that circulate in today’s global media about 
events of horror range between the two poles:  the pole of natural disasters, on the one hand; 
and that of terrorist attacks, on the other. Such images of disaster play a central role in the 
affective reception of the frightful events they portray. As a result of the emphasis on the 
horrors of the event and the renunciation to make sense of it, global media produce an 
affective impact by instilling a strike of insurmountable horror, which eventually mutates into 
a continuum of ‘low-level’ fear that becomes the underlying permanent feature of everyday 
                                                
10 See Massumi, ‘Fear (The Spectrum Said),’ in Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring, 
2005), pp.31-48, <http://www.brianmassumi.com/textes/Fear (the Spectrum Said) - Positions.pdf> [accessed 
30th April 2012]; and Massumi, ‘Everywhere You Want to Be. Introduction to Fear,’ in Massumi (ed), The 
Politics of Everyday Fear (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp.3-38, 
<http://www.brianmassumi.com/textes/EVERYWHERE YOU WANT TO BE.pdf> [accessed 30th April 2012]. 
11 Steyerl, ‘Documentary Uncertainty.’  
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life. This low-level fear, in turn, undermines the potential for collective response and creates 
a tight link between a natural disaster and what is deemed a national security threat. As 
Massumi puts it: 
Fear defies a collective response. When response is re-enabled, it is on the individual scale of the 
personal actions of ‘everyday heroes’ carrying out small deeds of voluntaristic support. At this 
becalming pole of the affective conversion circuit, human agency is reasserted, but in the exemplary 
figure of individual actors exercising personal choice. By contrast, the out-of-scale strike of the 
unforeseen event seems utterly inhuman, an ‘act of God’ – by which is meant ‘nature.’ [...] This 
applies even to wholly human-caused events, such as terrorist attacks. An association is established 
between ‘natural disaster’ and ‘national security threat,’ which discourages any response other than 
the cyclic, media-driven return to the voluntaristic, individual human scale. That affective pattern 
becomes second nature.12   
Thus, fear is frequently employed by state apparatuses, such as the media, for the affective 
modulation and management of populations. It is worth noting at this point that the term 
‘affect’ has a particular meaning for Massumi, who took the term from Deleuze’s and Félix 
Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus,13 who in turn took it from the work of philosopher Baruch 
Spinoza. For Deleuze and Guattari, affect and affection should not be confused with feelings 
or with emotions. In the introductory notes to his translation of A Thousand Plateaus, 
Massumi further explains that while feelings are personal and biographical, emotions are 
social. By contrast, affect ‘is a prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one 
experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that 
body’s capacity to act.’14 Affects are non-conscious experiences of certain intensity. Affects 
are always prior to and/or outside of consciousness, and for this reason they are abstract, 
unstructured and cannot be fully captured through language. On the other hand, feelings are 
sensations that are confronted and labelled and interpreted against previous experiences. As 
opposed to affects thus, feelings depend on the distinctive set of previous sensations that each 
person has, which is why feelings are both biographical and personal. Emotions are 
projections and/or displays of a feeling, and in this sense they differ from feelings because 
emotions can be either genuine or feigned. What gives content to a feeling, and therefore to 
an emotion, is affect, the intensity that results from the stimuli that impinge upon our bodies 
via our senses. Affect thus determines the intensity of a feeling. 
                                                
12 Massumi, ‘The Half-Life of Disaster,’ in The Guardian (Friday, April 15th 2011), 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/apr/15/half-life-of-disaster> [accessed 10th October 2012]. 
13 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. by Brian Massumi (London 
and New York: Continuum, 2004). 
14 Ibid, p.xvii. 
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Understanding the cinematic image in terms of affect or of its affective modulation, 
entails affirming that the image operates upon us on a bodily or sensorial level, which in turn 
entails that meaning does not reside (exclusively) at the level of text or of language but also 
at the level of an embodied sensorial response. Steyerl’s idea that documentaries that have the 
potential to articulate a political criticism are able to engage spectators not exclusively by 
means of their representational content, but also (and perhaps more importantly) via what 
they express through their form is relevant because it allows thinking and explaining the 
political and ethical potential of documentary filmmaking beyond the framework of 
representation. In what follows, I will argue that approaching documentaries in terms of 
expression and affect allows us to consider other aspects and social relationships that can 
emerge through this form of filmmaking. These alternative aspects differ from the questions 
that usually arise from an exclusive focus on representation, and hence on the power relations 
necessarily existing between those represented and those with the power to represent and to 
speak on behalf of others. More specifically, since what a documentary expresses can invite 
the spectator to have a bodily-sensorial response that can open up the door to other meanings 
and other forms of engagement with the film, then the hierarchical relationship between those 
who represent, those who are represented, and those who are limited to observe such 
representations can be challenged. And consequently, such representational hierarchies can 
instead be substituted with a more horizontal set of social and ethical and political 
relationships among the spectators, the filmmaker and the filmed subjects. In the following 
sections of this chapter, I will discuss The Nine Muses because it is a documentary about 
migration, and its stylistic and formal features provide a good example of the extent to which 
temporal and acoustic elements of documentaries can produce affective and embodied 
responses in spectators.  
III. The Nine Muses and the Experience of Migration   
Akomfrah’s The Nine Muses could be described simultaneously as a documentary and a 
poetic essay film that offers a meditation on the experience of migration, on travel and epic 
journeys, as well as on the ideas of being and becoming. In line with his previous work as a 
solo video-artist and as part of the Black Audio Film Collective,15 The Nine Muses crucially 
                                                
15 The Black Audio Film Collective (BAFC) was a group founded in 1982 by Akomfrah alongside six other 
British students. Working mainly with moving and still images, they produced a diverse body of work ranging 
from essay films and experimental documentaries, videos, installations, and photographs to essays, posters, film 
programs, seminars and an art manifesto. Highly influenced by the work of French avant-garde and other non-
Western filmmakers, BAFC was concerned with the politics of representation (specifically with media 
representations of race) and dedicated their experimental work to explore issues of diaspora, memory and the 
political struggle of marginalized groups. See Eshun and Sagar (eds), The Ghosts of Songs: The Film Art of the 
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revolves around the question as to what extent it is possible to extract an image from the 
narrative and the chronology in which it has been presented, and then re-insert it within 
another set of images, another con-text. In other words, the question underlying the film is 
what sort of narrative (and subsequent mythology) would result from withdrawing some 
archival images and media representations of the African, Caribbean and Asian diasporas in 
Britain during the 1960s and through to the 1980s, and instead relocating these images into 
another context of expression, another framework. Would this new context allow the images 
of migrants to shed the original mythologies they have been imbued with and instead re-
articulate them in terms of new narratives? 
Indeed, the purpose of The Nine Muses is to suggest a counter-history, a counter-
mythology and a counter-memory of the experience of migration by re-working and re-
contextualising archival footage taken from films and newsreels portraying black and Asian 
migrants in post-war Britain. As Akomfrah puts it in an interview: 
In some sense […] the archive does exist as a kind of official memory of place, a moment and so on. 
But the archive survives in a very complicated way for diasporic subjectivities. Someone made the 
point that diasporic lives are characterized by the absence of monuments that attest to your existence, 
so in a way the archival inventory is that monument. But it’s contradictory because the archive is 
also the space of a certain fabulations and fictions. So there needs to be a critical interrogation of the 
archive. One of the important ways of doing this is to remove the narrative voice […]. If you remove 
one of the key structuring devices from archival images, they suddenly allow themselves to be 
reinserted into other narratives with which you can ask new questions.16  
Ever since the start of his career, Akomfrah has been interested in finding alternative ways of 
portraying and narrating the migrant experience and the lives of diasporas in Britain. One of 
the main concerns throughout the body of Akomfrah’s work has been drawing attention to 
and questioning mainstream media representations and public discourse about migration. In 
particular, he has been critical of the strong tendency within British media to depict migrants 
through negative, stereotyped and racist lenses. Migrants have frequently been scapegoated 
especially during times of economic crisis. Today, they are often blamed for the high levels 
of unemployment and for stealing jobs from the British working class, for driving down 
                                                                                                                                                  
Black Audio Film Collective (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007); and Romphf, ‘“Invention in the 
Name of Community”: Workshops, the Avant-Garde and The Black Audio Film Collective,’ in Kino: The 
Western Undergraduate Journal of Film Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2010), pp.1-8, 
<http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/kino/vol1/iss1/2> [accessed 30th May 2012]. 
16 Power, ‘Counter-Media, Migration, Poetry: Interview with John Akomfrah,’ in Film Quarterly, Vol. 65, No. 2 
(Winter 2011), pp.59-63 (p.62), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/FQ.2011.65.2.59> [accessed 20th April 
2012]. 
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wages, and also for ‘abusing’ the welfare system of the host nation.17 This portrayal of 
immigration has become so common in the media and within politicians’ rhetoric (the latter 
often done with electoral aims) that it has been ‘naturalised’ to the extent that this view is 
now taken as common sense, as something which is no longer called into question. It is 
precisely this prejudiced anti-immigration thinking that Akomfrah has sought to resist 
through his video-art installations and films.  
With the aim of challenging and trying to overcome the common depiction of 
migrants in relation to discussions about crime and other social problems, in The Nine Muses 
Akomfrah draws on epic literature as well as on English and non-Western poetry such as 
Homer’s Odyssey; Milton’s Paradise Lost, Beckett’s The Unnamable and Molloy; 
Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night and Richard II; Sophocles’s Oedipus; Dylan Thomas’s Under 
Milk Wood; The Epic of Gilgamesh; The Old Testament, among others. Akomfrah uses these 
works throughout The Nine Muses in the form of voice-over readings and captioned 
quotations that serve both as a framework and background against which the phenomenology 
of the experience of migration is explored. Thus, the film provides a different approach to 
today’s much discussed question of mass migration, and it questions the representation of the 
latter within mainstream media. One could argue here that the choice of a largely Western 
literary canon only reinforces -- rather than questions -- the powers of colonial and post-
colonial regimes that have imposed these texts as cannon. However, as I will argue below, 
Akomfrah’s film proposes a positive reclaiming and re-appropriating of these texts by way of 
mixing them and putting them in dialogue with images and other sounds effects. It is through 
this re-appropriation that this documentary is able to challenge mainstream representations of 
migrants and migration. 
 Akomfrah has affirmed that two of the concepts and tropes guiding The Nine Muses 
are those of being and becoming. In particular, while making the film he was trying to 
understand the process of ‘becoming’ a migrant and the sense in which migrant subjectivities 
seem to be always in a state of in-betweeness. That is, as if migrant subjectivities were 
always constantly arriving but never quite getting there, never quite completing the journey; 
and so in an endless state of transience and flux. As I said in chapter one following Balibar, 
because of their in-betweeness, migrants’ lives are borders themselves. Given that what 
characterizes migrant subjectivities is precisely this ontological transience, the endless 
                                                
17 See Forkert, ‘Cash Cows and Job Poachers? Non-EU Students and Austerity Politics,’ in Mute Magazine (11th 
October 2012), <http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/cash-cows-and-job-poachers-non-eu-students-and-
austerity-politics> [accessed 15th October 2012]. 
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displacement, and the rootlessness, then these lives can be seen on a par with epic journeys 
narratives. Indeed, migrants have endured long and very often difficult journeys, and in this 
process they have tried to find ways to avoid or overcome obstacles as well as to adapt to 
new environments by drawing on their own resources. And these experiences, says 
Akomfrah, bear striking similarities to the narratives of epic literature, and in particular to the 
outline of Homer’s Odyssey, which explains why the filmmaker decided to make use of this 
classic text. Thus, connecting archival images of migrants arriving, living and working in 
post-war Britain to the Homeric myth and the figure of the epic hero, frees these images from 
their context of expression and the narrative chains and stories to which they were first liked. 
These alternative narratives allow the images to say something different, to create new 
stories. 
The director has further claimed as regards the use of recorded poetry in his film that 
what he sought to convey is that there is a deeper underlying connection between all the 
apparently disparate texts and migrant subjectivities. The ontological mark of migrant lives, 
which is the constant state of becoming, the never-ending sense of in-betweeness, is a quality 
that is shared by all human beings and not just by migrants. According to Akomfrah, 
Beckett’s work and Milton’s Paradise Lost are two examples that clearly attest to this fact; 
the fact that human life is an interminable process. As he explains it: 
Paradise Lost is a monumental exposition of precisely that […] ontological transience […]. Paradise 
Lost is about man’s first disobedience -- we are born in that moment of flux and we never really 
move out of it. And this isn’t a migrant speaking; this is the major poet of the English language, who 
understood this. And everybody else in [The Nine Muses] is trying to understand this same problem. 
Beckett is all about flickering sparks in that transience; no one ever ‘is’ in Beckett. I think I am, I 
may be, I could be tomorrow. Endless questions.18 
This existentialist rumination is presented in The Nine Muses by way of the interweaving of 
the archival footage and newly shot material with the voice-over readings as well as the 
asynchronous and the dissonant and non-dissonant sound effects and music. In this way, the 
film simultaneously offers an investigation on the experience of migration to Britain during 
the twentieth century, and a philosophical contemplation of the journey as a metaphor of 
human life. Thus in the film a caption quoting Japanese poet Matsuo Basho reads: ‘Every day 
is a journey, and the journey itself is home.’ 
The connection that Akomfrah wishes to establish between migrants’ experiences and 
traditional epic narratives, on the one hand; and between migrant subjectivities and the 
                                                
18 Power, ‘Counter-Media, Migration, Poetry,’ p.62. 
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ontological mark of human beings, on the other, invites the question as to what extent these 
two analogies are possible. In other words, a question emerges as to whether these two 
metaphors are appropriate considering that what the film director aims to do is to offer a 
different depiction of migrants and diasporas, a different way of narrating the experience of 
migration. Can we really say that human life is just like the life of a migrant? What would 
this mean? What understanding of migration does this analogy imply? 
An epic is a long narrative poem employing a grandiose or elevated style to recount 
the deeds and adventures of a heroic figure, who is usually protected by gods (and sometimes 
even procreated by gods) and is engaged in a mission or a serious enterprise upon which the 
fate of a nation or a race depends. This quest frequently involves a battle or a long and 
arduous journey (or both) during which the hero has to defeat adversaries that attempt to 
thwart his endeavour. This journey is transformational. Thus upon his intrepid 
accomplishment, the hero returns home significantly shaped by this experience. According to 
The Concise Oxford Companion to Classical Literature, epic narratives have some formal 
features that are prominent, amongst them for instance, ‘the narrator vouches for the truth of 
his story; there are invocations [to the muses], elaborate greetings, long speeches, [...] and the 
frequent repetition of “typical” elements [such as the scene where the hero arms] for battle.’19 
Comparing migrants’ lives with epic narratives, as Akomfrah does, might seem farfetched, 
especially as regards the god-like nature of the hero and his always triumphant venture, since 
migrants’ journeys across borders do not always end successfully nor are migrants always 
able to return home. However, if one takes the metaphor to loosely mean that a migrant -- 
like the epic figure -- embarks on a perilous journey that requires courage to leave his 
homeland and loved ones behind, and that this experience deeply transforms him, then the 
analogy between epic narratives and migration seems reasonable. What is more, given that 
Akomfrah intends to challenge the traditionally negative representations of migrants in 
Britain, this analogy provides an opportunity to present an alternative portrayal of migration 
and diasporas in the UK, and also to question the ubiquitous prejudiced depictions found in 
mainstream media and in public political discourse. 
One might still wonder, nonetheless, whether Akomfrah’s attempt to offer a new 
portrayal and narrative of mass migration to 20th century Britain does not risk generalising 
the experience of migrants by presenting a single and overarching account of migrants’ 
subjectivities and the phenomenology of the experience of crossing borders. Would the 
                                                
19 Howatson and Chilvers (eds), The Concise Oxford Companion to Classical Literature (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), p.203. 
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attempt to establish this all-encompassing account not entail closing the door to other 
possible narratives? Would The Nine Muses not be falling prey of the very same problem it 
aims to criticise? Are the archival images, the newly shot footage and the classic western 
texts employed in this film not suggesting a univocal representation, a closed and reductive 
story of migrants’ lives? Furthermore, is the use of classic literature not another westernised 
and romanticised depiction of migrant subjectivities? Is the ontological characterization of 
human lives as resembling the life and journeys of the epic figure not a somewhat clichéd 
analogy? And if so, does this analogy not simplify, and moreover, homogenize the 
experience of migration and hence legitimize the hardships that migrants endure?   
In response to this criticism, one might argue, firstly, that employing classic Western 
literature such as Shakespeare, Beckett and/or Milton as a metaphor of migration does not 
necessarily amount to trivialising migrants’ difficult journeys or idealising their 
‘adventurous’ lives. Equally, the use of these authors does not entail adopting the frequently 
negative representations of migrant subjectivities and the experience of migration. Indeed, 
resorting to English speaking writers and to other texts considered canonical in the Western 
world (such as the Odyssey) does not by itself entail remaining uncritical of the official 
narratives and prejudiced portrayals of migrants. On the contrary, Akomfrah has made the 
point in a conversation that, 20 as a migrant who grew up in Britain (he was born in Ghana, 
and arrived in Britain when he was six years old), he actually had to read these canonical 
works and had been shaped by them. Thus by quoting these classical texts in his film, he 
wanted to present a narrative of the phenomenology of the experience of migration that -- 
rather than telling a story about how much the arrival of African, Asian and Caribbean 
immigrants affected British society and culture -- would invert the logic of official narratives 
in order to explore the extent to which the British host culture affected migrants. More 
specifically, he was interested in asking what and how these texts of classic literature could 
say about diasporic identities and migration, in general; and in particular, what these texts 
could also say about his own life as an immigrant growing up in the UK from an early age. In 
this sense, what Akomfrah is doing by invoking the Western canon is claiming ownership of 
these texts in order to explore the issue of migration from his own personal experience. It is 
this personal aspect that gives this documentary its essay-film aspect. As Rascaroli has 
                                                
20 See Akomfrah, ‘The Nine Muses. Q and A Session with Helen Dewitt,’ British Film Institute Live Website, 
<http://www.bfi.org.uk/live/video/470> [accessed 3rd May 2012]. 
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pointed out, what makes the foremost feature of essay-films is that the filmmaker expresses 
her own personal view, that she has a strong presence within the film as an authorial voice.21   
In addition to this, Akomfrah has insisted that the use of works by Dylan Thomas, 
Milton, Emily Dickinson and/or Beckett in no way amounts to ‘throwing away the 
revolutionary towel.’22 It is possible to create a documentary-essay film that is critical and 
poetic simultaneously. The most radical film essays to have been made in Britain were, 
according to Akomfrah, those that took distance from fabulist tales and epistolary forms, and 
in lieu of this adopted a more poetic form. For instance, Humphrey Jennings and other 
members of the GPO Film Unit,23 who saw in the use of poetry an essential part of their film 
works. It is by invoking the work of these canonical English authors in order to find a 
different voice and a different way of narrating migration, that a political criticism can be 
articulated. In other words, a subversive narrative that challenges the widely spread negative 
representations of migrants can be proposed precisely by extracting and transposing classic 
Western literature to produce new stories, stories that offer alternatives to the official ones. 
To be sure, there is something significantly subversive in taking a structure from its original 
form and applying it in another medium. 
Against the criticism that rather than opening up the possibility of new narratives 
Akomfrah’s film presents a closed and reductionist account of migrants’ experience in 
Britain, I would like to counter-argue throughout the remaining sections of this chapter that 
what this documentary-essay expresses by means of its form is a different way of narrating 
the experience of migration. I will claim that this new narrative about migration and migrant 
subjectivities is neither reductive nor does it deter the possibility of other accounts, other 
stories and other mythologies. Thus in what follows, I will analyse the form of The Nine 
Muses more closely, and will affirm that the manner in which time and memory are 
expressed, and also the way sound functions within the film are affective. In other words, I 
will make the point that this documentary-essay produces certain affects, embodied responses 
in spectators in a way that allows the latter to become actively engaged in the articulation of 
the meaning of the film. In this way, the film opens up the prospect of various alternative 
                                                
21 See Rascaroli, The Personal Camera. Subjective Cinema and The Essay Film. 
22 Power, ‘Counter-Media, Migration, Poetry,’ p.63. 
23 The GPO Film Unit was established by Sir Stephen Tallents in 1933 as part of the UK General Post Office’s 
new public relations department.  The Film Unit was directed by British documentary filmmaker, John 
Grierson, and it was in charge of creating sponsored documentary films in order to promote the activities of the 
GPO. Under Grierson’s guidance, the Film Unit emerged as a film school concerned with producing work with 
a socially useful purpose. See Anthony, ‘GPO Film Unit (1933-1940),’ in Screen Online 
<http://www.screenonline.org.uk/film/id/464254/index.html> [accessed 12th October 2012]. 
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narratives, and meanings. And this, I will argue following Steyerl, is what makes this film 
critical and where its potential for political subversion resides.  
IV. Form and Narrative in The Nine Muses 
A striking feature of The Nine Muses lies precisely in its form. To begin with, the way this 
film is organised closely resembles the structure of epic narratives not merely in terms of the 
montage interweaving archival and new footage accompanied by voice-over readings, but 
also in terms of its narrative elements and form. The Nine Muses is divided into nine sections 
or chapters, one standing for each of the Nine Muses of Greek mythology who -- as the film 
informs in a series of captions -- were the daughters of Zeus and Mnemosyne, the goddess of 
memory. In an oblique yet lyrical manner, the muses of Epic Poetry (Calliope), History 
(Clio), Sacred Song or Choral Poetry (Polyhymnia), Tragedy (Melpomene), Music (Euterpe), 
Astronomy (Urania), Comedy (Thalia), Erotic or Lyric Poetry (Erato), and Dance 
(Terpsichore) are evoked through sequences of intertwined images. Thus, like in any classic 
epic narrative, a muse or muses are invoked by the narrator so that he is divinely inspired and 
able to tell the story about the journey and events that the epic hero is faced with.   
The images in each of the nine chapters shift -- at times smoothly and at other times 
more dramatically -- between archival footage of migrants in post-war Britain realizing their 
everyday activities, and Akomfrah’s original filmed material depicting a snowed and icy 
Alaskan landscape and an unsettled Artic Sea. While the archive images appear to deal with 
constant movement, travel and the hectic urban life, the scenes of frozen and desolate 
landscapes, by contrast, seem static and meditative. In the latter, an anonymous solitary 
figure wearing a bright coloured winter coat stands still against the snowy monochromatic 
background with his back to the camera, thus suggesting the sense of alienation, isolation and 
the cold experienced by immigrants when they first arrived in Great Britain.   
Also in line with one of the traits of epic narratives, which is the use of repetitions and 
recurrent phrases, the film reiterates the trope of the unidentifiable dark figure in a bright coat 
against a snowy, grey and vast landscape. In yet another conversation about his work,24 
Akomfrah has explained that this motif of a single human silhouette in an open landscape 
represents questions of self and place. Specifically, a very important issue pervasive in all his 
films and video-installations is that of the place that diasporic subjectivities have within the 
larger imagery of the host nation or site of destination. The lone dark figure located outdoors 
stands for the idea that displaced subjects are largely marginal to the narratives of the place 
                                                
24 Akomfrah, ‘Conversation Between John Akomfrah and Mike Sperlinger,’ Caroll/Fletcher Gallery, London, 
24th October, 2012. 
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where they relocate. Again, it is this sense of isolation and estrangement of diasporic subjects 
that gets stressed time and time again throughout The Nine Muses, just like one of the 
recurrent lines that figure in epic poems.    
Another parallel that can be drawn between this documentary-essay and the 
characteristics of classic epic narratives is the core role played by the narrator’s voice. In its 
origins, epic poetry was primarily an oral form; fundamentally transmitted by oral means. 
This explains why these poems tended to be constituted by a series of short episodes that 
could be remembered both by narrators and audience more easily, thus ensuring the epic 
story would be preserved throughout its successive transmissions. The voice-over readings of 
classic texts in the film work as a trope that simultaneously highlights the importance of the 
narrator and reinforces the analogy between the epic hero figure and the figure of the 
migrant, between the epic journey and the migrant’s journey. The myriad works and the 
diverse voices employed to do the readings (performed by some renowned period and 
contemporary actors and actresses, such as Richard Burton, John Barrymore and Teresa 
Gallagher) appears to emulate the manner in which epic poetry is passed on: orally done by 
means of a consecutive chain of storytellers. But perhaps most importantly and because these 
voice-over readings are extra-diegetic and asynchronous with the images, The Nine Muses 
suggests that there are many ways to tell the story (and the history) of migration to post-war 
Britain, not just the official (and largely prejudiced and racist) way. This can be observed, for 
instance, in the chapter dedicated to Euterpe, the muse of music. In it shots of an open 
landscape showing snowy mountains, a frozen forest and a dark sea are paired with a reading 
of The Odyssey. At first, this seems to suggest that it is the anonymous figure in the bright 
coat walking in the snow the one who is acting as the narrator; telling about Odysseus 
encounter with the sirens and how he was able to avoid being enchanted by their song by 
tying himself to a mast. However, this same voice keeps narrating while traditional vocal 
Indian music simultaneously starts playing and gradually increases its volume. At the same 
time, the images shift from the Alaskan landscape to archival footage in black and white 
depicting, first, an industrial landscape and factory chimneys expelling smoke, and then, 
black immigrants on board of a big ship. The narrator’s voice overlapped with the Indian 
music but also with the diegetic sounds produced by factories and ship engines appear to 
subvert the idea that there is one single voice, one narrative. Instead, this mix of sounds and 
images emphasise that there are many voices, and myriad ways and perspectives to tell the 
story of migrants and diasporas in Britain.    
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The complex tapestry that Akomfrah’s film achieves through the assemblage of 
archive and newly shot scenes together with the voice-over readings, the poetry quotations as 
well as the contemporary atmospheric music by Arvo Pärt in tandem with Schubert, Wagner, 
Handel and the traditional vocal Indian music, results in an emotional recreation of the 
migrant experience. The film offers an emotional map of sorts tracing the journey towards 
and the encounter with the new land, and also migrants’ lives in this new territory. For 
instance, the section that is entitled ‘Polyhymnia’ begins with archive black and white 
footage of black singer Leontyne Price25 performing a song whose lyrics claim ‘sometimes I 
feel like a motherless child, a long way from home.’ The song plays throughout this section -- 
which is devoted to the muse of choral songs and hymns -- while archival images of trains in 
motion and British industrial urban landscapes are followed by newly filmed images of 
snowy forests and the Artic Sea. Thus, sounds and images are coupled in this section and 
throughout the film in order to suggest the sense of uprootedness and alienation migrants felt. 
The nostalgic and homesick tone of the song and its lyrics appear as the perfect hymn to 
evoke and illustrate the experience of migration.   
V. Time, Memory and Sound 
I would like now to explore two central elements belonging to the form of The Nine Muses, 
and that play a role in the expressive and thus also in the affective dimension of this film. 
These two elements are time and memory, on the one hand; and sound (voice, noise and 
music), on the other. Analysing these two elements and the affective resonance they produce, 
will allow me to further discuss -- following Steyerl -- the potential that this documentary-
essay has for engaging the spectator affectively and actively, and hence also its potential for 
challenging cultural, political and social hierarchies. 
There is a fundamental exploration of the concept of memory in The Nine Muses. The 
fact that this film is the result of the development and expansion of a previous video 
installation by Akomfrah, entitled ‘Mnemosyne,’ confirms this. Mnemosyne is the Greek 
goddess of memory. And the words ‘mnemonics’ and ‘mnemotechnics,’ which refer to 
techniques for remembering things with ease, are etymologically related for they share the 
Greek roots ‘mnēmē’ and ‘mnēmonikos,’ which respectively mean ‘memory’ and ‘of 
                                                
25 Leontyne Price is an American soprano who reached the peak of her career between the 1950’s and 1960’s 
performing in world known opera houses. She became the first black singer to have sung a leading role at 
Milan’s opera house, La Scala. See Oron, ‘Leontyne Price,’ in Bach Cantatas Website (January 2002), 
<http://www.bach-cantatas.com/Bio/Price-Leontyn.htm> [accessed 3rd July 2012]. 
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memory.’26 In ancient Greece, the art of memory or mnemotechnics emerged as a group of 
techniques or principles that were employed for the purposes of aiding recollection and 
organising memories usually in the practice of rhetoric and other oratorical exercises that 
demanded the memorization of large amounts of information, concepts or ideas. For instance, 
a common mnemotechnics consists in associating the idea or concept that is to be recalled 
with a striking visual image or some other salient sensorial impression.  
The Nine Muses itself can be considered as a mnemonic exercise or, perhaps better 
said, as a film deploying a mnemonic structure. The chapters or episodes named after each of 
the Nine Muses that repeatedly shift between new and archival footage function as a 
reminder of the need to question the evidence found in archives as well as the ‘official’ 
narratives based on such evidence. It is through the repetition of this collage of past and 
recent images that viewers are constantly reminded that there are other ways to portray the 
experience of migration and diasporic subjectivities. However, this is not the only sense in 
which Akomfrah’s film could be said to operate mnemonically. It is also worth noting that 
the multi-layered quality of The Nine Muses effectively captures the way in which memory 
actually operates in us, that is, the process through which we freely associate and dissociate 
past experiences. The fact that archival and new images, monochromatic black and white and 
colour footage, succeed one another seems to emulate the manner our memories shift from 
the most remote ones to more recent ones and vice versa without following an obvious logic.  
Additionally, each of the episodes seems to leave a ‘trace,’ a remnant of a past event, 
either in the form of archival material (images or sounds) or in the form of a voice-over 
fragment or a quotation taken from a classic text. Here it’s worth remembering briefly that 
the notion of ‘trace’ has been largely explored and given different definitions by philosophers 
and other theorists of film and photography. Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Emmanuel Lévinas, Jacques Derrida, Paul Ricoeur, among others, have discussed this 
concept in terms of the semiotic hybridity between materiality and experience that the notion 
of the trace has. For instance, Merleau-Ponty has described the trace as something that does 
not refer to the past, but rather the trace is present; and if we find in the trace signs of a 
previous event, that is because we derive our sense of the past from another experience but 
not from the trace itself. 27 The material trace of the past in documentaries like The Nine 
Muses stands not as an imprint or an index of an event but as a souvenir, for it draws 
                                                
26 See Anon, ‘Mnemosyne,’ in Oxford Dictionaries Online, 
<http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/Mnemosyne?q=mnemosyne> [accessed 30th October 2012]. 
27 See Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. by Colin Smith (London and New York: Routledge, 
2005).    
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attention to the fact that all cinematic images are a record of a past time, of a ‘death time’ 
(even when the phenomenology of watching moving images, as opposed to photographs, 
normally appears for the viewer to unfold in the present). The lingering presence of the past, 
nonetheless, functions as a trigger for memories in the spectator in the sense that it brings her 
to an awareness of time, a sense of the passing of time. As Wahlberg has explained it, the 
trace, instead of being a mark of a past event, is a constitutive sign within the re-construction 
and re-invention of the narrative of a historical event. In Wahlberg’s words: 
The trace of the trace is the label I choose for techniques in film and video to stage traces of the past 
through, for example, photographs, archival footage, recorded speech, text and verbal discourses of 
testimony. In this realm of re-invented memory, the trace is often evoked in collected fragments 
from different media contexts. This material aspect of image compilation questions the idea of the 
image-memory as directly correspondent to historical time. Instead, a sequence may perform as a 
documentary ready-made [...] which [...] results in a thought-provoking re-contextualising of the 
object or image.28 
In the case of The Nine Muses, because the spectator is constantly confronted with 
overlapping traces present in newly shot material and images extracted from television and 
film archives, the sense of what belongs in the distant past, what belongs in the more recent 
past, and what belongs in the present becomes blurry. The Nine Muses thus constitutes a 
multi-layered and complex collage of time and memory. Time unfolds in this film in many 
ways and directions. There is the time of watching, a ‘now’ time that presents to the spectator 
as developing in the present moment, occurring right in front of her. But there is also the time 
of recording of the recently filmed images, and the times of recording of the various archival 
images, which occurred in the past and so they function as repositories and mementos of past 
events. And there is also a time that unfolds at the juncture of all these times. It is precisely 
this disorienting (or at least ambiguous) experience of temporality that allows the spectator to 
acquire a sense of the passing of time as much as a sense of the many ways in which the 
experience of migration to Britain can be remembered, re-interpreted and re-narrated.  
The centrality that memory acquires in this documentary-essay is marked by the fact 
that the ‘official’ history of migration to post-war Britain gets revisited and subverted through 
the continuous transposition, interpolation, deconstruction and re-framing of archival 
material, and hence of temporality. Akomfrah stresses thereby the importance that memory 
and the archive have for the diasporic subject. For the film director, memory is an ‘essential 
                                                
28 Wahlberg, ‘Inscription and Re-framing: At the Editing Table of Harun Farocki,’ in Konsthistorisk Tidskrift/ 
Journal of Art History, Vol. 73, No. 1 (February, 2004), pp.15-26 (pp.17-18), 
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prerequisite to being’ in general, for it is what allows people to have a sense of identity and 
belonging, and to acquire a sense of value. In the particular case of the migrant and/or the 
diasporic subject, memory is ever more relevant because through their displacement and 
travels the sense of belonging gets disrupted, dislocated, since there are almost no spaces that 
serve as memorials to attest and thus anchor or give grounding to migrants’ identity. As 
Akomfrah claims, the archive provides the only space of the ‘memorial for diasporic 
subjects.’29 But the archive is at the same time a site of struggle between the official and the 
unofficial; between that which is deemed a historical fact and that which is not recognised as 
such and has been suppressed or overlooked. Hence the importance for Akomfrah to delve 
into various film and television archives, to exhume them, and to de-construct and re-
construct them.     
The other remarkable trait of The Nine Muses is the way it plays with sound, be this in 
the form of voice-over readings, music, machine and engine noises or as rain, snow, wind and 
wave-crashing sounds. In a similar fashion to the way Akomfrah interpolates archival and 
new footage, the sound effects and music accompanying the images flow continuously 
sometimes succeeding one another, sometimes overlapping and then dissolving into each 
other. From contemporary instrumental music (purposely composed for the film by 
Akomfrah’s long term collaborator, Trevor Mathison) to classical music to distorted diegetic 
and non-diegetic machine-like sounds, and to the voice-over readings of classic texts, this 
documentary-essay creates an elaborate sonic collage. In this way, the sound effects and 
score in The Nine Muses also shift freely from past to more recent sounds, much in the same 
way that our memory functions. And once again, all this is done with the purpose of 
deconstructing the narrative and original context within which images and sounds were 
originally used in order to reconstruct a new alternative narrative. This is clear, for instance, 
towards the end of the section devoted to Polyhymnia, where the voice of singer Price 
dissolves into echoes and machine-like noises. In this respect, Akomfrah affirms: 
I’m fond of trying to force apparently dissonant sounds to cohabit the same narrative space as non-
dissonant sounds. Leontyne Price is singing about being motherless, but marrying her with post-Eno, 
post-Stockhausen type sounds that suggest another universe of openness and open possibilities, 
suddenly something really strange starts to happen which can’t be anticipated in advance of trying 
it.30  
                                                
29 Akomfrah, ‘Chiasmus. An Interview with John Akomfrah,’ The Nine Muses DVD (London: New Wave 
Films, 2010). 
30 Trilling, ‘Sound on Film. Interview: John Akomfrah,’ in Sound and Music Website, 
<http://soundandmusic.org/features/sound-film/interview-john-akomfrah> [accessed 12th July 2012]. 
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Sound acquires a particular relevance within this film because Akomfrah employs it as 
another element within the form and narrative, of equal importance to the images. Instead of 
simply subordinating sound and using it as a mere accompaniment to the footage, he 
interweaves the two in such a manner that the film serves as a reminder that cinema is both 
an audio and a visual medium, and that sound can actually undermine the narratives and the 
logic that images follow. Akomfrah thus lets sound follow and produce its own logic, one 
that is different from and even sometimes contradictory to the order produced by the images. 
As he explains: ‘I am very interested in the sense of cacophony -- in the metaphoric sense -- 
that sound brings [for] it has a kind of subversive presence, [...] a sort of disruptive value vis-
à-vis the logic of images.’31 This cacophony between sound and image is emphasised 
throughout the length of The Nine Muses. For instance, in the episode entitled ‘Clio’ a 
sequence from a black and white British TV film -- A Man from the Sun (1956)32 -- frames a 
white man in a raincoat walking along the pavement on a busy commercial street. The man 
stops to look to the other side of the street. A shot-reverse-shot shows a black man and a 
white woman holding a conversation on the street. The woman turns her head away from the 
black man and then the camera returns to frame the white man disapprovingly staring in the 
direction of the couple. Then the black man asks the woman why she had turned away, and 
she explains that her father was standing across the street and would not have liked seeing her 
speaking to a man. The black man responds that what she really had meant to say was that 
her father would not have liked to see her speaking to a black man. While the dialogue 
between the black man and the white woman continues to be heard, the frame changes to 
show a colour low-angle shot (clearly not taken from the TV film) of another black man 
walking towards a building that looks like a warehouse or an old factory. As the conversation 
between the couple slowly fades, it is substituted gradually by non-diegetic guitar music. 
Finally, another cut introduces one more black and white archival shot depicting a close-up of 
a pair of hands playing a guitar. Only the upper part of the torso of the guitar player is shown 
as his face and the rest of his body remain outside the frame, unseen. 
The fact that Akomfrah allows the dialogue extracted from A Man from the Sun to 
extend into and then become part of the newly shot sequence of a black man wandering in an 
                                                
31 Akomfrah, ‘Chiasmus.’ 
32 A Man from the Sun is a TV film written by John Elliot, produced by the BBC in 1956. This film is an 
example of the attempts that British TV drama undertook in the mid-1950s to portray the lives of West Indian 
immigrants in Britain. The film follows a group of individuals who arrive in London from the West Indies, and 
they are faced with the racist and stereotyped views of the white population. See Daniels, ‘A Man from the Sun 
(1956),’ in Screen Online <http://www.screenonline.org.uk/tv/id/475546/index.html> [accessed 5th November 
2012].  
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urban landscape is one of the many moments in The Nine Muses that uses asynchronous 
sound in order to produce the cacophony between images and sound. The tension thus created 
underlines the different logic governing these two elements, and hence the different 
contributions that sound and image bring to films in general, and to this documentary-essay 
in particular. In the scene described above, sound disrupts the narrative flow of the archival 
images and the original footage by way of dissonance and syncopation. And this in turn can 
challenge the viewer’s expectations as regards the story and the history that Akomfrah’s 
documentary is trying to articulate, for it is a self-reflexive practice that draws attention to the 
constructed nature of cinematic representations. In this sense, sound operates as a trace 
insofar as it provides a reminder of the fact that both the newly shot images and the ones 
taken from archives -- and even sound itself -- are records of a past time even when, at the 
time of watching, the events portrayed appear to be live. Sound thus lays bare the artifice of 
cinema. But, perhaps most importantly, sound in this documentary-essay also acts as a 
thought-provoking and affective element within the film’s form, since it highlights the 
possibility and the need of revisiting, dislocating and reconstructing the ‘official’ history and 
narratives of immigrants and their experiences of moving to, settling and living in post-war 
Britain.       
In the next section, I will examine how the way sound and images area articulated in 
The Nine Muses can produce affective responses in the spectators, and how these responses 
invite spectators to be active participants in the determination of the meaning of the film. 
Exploring again the transposition of Azoulay’s model of photography, and drawing on 
Steyerl and Rancière, I will argue that this active engagement of the spectator is facilitated by 
the filmmaker. The latter, instead of adopting a position of superiority and attempting to 
teach spectators, acts as a host inviting them to take part. This is how spectators and 
filmmaker form a political and ethical bond based on equality.  
VI. Affect and the Potential for Political Relationships 
In her influential book The Skin of the Film. Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment and the 
Senses, Laura U. Marks argues that one of the traits of what she deems ‘intercultural cinema’ 
is that it inscribes the history and the memory of diasporic subjects with what Deleuze called 
the ‘powers of the false.’ This means that intercultural films act as falsifiers that ‘undermine 
the hegemonic character of official images, clichés, and other totalizing regimes of 
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knowledge.’33 As falsifying powers, these films refuse to call upon univocal voices, all-
encompassing narratives and/or pre-existing truths of community and culture. Marks also 
claims that films that can be qualified as intercultural are experimental in style and form; and 
that they constitute attempts to portray and reflect on the experience of living between two or 
more cultural frameworks and regimes of knowledge. These cinematographic works suggest 
that there are countless ways of knowing and representing the world; and they suspend or at 
least are sceptic of the ideological presumption that films can actually represent reality as it 
is. Another central feature of intercultural cinema according to Marks is that these films try to 
express the inexpressible and call to the fore that which is hard to represent. The way 
intercultural cinema does this is by summoning those senses that cannot be easily invoked 
through the medium of film except in a way that challenges traditional understandings of the 
manner in which sound and vision work together. In so doing, intercultural films experiment 
with and push the interplay between images and sound to new thresholds of perception. And 
the way these films open up new limits of perception is by offering ‘haptic images’34 or 
tactile images, which are images that invite a look that moves along the surface of an object 
or objects portrayed in such a way that the viewing subject cannot perceive the objects as 
separate and distinct forms in deep space. Haptic images allow for a gaze that discerns 
texture much more than it distinguishes form; thus giving prominence to the material (hence 
sensorial) aspect of the image, rather than to its representational potential as optical images 
do. Haptic images call for a haptic visuality, where the sense of touch is evoked through 
vision, and the eyes hence operate as organs of touch. Marks thus explains: 
Drawing from other forms of sense experience, primarily touch and kinaesthetics, haptic visuality 
involves the body more than is the case with optical visuality. Touch is a sense located on the surface 
of the body: thinking of cinema as haptic is only a step towards considering the ways cinema appeals 
to the body as a whole. The difference between haptic and optical visuality is a matter of degree. [...] 
Haptic images are [...] so ‘thin’ and unclichéd that the viewer must bring his or her resources of 
memory and imagination to complete them. The haptic image forces the viewer to contemplate the 
image itself instead of being pulled into narrative.35 
Marks sees in the falsifying powers that she ascribes to intercultural cinema the potential for 
creating ‘political transformations.’36 Because these films refuse to accept a hegemonic, 
homogenising, reductionist and all-encompassing account of the experience of migration and 
                                                
33 Marks, The Skin of the Film. Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment and the Senses (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2000), p.66. 
34 Ibid, p.22. 
35 Ibid, p.163. 
36 Ibid, p.67.  
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of cultural displacement, they become open spaces that allow multiple perspectives and 
alternative regimes of knowledge as regards the condition of in-betweeness that migrants and 
diasporic subjects have. It is in this sense that intercultural films are subversive, endowed 
with political potentiality, for they inaugurate a deterritorialised place, a place beyond geo-
political borders that acknowledges the lives of people in-between cultures. This space serves 
as a vessel for their histories and memories without pretending to be an objective record of 
the past (since such a record is impossible) or to stand as the only authentic voice of these 
displaced people.   
Bearing in mind Marks’s understanding of intercultural cinema, it is possible to 
characterize The Nine Muses as an intercultural documentary-essay, because it is an 
experimental film made by a diasporic filmmaker that explores the possibility of creating new 
narratives about the experience of migration and refuses to adopt a single definite account of 
migrants’ subjectivities. Akomfrah de-constructs and re-constructs film and TV archives 
mixing them with original footage in order to question the political and cultural limitations of 
what can be represented through a supposedly univocal history of migrant subjectivities in 
post-war Britain. The audiovisual collage that The Nine Muses achieves produces a narrative 
that is often disorienting, for it employs asynchronous sounds and voice-overs, and it splits 
time by moving back and forth -- from past to present and vice versa -- with the new and the 
archival images. All this results in a revision of official versions of history which foregrounds 
the necessarily fictional character of such dominant narratives that pretend to stand as 
discourses of truth. At the same time, Akomfrah’s film suggests an alternative story (equally 
fictional) that offers a sensorial and embodied approach to the experience of migration, and 
thus opens up a new space for diasporic memorials. As I will claim further on, the role that 
Akomfrah here adopts is one of a narrator that presents a personal view on migration, but that 
invites and fosters (but never forces) spectators to create their own story. In this way, the film 
undermines dominant discourses, and hence sets the conditions for political transformation.  
Let us return now to Steyerl’s thesis that documentaries that can articulate a political 
criticism manage to move a step beyond the level of text and representation, and instead 
engage spectators by means of expression. This means, as Massumi would say, that these 
films mobilise viewers at the level of affect, by prompting in them sensorial embodied 
responses. Steyerl largely coincides with Marks here. But perhaps the difference between the 
two is that Steyerl focuses on discussing how the formal elements and the expressive 
dimension of a documentary can constitute a political critique, whereas Marks is interested in 
defining intercultural cinema and discussing the embodied and sensorial experience that 
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necessarily results from watching intercultural films. While Steyerl puts her emphasis in the 
subversive potential of documentary films and the articulation of political critiques, Marks 
argues for the possibility of intercultural cinema (regardless of whether it is fictional or non-
fictional) to offer an alternative way of preserving cultural memory there where official 
histories are incomplete or misled, and where images, sounds and words seem simply 
inadequate. Ultimately, Marks’s focus is on the haptic or tactile possibilities of intercultural 
cinema, the feasibility of non-audiovisual sense experiences through this kind of cinema.37 I 
believe that Marks’s and Steyerl’s views are not mutually exclusive, and that the two 
positions can in fact supplement each other to provide a richer perspective on how 
documentaries about migration and border-crossing experiences can articulate a political 
criticism, subvert cultural and political hierarchies and establish alternative political and 
ethical relationships amongst viewers, filmed subjects and filmmakers. Turning again to The 
Nine Muses, I will suggest how these two views can work together. 
As I have argued throughout this chapter, The Nine Muses evokes the sensorial and 
emotional impact upon Asian, African and Caribbean migrants leaving their countries of 
origin and arriving in Britain. The film recreates and heightens the sense of strangeness and 
dislocation and the cold that immigrants felt; and it does so through coupling and organising 
apparently disparate images and sounds in such a way that there does not seem to be a 
definitive meaning or a final or complete closure to the film. Rather, new alternative closures 
and meanings emerge as possible to the extent that the recent footage, the archival images 
and the various sound effects are shown to be independent or, better said, detachable from the 
narrative chains in which they had been inserted in the first place. What The Nine Muses thus 
suggests is that there is no such thing as a single narrative, nor is there an exclusive authority 
to tell the story of migration to post-war Britain. The migrant experience can be re-presented 
in many ways and from many angles. In Akomfrah’s words: 
What seemed to me to be absolutely crucial when we started this film was to first banish that voice 
that you’re talking about -- what people call the ‘voice of God’ -- and then bring it back again. Every 
single bit of archive used in the film would have [originally been narrated in] that voice, but the 
voice would have said something very different. It would have said: I know everything and 
everything I’m going to tell you is the absolute truth […]. But if you could get that voice to recite 
poetry, for instance, which is a highly subjective reading of a situation, then that voice starts to 
                                                
37 In her book Marks devotes her analysis almost entirely to the sense of touch as evoked by intercultural 
cinema. She engages also with the senses of smell and taste. But she tends to leave out the consideration of 
sound. Even though she acknowledges the important role that sound plays in intercultural films, for sound can 
also be haptic and thus contribute to the embodied experience that these films produce, she leaves its discussion 
to one side. See Marks, The Skin of the Film, p.xvi.   
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resonate differently. It also seems to me that once you let the voice back in, be it male or female, 
then weirdly you start to see the range of it. Because as they [the various narrators] come in to speak 
partial truths you suddenly start to see the texture of each voice and what each voice does.38 
It’s worth pondering here whether Akomfrah’s documentary-essay really displays an open 
form. Does its narrative have no closure at all? This film does have a closure insofar as it 
builds up a narrative chain. It is divided into nine sections and each of them is in turn self-
contained; each offering a lyrical reflection or an existential allegory of sorts around the topic 
that gives name to the section. For example, the chapter entitled ‘Thalia,’ the muse of 
comedy, begins with a panning single close-up shot of children laughing and playing in front 
of the camera. Their voices and laughter can be heard simultaneously until they slowly fade 
away and a cut introduces a black screen with white titles quoting a fragment of 
Shakespeare’s Sonnet 50: ‘How heavy do I journey on the way, When what I seek, my weary 
travels end.’39 Later on, black and white footage shows a medium shot of a white man 
delivering a racist discourse about the urgency of stopping immigration to Britain. Unless the 
spectator is well versed in British political history, it is hard to know who he is, since the film 
does not say. However, the film makes explicit that this speaker is strongly against 
immigration. The man in question is British conservative politician Enoch Powell, who in 
1968 gave a controversial speech, known as ‘Rivers of Blood Speech,’ where he stated that 
the increasing number of migrants in Britain needed to be cut if the British culture and 
society were to survive and be saved from imminent violence. Still, the identity of this man is 
not relevant. What matters is that, through the footage of his discourse, the film suggests that 
migrating and settling in the UK was not easy, and that the experience did not always mean 
for the new arrivals to be in contentment in the new land, happily laughing like the children 
in the opening sequence of this section. There appears thus to be a wholeness or a 
completeness to this chapter devoted to the muse of comedy, and a similar logic is present in 
the other eight sections of the film. 
Despite this closure, however, The Nine Muses is structured in a way that does not 
close down form. Rather, this film’s closure works simultaneously as an opening in the sense 
that it allows for alternative interpretations and meanings, for it denies the possibility of both 
reaching one single univocal account of the experience of migration and offering an objective 
record of reality. Thus the film leaves the door open for the spectator to ponder in what other 
                                                
38 Trilling, ‘Interview: John Akomfrah.’ 
39 Shakespeare, ‘Sonnet 50: How Heavy Do I Journey on the Way,’ in Alchin, William Shakespeare Info. The 
Complete Works Online, <http://www.william-shakespeare.info/william-shakespeare-sonnet-50.htm> [accessed 
17th November 2012]. 
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ways the migrant experience can be depicted; and what other stories, histories and memories 
can be constructed about diasporic subjectivities. The active questioning on the part of the 
viewer entails her appropriation of the story, and hence a potential challenge to traditional 
representational practices, which normally endow those with representational powers (the 
filmmaker) with a position of knowledge -- and hence of cultural and political superiority -- 
over the represented subjects and even over the viewers. The spectator’s active involvement 
with the film can undermine social, political and cultural hierarchies necessarily presupposed 
by representational practices like documentaries. Insofar as The Nine Muses invites the 
spectator to engage in such a questioning, then the film has the potential to articulate a 
political critique in the way that Steyerl proposes. The fact that through its form the film 
allows others to take part in the construction of meaning opens the possibility of the 
emergence of alternative political relationships beyond the framework of the nation-state. 
Indeed, in the absence of one single subject of knowledge and of meaning, the bonds created 
by the film do not fall under the direct regulation of the national sovereign, much in the way 
that Azoulay says that photography can create political relationships. These political bonds 
formed through the documentary between spectators, the filmmaker and the filmed subjects 
challenge hierarchies of representation, and thus seem to be more horizontal rather than 
vertical, and more equal rather than stratified. Hence, these are political but also ethical 
relationships, relationships based on equality, solidarity and partnership. In other words, these 
are of hospitality in a Derridian sense. As Akomfrah has put it: 
[The idea behind The Nine Muses is an] idea of a kind of recycling aesthetic; an idea of sort of post-
scarcity aesthetic, which allows the possibility of re-use [of images] but for an ethical reason. There 
is a reason to revisit memory; there is a reason to revisit our past [and our official narratives]. And 
then to see whether stuff that you used in films previously can say something else later.40 
It is significant that Akomfrah invokes here an ethical rationale for revisiting archival images, 
relocating and reordering them in order to produce alternative narratives about migration and 
diasporic subjectivities. The film director seems to confirm thereby that he is committed to 
making artworks that are politically and ethically engaged. Politically engaged insofar as 
these works seek to resist hegemonic discourses and propose new stories of migrants’ 
experiences without imposing them as univocal and exhaustive. And ethically engaged 
insofar as Akomfrah sees this political motivation as a moral responsibility of sorts towards 
diasporic subjects.          
                                                
40 Akomfrah, ‘The Nine Muses. Q & A Session with Helen Dewitt.’ 
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However, a critic could still insist on asking whether Akomfrah’s film really invites 
viewers to become actively engaged with it. Does the thorough use of classic texts and the 
constant shift between new and archival images not produce too great a form of alienation for 
the spectator or, indeed, certain spectators? Does Akomfrah’s attempt to subvert hegemonic 
regimes of truth and official discourses not end up being overly intellectualized and thus 
impenetrable? What is more, does his film not require a particular kind of viewer who is at 
least familiar with the quoted texts? And if this were the case, would this not mean that this 
documentary-essay is actually deterring the possibility of the active participation of the 
spectator in the articulation of the film’s meaning? 
 One could agree that a documentary-essay like The Nine Muses is most likely to be 
appealing to certain viewers; perhaps those who have already an interest in documentary and 
experimental cinema or those who prefer watching so-called art-house films rather than 
blockbusters screened at cinema multiplexes. Akomfrah’s film is also arguably not very 
likely to attract large numbers of viewers, for its distribution and exhibition cannot match 
those of large budget commercial films. However, this does not mean that the film can only 
engage highly educated viewers. As Rancière explains, there is no way to predict how a 
spectator will react to a work of art (in this case, to a documentary), and it is not the role of 
the artist or filmmaker to enlighten or emancipate spectators.41 Instead, as I said in previous 
chapters, spectators are free to determine whether and to what degree they become involved 
in articulating the meaning of the film. The filmmaker should only open the possibility, the 
space, for spectators to become active participants. Akomfrah’s documentary-essay has the 
potential to engage spectators (both highly educated and not) since his voice and presence as 
enunciator and author is present, but in a way that is hospitable and that invites spectators to 
act as equal partakers.    
Let us draw again on Steyerl’s argument that the potential that a documentary has to 
articulate a political criticism and thus subvert social and cultural hierarchies resides in the 
film’s form and what is expressed through the latter, rather than in what the film represents 
and the ideological content that the documentary may have. If we accept Steyerl’s position, 
then the spectators become involved in the determination of the film’s signification at the 
linguistic and cognitive level of text, but also at the sensorial, bodily level of affect. And if 
this is the case, then there is no need for the viewer of The Nine Muses to be versed in the 
classic authors and the canonical literature cited or read as voice-overs in order for her to be 
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able to actively take part in establishing the meaning of this documentary. As I have 
explained, it is by means of its stylistic features, the rich collage of past and present images 
intertwined with sounds and music, and its epic narrative and self-reflexive structure, that the 
film and the filmmaker invite the viewer to be an active participant questioning and 
contributing to the meaning of the film -- rather than merely being a passive observer. The 
cold, nostalgia, estrangement and general disorientation experienced by migrants in the new 
land is conveyed effectively and affectively to the spectator. As Marks would claim, The 
Nine Muses is an intercultural film presenting haptic images that prompt the spectator’s 
sensorial apparatus (in this particular case specially the senses of hearing and touch) so as to 
‘complete’ the images she is presented with and to actively provide them with meaning. In 
this sense, it becomes possible to understand Akomfrah’s film as bearing a skin of sorts that 
is not simply the screen or surface where it is (or can be) projected, but rather a skin that 
functions like ‘a membrane that brings its audience into contact with the material [and 
sensorial] forms of memory.’42 Thus this documentary-essay operates as a site for 
remembrance insofar as it evokes and invokes the sensorial memories of the experience of 
migration that have no other space to be preserved and made visible within the official 
histories, records and institutional discourses of the dominant host society and culture.   
This potential active and embodied engagement of the spectator in the interpretation 
and determination of the meaning of the film entails that she becomes also a storyteller within 
the narrative of this documentary. As Rancière has argued, this is the political potential or the 
politicizing effect that ‘documentary fiction’ has upon viewers. When the spectator actively 
adopts the role both as an interpreter and narrator, appropriates the story and thereby becomes 
an ‘emancipated spectator,’ then the documentary is necessarily critical and subverts social, 
cultural and political hierarchies. And it is in this sense that the relationships emerging 
between filmmaker, spectator and filmed subjects become less stratified and more equal. In 
Rancière’s words: 
Like researchers, artists [filmmakers included] construct the stages where the manifestation and 
effect of their skills are exhibited, rendered uncertain in the terms of the new idiom that conveys a 
new intellectual adventure. The effect of the idiom cannot be anticipated. It requires spectators who 
play the role of active interpreters, who develop their own translation in order to appropriate the 
‘story’ and make it their own story. An emancipated community is a community of narrators and 
translators.43 
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233 
Insofar as Akomfrah’s The Nine Muses has an open form and a narrative that can invite the 
spectator to be an interpreter or translator and thus a narrator, this documentary-essay has the 
potential to form social relationships amongst equals. Thus the film gives rise to a space for 
hospitality relations, and hence to a community of equality. And even though such 
relationships amongst equal subjects might not be considered as constituting the utopian civil 
contract of photography of which Azoulay speaks, they can be said to be political and ethical 
relationships of mutual responsibility and solidarity that can pose a challenge to the dominant 
social, cultural and political hierarchies. 
VII. Final Remarks 
In this chapter, I have argued that documentaries can be affective and politically subversive 
practices by analysing Akomfrah’s documentary-essay, The Nine Muses. I have based my 
discussion of this film mainly on Steyerl’s and Marks’s ideas about the expressive and the 
affective dimensions of documentaries. Through a close reading of various sequences, and 
focusing mainly on the form and stylistic features of Akomfrah’s film, my aim has been to 
make the point that documentary films about migration have the potential to articulate a 
political critique and thus undermine social, cultural and political hierarchies. I have claimed 
that these films can articulate such a criticism by means of what they express with their form. 
This means that the political potentiality of a film resides not so much in its ideological 
content, at the level of text and representation, but more in the manner in which it is put 
together. Documentaries about migration that, like The Nine Muses, show a narrative that 
does not have an overt closure and a form that is open, are able to invite the viewer to 
become an active participant in determining the meaning of the film. Such films have 
political potential for they can engage the viewers also affectively. This in turn means that 
rather than indoctrinating spectators with a certain ready-made point of view, these films can 
produce embodied sensorial responses incentivising them to interpret and appropriate the 
narrative. In so doing, these documentaries are able to put into question the power relations 
that inevitably emerge between those represented and those with the power to represent. And 
instead, new political relationships based on equality are thus created between the filmed 
subjects, the filmmakers and the spectators. Here two questions surface. One is the question 
of whether spectators really become involved with the film, and second is to what extent they 
need to participate so that the documentary actualises its political potential and disrupts 
hierarchies. However, I believe it suffices to conclude that even though there is the chance for 
viewers to not be engaged and actively participate in determining the meaning of a film, the 
fact that a documentary film offers viewers with the option of being active participants, 
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already leaves the door open for the formation of alternative political (and ethical) 
relationships that can subvert current hierarchies. These ethical and political relationships are 
not directly sanctioned by the nation-state, and thus they are not governed by geo-political 
borders.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
I. 
Documentary films about border-crossings and migration can function as alternative 
spaces for politics and political relations. In drawing on Azoulay’s theoretical 
approach to photography, my undertaking here has been to show that it is possible to 
transpose her triadic model of the photographic event to the documentary form, and 
thus understand this form as having the potential to create a domain of political and 
ethical relationships that escape the direct sanction of the nation-state and its 
sovereign power. I have also argued that since these alternative relationships are 
based on solidarity and partnership and since they assume the equality of the 
individuals involved, these are relationships that actualize the ethics and politics of 
hospitality in the sense that Derrida understands the latter. In this way, this work maps 
out a theoretical framework or a toolkit for thinking documentary films in terms of 
their political dimension, as well as for thinking politics, citizenship and migration in 
ways that are not limited to the parameters of the nation-state. 
II. A Politics of No-Borders? 
Chapter 1 dealt with the question of how the border operates as an institution of class 
differentiation and violence that exercises its power beyond its mere geographical 
location. I then presented Derrida’s proposal of the ethics and politics of hospitality as 
an alternative and productive approach to the questions posed by undocumented 
migration and stateless people. I argued with Derrida that the concept of hospitality 
provides a perspective that allows us to see that politics and ethics, calculation and the 
incalculable, the conditional and the unconditional are two opposing but inseparable 
domains that need to work together, supplementing each other. This perspective of 
hospitality offers the chance to conceive of politics and political relationships in a 
way that is independent from the direct mediation and regulation of the nation-state, 
and hence in a way that is deterritorialised. We need to find ways to relate to other 
individuals neither on the basis of resemblance and identification nor on the basis of 
the places and functions that we have been assigned by the social order, but on the 
basis of alterity and also solidarity, partnership, responsibility and equality towards 
others. If we do this, then the emergence of forms of political bonds not directly 
sanctioned by an ongoing form of national sovereignty seems possible. Here Derrida 
is not referring to relationships that can emerge between people in different nations, 
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for surely friendships and work collaborations take place across borders. The kinds of 
relationships that he is endorsing are relationships founded on political and ethical 
responsibility for other individuals not because that is what the national-state demands 
as one of our duties as members or citizens of such state, but because we as 
individuals can show concern for others and take action accordingly regardless of the 
citizenship status that the latter might have.  
Derrida proposes these political and ethical relationships falling outside the 
framework of the nation-state as an alternative way to approach both the problems 
posed by undocumented migrants, refugees and stateless people and national borders, 
as well as the concept of politics. However, his thesis of hospitality could seem 
problematic if it was taken to mean as a proposal that all national borders be 
eliminated. Would it be realistic to defend a world without geo-political borders? I 
believe that Derrida would not endorse such a proposal, for he has said that absolute 
hospitality is impossible and also not desirable. Likewise, Derrida has acknowledged 
the fact that a complete disappearance of nation-states and their borders would mean 
allowing capital and global markets to rule freely without any restrictions. Today we 
witness alongside the ‘homogenization, market unification, the permeability of 
frontiers [and] the speed and power of transnational communication, [an 
unprecedented number of] victims of inequality and repression.’1 A total erosion of 
national boundaries would most likely make inequality gaps larger still. Indeed, it 
seems that at least some form of national sovereign power is required to avoid the 
absolute rule of capital over all human activities and exchanges. The question of a 
world with no borders has no simple answers, and thus calls for a multi-disciplinary 
and comprehensive enquiry. As outlined in the introduction, this dissertation is a 
contribution to a much broader discussion that would necessarily include, amongst 
others, a detailed engagement with the economic features and infrastructures of 
today’s globalised markets that shape and underpin migration as well as many other 
human interactions.  
In considering Derrida’s thesis of the necessity to find forms of political 
relationships that do not exclude alterity and that are not determined by the 
framework of the nation-state, I suggested that Azoulay’s theory of the political 
relations that emerge through photography can be understood as exemplifying 
                                                
1 Derrida, ‘What Does it Mean to be a French Philosopher Today?,’ in Paper Machine, pp.112-120 
(p.117). 
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Derrida’s ideas. In Chapter 2 I explained that the significance of Azoulay’s triadic 
model of photography to the field is that it presents an understanding of the practice 
of photography that differs from the common approach that reduces it to an 
interaction of power relations between an active person as owner of the means and 
powers of representation, and a passive viewer who lacks the latter. Instead, Azoulay 
proposes we look at the photographic encounter between photographer, photographed 
subjects and spectators (actual or potential) as inaugurating a space of political 
relations founded on solidarity and partnership. These three parties take part as equals 
in the determination of the meaning of the photograph, which means that the 
photographer does not have exclusive control over the image and that the latter is 
never a finished and fixed product. Because every photographic encounter can 
produce a different meaning that bypasses the photographer's original intention, 
photography for Azoulay constitutes an open and always evolving set of practices 
where there is no single or ultimate authority. What is unique in Azoulay's theory of 
photography is that it grants both the photographed subject and the spectator an active 
role. The person portrayed in a situation of 'regime-made disaster'2 or 'on the verge of 
catastrophe'3 appeals to a potential viewer to air her grievances. The viewer, in turn, 
as an addressee of these grievances reads the photograph as an emergency statement 
that calls for the urgent reparation of the harm and suffering of the photographed 
subject. In this way, the photographic encounter creates a citizenry of sorts, a 
community of equality and plurality established by a hypothetical civil contract that 
binds individuals primarily through a duty toward one another, rather than a duty 
toward the national sovereign.  
I have linked Azoulay's thesis of the political relationships of photography to 
Derrida's ideas on hospitality. My argument has been that her proposal can be seen as 
exemplifying Derrida's ethics and politics of hospitality insofar as the political bonds 
created through the photographic encounter are neither directly mediated by the 
nation-state nor restricted to national borders and citizenship status. Since such 
political bonds are based on solidarity, partnership and equality then they can be seen 
as relationships of hospitality. Nonetheless, I have also shown that the 
conceptualization of citizenship that Azoulay derives form her triadic model of 
photography is problematic, for it seems to imply a utopian, idealised, notion of 
                                                
2 Azoulay, Civil Imagination, p.1.  
3 Azoulay, Civil Contract, pp.290-291. 
 238 
citizenship that is granted to anyone and everyone and that eliminates the sovereign 
power altogether. Undoubtedly, Derrida's thesis of unconditional hospitality and the 
total unrestricted reception of the other might seem romantic. But, as I have 
explained, even though absolute hospitality is unrealisable and cannot be actualised in 
laws, he proposes that the politics of hospitality is a constant exercise of improving 
the laws, an ongoing effort to make less bad laws, laws that do less violence to the 
other, laws that are more in accordance to absolute hospitality. The case I have made 
here is that Azoulay’s conception of citizenship provides a solid starting point to 
rethink this concept not merely as a membership that grants duties and rights within a 
territory, but as a form of relating to other individuals. But if this alternative form of 
relationship is seen as an example of hospitality, then there is no need to postulate 
imaginary citizenries as Azoulay does. Further discussion on alternative ways of 
understanding citizenship is another area toward which this critical project could be 
expanded.   
In my analysis of Azoulay’s triadic model of photography I have shown that 
her understanding of the political as the result of human interactions, and hence as a 
collective practice that does not exclude or oppose the aesthetic shares similarities 
with Rancière’s ideas on the relation between politics and aesthetics. Contrasting the 
positions of these two scholars has allowed me to deepen my discussion of Azoulay’s 
notion of politics. They both defend a conceptualization of the political as a 
communal exercise. Azoulay’s proposal that photography can produce political bonds 
based on solidarity and equality seems to be in line with Rancière’s claim that politics 
is a collective action that consists on an assumption and enactment of equality. 
Indeed, the thesis that the photographer, the spectator and the photographed subject 
are equally active participants in the photographic event mirrors Rancière’s view that 
politics is a process through which spectators and the artist dis-identify from their 
roles and functions assigned by the social order, and thereby artist and spectators 
emerge as equals. However, Azoulay argues against Rancière that the political does 
not produce a change within the hierarchies of the social order. For her, it is only 
through the engagement of the civil skill and intention that a political relationship can 
really disrupt social and political hierarchies. By comparing Rancière’s views with 
Azoulay’s thesis that all human interactions are political, I have shown that her 
position seems to dilute the sense of what political action is. For, if all interactions are 
political, it seems hard to distinguish human interactions with the potential to disrupt 
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power relations and social hierarchies from those that lack this potential. What is 
more, Azoulay’s distinction between the civil and the political only appears to 
complicate both concepts. By contrast, Rancière’s view clearly delimits what politics 
is by specifying under what circumstances a human encounter is political. There is no 
need for Rancière to add the dimension of the civil (as separate from the political) in 
order to explain how political relationships make evident the contingent character of 
social hierarchies and are based on the principle of equality. The discussion about the 
link between politics and the civil is an extensive one, and it thus requires further 
analysis beyond the ideas proposed by Azoulay and Rancière.  
I have placed these two authors in conversation here because they both 
underscore the connection between art and politics, and because I believe Rancière’s 
ideas clarify and often improve those of Azoulay. My aim in this thesis has been to 
demonstrate that Azoulay’s thesis that photographic encounters have the potential to 
create a space of political bonds can be transposed to documentary films about 
migration and border-crossings. For this reason, the work of Rancière seems relevant 
to the analysis of the political potential of the documentary, for he thinks there is a 
political dimension in art as well as an aesthetic dimension in politics. The way in 
which aesthetics is related to politics is yet another vast area of study that exceeds the 
limits of this thesis and that requires extensive discussion, especially in the light of the 
constant changes that artistic forms adopt due to the innovations in technology and the 
emergence of new media.  
III. Transpositions and Interactions. 
The medium of film and the medium of photography share similarities but they are 
also significantly different. To be sure, the moving images, temporality and sound 
effects present in (documentary) film but not in the medium of photography affect the 
way in which the filmmaker, the subjects filmed and the spectators might relate to one 
another as well as the way in which they each take part in the articulation of the 
meaning of the film. I have explored these distinct aspects of the documentary and 
discussed to what extent Azoulay’s proposal can be extended to this film form by 
examining three recent documentaries dealing with migration. In this sense, this thesis 
does not present an exhaustive history of documentaries about borders and migration, 
but it provides a foundation for studying these films under the perspective of their 
potential for creating political relations that are not directly sanctioned and mediated 
by the national sovereign.    
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Drawing on the work of Trinh and Steyerl, in Chapter 3 I have claimed that 
the form or the stylistic features of the documentary crucially determine the way in 
which spectators might become involved with the film. These two documentary 
theorists agree in that for the meaning of a documentary to have political effects it 
needs to avoid being immediately fixed or stabilized. When the documentary’s 
meaning remains open and refuses to have a single final source of authority, it gives 
space for the viewer to participate in making sense of the film. Both Trinh and Steyerl 
argue that when the documentary has a self-reflexive form in the sense that it does not 
aim to conceal or deny its own artifice or constructed quality, it invites spectators to 
question and actively engage with the film. This can only be so, as Trinh well 
observes, when self-reflexivity is not used exclusively as an aesthetic technique, when 
self-reflexivity is used to question the film’s assumptions and to prevent its meaning 
from reaching a final closure. I have taken cue from this idea of the open form of 
documentary in order to suggest how spectators might adopt an active role and thus 
become equal participants with the filmmaker. Even though Azoulay does not speak 
of a particular form or a quality that photographs need to present in order to produce 
political relationships based on partnership and solidarity, I believe that Trinh’s and 
Steyerl’s remarks help make clear the way in which spectators might become 
involved with the particular medium of documentary.  
I have also drawn on Rancière’s idea of the emancipated spectator to explain 
how the blurring of functions between the filmmaker and the spectators can take place 
through documentaries, and hence how the disruption of hierarchies of the social 
order can occur. My claim has been that, as Rancière explains, the artist (the 
filmmaker in this case) needs to renounce her attempt to enlighten or emancipate 
spectators and instead assume a position of equality with the latter by offering the 
film as an open sphere for collective intervention and the sharing of knowledges. And 
even though it is not possible to anticipate or predict the degree of involvement that a 
spectator might adopt -- for this is always a matter of her own choice, the 
documentary needs to invite and open up a space for the spectator to have the option 
to partake in the determination of the meaning of the film. Here, a connection 
between the cinematic cut, Derrida’s understanding of politics and Rancière’s notion 
of politics emerges. The filmmaker makes choices, sets limits to the form and content 
of the film. Like in Derridian politics, the filmmaker takes decisions that are 
ungrounded; her decisions cannot predict the spectator’s response. The filmmaker 
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thus can only act as a host; through her decisions she invites spectators and filmed 
subjects to become actively engaged in determining the meaning of the film. 
Remaining open to the arrival of the absolute other, the filmmaker also opens up the 
possibility of multiple meanings of the film and hence of a new social order, a 
redistribution of the sensible, as Rancière would say. Following Trinh and Steyerl, I 
have explained that it is the self-reflexive form of the documentary, and not so much 
its content, that provides this open space for the reception of the radical other. The 
documentary, in this sense, has the potentiality to become a space for political 
relationships that are based on equality and that escape the regulation of the national 
sovereign. The documentary can, in other words, function as a space for relationships 
of hospitality.   
I have used three different documentaries as my case studies in order to 
explore the transposition of Azoulay’s model of photography to documentary films 
about migration and border-crossings. The form, the stylistic qualities and the way in 
which these films have been made has allowed me to focus my analysis on the roles 
that filmmakers, filmed subjects and spectators have in each film. Through these case 
studies I have also analysed the possibility of extrapolating Azoulay’s theses to other 
geographical political contexts beyond Palestine, which is the one upon which 
Azoulay centres her discussion on photography. By looking at documentaries 
portraying the experience of migration through different approaches, I have argued 
that her theory can also be used to think about today’s phenomenon of migration in 
terms of political and ethical relationships not restricted to the framework of national 
borders. 
My analysis of Nkosi’s documentary, Border Farm, has allowed me to take 
issue with the question of the way and extent to which the filmed subjects can be 
considered as playing an active part within a documentary. I have discussed whether 
the involvement of these subjects in the making of a documentary can be so that they 
become equals with the filmmaker and thus subvert the hierarchical distinction 
between those with the power and means of representation and those who lack this 
power. My claim here has been that even when these hierarchies cannot be 
completely dismantled, documentaries like Border Farm do have the capacity to 
subtly challenge the functions and places assigned by the social order. 
Through Shout and The Nine Muses I have explored in greater depth the ways 
in which spectators might engage with the films and thus adopt a position of equality 
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with both the filmmaker and the filmed subjects. When spectators become thus 
involved, they appropriate the narrative and create their own fictions. And this is 
possible only when the documentarist acts as a host and, instead of attempting to 
educate spectators, opens the space for the latter to participate actively. The degree of 
involvement a spectator can take is never fixed and, as Rancière observes, it cannot be 
predicted. It is always open to the spectator to decide whether and to what extent she 
takes responsibility for the images she is presented with and if she reads them as calls 
to take action to modify the situation of the subjects portrayed.  
In close relation to the issue of the engagement of spectators is the question of 
the ethics of spectatorship. I have claimed that the political and ethical relationships 
that can be created by documentaries about migration are not based on charity, but on 
hospitality, an unconditional commitment towards the other as an equal. The notion of 
charity tends to reinforce, rather than challenge, existing social hierarchies and 
boundaries whilst claiming to mediate between these. Thus, a notion of the ethics of 
spectatorship needs to acknowledge this. More specifically, as I indicated in the 
introduction, further analysis might be carried out on the economic structures and 
national discourses underpinning the funding of filmmaking projects by charitable 
organisations and NGOs in order to understand the relationships between spectators 
and filmed subjects. 
 Through The Nine Muses I have discussed how temporality and sound -- 
elements that are not present in the medium of photography -- intervene in the 
responses of spectators. I have argued that these two dimensions shape the 
engagement of the spectator at the level of affect, the level of embodied sensorial 
responses. This, I have said, further complicates the forms and degrees in which 
spectators engage with documentaries, and this also suggests the need of more 
empirical exploration as regards the ways in which spectators respond to films as well 
as the ways they relate to the filmmaker and the subjects filmed. In this sense, the 
question of the relation between affect and politics is not just about the ways in which 
power uses affects or affective modulation to govern and control populations, but also 
about the way in which affects can give rise to political relationships that can 
challenge the social order. This is yet another topic that calls for more research.    
A study into the forms of interaction between filmmakers, subjects filmed and 
spectators that are allowed by new technologies today is, likewise, an issue for further 
study. The emergence of web-documentaries, for instance, has given viewers the 
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opportunity to have more control over and a greater contribution to the narrative of 
the film, and hence a different form of engagement with it. To be sure, this opens the 
door to new and perhaps more equal forms of relationship between the filmmaker, the 
filmed subjects and the viewers. Can this interactive technology produce a complete 
disruption of the hierarchies of documentary representation? 4  Even though the 
scholarship on webdocumentary is still in its early days, this question points to a 
further area of study towards which my study of the possible political relations 
created through documentaries can be directed.   
This thesis provides a starting point and a groundwork to think about the 
documentary film form under the light of its political potential and also, necessarily, 
under the light of its ethical dimension. In other words, this work shows how and to 
which degree political and ethical relationships, and hence political theory, are not 
outside or beyond the visual medium of documentary, but inherent to it. This 
approach to documentary has implications to many other areas of study such as 
citizenship and border studies, migration studies, aesthetics and politics, participatory 
and interactive art, among others. These links to further areas of scholarship remain to 
be explored particularly in the light of new technologies that have changed, and are 
still changing, the ways in which documentaries are made, watched, consumed and 
circulated. Documentaries in this sense are like borders. They are spaces of in-
betweeness and mediation, in-between fact and fiction; but also spaces for the 
confluence of many questions and areas of study.  
                                                
4 See Nash, ‘Modes of Interactivity: Analyzing the Webdoc,’ in Media, Culture and Society, Vol. 34, 
No. 2 (2012), pp.195-210, <http://mcs.sagepub.com/content/34/2/195> [accessed 25th November 
2013]. 
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